IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana In re B.W. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services A.P. (Mother) and C.W. (Father), FILED Appellants-Respondents Jul 03 2025, 9:12 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court v. Court of Appeals and Tax Court
Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner
July 3, 2025 Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-JC-2557 Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court The Honorable Lisa G. Reger, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 10C04-2406-JC-000116
Opinion by Judge Felix Judge Foley concurs. Judge Mathias concurs in part and dissents in part, with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 1 of 17 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] A.P. (“Mother”) reported ongoing domestic violence committed by C.W.
(“Father”) to the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Specifically,
Mother alleged Father slapped her in the face, hit her with a folding chair,
cracked her windshield, broke her phone, and brandished a firearm. After
making her report to DCS, Mother took B.W. (“Child”) and left the home they
shared with Father. Despite the seriousness of the allegations, Mother and
Child returned home, prompting DCS to file a petition alleging Child was a
child in need of services (“CHINS”). The trial court adjudicated Child a
CHINS and entered a dispositional order removing Child from the home and
requiring Mother and Father to comply with certain requirements. Mother and
Father both appealed, and we consolidated their separate appeals. Mother and
Father raise the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the CHINS disposition was clearly erroneous; and 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing its dispositional order.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] On December 27, 2019, Child was born to Mother and Father. On June 7,
2024, Mother and Child went to the Clark County DCS office to request help
because “[Mother] was being abused emotionally, financially and physically.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 2 of 17 Tr. Vol. II at 23. Mother spoke with Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Peyton
Medley and alleged that Father “slapped her in the face in front of the Child . . .
cracked the windshield of [Mother’s] car with [Child] in the car . . . broke
[Mother’s] phone . . . [and] hit [Mother] in the head with a folding chair . . . .”
Id. at 24. Mother also claimed that, on June 6, Father brandished a firearm
during an argument between Mother and Father, and Child saw the firearm.
Mother and Child also reported concerns with Father’s excessive alcohol usage,
and, at the time of the factfinding hearing, Father had a pending criminal
charge for allegedly operating a vehicle while intoxicated while Child was a
passenger in the car. During the June 7 meeting, Child also “disclosed
Domestic Violence in the home,” Joint Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 39, so
Mother and FCM Medley discussed the need to keep Child safe, and Mother
made arrangements to stay with a family member.
[4] On or about June 16, Mother and Child returned to live with Father. After
learning of their return, DCS obtained emergency custody of Child. When
FCM Medley removed Child from the home, Mother “said thank you and
stated that the[y] needed help, her and [Father].” Tr. Vol. II at 76.
[5] During the initial hearing, Mother agreed that Child should remain outside of
her care. Mother and Father were offered services but declined to participate.
During the CHINS factfinding hearing, Mother testified that her June 7
statements to DCS were untrue and due to mental health issues and jealousy.
Mother denied Child witnessed any acts of domestic violence, and denied any
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 3 of 17 domestic violence occurred in that last 12 months. However, Father’s
testimony paints a different picture:
Q: You and [Mother] argue sometimes?
A: Everybody does.
Q: During the times that you argue is [Child] present?
A: No.
Q: The child was never present during any . . .
A: Not majority of the time! ! [sic]
Q: Alright. Talk to me a little bit about that. When she is present, what
does that look like?
A: When she’s present, we don’t, I mean it’s not like the rest of arguing
where we’re throwing stuff or hitting each other or whatever . . . .
Tr. Vol. II at 67. This is not the first time Mother has made very specific claims
of vicious acts of domestic violence only to later recant her statements. For
instance, in 2020, Mother alleged that Father grabbed her by her hair, threw her
to the ground, and punched her in the face. Father was charged but not tried
for the incident after Mother recanted the allegation to the prosecutor’s office to
have the charges and no contact order dropped. During the June 7 meeting
with FCM Medley, Mother discussed the 2020 incident and, in regards to her
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 4 of 17 recanting, admitted that she “lied to have the no contact order dropped.” Id. at
26.
