UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ___________________________________ ) PATRICK CHRISTIAN, ) ) Civil Action No. 24-cv-02696 (APM) Plaintiff, ) Consolidated with No. 24-cv-02386 (APM) ) v. ) ) WASHINGTON DISTRICT ) OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendant the District of Columbia’s Motion to Dismiss
(“MTD”), and supporting Memorandum (“MTD Mem.”), collectively ECF No. 9. For the reasons
stated below, the court grants the District’s Motion and dismisses this matter in full.
BACKGROUND
Patrick Christian, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), filed this matter on
September 23, 2024. See generally Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. The Complaint is not a
model of clarity. As best understood, Christian alleges that, on August 14, 2024, he received a
barring order prohibiting him from entry at all D.C. Public Library (“DCPL”) locations for one
year. See id. at 5; MTD Ex. 1 (Barring Order, Aug. 14, 2024) (“Barring Ord.”), ECF No. 9-1. He
contends that this ban was instituted when, while visiting Woodridge Library, he spoke out
“against children being raped in the public library[.]” Compl. at 5; Pl.’s Opp’n to MTD (“Opp’n”),
ECF No. 11, at 1. As a result, Christian’s “computer usage” in the District’s “resources centers”
has been reduced, and worse yet, his privacy has allegedly been infringed because he has been
“hacked and interfered with,” threatened, stalked, and “cyberstalked.” Compl. at 4–5. Because Christian has been unable to check his email, he has been prevented from running as a write-in
candidate for the 2024 U.S. presidential election, and also has struggled to secure housing and
employment. See id. at 4–5, 7. He contends that the District and its officials conspired to render
him “incommunicado,” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983(3), and have contravened their public
duties, in violation of his right of the “pursuit of happiness,” the “double jeopardy” clause, the
Ninth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 4–5. He demands $1,150,000 in
damages. See id. at 5.
In response to the Complaint, on April 4, 2025, the District filed the pending Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See MTD Mem. at 2. On April 7,
2025, the Court issued an Order, ECF No. 10, directing Christian to respond to the Motion to
Dismiss by May 7, 2025, and advising him of the risks of failing to comply, see id. at 1 (citing
Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). On April 16, 2025, Christian
filed an Opposition, and on April 23, 2025, the District filed its Reply, ECF No. 13.
Then, on April 29, 2025, Christian filed a Surreply (“SR”), ECF No. 14, without first
seeking the Court’s leave to do so. Neither the court’s Local Rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide the right to file a surreply; indeed, surreplies “are rarely permitted, and only
when a party is ‘unable to contest matters presented to the court for the first time in the last
scheduled pleading.” Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 119, 130 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
Ben–Kotel v. Howard Univ., 319 F.3d 532, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, given Christian’s pro se status, the Court grants him leave to file the Surreply,
and it has considered the submission. See Brown v Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., 789 F.3d
146, 15152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“a district court errs in failing to consider a pro se
litigant’s complaint ‘in light of’ all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss”).
2 LEGAL STANDARD
Failure to State a Claim
A plaintiff need only provide a short and plain statement of his claim showing that he is
entitled to relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The court “must construe
the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(per curiam) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1088 (2013); Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same). However, “the [C]ourt need not accept
inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the
complaint.” Id. Nor must the court accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” or
“naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements,” are not sufficient to state a claim. Id. Although a pro se complaint
“must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it still “must plead ‘factual matter’ that
permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct,’” Atherton
v. Dist. of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678–79).
3 In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court may consider the
facts alleged in the complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters
of which a court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record. See EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Frivolous Claims
A claim that lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a court shall dismiss such claim “when the facts alleged
rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992), or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi v. Holland,
655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly held
that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if
they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.” Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (mandating dismissal of frivolous
claims brought by IFP plaintiffs).
DISCUSSION
The District argues that Christian “fails to state a plausible claim for relief under any of his
claims.” MTD Mem. at 1. The court agrees, addressing the claims below seriatim.
