FILED Apr 21 2025, 8:59 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of J.J. and Jer.J. (Minor Children), Children in Need of Services, and M.J. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
and
Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian ad Litem
April 21, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-JC-1676 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 1 of 16 The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Judge The Honorable Duane Merchant, Magistrate Trial Court Cause Nos. 49D09-2212-JC-9232 49D09-2301-JC-262
Opinion by Judge Kenworthy Judges Bradford and Pyle concur.
Kenworthy, Judge.
Case Summary [1] M.J. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s adjudication of her two youngest sons
as children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother claims the trial court erred
in finding the children to be CHINS because the Indiana Department of Child
Services (“DCS”) failed to present sufficient evidence that their physical or
mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered or that court
intervention was needed. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Mother has four sons, Jo., Jos., J.J., and Jer.J. 1 Jer.J. was born four weeks
early on August 19, 2022, and was “small for [his] age.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 113. He
1 J.R. is the father of Jo., born in 2014, and J.J., born in 2019. K.H. is the father of Jos., born in 2017. And R.N. is the father of Jer.J. All the fathers participated in the proceedings below but none of them participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 2 of 16 was discharged from the hospital a month later, but on October 7, he was
admitted to Riley Hospital for Children for poor weight gain and viral
pneumonia. While at the hospital, Jer.J. was evaluated by a speech therapist
and found to have an “uncoordinated suck” leading to a risk of aspirating food
into his airway. Id. at 112. Doctors placed a nasogastric tube (“NG tube”) and
trained Mother on using the NG tube for feeding Jer.J. Jer.J. was discharged
on October 18 and Mother was instructed it was “very important for her to
follow up with his pediatrician for weight checks” because “weight gain in the
first two years of life . . . is tied to brain development and neurologic growths.”
Id. at 113–14. Before Jer.J. was discharged, Riley staff scheduled several
appointments for him—including weekly appointments for weight checks—and
communicated those appointments to Mother. Mother did not take Jer.J. to
any of the appointments, and Riley made a report of medical neglect to DCS in
late November.
[3] DCS assessment family case manager (“FCM”) Ouassila Kaced was assigned
to investigate the initial report. Mother told FCM Kaced she had been taking
Jer.J. to a neighborhood clinic and that he was “doing just fine” and “thriving”
despite the medical evidence and Kaced’s own observations. Id. at 175. The
clinic told DCS Mother had recently made a first appointment for Jer.J., but
that appointment had not yet occurred. In other words, there was no evidence
Jer.J. had received medical care or treatment since being discharged from the
hospital in mid-October.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 3 of 16 [4] DCS received a second report on December 7 alleging Mother hit J.J. and
pulled his hair. FCM Kaced’s efforts to contact Mother in person and by phone
to investigate were unsuccessful.
[5] On December 11, Mother took Jer.J. to the Methodist Hospital emergency
department for fever and vomiting. Doctors at Methodist wanted to transfer
Jer.J. to Riley but Mother refused, saying she would take him to Riley “when
she [could] fit it into her schedule.” Id. at 130. Even after being informed
doctors believed Jer.J.’s condition was life threatening, Mother still tried to
leave with Jer.J. DCS and hospital security became involved, and Jer.J. was
transferred to Riley and admitted.
[6] DCS filed a petition alleging Jer.J. was a CHINS because his physical or mental
condition was seriously impaired or seriously endangered due to Mother’s
inability, refusal, or neglect to provide necessary medical care. DCS also
requested and was granted an order removing Jer.J. from Mother’s custody.
Mother did not attend the initial/detention hearing. When Jer.J. was
discharged from Riley, he was placed in foster care.
[7] After Jer.J.’s removal, FCM Kaced again attempted to contact Mother by
various means to check on the other children but failed. FCM Kaced obtained
an order compelling Mother to allow her to access the home and interview the
children. FCM Kaced, accompanied by law enforcement, served the order on
January 9, 2023. Initially, Mother would not let them in the house and used
eight-year-old Jo. as a go-between to relay messages. Mother eventually
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 4 of 16 allowed access but tried to impede their movement throughout the house. The
house had a bad odor and was very dirty; the refrigerator contained moldy
food; the stove was not working; the toilet in the only bathroom was clogged;
and there was only one bedroom and one bed with a dirty mattress for everyone
and no crib or bassinette for Jer.J. FCM Kaced observed fruit flies and roaches
in the home and an open container of bleach within reach of the children.
Mother blamed the boys for making the mess.
