Chris Falcone v. Robert L Dingess

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 5, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-04547
StatusUnknown

This text of Chris Falcone v. Robert L Dingess (Chris Falcone v. Robert L Dingess) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chris Falcone v. Robert L Dingess, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 No.: CV-19-04547-PHX-GMS In Re Taronis Technologies, Inc. LEAD CASE 10 Shareholder Derivative Litigation 11 Consolidated with No. CV-19-05233-PHX-GMS 12

13 This Document Relates To: ORDER

14 All Actions

17 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Settlement and for an 18 Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses. (Doc. 40.) For the following 19 reasons, the motion is granted. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Taronis Technologies, Inc., now known as BBHC, (“Taronis” or “BBHC”) is an 22 energy company that offers technology solutions to create, process, and produce hydrogen- 23 based fuel. 24 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by making or 25 causing a series of false statements about the company. Plaintiffs allege that on January 28, 26 2019 Taronis disclosed in a press release that the City of San Diego had elected to use a 27 Taronis product as its fuel of choice. (Doc. 1 at 5–6.) The market price of Taronis common 28 stock promptly increased over 25% after news of the San Diego contract was published. 1 Id. at 6. However, Plaintiffs allege that the Company’s disclosure about the contract with 2 the City of San Diego was entirely false. Id. at 7. They claim that Defendants knew the 3 press release was false but released it to artificially inflate the common stock price. 4 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants waited until February 12, 2019 to clarify the Press Release 5 and that the value of the company’s securities suffered significant damage as a result. Id. 6 at 7–8. 7 The Court granted preliminary approval of the parties’ proposed settlement on 8 November 20, 2020. (Doc. 37.) Plaintiffs now move for final approval of settlement. An 9 action arising out of the same alleged misconduct is pending in the United States District 10 Court for the District of Delaware. The Plaintiffs in that case (“Delaware Plaintiffs”) 11 submitted an objection to the final approval of the settlement and award of attorneys’ fees 12 and expenses. (Doc 42.) 13 DISCUSSION 14 I. Legal Standard 15 “A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only 16 with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(c). After preliminary approval, “notice of 17 a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must be given to shareholders 18 or members in the manner that the court orders.” Id. Although there is little Ninth Circuit 19 authority interpreting Rule 23.1(c), “approval of a derivative action appears to be a two- 20 step process, similar to that employed for approving class action settlements, in which the 21 Court first determines whether a proposed settlement deserves preliminary approval and 22 then, after notice of the settlement is provided to class members, determines whether final 23 approval is warranted.” In re MRV Commc’ns, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 08-03800 24 GAF MANX, 2013 WL 2897874, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2013); see In re HQ Sustainable 25 Mar. Indus., Inc., No. C11-0910RSL, 2013 WL 3191867, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 20, 26 2013); In re NVIDIA Corp., No. C-06- 06110-SBA(JCS), 2008 WL 5382544, at *2 (N.D. 27 Cal. Dec. 22, 2008). A court must assess whether a settlement is the product of 28 overreaching or collusion by or between the negotiating parties, and whether the settlement 1 taken as a whole “is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.” In re Hewlett-Packard 2 Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 716 F. App’x 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2017); Talley v. Mann, No. 3 CV 11-5003 GAF (SSX), 2012 WL 12918344, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2012). These 4 safeguards are “intended to prevent shareholders from suing in place of the corporation in 5 circumstances where the action would disserve the legitimate interests of the company or 6 its shareholders.” Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 532 n.7 (1984). 7 II. Analysis 8 Here, the settlement is the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, 9 with no obvious deficiency or preferential treatment. Both sides are represented by 10 experienced counsel, and the parties engaged in negotiations with a professional mediator. 11 (Doc. 40-1 at 6.) The parties have litigated this case since June 2019, and their briefing 12 demonstrates that they have thoroughly considered the strengths and weaknesses of the 13 asserted claims. (Doc. 40 at 22–23.) Therefore, the proposed settlement agreement appears 14 to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations. 15 Moreover, the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. The 16 proposed agreement confers substantial benefit on the corporation and its shareholders by 17 establishing safeguards in the corporate structure that can prevent future ethical violations. 18 The agreement provides that “BBHC shall adopt a resolution and draft a charter formally 19 creating a Board-level Risk and Disclosure Committee” tasked with “monitoring BBHC’s 20 compliance with all public reporting required of BBHC as well as internal risk assessment 21 and internal reporting.” (Doc 31-1 at 25.) These changes confer a sufficient benefit; 22 “[c]ourts have recognized that corporate governance reforms such as those achieved here 23 provide valuable benefits to public companies.” In re NVIDIA Corp., 2008 WL 5382544, 24 at *3; see In re Rambus Inc., No. C 06-3513 JF (HRL), 2009 WL 166689, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 25 Jan. 20, 2009) (approving a settlement where the benefit was a corporate reform addressing 26 the source of the alleged violations). 27 The Delaware Plaintiffs’ Objection does not undermine these conclusions. For the 28 reasons set forth above, the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The 1 parties’ published notice adequately placed shareholders on notice that resolution of this 2 litigation may affect their rights in other matters, specifying: 3 If you are a current holder of BBHC common stock and do not take steps to 4 appear in this action and object to the proposed settlement, you will be bound by the Final Judgment of the Court and will forever be barred from raising 5 an objection to such settlement in this or any other action or proceeding, and 6 from pursuing any of the Released Claims. 7 (Doc. 41-2 at 6.) It also explained that all capitalized terms used in the notice were defined 8 in the Stipulation and included a link to reach the agreement. The Released Claims include 9 the related action in Delaware arising out of the same incident.1 Shareholders were thus 10 alerted that they could lose rights in other litigations by failing to object here. The Delaware 11 Plaintiffs offer no authority establishing that such notice becomes unfair or ineffective 12 because it does not include the existence of specific actions in other jurisdictions. See 13 Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is 14 satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert 15 those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.”) (internal 16 quotation omitted). 17 The Parties’ agreed-to corporate governance changes are also adequate 18 consideration. The parties agreed to create protocols addressing compliance with public- 19 reporting requirements because that was the nature of the failure in this case. The fact that 20 these changes do not explicitly address press releases, the exact form of non-compliance 21 here, does not render the changes nonprotective. The Court is aware of no requirement that 22 corporate governance reform exactly match the factual allegations in a case to be deemed 23 effective, and the Delaware Plaintiffs suggest none.

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Chris Falcone v. Robert L Dingess, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chris-falcone-v-robert-l-dingess-azd-2021.