Threats, Hacking, Cyber Stalking, and Stalking Claims
The District argues that Christian’s vague assertions that he suffered infringement of his
right to privacy due to threats, hacking, stalking, and cyberstalking do not sufficiently state a claim,
see MTD Mem. at 6. Upon review of the allegations, the court finds that, not only does Christian
fall short of stating a claim, but the allegations presented are patently frivolous, see Lewis v. Bayh,
577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Courts have held that claims alleging, without any
4 evidence, that the defendants hacked a plaintiff’s computer and tapped a plaintiff’s phone are
frivolous.”) (collecting cases).
The court finds no merit in Christian’s dubious allegations that unnamed bad actors
associated with the District have somehow infiltrated his private affairs, electronically or
otherwise. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Comey, 300 F. Supp. 3d 158, 168–69 (D.D.C. 2018)
(dismissing claims as frivolous where the plaintiffs alleged that government officials hacked their
cell phones and computers), aff’d, 752 Fed. Appx. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Juste v.
Resident Agency Martinsburg, 153 F. Supp. 3d 242, 244–45 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing claims
against the District and its officials as frivolous where the plaintiff alleged that the defendants
stalked him and maliciously prosecuted him); Jordan v. Quander, 882 F. Supp. 2d 88, 97–98
(D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing claims as frivolous due to the plaintiff’s “vague and unsupported
allegations of harassment, threats, assaults and government surveillance”) (collecting cases);
Roum v. Fenty, 697 F. Supp. 2d 39, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing claims as frivolous based on
a purported government conspiracy where the defendants allegedly tapped the plaintiff’s phones,
monitored conversations, tracked him, and surveilled him); Newby v. Obama, 681 F. Supp. 2d 53,
55–56 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing claims of government surveillance and stalking as frivolous).
Accordingly, these claims are dismissed as frivolous.
Section 1985(3) Claims
Section 1985(3) affords a cause of action against two or more persons who participate in a
conspiracy motivated by class-based discriminatory animus. Atherton, 567 F.3d at 688. The
D.C. Circuit has further explained that,
[t]o state a claim under § 1985(3), [a plaintiff must] allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, . . . and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
5 (4) whereby a person is either injured in her [or his] person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. The statute does not apply to all conspiratorial tortious interferences with the rights of others, but only those motivated by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.
Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96–102 (1971); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237,
258 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (other citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). So, for a plaintiff to
state a §1985 claim, he must first allege the elements of civil conspiracy, including: ‘an agreement
to take part in an unlawful action or a lawful action in an unlawful manner.’” Barr v. Clinton, 370
F.3d 1196, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Clinton, 285 F.3d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
“A civil conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more people to participate in an
unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner.” Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 51 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam), rev’d in part on other grounds, Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
787 F.3d 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Christian fails at the outset. In his briefing, he repeats iterations of the words “conspiracy”
and “conspirators,” see Opp’n at 2; SR at 1, but merely saying those words does not make it so.
See Brady v. Livingood, 360 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2004) (“A plaintiff must set forth more
than just conclusory allegations of an agreement to sustain a claim of conspiracy against a motion
to dismiss.”). Christian does not set forth any indicia of collusion, for example, an agreement
sufficient to trigger conspiratorial liability, or any “events, conversations, or documents indicating
that there was ever an agreement or meeting of the minds” between the District and another party.
Indeed, Christian does not identify the parties with whom the District purportedly conspired.
See Barber v. Dist. of Columbia Gov’t, 394 F. Supp. 3d 49, 65–66 (D.D.C. 2019). His puzzling
allegations that “[e]verywhere he goes everyone cooperates or conspires, due to the Principals,
they are either a Politician or an Entertainer[,]” and that he “has been experiencing this Civil
6 Rights Conspiracy for 17 years now,” see SR at 1, fail to “raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of [an] illegal agreement[,]” and, at best, are insufficient “bare
assertions,” see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 556.