[6] On September 6, the trial court determined Child was a CHINS. The trial
court’s decision included 28 findings concerning Father’s criminal history,
domestic violence between the Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”), and
the Parents’ drug and alcohol use. Significantly, the trial court found that
“Mother’s return to the home places [Child] at unacceptable risk of witnessing
further domestic violence.” Joint Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 68. This appeal
followed. 1
Discussion and Decision 1. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err by Adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1
[7] Mother and Father challenge the CHINS determination under Indiana Code
section 31-34-1-1. That section provides that in order to adjudicate a child a
CHINS thereunder, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
1 Mother and Father filed separate appeals. Father filed a Motion to Consolidate these appeals, and the Motion was granted.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 5 of 17 (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. Although there is “a certain implication of parental fault
in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS
adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services.
Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part
of a particular parent.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010).
[8] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if the trial court’s decision was
clearly erroneous. In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re D.J.,
68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record
facts do not support the findings or if [the trial court] applies the wrong legal
standard to properly found facts.” Id. (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578). “[W]e
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. (citing D.J., 68
N.E.3d at 577–78). When, as here, a trial court enters findings and conclusions
sua sponte, we review any issue not covered by the findings “under the general
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 6 of 17 judgment standard,” which means we will affirm “on any legal theory
supported by the evidence.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)
(citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). Furthermore, we accept as
true any findings that Mother and Father do not challenge on appeal. See R.M.
v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing
Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.
[9] On appeal, Mother argues that DCS failed to show that Mother seriously
endangered Child and that Child’s needs would not be met without
intervention. In making her arguments, Mother does not specifically challenge
any of the trial court’s findings, so we take them all as true, see R.M., 203
N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). Father did challenge specific
facts, but all of his arguments are clearly invitations for us to reweigh the
evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134
N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).
For instance, Father challenges findings related to Mother’s June 7 report to
DCS of domestic violence, 2 claiming the trial court should have believed her
2 In particular, Father challenges the following findings regarding domestic violence:
4) Mother admitted to DCS on June 7, 2024, that she was the victim of domestic violence by Father. 5) Mother stated that the relationship with Father was physically, mentally, and financially abusive. 6) Mother indicated that Father has an alcohol problem, and that when he is impaired, he is violent. 7) Mother indicated that she has been struck by Father in front of the child on more than one occasion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 7 of 17 sworn testimony denying the allegations rather than the initial report. Father
Appellant’s Br. at 17–19. However, the trial court was free to discount
Mother’s testimony recanting her most recent allegations of ongoing domestic
violence given her admission to FCM Medley that she lied when she recanted
the allegations she made regarding the 2020 domestic violence incident and
Father’s testimony that, when Child is not present, Mother and Father’s
arguments include “throwing stuff or hitting each other or whatever,” Tr. Vol.
II at 67.
[10] We reiterate that a CHINS adjudication is not about parental fault; it is simply
a determination that the child needs services. N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. Here,
the trial court found there is evidence of domestic violence in the home, and
that Child has witnessed the violence. In K.B. v. Indiana Department of Child
Services, a panel of this court held that “a child’s exposure to domestic violence
can support a CHINS finding.” 24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)
(citing N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106). The trial court need not “wait until a child is
physically or emotionally harmed to intervene; rather, a child may be
determined to be a CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition is
endangered.” Id. (citing In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).
8) Mother admitted that Father brandished a firearm at Mother during the most recent domestic violence incident. Joint Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 67–68.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 8 of 17 [11] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
juvenile court’s decision, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred in
concluding that (1) the abuse Mother described on June 7 did occur, (2)
Mother’s denials regarding the violence on June 7 were not credible given her
recantation of the 2020 incident and admission that that recantation was
untruthful, and (3) Child’s return to the home creates an “unacceptable risk of
witnessing further domestic violence[.]” Joint Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 68.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Entering the Dispositional Order
[12] Mother next challenges the dispositional order. After a child is adjudicated a
CHINS, the trial court holds a dispositional hearing to consider “placement of
the child . . . [and t]he necessity, nature, and extent of the participation by a
parent . . . in the program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.” I.
C. § 31-34-19-1. Mother argues the juvenile court erred by (a) imposing certain
requirements and (b) placing Child outside the home. We address each
argument in turn.
a. Dispositional Requirements
[13] A trial court has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services
in which a parent is required to participate” following a CHINS determination,
but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was
[sic] revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012)
(citing A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009)). Thus, we review a trial court’s order of services and conditions in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 9 of 17 a CHINS case for abuse of discretion. See In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180–81
(Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s action is
“against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or
the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” A.C. v. State,
144 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d
215, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).
