Christian Kreipke v. Department of Veterans Affairs
Opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
CHRISTIAN KREIPKE, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CH-1221-15-0284-P-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: August 3, 2026 AFFAIRS, Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Hayden Pendergrass , Esquire, and Shereef Akeel , Esquire, Troy, Michigan, for the appellant.
Amy Slameka , Esquire, and Gregory Davis White , Esquire, Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.
BEFORE
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the addendum initial decision, which awarded the appellant $60,000 in compensatory damages after the Board ordered corrective action in the underlying individual right of action (IRA) appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s petition for review.
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to address the appellant’s damages claim relating to a lost teaching contract, we AFFIRM the initial decision, still awarding him $60,000 in compensatory damages.
The appellant asserts on review that the record included evidence of more than just a screenshot of the Mexican university’s website where he allegedly lost a teaching contract as a result of the agency’s retaliatory actions, as the administrative judge found, because there was testimony at the merits hearing on that matter and email correspondence he submitted establishing his prospective compensation and the basis for terminating the contract. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 19.
The administrative judge found that the appellant claimed a loss of approximately $207,780 when he lost a teaching contract with the Universidad Autonoma de Guadalajara (UAG), and that this was an estimate of his salary for the length of the contract because he was unable to locate salary documents. Kreipke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-15-0284-P-1 (P-1 AF), Tab 29, Addendum Initial Decision (AID) at 11. She found that the appellant admitted that he did not have a teaching employment contract with UAG or documents showing the termination of employment with UAG, and that he provided a single screenshot of a webpage within the university’s website that referred to him as a visiting professor. Id. Thus, she found this claim unsubstantiated because the appellant did not submit any evidence of a teaching contract with UAG or establish that any purported contract was impacted by the agency’s actions. Id.
The administrative judge based her findings on the appellant’s admissions to certain discovery requests propounded by the agency. P-1 AF, Tab 18 at 521-22. However, the appellant also submitted email correspondence he had with an individual at UAG. P-1 AF, Tab 25 at 88-89. The first email chain is dated October 24-25, 2012. Id. at 88. In it, the appellant asks when he will be teaching that semester. Id. The UAG representative responds that they will be expecting
him in February “once again,” that exact dates will be determined based on semester timing, that UAG would “accommodate” his flight, and that he “will be paid $10,300 for the three-week commitment plus per diem of $100/day that you are teaching (total 14 days).” Id. The second email chain is dated May 21-22, 2013. Id. at 89. The appellant asks if there will be a need for him to teach. Id. The UAG representative replies as follows:
Hope you are doing ok. Sorry to hear of your struggles at your employer. Unfortunately we are no longer able to support your teaching position. We hold our faculty to the strictes[t] standards and have thus sought other avenues for our students. Please let me know the outcome of your situation and we will be happy to reinstate you assuming a positive outcome.
Id. The appellant also asserted that he testified at the hearing on the merits of his IRA appeal that, before “all this happened, I used to teach down in Mexico.” P-1 AF, Tab 25 at 19.
To receive an award of compensatory damages pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 1221(g), an appellant must show, among other things, that he has been harmed “as a result of the agency’s unlawful retaliatory activities.” Gilewicz v. Department of Homeland Security, 2024 MSPB 7, ¶ 7. Here, even considering the email correspondence and testimony identified by the appellant, he has not proven entitlement to such damages by preponderant evidence. See Perlick v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 104 F.4th 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2024). He has not shown or submitted additional evidence supporting a claim that the “struggles at your employer” reference by the UAG representative was a reference to retaliatory activities by the agency, as opposed to the February 2012 termination of his employment by Wayne State University (WSU), where he held a dual appointment. In this regard, we note that at the time of the UAG May 22, 2013 email, the appellant had already been terminated by WSU but had not yet been separated from the agency. The appellant’s own description of his teaching in Mexico before “all this happened” similarly does not establish causation related to any retaliatory
action by the agency, as opposed to the investigation and termination by WSU. Accordingly, even considering the evidence not addressed by the administrative judge, the appellant has not proven by preponderant evidence his entitlement to these damages.
ORDER
We ORDER the agency to issue a check to the appellant for nonpecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of $60,000. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not fully carried out the Board’s Order and should include the dates and results of any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You
must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued the initial decision on your appeal.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Christian Kreipke v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Christian Kreipke v. Department of Veterans Affairs) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.