Assuming Christian were successful in pleading the first element of a § 1985(3) claim, he
does not satisfy the second element either––he does not adequately allege that the conspiracy, if
any, was motivated by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. In his briefing,
Christian briefly insinuates that he was discriminated against “for being a heterosexual in a
predominantly homosexual or as they say ‘acronym’ City[.]” See SR at 2; Opp’n at 1. But these
allegations are so ambiguous that they fail to “set forth even conclusory assertions that would
support a finding of class-based animus.” See Mittleman v. U.S. Treasury, 773 F. Supp. 442, 449
(D.D.C. 1991) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim because the plaintiff’s “bare allegation toward the end
of her complaint that she was a victim of gender bias clearly [was] not enough to survive a motion
to dismiss”).
For all of these reasons, Christian has failed to state a § 1985(3) claim and those claims are
dismissed.
Monell Claims
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a private cause of action may exist against a municipality or
individual that, under color of state law, deprives an individual of a federal constitutional or
statutory right. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–94
(1978); Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004). A municipality may be
held liable under § 1983 only “where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at
issue,” because municipalities cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees via
7 respondeat superior liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989) (same).
To state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a predicate
constitutional violation, and (2) that a custom or policy of the municipality caused that violation.
See Baker v. Dist. of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
A. First Prong, Predicate Constitutional Violation
1. Pursuit of Happiness
First, Christian alleges that the District violated his right to pursue happiness. See Compl.
at 4. The concept of the “pursuit of happiness” is “derived from the Declaration of
Independence[,]” which “does not grant rights that may be pursued through the judicial system.”
Morris v. Off. of Person. Mgmt., No. 20-0016, 2021 WL 2188143, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 2021)
(citing cases). Accordingly, Christian’s pursuit of happiness cannot be raised as a predicate
constitutional violation.
2. Ninth Amendment
Second, Christian alleges that the District violated the Ninth Amendment. See Compl. at
4. The Ninth Amendment establishes that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX.
But this claim is facially invalid because the Ninth Amendment “is a rule of construction, not a
substantive basis for a civil rights claim.” Rynn v. Jaffe, 457 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2006)
(explaining that a plaintiff cannot “cite the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to support
a § 1983 action”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 851 n.20 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Ninth Amendment is an “obvious example” of a constitutional
provision that “are not readily construed as protecting rights that belong to individuals”);
8 Marshall v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 1996) (dismissing Ninth Amendment claim
because it “does not set forth any particular guarantees, but is merely a rule of construction”). In
other words, Christian cannot “independently assert a cause of action under the Ninth
Amendment.” Slaby v. Fairbridge, 3 F. Supp. 2d 22, 30 (D.D.C. 1998); Robinson v. Pilgram, No.
20-cv-2965, 2021 WL 5987016, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2021) (same), aff’d, No. 22-5001, 2022
WL 3009621 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 28, 2022) (per curiam); see Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No.
23-cv-02298, 2023 WL 8600569, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2023) (holding that there is no private
cause of action “to enforce the Ninth Amendment”) (citing Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211,
218 (2011)). Accordingly, the Ninth Amendment does not afford a cognizable predicate
constitutional violation in this action.
3. Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments
Third, Christian alleges that the District violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Compl.
at 4. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1).
As discussed by the District, see MTD Mem. at 6 n.3, neither the District nor its officials
may be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment because the District of Columbia is not a
State. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Propert v. Dist. of Columbia, 948 F.2d
1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 200 F. Supp. 3d 104, 107 (D.D.C.
2016), aff’d, 686 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Because the protections of the
9 Fifth Amendment instead extend to the District of Columbia, the Court will construe Christian’s
Fourteenth Amendment claims thereunder. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498–99.
While Christian is not obligated to prove a prima facie case at this stage, he must at least
set forth enough information to provide notice of the nature and grounds of his intended claims.
The Complaint does not identify which of his Fifth Amendment rights were allegedly violated,
and as discussed, his bare assertions are “not entitled to be assumed true,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682.
Given this lack of clarity, the Court finds that the Complaint fails outright “to articulate adequately
the deprivation of a protected right” under the Fifth Amendment. See Melton v. Dist. of Columbia,
85 F. Supp. 3d 183, 193 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 2015 WL 9012019 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 2015) (per
curiam).
