IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana In the Matter of N.C. (Minor Child), FILED May 12 2026, 9:16 am A Child in Need of Services CLERK Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and Tax Court
D.C. (Father), Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
and Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem
May 12, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-JC-2526 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Tara Y. Melton, Judge The Honorable Leon A. Keith, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D15-2501-JC-750
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 1 of 22 Opinion by Judge Scheele Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur.
Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary [1] D.C. (Father) appeals, following the trial court’s determination that his
daughter, N.C. (Child), is a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). Father raises
four issues, which we restate as the following three:
1. Whether Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6 is unconstitutional;
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in entering a no reasonable efforts finding and denying Father’s motion to reconsider;
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Child is a CHINS.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In May 2006, Father was convicted of molesting J.C., his then eight-year-old
daughter. His conviction was classified as Class C felony child molesting
pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(b) (2006), and he was required to
register on Indiana’s Sex and Violent Offender Registry (Sex Offender Registry)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 2 of 22 for life. See Petitioner’s Ex. 2; Tr. Vol. II pp. 10-11. Father later told J.C. that
she “ruined his life” by reporting the sexual abuse because he “can’t get a job, a
house, [a] car . . . because of his felony” conviction. Id. at 83. When J.C. was an
adult, Father said he molested her because she “was his first child and that he
did not know how to love [her] correctly and that drugs controlled his life[.]” Id.
at 84.
[3] In December 2020, Child was born to Father and S.C. (Mother). 1 Father
struggled with housing stability and registered as “homeless” on the Sex
Offender Registry four or five times between 2021 and 2025. Id. at 36. And
from May 2023 through March 2024, Father was incarcerated following a
possession of cocaine conviction; Mother was Child’s primary caregiver during
that time.
[4] In October 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) assessed a
report that alleged concerns for homelessness and Mother’s mental health. DCS
initially learned that Mother was leasing a home and could provide appropriate
shelter for Child. At that time, Father was not living with Mother and Child.
However, sometime during the assessment, Mother was admitted to a “mental
institution” for treatment. Id. at 14.
[5] On October 19, Father asked his adult daughter, J.C., to keep Child until “DCS
fell off his back.” Id. at 93. Although Father later asserted that Child was not
1 Mother died in March 2025.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 3 of 22 supposed to stay with J.C. long-term, J.C. believed the “intent” was for her to
keep Child longer. Id. at 76. When J.C. picked up Child, Father only provided a
car seat and a bag of diapers. Because Mother had services and Child had a safe
place to stay, DCS ultimately unsubstantiated the assessment with Father’s
safety plan “that he was not going to be around” if Child returned from J.C.’s
to Mother’s home. Id. at 140.
[6] While Child was with J.C., she discovered Child had a “yeast infection, [a]
UTI,” and about seven “green oozing” sores from “staph infection all over her
body.” Id. at 90, 78. Father had medication for the staph infection, but he did
not give it to J.C. until a couple of days after J.C. took Child. J.C. also observed
Child display “sexually maladaptive” behaviors including undressing dolls and
making them kiss, inappropriately touching J.C.’s daughter in the bathtub, and
“humping” a broomstick. Id. at 80, 81. On one occasion, J.C. found Child in
her room touching herself in a “sexually inappropriate way” with “her pants
under her knees[.]” Id. at 80. Another time, Child put two lip gloss tubes in her
pants and was “playing in her bottom with them[;]” J.C. clarified Child put the
tubes “[n]ot inside, but [was] just playing.” Id. at 82.
[7] In January 2025, DCS assessed a new report with concerns that Child was
sexually abused. Child, then four, underwent a forensic examination at Riley
Children’s Hospital that did not reveal “acute abnormal findings” of sexual
abuse. Id. at 175. Child also participated in a forensic interview but made no
disclosures of sexual abuse. When Family Case Manager (FCM) Haley Shipp
spoke with Father about the assessment, he smelled of “cigarettes and alcohol.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 4 of 22 Id. at 114. Father denied the reported allegations but disclosed that he was
living in his car. Because FCM Shipp had concerns regarding Father’s
substance use due to his criminal history, she asked him to complete a drug
screen, but he refused. FCM Shipp also learned that Father had a prior
substantiated assessment for sexual abuse of his older daughter, J.C. See App.
Vol. II p. 26.
[8] DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS because of parents’ inability,
refusal, or neglect to provide Child with necessities and Child permanently
resided in a household with Father, who had committed child molesting. On
January 28, the trial court authorized Child’s removal from Father and Mother.