[8] DCS did not immediately remove the children but soon after the home visit
filed a petition alleging Jo., Jos., and J.J. were CHINS because their physical or
mental conditions were seriously impaired or seriously endangered due to
Mother’s inability, refusal, or neglect to provide a safe, sanitary, and
appropriate living environment. Mother appeared at the initial/detention
hearing at which DCS requested and was granted an order removing the three
boys from Mother’s custody because of the “deplorable conditions of the
home.” Id. at 21. 2
[9] No one was home when FCM Kaced went to Mother’s home to execute the
order of removal, but she managed to reach Mother by phone a few times over
the next couple of days. Each time, Mother offered a different explanation
about where J.J. was. Around 8 p.m. on January 14, 2023, several days after
2 Jo. and Jos. were eventually placed with their fathers—J.R. and K.H., respectively. J.R. and K.H. were each granted custody of their sons during these proceedings. After the custody modifications, the CHINS cases for Jo. and Jos. were closed. Although this did not happen immediately and Jo. and Jos. were part of the CHINS case for a while, we will refer to only J.J. hereafter for clarity.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 5 of 16 the initial hearing, Mother left J.J. outside the door of the DCS office. A DCS
FCM drove J.J. to his father, J.R.’s home in Gary that night. J.J. remained in
relative placement with J.R. throughout this case.
[10] The fact-finding hearing for J.J. and Jer.J.’s CHINS cases began on April 28,
2023, and continued over several dates until its conclusion on February 22,
2024. Mother attended the first two days of hearings but did not attend any
hearings after May 5, 2023.
[11] Gwen Grant, the family’s permanency FCM beginning in January 2023, put
home-based casework and supervised visitation services in place for Mother.
FCM Grant acknowledged Mother said she was using community resources
before DCS involvement. She said if Mother is “doing all these services
already[,] all she has to do is provide us with proof and let them become part of
the [Child and Family Team]” so DCS could verify they were being done. Id.
at 91. For Jer.J. to be returned to Mother’s care, FCM Grant said Mother
needed to be consistent with parenting time and “stay on track with his medical
needs” by attending scheduled appointments. Id. FCM Grant testified court
intervention was necessary to help Mother learn how to prioritize her time so
“she can have more time . . . for her kids especially since she has a very sickly
child.” Id. at 44. FCM Grant felt Mother needed services to learn “some life
balance”—“her children are of school-age[] and you can’t work two jobs and be
in school and run a household and get your kids ready for school and take them
on . . . medical appointments if you’re committed to those three areas: job, job,
and school.” Id. at 44–45.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 6 of 16 [12] Mother’s visitation with Jer.J. while the CHINS case was pending was
inconsistent, but by July 2023, she showed signs of improvement “in terms of
doing what is necessary to care for” Jer.J., and the bond between them had
increased. Tr. Vol. 3 at 6. At a visit on January 11, 2024, however, Mother told
the visit supervisor she “was no longer comfortable with feeding [Jer.J.] through
a [N]G-tube.” Id. at 72. 3 The supervisor was caught off guard because Mother
had been engaged in feeding Jer.J. previously. When asked to explain, Mother
said, “[L]egal advised me that I should not be a part of the feeding and I
shouldn’t even be present when it’s taking place.” Id. at 72. Mother left the
room while the visit supervisor fed Jer.J. The next three visits all ended early
because of Mother’s refusal to feed Jer.J. through the NG tube. The visit
supervisor testified Mother is “very firm and adamant that she’s not in
agreement with” the NG tube feeding and her unwillingness to feed Jer.J. is a
safety concern. Id. at 74.
[13] Mother’s visitation with J.J. was also inconsistent. Demetria Williams was
assigned as the visitation facilitator in May 2023, but was unable to successfully
arrange a visit until July due to Mother’s work schedule or failure to timely
confirm appointments. Williams testified at the hearing in July 2023 that she
had supervised four visits. Williams observed Mother was meeting J.J.’s basic
3 By this time, Jer.J. was eating some solid food but “not consum[ing] a lot of it” so his nutrition was still being supplemented through the NG tube. Id. at 85. Mother also refused to give Jer.J. snacks the foster mother provided, because she felt “there’s no way he should be doing both and so . . . she refuses to do either one[.]” Id. at 79.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 7 of 16 emotional needs at visits but her priorities were torn between attending visits
and getting overtime at work. Ryan Avery was also a visitation facilitator for
J.J. He supervised virtual visits which “went pretty well” until shortly before
the hearing on February 8, 2024. Id. at 100. By then, Mother had missed four
visits in a row.
[14] As for the conditions of her home, Mother largely refused to allow anyone to
access the home. Avery, who was also Mother’s home-based caseworker, was
in the home in March 2023. He described it as being “in pretty bad shape.” Id.
at 95. He was in the home again about a month later and “it was, you know,
cleaner.” Id. He had not been in the home since then—although he had tried
to make appointments to meet Mother there for their casework, “something
seems to always come up.” Id. at 96. Mother made complaints to her landlord
about the condition of her home but would not allow maintenance in to address
the issues. She stopped paying rent in September 2023 and the landlord started
eviction proceedings. Mother then made a complaint to the health department
which paused the eviction, but she would not allow the health department in to
inspect the home. The most recent permanency FCM, Claudia Smith, had not
been allowed into Mother’s home since she was assigned the case in September
2023.