Christian later references his right to equal protection in his briefing, see Opp’n at 1, and
potentially, his right to due process, see id. at 4. Even quite generously supposing that Christian
hinted at equal protection or due process violations in his Complaint, he has still failed to state a
predicate constitutional violation for either type of infringement.
If Christian is raising a due process claim, it is unclear if the alleged violation was
procedural or substantive. Procedural due process requires ‘the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’ when an individual is deprived of liberty or property
interests.” Robinson v. WMATA, 167 F. Supp. 3d 118, 130 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)); see Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d
524, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A procedural due process violation occurs when an official deprives
an individual of a liberty or property interest without providing appropriate procedural
protections.”) (quoting Atherton, 567 F.3d at 689).
10 Courts have held that access to a public library is a protected right. See Armstrong,
154 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (collecting cases); Miller v. NW Region Libr. Bd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570
(M.D.N.C. 2004) (same) (citing Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 958
F.2d 1242, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1992); Neinast v. Bd. of Trustees of the Columbus Metro. Library, 346
F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2003); Armstrong, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 75); see also Wayfield v. Town of
Tisbury, 925 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that suspension of “library privileges is
an occurrence important enough to warrant due process protection”); Nappi v. Timberline Reg.
Libr., No. C14–5945, 2015 WL 3936308, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 2015) (“Arguably, the
suspension of library privileges involves a cognizable liberty interest”); Doyle v. Clark County
Pub. Library, No. C-3-07-0003, 2007 WL 2407051, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2007) (same);
Grant-Davis v. Bd. of Trustees of Charleston County Pub. Libr., No. 15-cv-2676, 2017 WL
9360875, at * 24 (D.S.C. May 24, 2017) (recognizing liberty interest but noting “that it is not
absolute–it can be lost for engaging in conduct inconsistent with the purpose of public libraries”)
(quoting Doyle, 2007 WL 2407051, at *5; Hunt v. Wise, No. 8:07-cv-1168, 2009 WL 2163108, at
* 6 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2009) (recognizing restrictions for use of a public library when an
individual “acted in a threatening manner”)), R&R adopted, 2017 WL 3634070 (D.S.C. Aug. 24,
2017), aff’d, 710 Fed. Appx. 134 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
However, Christian has not identified any process that he was allegedly due, or how the
District denied him any such process. “This alone is fatal to his claim.” See Slovinec v.
Georgetown Univ., 268 F. Supp. 3d 55, 60 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d, No. 17–7122, 2018 WL 1052650
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 2018) (per curiam). Moreover, it appears that the District complied with its
obligation to provide procedural due process. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the given situation demands. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. Here, DCPL’s barring
11 notice provides clear instructions for appealing the decision––by submitting a written request for
administrative review to the mailing address or email address provided. See Barring Ord. at 1; see
also 19 DCMR § 810.4 (memorializing same). Because Christian was afforded the “essential
requirement” of due process, i.e., “notice and an opportunity to respond[,]” he has failed to state a
procedural due process claim. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985);
see also Slovinec, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 60–61 (dismissing due process claim and finding that report
barring the plaintiff from Georgetown University’s campus for “inappropriate” and “disruptive”
behavior provided adequate notice of how to contest the decision); Bigelow v. Lindsay, No. 84–
3302, 1986 WL 15274, at *5 (D.D.C. Jul. 30, 1986) (dismissing due process claim where the
plaintiff “did not seek review of the Housing Board’s decision . . . and ha[d] not advanced any
allegations . . . to show that the Housing Board’s decision was in bad faith or pretextual”) (citing
Crosby-Bey v. District of Columbia, 786 F.2d 1182, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam)).
Christian fares no better if his Fifth Amendment claim is construed as alleging a substantive
due process violation. “[S]ubstantive due process forbids only ‘egregious government
misconduct,’ involving state officials guilty of ‘grave unfairness’ so severe that it constitutes either
‘a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus,’ or ‘a deliberate
flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or property rights[.]’” Zevallos v. Obama,
793 F.3d 106, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting George Wash. Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d
203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Municipal
officials must have engaged in alleged behavior “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Estate of Phillips v. District of Columbia, 455 F.3d
397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998));
see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). The D.C. Circuit has further
12 explained that “the concept of substantive due process, itself oxymoronic, [applies] to actions that
in their totality are genuinely drastic . . . [U]nless the victim of government imposition has pushed
its local remedies to the hilt, it ordinarily will not be able to show the necessary substantiality.”
