Chrichlow v. Sipple

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 11, 2020
Docket7:18-cv-03222
StatusUnknown

This text of Chrichlow v. Sipple (Chrichlow v. Sipple) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chrichlow v. Sipple, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KEVIN DAMION CRICHLOW, Plaintiff, ORDER -against-

COMMISSIONER ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, 18-CV-3222 (PMH) et al., Defendants.

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Five Points Correctional facility, commenced this pro se action on April 12, 2018, asserting that, inter alia, Defendants violated his federally protected rights. By order dated August 16, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 (Doc. 2). On December 27, 2018, Plaintiff, pursuant to an Order permitting an amendment, filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 17, “Amended Complaint”). On January 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which the Court at that time construed as a supplement to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 18).2 On February 5, 2019, Judge Karas issued an Order of Service which, inter alia, dismissed certain Defendants and ordered service on the remaining Defendants named in the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 20). On April 25, 2019, Defendants filed a pre-motion letter seeking revocation of Plaintiff’s IFP status and for a stay of their time to respond to the Amended Complaint until 30 days after a decision is rendered on their request to revoke IFP status. (Doc. 41). The Court

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 2 Despite the filing of the Amended Complaint and later, leave to file the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff apparently pressed the motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 18) in May and July, 2019. (Docs. 44, 46, 55). Defendants were directed to respond, and did respond thereto, on August 2, 2019. (Doc. 58). subsequently granted Defendants’ request for a stay (Doc. 43); and ordered Plaintiff to respond to the request to revoke IFP status and to file a Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 42, 47). On July 19 and 22, 2019, Plaintiff responded to Defendants’ request to revoke IFP status (Docs. 55 and 57), and on August 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 60, “Second

Amended Complaint”). On January 17, 2020, Plaintiff requested that the Court extend the time for him to effectuate service of the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 70). On April 16, 2020, this case was reassigned to me. The Court denies Defendants’ request to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status. The Court extends Plaintiff’s time to serve the Second Amended Complaint nunc pro tunc and directs service on the newly identified Defendants. The Court also directs the newly identified Defendants to comply with Local Civil Rule 33.2 within 120 days of service of the Second Amended Complaint, and the previously served Defendants to comply within 120 days of the date of this Order. The Court further directs the Attorney General of the State of New York to provide to Plaintiff and the Court the identity, service address, and if appropriate, the badge number of the unidentified Defendants.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice to Plaintiff’s applying again for such relief at a later date. ANALYSIS I. IFP Status Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s IFP status should be revoked pursuant to the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars inmates from receiving IFP status. At first glance, Plaintiff appears to have three “strikes,” which under § 1915(g), would normally bar him from proceeding IFP as a prisoner. See Crichlow v. Butchen, No. 09-CV-4398 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2009) (case dismissed) (“Crichlow I”); Crichlow 2 v. Crichlow, No. 12-CV-8932 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013) (case dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Crichlow v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-1454 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (appeal dismissed as frivolous). A review of the docket in Crichlow I, however, reveals that it was dismissed in part for failure to state a claim, and later dismissed for failure to prosecute with respect to Plaintiff’s

failure to submit an amended complaint within the time allowed. A partial dismissal of a case based on § 1915(g) grounds does not constitute a strike in this District. See Morehouse v. Vasques, No. 17-CV-4836, 2018 WL 4211320, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2018) (holding that partial dismissal does not constitute a strike); McNair v. Kelly, No. 13-CV-728, 2013 WL 4574247, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013) (same); Tafari v. Hues, 539 F. Supp. 2d 694, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same). Moreover, dismissals based on a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute are not considered strikes. See Toliver v. Perri, No. 10-CV-3165, 2011 WL 43461, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2011) (characterizing the failure to amend a complaint within a specified time period as the failure to prosecute and declining to treat it as a strike); Harry v. Doe, No. 09-CV-2342, 2009 WL 2152531 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 17, 2009). Likewise, dismissals based upon mixed reasoning only some

of which can be categorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) are not strikes under the PLRA. See Escalera v. Samaritan Vill., 938 F.3d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ request to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status. II. Extension of Time to Serve and Service on the Identified Defendants Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint names twelve newly identified Defendants, ten of whom this Court orders service upon, and two of whom this Court dismisses for Plaintiff’s failure to plead any allegations against them; sixteen Defendants who were previously served and have appeared in this action; two Defendants who were previously dismissed, the claims against whom are dismissed again herein; and two newly unidentified Defendants. 3 With respect to the twelve newly identified Defendants, Plaintiff has not set forth any allegations against two of them, Ms. Rachel Herzog or C.O. S. William. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that there is (1) a right to relief against those Defendants jointly or severally with the Defendants served and to be served, or that arises out of the same transactions or

occurrences as those that involve such Defendants, and (2) a question of law or fact common to both. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Plaintiffs allegations about these two Defendants lack the detail necessary to show proper joinder, see id., or to comply with the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 pleading requirement that a complaint “contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see id. at 42 (holding that a complaint’s statement of claim “should be short because unnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage”) (quotations and alterations omitted).

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Coppedge v. United States
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Salahuddin v. Cuomo
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717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
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William Escalera, Jr. v. Samaritan Village
938 F.3d 380 (Second Circuit, 2019)

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