[15] FCM Smith testified J.J. and Jer.J. “would not be safe under [Mother’s] care”
because she “has not demonstrated the ability to meet [Jer.J.’s] medical . . .
needs or have a safe living environment for the children.” Id. at 138. Mother’s
refusal to feed Jer.J. appropriately “is a big concern.” Id. at 137. Mother could
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 8 of 16 alleviate those concerns by working with her providers and allowing a home
study. But FCM Smith did not believe she would do that without court
intervention because she had told Mother what was required “many times” and
“she’s had plenty of time to correct the unsafe . . . home, make it correct, meet
with providers, she’s just not wanting to.” Id. at 138, 143.
[16] As noted above, Mother did not attend the last four days of the fact-finding
hearing and did not testify. The only evidence Mother presented was the
testimony of Deborah Alexander, a First Steps worker who provided services
for J.J. until he aged out of the program in February 2022 and then remained in
contact with Mother occasionally by phone. Alexander never met Jer.J. and
had not been in Mother’s home since early 2022. Alexander described
Mother’s home at that time as cluttered but not unsafe. She believed Mother
could be a good parent but needed community support.
[17] In its fact-finding order, the trial court stated:
It is in the best interest of [Jer.J.] and [J.J.] to be removed from the home environment. Remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the children because of an inability, refusal, or neglect to provide adequate shelter, care and/or supervision and the children need protection that cannot be provided in the home. Coercive intervention of the court is required to ensure the family participates in needed services.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 38. The trial court later held a dispositional hearing—
Mother did not attend—and entered its dispositional order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 9 of 16 Standard of Review [18] In a CHINS proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. In re K.D.,
962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012); see Ind. Code §§ 31-34-1-1 to -11 (describing
circumstances under which a child is a CHINS); I.C. § 31-34-12-3 (1997)
(imposing preponderance standard). When we review a CHINS adjudication,
we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re
D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017). Instead, “[w]e consider only the
evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
[19] The trial court here entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon sua sponte
following the fact-finding hearing. 4 In such case, we review issues covered by
the findings with a “two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the
findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d
1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). We review any issues not covered by the findings
under the general judgment standard, meaning we will affirm the judgment if it
can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. We reverse
a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578.
“A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or
4 No statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS fact-finding order and none of the parties requested findings under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Mother challenges only the fact-finding order and does not challenge the dispositional order, which does require findings. See I.C. § 31-34-19-10(a) (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 10 of 16 if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The CHINS determination is supported by evidence and is not clearly erroneous. [20] We would be remiss if we did not begin by commenting on the lengthy delay in
bringing this CHINS case to disposition. The petition alleging Jer.J. was a
CHINS was filed on December 12, 2022, and the petition alleging J.J. was a
CHINS was filed on January 11, 2023. Indiana Code Section 31-34-11-1(a)
requires a fact-finding hearing to be completed within sixty days of the filing of
the petition. If all parties consent, that time can be extended by an additional
sixty days. I.C. § 31-34-11-1(b). And our Supreme Court has held the fact-
finding hearing may be extended beyond the 120 days provided by statute upon
a finding of good cause. In re M.S., 140 N.E.3d 279, 285 (Ind. 2020). No party
has raised the issue of timeliness, so we will assume completion of the fact-
finding hearing was appropriately continued beyond sixty days and there was
good cause to extend it beyond 120 days. 5 After the good cause finding,
however, everyone involved seemed to act as if there was no longer any
urgency to conclude this matter. The fact-finding hearing was not concluded
until February 22, 2024—a period of 407 days from the time the first petition
was filed. In total, 585 days passed between the filing of the first CHINS
5 Having said that, it appears the timelines were based on the later-filed petition rather than the earlier.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 11 of 16 petition and the dispositional order. The General Assembly has shown it
considers CHINS actions a priority by placing time constraints on the
proceedings and providing a mechanism for dismissal if the timelines are not
met. See id. at 283; see also I.C. § 31-34-11-1(d). 6 The Supreme Court
acknowledged as much in M.S., and we therefore do not believe the Court
intended to eliminate all time requirements when it allowed cases to proceed
beyond 120 days. We are troubled—to say the least—that bringing this case to
resolution took nearly ten times the number of days allowed by statute,
especially given that Mother’s cooperation deteriorated as the case dragged on.
We hope and expect this case was an outlier and delays of this magnitude are
unusual.