Tri County Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal
citation omitted). Here, the actions alleged in the Complaint simply do not qualify as egregious
conduct that “shocks the conscience.” See Phillips, 455 F.3d at 403; see Psychas v. Dist. Dep’t of
Transp., No. 18-0081, 2019 WL 4644503 at *17–*18 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2019) (collecting cases
where substantive due process claims have been dismissed for objectively far more serious
conduct); see also Upton v. County of San Bernardino, No. 23-1691, 2024 WL 5465058, at *3–4
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2024) (dismissing substantive due process claim because the defendants’
actions in temporarily banning the plaintiff from the public library failed to shock the conscience),
R&R adopted, 2025 WL 1918881 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 11, 2025); Doyle, 2007 WL 2407051, at *4 (“The
Supreme Court has never identified a substantive due process right of access to a public library.”).
Accordingly, the court finds that Christian has failed to set forth a predicate violation of his right
to substantive due process. See Melton, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (“Events may not have unfolded as
Plaintiff wished, but his dissatisfaction . . . do[es] not form a basis for a due process violation.”).
Insofar as Christian has alleged an equal protection violation, he has also failed to state a
claim. The District is required to ‘treat similarly situated persons alike . . . by virtue of the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.’” Robinson, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 107 n.3 (quoting
Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1996));
see Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498–500 (same). Christian must allege facts showing that he “was subject
to differential treatment because of membership in a protected class,” or that “he was arbitrarily
and intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly situated—and the government
13 has no rational basis for the disparity.” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F. Supp. 3d 142,
158 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted) (citing Kelley, 893 F. Supp.
at 122; Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564–565 (2000) (per curiam)).
Again, the Complaint does not plausibly state an equal protection claim. As discussed
above, Christian’s references in briefing to “being a heterosexual,” see Opp’n at 1; SR at 2, do not
include even the most nominal facts or context from which discrimination, based on his sexual
orientation or otherwise, may be discerned, apart from this singular generalization. See Atherton,
567 F.3d at 687–88. (finding the pro se plaintiff’s equal protection claim based on “spare facts and
allegations” inadequately pleaded); Colbert v. Metro. Police Dep’t, Dist. 5, 404 Fed. App’x 509,
509 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“The district court properly dismissed appellant’s complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to support a claim of discrimination.”); Hodge v. U.S. Postal Serv., 161 Fed. App’x
19, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of equal protection claim where the
complaint failed to “allege facts indicating . . . that the alleged actions were undertaken on a
discriminatory basis or were motivated by discriminatory intent or purpose”).
Finally, Christian fails to adequately plead a claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments for the same
criminal offense. United States v. Little, 123 F.4th 1360, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)); see U.S. Const. amend. V. Although
Christian references a “1996 felony,” see Compl. at 4, he pleads no details regarding this crime, or
his prosecution or conviction arising therefrom, or its connection, if any, to DCPL’s barring order.
Nor is a second criminal prosecution alleged; indeed, as noted by the District, Christian’s “ban
from DC public libraries is not an action to which the Double Jeopardy Clause applies, nor does
14 he explain otherwise.” MTD Mem. at 11. In his briefing, Christian appears to concede this point.
See Opp’n at 3 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply[.]”).
For all of these reasons, Christian has failed to state a predicate double jeopardy violation
under the Fifth Amendment. See Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia, 606 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C.
2009) (dismissing double jeopardy claim because the plaintiff’s “contention in this complaint
appears to be based on confusion between a criminal sentence or punishment, and other adverse
actions by a governmental authority that do not amount to criminal punishment.”).
* * *
All told, the court finds that Christian has failed to sufficiently allege a single predicate
violation of a protected right, and his Monell claims against the District fail at the first prong. But
even if Christian had sufficiently set forth a predicate constitutional violation, he has failed to
sufficiently allege causation by the District, falling short of the second Monell prong, as explained
below.