Due to J.C.’s concerns about Child inappropriately touching her daughter,
Child was placed in kinship care with another relative. Prior to a factfinding
hearing on the petition, FCM Jessica Frye took over the case. Child underwent
an educational evaluation and was diagnosed with a “developmental delay in
language impairment categories.” Tr. Vol. II p. 52. She was recommended to
attend special education services and a developmental preschool.
[9] FCM Frye also referred Father to home-based casework, home-based therapy,
random drug screens (due to concerns about Father’s prior substance use), and
father’s engagement services. Father attended one therapy session. Because he
did not participate in the other services and discontinued therapy, he was
unsuccessfully discharged from services. Father also failed to communicate
with FCM Frye despite her weekly attempts to contact him; thus, she was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 5 of 22 unable to set up a child and family team meeting with Father. Then, after
Mother passed away in March, Father told FCM Frye to leave him alone.
[10] In May, DCS motioned for a hearing pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-
21-5.6 (the NRE statute), alleging reasonable efforts were not required because
Father was previously convicted of child molesting as described in section 5.6
and that Father was required to register as a sex or violent offender. DCS
requested the court find that reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Father “are
not required, proceed to disposition and order no services, and change the
permanency plan to adoption[.]” App. Vol. II p. 107.
[11] On May 16 and 21, the court held a factfinding hearing on the CHINS petition
and the NRE motion. Regarding the latter, Father argued a NRE finding is
discretionary and noted he had been rehabilitated since his conviction
approximately twenty years earlier. He also argued the NRE Statute violated
his constitutional right to due process and that a NRE finding was not in
Child’s best interests.
[12] While the parties awaited the court’s factfinding order, Father began
participating in therapy. He attended four sessions total, one in July and three
in August. On August 7, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS. The court
found Father was convicted of child molesting as the NRE Statute described
and was required to register as a sex offender under Indiana Code section 36-2-
13-5.5. Thus, the court found that reasonable efforts to reunify Child with
Father were not required. Thereafter, DCS canceled Father’s therapy referral.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 6 of 22 [13] On August 25, Father moved to reconsider the NRE finding, arguing “material
changes” since the May factfinding, including that he obtained housing and
engaged in therapy, and requested that DCS be ordered to provide services and
“case management tasks” including Child and Family Team meetings. Id. at
166, 167. At a hearing on Father’s motion, Father’s therapist said Father “had
to show me that he was going to show up to do the work and if I saw some
progress, then I would make a recommendation based on what I thought was
appropriate at the time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 228. The court denied Father’s motion to
reconsider the NRE finding and, in its dispositional order, again found that
DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify. In a separate
order, the court changed Child’s permanency plan to adoption. Father now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision I. Statutory Background and The NRE Statute
[14] As we recently summarized,
States, through their child welfare programs, are required to use “reasonable efforts ... to preserve and reunify families” in order to receive federal grants for foster care, prevention, and permanency. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B). However, states may codify aggravated circumstances under which a court may order that such reasonable efforts are no longer required. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). This requirement and these circumstances are codified in Indiana Code sections 31-34-21-5.5 (reasonable efforts) and 31-34-21-5.6 (no reasonable efforts).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 7 of 22 Matter of P.F., 268 N.E.3d 777, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Section 5.6, i.e. the
NRE Statute, lists instances in which a court may find that DCS is not required
to make reasonable efforts to reunify. In 2024, subsection 5.6(b)(2) was
amended to include, in relevant part, that reasonable efforts are not required if a
parent:
(C) is required to register:
(i) as a sex offender under 34 U.S.C. 20913; or
(ii) as a sex or violent offender under IC 36-2-13-5.5; or
(D) committed an offense described in IC 31-34-1-3 or IC 31-34- 1-3.5 against a child and the offense resulted in a conviction or a judgment under IC 31-34-11-2.
Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.6(b)(2)(C)-(D) (2024). The constitutionality of this
portion of the amended statute has yet to be interpreted by this court. Initially,
we note it is undisputed that Father is required to register as a sex offender
under Indiana Code section 36-2-13-5.5 and that he was convicted of
committing an offense described in Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3 against a
child, namely Class C felony child molesting pursuant to Indiana Code section
35-42-4-3(b) (2006).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 8 of 22 II. Due Process
A. Facial Constitutionality
[15] Father contends the NRE Statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied
because it violates his substantive and procedural due process rights. 2 Whether
a statute is constitutional on its face is a question of law that we review de
novo. G.B. v. Dearborn Cnty. Div. of Family and Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1031
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Further, legislation is presumed to be
constitutional, and any reasonable doubts are construed in favor of
constitutionality. Id.
Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Similarly, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution stipulates that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The analysis for federal and state substantive due process claims is identical. G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1031. In order to succeed on [his] claim, [Father] “must show either that the [NRE Statute] infringes upon a fundamental right or liberties deeply rooted in our nation’s history or that the law does not bear a substantial relation to permissible state objectives.” Id.
Matter of S.G., 67 N.E.3d 1138, 1145-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
2 The State argues Father’s facial challenge is waived because he raises this challenge for the first time on appeal. See Plank v. Cmty. Hosps of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013) (failure to challenge constitutional claims before the trial court results in waiver on appeal). However, appellate courts are not prohibited from addressing waived constitutional claims, and we exercise our discretion to review Father’s claim here. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 9 of 22 [16] “Our courts have long recognized that parents have a fundamental right to
family integrity, and ‘the right to raise one’s children is essential, basic, more
precious than property rights, and within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.’” Id. (quoting G.B., 754 N.E.2d
at 1031). Because the NRE Statute eliminates the efforts DCS must make to
reunify a child with a parent after the State has intervened in and restricted that
fundamental right, we have strictly construed the NRE Statute. Strict scrutiny
requires that the statute “serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.” Id.
[17] We have previously held the NRE Statute is narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling state interest of protecting a child’s welfare and, thus, is
constitutional. See id.; G.B., 754 N.E.2d 1027. We do not re-visit whether the
State has a compelling interest in protecting child welfare. The question we are
presented with here is whether the new subsections, i.e. those regarding a
parent with a Sex Offender Registry requirement or a conviction for child
molestation as described, are narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest.
See I.C. § 31-34-21-5.6(b)(2)(C)-(D). Father argues the NRE Statute contains
“no limiting language circumscribing the circumstances under which it should
or should not be applied.” Appellant’s Br. p. 44. Specifically, Father contends
the statute judges parents based on “past mistakes” “regardless of the
remoteness” of that conduct. Id. at 43. We cannot agree.
[18] Subsections 5.6(b)(2)(C) and (D) are narrowly tailored to include only those
parents who are required to register on Indiana’s Sex Offender Registry or who
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 10 of 22 have been convicted of child molestation against another child. “Sex offenders
are a serious threat[.]” McCune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (2002).
“When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than
any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault.” Id.
at 33, 122 S.Ct. 2017 (citing University of New Hampshire, Crimes Against
Children Research Center, Fact Sheet 5; Sex Offenses 27; U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, p. 6
(1997)). In addition, our court has previously observed that “child molesters
molest children to whom they have access.” Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864,
874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Smith v. State, 779 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002), trans. denied), trans. denied. As such, these subsections are “not more
intrusive than necessary to protect the welfare of children” who reside with
parents that have been convicted of child molestation or are required to register
as sex offenders. G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1032.
[19] Because subsections 5.6(b)(2)(C) and (D) are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, they do not violate substantive due process under the
Indiana and United States Constitutions. Moreover, a court’s NRE finding is
discretionary during a CHINS proceeding, and, even if a court finds that
reasonable efforts to reunify are not required, DCS and the court “are still
required to follow the statutory procedures in both CHINS and termination
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 11 of 22 cases.” G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1032. Thus, we find no procedural due process
violation on the face of the statute. 3
B. Constitutionality As Applied
[20] Father claims application of the NRE Statute to the facts of his case violated his
substantive and procedural due process rights. 4 “[D]ue process protections at all
stages of CHINS proceedings are vital because every CHINS proceeding has
the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their
children.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (citations and quotations
omitted). The process due in a CHINS proceeding is the same as what is due in
a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding. Id.; In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d
1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012). To determine whether a parent was afforded due
process, “we balance the three factors laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Mathews [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)]: ‘(1)
the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by
the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest
supporting use of the challenged procedure.’” G.P., 4 N.E.3d at 1165-66
(quoting K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257). “[T]he resulting balance of those factors
3 For the first time on appeal, Father also argues the NRE Statute is void for vagueness. Father’s claim is waived. See Plank, 981 N.E.2d at 53. Waiver notwithstanding, we have previously concluded the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the NRE Statute because it is not a penal statute. See Matter of S.G., 67 N.E.3d 1138, 1146-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
4 On appeal, Father labels his as applied challenge as a procedural due process violation; however, the content of his argument focuses on both his substantive right to parent Child and his procedural right to fair proceedings.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 12 of 22 must provide ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct.