[21] But, as noted, no party challenges the timeliness of the proceedings, so we
proceed to consider the CHINS adjudication. The purpose of a CHINS inquiry
is to protect children, not punish parents. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1255. Here, the
trial court adjudicated the children as CHINS under the general neglect
provision. A child is a CHINS under this provision when:
(1) [T]he child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability,
6 A bill currently pending in the General Assembly would, among other things, provide that a procedural timeline in a CHINS case is not subject to waiver by a party to the proceeding except as permitted in specific circumstances and that the statutory deadline for holding a fact-finding hearing in a CHINS proceeding would not be subject to dismissal after 120 days if the court finds the extension is required because of unanticipated, emergent circumstances; the circumstances of the case; or the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. The first provision would eliminate routine waiver of timelines in CHINS cases and the second appears to incorporate the Supreme Court’s holding in M.S. H.B. 1605, §§ 7 & 14, 124th Gen. Assemb. (2025).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 12 of 16 refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent . . . to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision . . .; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
I.C. § 31-34-1-1. Our Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to require
proof of “three basic elements: that the parent’s actions or inactions have
seriously endangered the child, that the child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps
most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.”
S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.
[22] Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact, and we
therefore take them as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind.
1992). And Mother concedes Jer.J. was born with special medical needs and
the conditions of her home at the time of J.J.’s removal were inadequate. See
Appellant’s Br. at 16. But she argues DCS did not prove the children’s
conditions are seriously impaired or endangered by her actions or inactions.
She also argues DCS did not prove court intervention is necessary because she
was providing treatment for Jer.J. and had voluntarily engaged in “a panoply of
community and government services” to address the family’s needs before DCS
became involved. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 13 of 16 [23] Mother likens her case to S.D. and In re A.H., 58 N.E.3d 951 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016), cases in which a CHINS determination was reversed. In S.D., the
Supreme Court found no evidence that mother was unlikely to provide
appropriate care for her child with special medical needs without court
intervention. Although mother had not completed the medical training
necessary to care for the child at home, the evidence showed only that “she was
still one small step away,” not that she was unwilling or unable to complete the
training. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. And in A.H., a panel of this Court found the
coercive intervention of the court was not needed when evidence showed the
parent did everything she could to seek help for her troubled child, but the care
was “ultimately unsuccessful through no fault of the parent.” 58 N.E.3d at 951.
But in this case, Mother was not “one small step away” from caring for Jer.J.’s
medical needs and had not done everything she could to show she could
provide a suitable home.
[24] Here, DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence the “three basic
elements” supporting a CHINS adjudication. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. The
children’s conditions were seriously impaired or endangered by Mother’s
actions or inactions and their needs were unmet. Jer.J. was removed from
Mother’s care because she was not appropriately addressing his precarious
physical condition. She did not take him to follow-up medical appointments,
and he was not gaining the expected amount of weight each week. And by the
conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had expressed her disagreement
with his medical treatment and refused to participate in feeding him, causing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 14 of 16 continued concern for both his physical health and their emotional bond. As
for the home, there was some evidence the conditions of Mother’s home may
have improved shortly after J.J. was removed. But Mother refused to allow
anyone into her home for nearly a year after that assessment, so there was no
way to know the home’s current condition. And Mother’s failure to cooperate
in a home study necessary for reunification casts doubt on the home’s safety for
the children. Mother was also subject to an eviction proceeding.
[25] Moreover, the coercive intervention of the court was necessary to ensure the
children’s needs were met. When determining whether a child is a CHINS
under Section 31-34-1-1, and particularly when determining whether the
coercive intervention of the court is necessary, the court “should consider the
family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.”
Id. at 1290. Based on the testimony provided over the course of the
proceedings, Mother was uncooperative and inconsistent in the home-based
casework and visitation services provided for her. She was unwilling to provide
the medical care Jer.J. needed and obstructed DCS’ efforts to verify the children
would have safe housing if returned to Mother’s care. Mother points to
evidence she had community support in place before DCS involvement as proof
the coercive intervention of the court was unnecessary. DCS acknowledged
Mother said at the start she had sought out services on her own. But Mother
did not testify and offered no evidence she continued to use—and more
importantly, benefit from—those services during these proceedings. This
argument is essentially a request to reweigh the evidence in Mother’s favor and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 15 of 16 disregard evidence of conditions at the time of the hearing, a request we must
decline. See K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.
Conclusion [26] The trial court determined the children are CHINS because Mother “needs
assistance managing her living conditions and [Jer.J.’s] health condition and
requires the coercive intervention of the court to ensure she gets the services she
needs.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 41. DCS presented ample evidence to support
that determination, and the judgment is not clearly erroneous.
[27] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Daniel G. Foote Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-1676 | April 21, 2025 Page 16 of 16