Childress v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedFebruary 18, 2025
Docket4:21-cv-00237
StatusUnknown

This text of Childress v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner (Childress v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Childress v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, (N.D. Ala. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION JOSHUA R. CHILDRESS, ) ) Claimant, ) ) vs. ) Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-237-CLS ) MICHELLE KING, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Joshua R. Childress commenced this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, affirming the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and, thereby, denying his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. For the reasons stated herein, the court finds that the Commissioner’s ruling is due to be affirmed. I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the

Commissioner, and, whether correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983). The court may not “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence,

or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security, 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (alteration supplied). II. DISCUSSION

Claimant contends that the Commissioner’s decision is neither supported by substantial evidence, nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically, claimant asserts that: (1) the ALJ’s description of claimant’s residual functional

capacity conflicts with the testimony of the vocational expert; (2) the ALJ did not accord proper weight to the opinion of Michael Wood, M.D., and, therefore, improperly discounted the severity of claimant’s hernias; (3) and, the decision of the

Eleventh Circuit in Harner v. Social Security Administration, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022), should be overruled.1 A. The Residual Functional Capacity Determination

The ALJ found that claimant suffered from the severe impairments of incisional hernia, nonincarcerated supraumbilical hernia, scoliosis, chronic pain disorder, hypertension, morbid obesity, depression, panic disorder, and specific

1 Doc. no. 24 (Plaintiff’s Opening Brief), at 2. 2 learning disorder.2 The ALJ further found that those severe impairments and related symptoms significantly limited claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.3

Accordingly, the ALJ was required to determine claimant’s residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Following review of claimant’s medical records and his testimony during an

administrative hearing, the ALJ determined that claimant retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work, with the following limitations: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally

balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; and, avoid all exposure to dangerous moving machine parts and to unprotected heights.4 The ALJ further found that claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; adapt to

routine and infrequent workplace changes; make simple work-related decisions; maintain attention and concentration for two-hour periods; perform jobs that do not require a specific production rate; and, occasionally interact with co-workers and the general public.5

As claimant correctly points out, that residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

2 R. 58. 3 R. 59. 4 R. 62 (emphasis supplied). 5 Id. 3 determination differed from the one initially posed by the ALJ to the vocational expert (“VE”) in the following hypothetical question during the administrative

hearing conducted on May 24, 2022: [P]lease consider an individual of the Claimant’s age, education, and work history. The individual can perform a full range of light work, however, the individual should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,, [and] can frequently climb ramps and stairs, [and] balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. The individual should avoid all exposure to dangerous moving machine parts and to unprotected heights, can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions, can adapt to routine and infrequent workplace changes. The individual can maintain attention and concentration for two-hour periods at a time, can make simple, work- related decisions, [and] can perform jobs that do not require a specific production rate. The individual can have occasional interaction with the general public, and frequent interaction with co-workers. R. 109-10 (alterations and emphasis supplied). The VE confirmed that, with those limitations, claimant could not perform any of his past work,6 but there still existed other jobs in the national economy that he could perform. Specifically, the VE testified that claimant could perform the work of a photocopying machine operator, marker, and non-postal mail clerk.7 The ALJ then modified the hypothetical question to include only occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, and occasional interaction 6 Claimant’s past work included: dishwasher; fast-food worker; short-order cook; forklift operator; stacker; and, semi-truck driver. R. 109. 7 R. 110. 4 with co-workers.8 The VE testified that, with those additional limitations, claimant would be able to perform the job of photocopy machine operator and marker, but the

number of mail clerk positions would be reduced by at least thirty percent.9 The VE opined that claimant also could perform the duties of an inserting machine operator.10 Based upon the VE’s responses, the ALJ concluded that claimant could

perform the requirements of the following occupations: photocopy machine operator, with 17,917 jobs nationally; marker, with 262,683 jobs nationally; non-postal mail clerk, with 55,521 jobs nationally; and, inserting machine operator, with 2,461 jobs

nationally. Claimant contends that those findings are in error, because the ALJ’s ultimate RFC determination restricted claimant to occasional balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, and crawling, whereas the hypothetical posed to the VE

provided for frequent performance of those activities — i.e., the RFC assigned by the ALJ was more restrictive. Claimant asserts that, therefore, the ALJ’s finding that claimant could perform other work, considering his RFC, is not supported by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).11

8 Id. 9 R. 111. 10 Id. 11 That regulation provides, in relevant part: (g) Your impairment(s) must prevent you from making an adjustment to any other work. 5 Claimant contends that the ALJ’s more restrictive RFC precludes claimant from performing the job duties of the occupations identified by the VE during the

hearing. As an initial matter, claimant notes that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) code numbers cited by the VE and by the ALJ for the photocopying machine operator job were incorrect. During the hearing, the VE cited “DOT

208.685-027” for that position. However, there is no occupation listed in the DOT that corresponds to that code number. In her decision, the ALJ cited “DOT 208.685- 026” for the photocopying machine operator job, but that code number corresponds

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