893). Because the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the
proceeding, we focus on the risk of error created by DCS’s and the trial court’s
actions. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.
[21] Father undisputedly received adequate notice of DCS’s motion for a NRE
finding, and the court held a hearing where Father presented evidence in
opposition to that motion. Father presented witnesses on his behalf, including
his own father and his older son, who indicated a belief that Father did not pose
a danger to Child. He also asked the court to consider the remoteness of his
conviction. DCS presented evidence, however, in opposition to Father’s
position including that Father had a prior substantiation for sexual abuse of J.C.
and that Child was displaying “sexually maladaptive” behaviors after being in
Father’s care. Tr. Vol. II p. 80. Father also had the opportunity to cross-
examine every witness at the factfinding and NRE hearing. In addition, Father
admitted he was required to register as a sex offender in Indiana and he had a
prior conviction for molesting his older daughter, J.C. After considering the
arguments of both parties, the trial court entered a NRE finding.
[22] Thus, Father was given an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and
manner: he has not identified any procedural irregularity to persuade us that his
procedural or substantive rights were violated by entry of the NRE finding.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that DCS’s or the court’s actions created a risk
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 13 of 22 of error in the CHINS proceeding. As such, application of the NRE Statute to
the facts of Father’s case did not violate his due process rights. 5
C. DCS’s Arguments
[23] Before turning to Father’s subsequent issues, we elect to address DCS’s
responsive arguments. DCS attacks Father’s substantive due process claim,
alleging Father’s claim “begin[s] with the flawed assumption that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental right to reasonable
reunification services.” Appellee’s Br. p. 22. Asserting the Fourteenth
Amendment does not provide Father with a fundamental right to state-
sponsored services and that “the NRE [Statute]. . . does not impact Father’s
ability to parent Child[,]” DCS thus argues the rational basis review should
apply to the NRE Statute. Id.
[24] DCS also contends “the cases that have found a procedural due process
violation based on DCS’s failure to provide reasonable services are wrongly
decided.” Id. at 23. DCS reasons that we have “consistently misapplied” the
governing law for due process, failing to first consider that “[t]he existence of a
liberty interest depends on whether a person facing governmental action has a
legitimate claim of entitlement under the Fourteenth Amendment or state law.”
5 Father also argues “DCS itself may have waived application of the NRE statute by adopting its own written policies.” Appellant’s Br. p. 38. Although Father recites many of DCS’s policies thereafter, he provides no authority to support his assertion that the existence of those policies amounts to waiver of a statute’s applicability, and we find none. This argument is, thus, waived. See Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring arguments on issues to be supported by cogent reasoning with citation to authorities).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 14 of 22 Id. at 45, 46. Ultimately, DCS asserts that “the NRE Statute does not impact
Father’s protected liberty or property interests” because “the constitution does
not guarantee parents facing CHINS proceedings a right to reasonable efforts,
so the Fourteenth Amendment creates no entitlement to services.” Id. at 51.
[25] We disagree with DCS’s characterization of these issues and its attempt to
minimize the impact that the NRE Statute has on Father’s fundamental rights.
DCS’s position assumes that a parent’s fundamental right to care, custody, and
control over his children is readily separable from the reasonable efforts DCS is
generally obligated to provide throughout a CHINS case. But that analysis is
not so simple. It is well-settled that “due process protections at all stages of
CHINS proceedings are vital because every CHINS proceeding has the
potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of their
children.” Matter of D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting
G.P., 4 N.E.3d at 1165 (quotations and citations omitted)), trans. denied.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has observed that “CHINS and TPR—are
deeply and obviously intertwined to the extent that an error in the former may
flow into and infect the latter” and “procedural irregularities . . . in a CHINS
proceeding may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due
process with respect to a potential subsequent termination of parental rights.”