B. Second Prong, Causation by the Municipality
To satisfy the second prong of a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality
(1) “explicitly adopted the policy that was the moving force of the constitutional violation”;
(2) “knowingly ignore[d] a practice that was consistent enough to constitute custom”; or (3) failed
to “respond[ ] to a need . . . in such a manner as to show deliberate indifference to the risk that not
addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.” Warren, 353 F.3d at 39 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may also succeed by alleging that an authorized
municipal policymaker made a one-time decision that resulted in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. See Singletary v. Dist. of Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Put differently,
“municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow
15 a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible
for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); see Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985)
(requiring a plaintiff to show a course deliberately pursued by the city establishing an affirmative
link between the city’s policy and the alleged constitutional violation).
Conspicuously absent from the Complaint are any factual allegations, let alone plausible
ones, to support a municipal liability claim under any of these four approaches. Christian does not
describe, specify, or even hint at any District policy or practice that caused the alleged predicate
constitutional violations, which, standing alone, necessitates dismissal of his § 1983 claims.
See Collington v. Dist. of Columbia, 828 F. Supp. 2d 210, 215 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing Monell
claims and explaining that if “the complaint sets forth no factual allegations regarding the existence
and enforcement of a municipal policy, custom or practice that directly caused” the underlying
constitutional violation,” that “pleading defect is fatal,” “[r]egardless of the circumstances” of the
underlying constitutional violation); see also Frost v. Catholic Univ. of America, 960 F. Supp. 2d
226, 233 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing Monell claim where the plaintiff was banned from the law
library but failed to allege “a specific policy that infringed on the plaintiff’s rights or that
administrators . . . ordered or caused the depravation of Frost’s rights.”), aff’d, 555 Fed. Appx. 6
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Prince v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 22-746, 2022 WL 17415058, at *3
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2022) (dismissing Monell claims against the District where the plaintiff was
ejected from a public library without notice or explanation because the complaint only set forth
sparse allegations of a policy or custom), aff’d, No. 22-7165, 2023 WL 6938135, (D.C. Cir. Oct.
19, 2023) (per curiam).
16 The court notes that Christian, with increasing paranoia in each successive submission,
alleges that DCPL staff bear a “malicious motive” because they have “something to hide,”
see Opp’n at 1, 3, namely, their conspiracy to engage in “video voyeurism,” and erase
“surveillance footage,” to conceal the “rape and sexual assault in Public Libraries,” either by them,
or by others under their watch, see id.; Compl. at 5; SR at 1–2. To the extent that Christian alleges
that his ban was “a direct reflection of the Staff’s cooperation[,]” SR at 1, in executing this
purported nefarious scheme, the court finds any such contention meritless and nothing more than
a “bizarre conspiracy theory” concerning “fantastic government manipulations[,]” see Best v.
Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Martin, 830 F.2d at 258 (“[U]nsupported
factual allegations which fail to specify in detail the factual basis necessary to enable [defendants]
to intelligently prepare their defense, will not suffice to sustain a claim of governmental conspiracy
to deprive [plaintiffs] of their constitutional rights.”) (citations omitted); Christmann v. Dist. of
Columbia, No. 22-2189, 2024 WL 216726, at *4–5 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2024) (dismissing § 1983
claims against the District and its officials where the plaintiff’s submissions contained “sweeping
allegations” about the defendants’ alleged “deceitful” actions to conceal abuse of process that
“spiral[ed] into wholly unsupported allegations and conclusions about the catastrophic
consequences of defendants’ conduct.”). Put differently, these frivolous allegations do not support
a municipal custom or policy, assuming that was Christian’s intention.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Christian has not only failed to sufficiently state a
predicate constitutional violation, but he fallen equally short in clearing the second hurdle to
plausibly allege causation by the District.
17 CONCLUSION
For all of the stated reasons the Court grants the District’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.
The court dismisses the complaint and this action. A final, appealable order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: March 9, 2026
__________/s/_____________ AMIT P. MEHTA United States District Judge