[14] As an initial matter, we note that DCS argues Mother waived her appellate
challenge to the dispositional requirements by failing to object to them in the
trial court. We disagree. In support of its waiver argument, DCS cites to In re
N.G., in which our Supreme Court held that a parent waived her due process
claim after she failed to object in the trial court and her counsel told the trial
court the contested matter was resolved. 51 N.E.3d 1167 (Ind. 2016). Here,
Mother made no such concession to the trial court and tendered her own
proposed dispositional order which was not adopted by the trial court. DCS
also cites to Plank v. Community Hospitals of Indiana, Inc. in support of waiver,
but that case involved a constitutional challenge to a statute, not dispositional
requirements. 981 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. 2013). The statute at issue in Plank was
known to the appellant at the time of the trial, id. at 53–54, unlike the
dispositional requirements entered here.
[15] Without any discussion of the specific requirements included in the proposed
order submitted by DCS, the trial court made an in-court ruling adopting DCS’s
proposed order as submitted and gave Mother no opportunity to object. We
liken the appeal of the dispositional requirements to an appeal of probation
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 10 of 17 conditions or a criminal sentence, “which we may review ‘without insisting that
the claim first be presented to the trial judge.’” Piercefield v. State, 877 N.E.2d
1213, 1218 (Ind. Ct App. 2007) (quoting Kincaid v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1008, 1010
(Ind. 2005). Accordingly, we review Mother’s challenges to the dispositional
requirements.
[16] Mother argues that the trial court “imposed several requirements on her
unrelated to the behavior or circumstances revealed by the evidence.” Mother
Appellant’s Br. at 10. For instance, Mother claims the requirement to “[n]otify
the [FCM] of any arrest or criminal charges for any household member within
five (5) calendar days of said change” was not sufficiently related “to the
behavior or circumstances revealed by the evidence” because it is not limited to
Father’s existing criminal history. Id. at 10 (quoting K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258).
This argument lacks any merit. The State has an interest in ensuring the Child
is sheltered from criminal behavior, and we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in recognizing this.
[17] Next, Mother claims the requirement to “[a]llow the [FCM] or other service
providers to make announced or unannounced visits to the home of the child,
permitting entrance into the home to ensure the safety of the child and to make
the child available to the FCM and/or GAL/CASA” cannot stand because the
child was removed. Mother Appellant’s Br. at 11. Child was removed from the
home because there was evidence that Child was present for multiple domestic
violence episodes. Given the goal of this case is reunification, we cannot agree
that this requirement represents an abuse of discretion or that the trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 11 of 17 should have waited until after Child returned to the home. Before making the
determination to permit Child’s return to the home, it will be incumbent on
DCS to ensure that no violence is occurring or has recently occurred. One of
the best methods of making that determination is to inspect the home for signs
or evidence of continuing violence.
[18] Mother also challenges the requirement to provide a safe, clean home for Child
because there was no evidence that Child lacked food, failed to attend
appointments, or that she was not hitting developmental milestones. Mother
cites to our decision in In re V.H., 967 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), to
claim that this language is boilerplate and should not be allowed to stand. In
V.H., the mother was ordered to institute a protection plan to protect her
daughter from abuse, but there was no evidence that V.H. had been abused. Id.
at 1074. In the present case, there is evidence Child witnessed domestic
violence in the home, so the requirement to maintain a safe home is related to
the evidence and not an abuse of discretion.
[19] Next, Mother challenges the prohibition to consume alcohol because there is no
evidence she abused alcohol. Mother claims this “boilerplate language” cannot
stand, and she relies on In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), for that
proposition. However, the present case is distinguishable. In A.C., the parent
had no drug history but was ordered to participate in drug treatment. Id. at 464.
That is, the parent in A.C. was required to affirmatively do something unrelated
to the CHINS adjudication that could have delayed reunification. Id. Here,
Mother is simply ordered not to consume alcohol, which does not present a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 12 of 17 delay in reunification efforts and is related to the factual finding that Mother
has a “history of substance abuse, specifically for cocaine and alcohol.” Joint
Appellants App. Vol. II at 68. Therefore, ordering Mother to abstain is not an
abuse of discretion.