G.P., 4 N.E.3d at 1165. Our precedent is clear that a fundamental right—i.e. a
parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child—is at stake
at every stage of a CHINS case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 15 of 22 [26] Because our legislature’s mandate that DCS shall provide reasonable efforts to
reunify families is predicated on DCS’s removal of a child from her home (and,
thus, the initiation of CHINS proceedings), it is indisputable that a parent’s
entitlement to reasonable efforts is inextricably linked to a parent’s fundamental
rights via the CHINS case. In other words, but for DCS’s interference with a
parent’s fundamental right, there would be no CHINS proceedings to trigger
entitlement to reasonable efforts. This nexus between a parent’s fundamental
right and reasonable efforts is why we have held that, to protect due process in a
termination proceeding, “DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve
and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case[,]” T.W., 135 N.E.3d at 615,
even though the CHINS statute requiring reasonable efforts to reunify “is not a
requisite element of our parental rights termination statute[.]” In re H.L., 915
N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[27] It follows that when DCS moves for a NRE finding, which may be made “at
any phase of a [CHINS] proceeding[,]” a parent’s fundamental right to parent
his child is again impacted by the government’s exercise of authority over his
child. I.C. § 31-34-21-5.6(a). So, while an individual’s right to state-sponsored
services or reasonable efforts may not be fundamentally protected on its own,
parental rights are fundamentally protected and inevitably impacted by whether
DCS provides such efforts after removing his child from his care. Therefore, we
continue to strictly construe whether the NRE Statute violates a parent’s
substantive due process rights. See G.B., 754 N.E.2d at 1031-32; S.G., 67 N.E.3d
at 1145.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 16 of 22 [28] Further, DCS contends T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, was wrongly decided for three
reasons: first, that we misapplied the Mathews balancing test without first
considering whether the parent in that case had an entitlement to services;
second, that we have required process beyond constitutionally protected
minimums; and third, that we treated a “run-of the-mill issue[] of statutory
compliance as [a] constitutional violation[].” Appellee’s Br p. 49. We disagree.
[29] As we explained above, reasonable efforts or the lack thereof by a NRE finding
are inextricably intertwined with DCS’s restriction of a parent’s fundamental
rights during a CHINS proceeding. Because a parent’s fundamental liberty
interest was at stake in T.W., the first step of Mathews, i.e. determining whether
a protected Fifth Amendment interest was at stake, was implicitly met. For the
same reason, T.W.’s discussion of reasonable efforts focused not on whether
DCS complied with the reasonable efforts statute, but on whether DCS’s
irregularities in providing reasonable efforts or not violated that parent’s liberty
interests. And, in applying the three-factor Mathews balancing test in T.W., we
followed our Supreme Court’s precedent applying the same to CHINS and TPR
proceedings. See G.P., 4 N.E.3d at 1165-66. The T.W. court did not misapply
the Mathews test to evaluate a parent’s due process claim in the context of a
TPR case.
III. NRE Finding and Motion to Reconsider
[30] Next, Father asserts the trial court abused its discretion by entering a NRE
finding on the facts of his case. Because the term “may” in a statute ordinarily
implies a permissive condition and a grant of discretion, we review a court’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 17 of 22 NRE finding for an abuse of that discretion. See Key v. State, 48 N.E.3d 333, 337
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“may” implies permissive condition and grant of
discretion); see also S.G., 67 N.E.3d at 1144 (concluding trial court’s entry of
NRE finding was not an abuse of discretion). We also review a trial court’s
decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion.
Matter of Est. of Lewis, 123 N.E.3d 670, 673 (Ind. 2019). “A trial
court abuses its discretion only if its decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Matter of N.E., 228
N.E.3d 457, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
[31] As discussed above, the trial court may enter a NRE finding if a child’s parent
has been convicted of child molesting as described in the NRE Statute or is
required to register as a sex offender under Indiana Code section 36-2-13-5.5. In
addition, the court was required to consider the best interests of Child when
making its NRE determination. Ind. Code § 31-10-2-2 (2019).
[32] Father does not dispute that he was convicted of child molesting as described in
the NRE Statute or that he is required to register as a sex offender under section
36-2-13-5.5. Further, Father does not argue that the trial court failed to consider
Child’s best interests in entering a NRE finding. Instead, Father argues the
passage of time since his conviction, Child’s negative forensic exam, and
testimony of some witnesses regarding “their beliefs that Father posed no
danger” to Child are all facts and circumstances that disfavor the NRE finding.
Appellant’s Br. p. 38. We are not persuaded by Father’s argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 18 of 22 [33] Regardless of the timing, Father has a prior DCS substantiation for sexual
abuse. While Child was staying with J.C., she displayed “sexually
maladaptive” behaviors including touching herself and J.C.’s daughter in a
sexually inappropriate manner and acting out sexual gestures. Tr. Vol. II p. 80.
