Choy v. US Marchells

District Court, S.D. Georgia·Decided February 5, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-00135·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION

MATTHEW CHOY,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:24-cv-135

v.

WARDEN, FCI JESUP,

Respondent.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Petitioner Matthew Choy (“Choy”) failed to comply with the Court’s December 9, 2024 directive. Doc. 8. As discussed in greater detail below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without prejudice Choy’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, doc. 1, for failure to follow this Court’s directive, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Choy leave to appeal in forma pauperis.1 I DENY as moot Choy’s Motion to Transfer. Doc. 10.

1 A “district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair . . . . To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation provides such notice and opportunity to respond. See Shivers v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union, 349, 262 F. App’x 121, 125, 127 (11th Cir. 2008) (indicating a party has notice of a district court’s intent to sua sponte grant summary judgment where a magistrate judge issues a report recommending the sua sponte granting of summary judgment); Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting report and recommendation served as notice claims would be sua sponte dismissed). This Report and Recommendation constitutes fair notice to Choy his suit is due to be dismissed. As indicated below, Choy will have the opportunity to present his objections to this finding, and the presiding district judge will review de novo properly submitted objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Glover v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-3562, 2012 WL 5930633, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining magistrate judge’s report and recommendation constituted adequate notice and petitioner’s opportunity to file objections provided a reasonable opportunity to respond). BACKGROUND On October 29, 2024, Choy filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition with the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. Doc. 1. That court transferred Choy’s Petition to this Court, as he is housed in the Brunswick Division of the Southern District of Georgia. Docs. 4, 5.

The Clerk of this Court notified Choy he had to either pay the requisite $5.00 filing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis within 21 days of the December 9, 2024 directive. Doc. 8. There is nothing before the Court indicating this mailing was returned as undeliverable or otherwise failed to reach Choy. Choy has not responded to this directive, either by paying the requisite fee or moving to proceed on an in forma pauperis basis, and the time to do so has elapsed. DISCUSSION The Court must now determine how to address Choy’s failure to comply with this Court’s directive. For the reasons set forth below, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS without prejudice Choy’s Petition and DENY Choy leave to appeal in forma pauperis. I. Dismissal for Failure to Follow This Court’s Directive

A district court may dismiss a petitioner’s claims sua sponte pursuant to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) or the court’s inherent authority to manage its docket.2 Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962);3 Coleman v. St. Lucie Cnty. Jail, 433 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)). In particular, Rule 41(b) allows for the involuntary dismissal

2 Pursuant to Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the § 2254 Rules may be applied to § 2241 petitions.

3 In Wabash, the Court held a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute “even without affording notice of its intention to do so.” 370 U.S. at 633. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, the Court advised Choy his failure to pay the filing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis would result in dismissal of this action. Doc. 8. of a petitioner’s claims where he has failed to prosecute those claims, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or local rules, or follow a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 718; Sanders v. Barrett, No. 05-12660, 2005 WL 2640979, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993)); cf. Local R.

41.1(b) (“[T]he assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte . . . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice[,] . . . [based on] willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court.” (emphasis omitted)). Additionally, a district court’s “power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits.” Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jones v. Graham, 709 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983)). It is true dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “sanction . . . to be utilized only in extreme situations” and requires a court to “(1) conclud[e] a clear record of delay or willful contempt exists; and (2) mak[e] an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Thomas v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 170 F. App’x 623, 625–26 (11th Cir.

2006) (quoting Morewitz v. West of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (Lux.), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Taylor v. Spaziano, 251 F. App’x 616, 619 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Morewitz, 62 F.3d at 1366). By contrast, dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute is not an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, courts are afforded greater discretion in dismissing claims in this manner. Taylor, 251 F. App’x at 619; see also Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719; Brown, 205 F. App’x at 802–03. While the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss cases with caution, dismissal of this action without prejudice is warranted. See Coleman, 433 F. App’x at 719 (upholding dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute where plaintiff did not respond to court order to supply defendant’s current address for purpose of service); Taylor, 251 F.

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