[20] Additionally, Mother claims the requirement to ensure Child is fed, clothed,
supervised, and attending school is unsupported by the evidence because there
was no evidence that Child lacked food, failed to attend appointments, or that
she was not hitting developmental milestones. We agree the record supports
the contention that Child is fed, attends appointments, and is hitting
developmental milestones. The trial court’s inclusion of this requirement was
unrelated to “some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the
evidence,” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258, and was therefore an abuse of discretion.
[21] Lastly, Mother challenges the following requirement (hereinafter referred to as
the “Enrollment Requirement”):
If a program or programs is/are recommended by the [FCM] or other service provider, enroll in that program [within] a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days and participate in the program as scheduled by that program without delay or missed appointments. If required to obtain an assessment, arrange to complete that assessment within thirty (30) days.
Joint Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 13. In particular, Mother claims the
Enrollment Requirement violates her procedural due process rights.
Procedural due process requires “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 13 of 17 time and in a meaningful manner.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257 (quoting
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
[22] Mother argues the Enrollment Requirement cannot stand because the trial court
impermissibly delegated its “ability to create orders that [Mother] must follow or
suffer potential ramifications.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). We disagree
with Mother’s characterization of the Enrollment Requirement. The
dispositional order clearly requires Mother to complete a parenting assessment,
substance abuse assessment, and domestic violence assessment as well as
complete all recommendations associated with those assessments. Mother had
notice of those requirements as they were included in the predispositional
report. The Enrollment Requirement allows DCS to recommend specific
programs to attend and complete based upon the recommendations of the
assessments. Moreover, the trial court remains involved in the CHINS case,
conducting periodic reviews, see, e.g., I. C. § 31-34-21-2; thus, Mother can easily
petition the trial court if she disagrees with any recommendation. For the
foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the
Enrollment Requirement.
b. Child Removal
[23] Mother argues that the out-of-home placement violates her “fundamental right
to raise” Child. Mother Appellant’s Br. at 16. This right, however, is
tempered with the best interest of Child. See K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39
N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (citing Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family &
Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005) (“[P]arental rights are not absolute, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 14 of 17 and the best interests of the child must prevail.”). “If consistent with the safety
of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a
dispositional decree that . . . is least disruptive of family life . . . .” I.C. § 31-34-
19-6(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
[24] Although Mother claims the least restrictive option would have been leaving
Child in the home and requiring Parents to participate in services, Mother and
Father’s downplaying of the violence and failure to participate in suggested
services until after the CHINS adjudication illustrates the need for more
coercive measures. Child was removed from the home because there was
evidence that Child was present for multiple domestic violence episodes. The
specific instances were particularly violent and involved Father slapping
Mother in the face, cracking Mother’s windshield, breaking Mother’s phone,
and striking Mother in the head with a folding chair. There are also concerns of
alcohol and firearm use. After the emergency custody order was issued,
Mother thanked DCS for taking Child and did not object to Child’s out of home
placement during the initial hearing. Although Mother has had second
thoughts since making her report, we are not obliged to do the same. The trial
court determined that it was in Child’s best interests to be removed from the
home while Mother and Father make efforts toward reunification, and we
agree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by removing Child from the
home.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 15 of 17 Conclusion [25] In sum, the trial court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child a CHINS and
did not abuse its discretion by removing Child from the home. We affirm the
trial court on these issues. However, the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering Mother to ensure Child is fed, clothed, supervised, and attending
school, so we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to strike
that requirement from its dispositional order as to Mother. We affirm all other
conditions imposed by the trial court in its dispositional order.
[26] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
Foley, J., concurs. Mathias, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with separate opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT – MOTHER Christopher Sturgeon Jeffersonville, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT – FATHER Andrew R. Rutz Lorch, Naville and Ward, LLC New Albany, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Mathias, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 16 of 17 [27] I concur with the majority in all but its decision to remove that part of the
dispositional order that requires Mother to ensure Child is fed, clothed,
supervised, and attending school. Mother objects to these components of the
order, citing a case which ordered programming for alleged criminal conduct
that was neither admitted nor proved. That case is easily distinguishable from
the case before us.
[28] The facts make clear that the circumstances in this household that resulted in
Child’s removal were chaotic and volatile, including domestic violence in the
presence of Child.
[29] It is always hoped that CHINS removals are temporary. These components of
the dispositional order seek to ensure stability in the home to which Child may
be returned and are, therefore both appropriate and necessary.
[30] I would therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-JC-2557 | July 3, 2025 Page 17 of 17