And although Child’s January 2025 exam did not reveal signs of acute sexual
abuse, the evidence shows that exam was not dispositive of whether Child was
sexually abused prior to October 2024 when she began staying with J.C.
Indeed, the forensic examiner who saw Child testified that, not only could
acute signs have healed by the time of the exam, but “[o]ftentimes there are no
signs of acute sex abuse” during forensic exams. Id. at 175. In addition, the
court considered other factors concerning Child’s best interests among the
seventy-three factual findings it made in this case, including Father’s housing
instability, his non-participation in services, and Child’s medical and
developmental conditions. Considering these facts alongside Father’s criminal
conviction for child molestation and his lifetime registration requirement, we
cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in finding that reasonable efforts
to reunify Child with Father were not required. For the same reasons, the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion to reconsider its NRE
finding.
IV. Sufficiency of Evidence
[34] Father also appears to challenge whether the evidence was sufficient to support
the CHINS finding. In doing so, Father concedes that Child “was a CHINS as
of the time of the May 2025 Fact Finding Hearings[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 33.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 19 of 22 However, Father asserts that by August 2025, when the adjudication order was
entered, the “circumstances had changed to the point the CHINS conditions
had lifted or could have been alleviated[.]” Id. at 30 (formatting altered). In
support of his argument, Father notes he had housing by August 2025 and that
Child’s developmental issues showed signs of change. He also claims his
“therapist would later testify he was on the verge of making a recommendation
for Father to have parenting time with [Child].” Id. at 32. In any event, the
therapist made no such recommendation before the factfinding order was
issued. And although Father argues he sought services without coercive
intervention after the factfinding, he does not argue that Child’s needs would
have been met without the court’s coercive intervention before the Child was
adjudicated a CHINS. Father also does not challenge any factual findings or
conclusions as clearly erroneous. For all these reasons, Father’s argument is not
a challenge to the CHINS finding and is waived.
[35] Nevertheless, the evidence was sufficient to prove Child was a CHINS. In
reviewing a trial court’s CHINS determination, “we do not reweigh evidence or
judge witness credibility” but consider only the evidence supporting the trial
court’s judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d
574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). Where, as here, the court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law, we consider “first, whether the evidence supports the
findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 578
(internal quotations omitted). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.”
Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 20 of 22 [36] The trial court concluded Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-
34-1-1, which provides in pertinent part that a child is a CHINS if her
“condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered” due to the parent’s
“inability, refusal, or neglect” to provide the child with necessities, and the
child needs care or treatment the child is not receiving or is unlikely to receive
without coercive intervention of the court. The court also determined Child was
a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3(a) because she resided in a
household with an adult who was convicted of child molesting under Indiana
Code section 35-42-4-3, and she needed care she was not receiving without
coercive intervention of the court. Finally, the court found that Father did not
rebut the presumption under Indiana Code section 31-34-12-4.5 that Child was
a CHINS because she lived with Father, who was convicted of an offense
described in Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3.
[37] Here, the evidence showed that Father did not have adequate shelter for Child
at the time of her removal or by the factfinding. When Child went to her sister’s
home in October 2024, Child had a yeast infection, a UTI, and a staph infection
and displayed sexually maladaptive behaviors. Initially, Father provided only a
car seat and one bag of diapers for Child; a couple of days after Child went to
her sister’s, Father provided medication only for Child’s staph infection. He did
not provide J.C. with money or other necessities for Child. And, despite his
initiation of therapy post-factfinding, Father refused to participate in services to
remedy the conditions for removal prior to factfinding. All this evidence
sufficiently supports the CHINS adjudication. Further, it is undisputed that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 21 of 22 Father has a criminal conviction for child molestation as described in Indiana
Code section 31-34-1-3. He thus failed to overcome the presumption that Child
is a CHINS. The evidence sufficiently supports Child’s CHINS adjudication.
Conclusion [38] Subsections 5.6(b)(2)(C) and (D) do not violate constitutional due process rights
on their face or as applied to Father. The court did not abuse its discretion in
making a NRE finding in the instant case or in denying Father’s motion to
reconsider that finding. And the evidence sufficiently proved Child is a CHINS.
[39] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Daniel G. Foote Foote Law Office Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General
Evan M. Comer Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE – GUARDIAN AD LITEM Katherine Grace Meger Kelsey Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-JC-2526 | May 12, 2026 Page 22 of 22