Christel Johnson v. Navy Federal Credit Union

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedAugust 25, 2025
Docket23-2057
StatusUnpublished

This text of Christel Johnson v. Navy Federal Credit Union (Christel Johnson v. Navy Federal Credit Union) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christel Johnson v. Navy Federal Credit Union, (4th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-2057 Doc: 30 Filed: 08/25/2025 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2057

CHRISTEL JOHNSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Judge. (1:23-cv-00794-MSN-JFA)

Submitted: August 21, 2025 Decided: August 25, 2025

Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Thomas F. Hennessy, THE HENNESSY LAW FIRM, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Edward Lee Isler, Micah E. Ticatch, ISLER DARE, P.C., Vienna, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-2057 Doc: 30 Filed: 08/25/2025 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Christel Johnson, an African-American woman, appeals the district court’s order

granting Employer’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim Johnson’s 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 amended complaint, in which she alleged disparate treatment based on her race. On

appeal, Johnson argues that the district court erred in finding that she failed to sufficiently

allege an actionable adverse employment action and an inference of unlawful

discrimination based on race. We affirm.

We review an order granting a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Feminist

Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2018). “In conducting such a

review, we are obliged to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].” Id. “However, legal conclusions pleaded

as factual allegations, unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, and naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement are not entitled to the presumption of

truth.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a

plaintiff must show that she (1) is a member of “a protected class”; (2) satisfactorily

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-2057 Doc: 30 Filed: 08/25/2025 Pg: 3 of 3

performed her work; (3) suffered an “adverse employment action”; and (4) was treated

differently “from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Perkins v. Int’l

Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 207 (4th Cir. 2019). For purposes of a disparate treatment

discrimination claim, an “adverse employment action” is one that “adversely affects the

terms, conditions or benefits of employment.” Id. As the Supreme Court recently

explained, “[t]he ‘terms or conditions’ phrase . . . is not used in the narrow contractual

sense; it covers more than the economic or tangible.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601

U.S. 346, 354 (2024) (citation modified). We conclude that the district court properly

found that Johnson did not plead sufficient facts to establish that she suffered an actionable

adverse employment action. We further conclude that the district court properly found that

Johnson did not sufficiently allege facts that gave rise to an inference of discrimination

based on her race. See Tabb v. Bd. of Educ. of Durham Pub. Schs., 29 F.4th 148, 156 (4th

Cir. 2022) (upholding district court’s finding that plaintiff failed to adequately plead

“race-based employment discrimination” in part because, although plaintiff identified a

comparator in her complaint, she failed to include facts supporting an inference that the

comparator was similarly situated).

We have reviewed the record and the transcript of the hearing and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Wikimedia Foundation v. National Security Agency
857 F.3d 193 (Fourth Circuit, 2017)
Feminist Majority Foundation v. Richard Hurley
911 F.3d 674 (Fourth Circuit, 2018)
Matthew Perkins v. International Paper Company
936 F.3d 196 (Fourth Circuit, 2019)
Wendell Tabb v. Bd of Ed Durham Pub Schools
29 F.4th 148 (Fourth Circuit, 2022)
Muldrow v. City of St. Louis
601 U.S. 346 (Supreme Court, 2024)

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Christel Johnson v. Navy Federal Credit Union, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/christel-johnson-v-navy-federal-credit-union-ca4-2025.