Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago

65 N.E. 470, 199 Ill. 579, 1902 Ill. LEXIS 2870
Illinois Supreme Court·Decided October 25, 1902·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Magruder

delivered the opinion of the court:

As will appear by reference to the case of Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 484,) the North Chicago City Railway Company was organized by special charter on February 14, 1859, and the Chicago West Division Railway Company was organized by special charter on February 21, 1861. The street railroads in the north and west divisions of the city were operated by these two railway companies until 1886 in the north division of the city, and until 1888 or 1889 in the west division of the city. About the year 1886, the North Chicago Street Railroad Company was organized under the general Incorporation law of this State, when, as is claimed by appellant, the North Chicago City Railway Company leased its property to the North Chicago Street Railroad Company. The latter company continued to operate its lines until about July 1, 1899, when, as is claimed by the appellant, the North Chicago Street Railroad Company leased its properties to the appellant. About the year 1888 or 1889, as is claimed by the appellant, the Chicago West Division Railway Company executed a lease of its properties to the West Chicago Street Railroad Company, and the latter company operated its lines until they were leased on July 1, 1899, to the appellant, as will appear by reference to the case of Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 484).

While the North Chicago Street Railroad Company and the West Chicago Street Railroad Company were engaged in the operation of street railway lines, various companies were organized in the north and west and north-east and north-west portions of the city as feeders to, or extensions of, the North Chicago Street Railroad Company and the West Chicago Street Railroad Company. The companies so organized were seven or eight in number, and will be mentioned hereafter. On or about February 27, 1899, they passed into the hands of the Chicago Consolidated Traction Company, a corporation organized under the general Incorporation act of this State on January 28, 1899. The appellant contends that it was not obliged to furnish transfer tickets under and in obedience to section 1723 of the Revised Code of Chicago to passengers, passing from any one of the lines, which it admits itself to be the owner of, to any one of the lines, constituting the Chicago Consolidated Traction Company, or from any one of the latter lines to any one of the lines, which it admits itself to be the owner of.

So far as any of the questions, involved in the case of Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, (ante, p. 484,) apply to the facts of the eight cases now under consideration, they have been already sufficiently discussed in the opinion in the last named case, and such discussion will not be here repeated. There are only two questions, involved in the present cases, in addition to the questions already decided in the other case, which disposed of three actions, based upon the same sections of the Revised Code of the city. The first of these questions is, whether the Chicago Consolidated Traction Company bears such a relation to the appellant company, as to make the two companies come within the purview and meaning of section 1723, so far as transfer tickets are concerned. Under this branch of the case, appellant claims that it was justified in refusing "the transfer tickets, upon the ground that it does not own, lease or operate or run the cars from which, or to which, as the case may be in each action, transfers were demanded and refused, but that said cars are owned, operated and run by another company, distinct and separate from the appellant, to-wit, the Chicago Consolidated Traction Company. On the other hand, the.appellee claims that the organization known as the Chicago Consolidated Traction Cotnpany is a mere “dummy;” that, if it has any legal existence at all, it is only on sufferance by the appellant, the Chicago Union Traction Company; that it is suffered to continue to preserve its technical legal existence only to subserve private interests, and not to subserve any public interest, nor to perform the public duties imposed upon it by the State when the State created it; that its duties to the public have been usurped and are being performed by the Chicago Union Traction Company; that the latter has absolute control, defacto, of all the property of which said Consolidated company may have a dry, technical, legal title; in a word, that, defacto, the Chicago Union Traction Company owns, operates and runs the cars for the conveyance of passengers over all the lines of street railway in the city of Chicago, which, for purposes of its own, it chooses to operate under the masqne of the name of the said fictitious Chicago Consolidated Traction Company; that the facts in the record must be viewed and examined, not from the point of view of a creditor or stockholder, in privity with the fictitious entity known as the Chicago Consolidated Traction Company, but from the point of view of the public to whom appellant owes great and important duties, the faithful performance of which is, in contemplation of law at least, appellant’s guiding thought; that the city council has the power to deal with facts within the limits of its jurisdiction as it finds them, whatever may be the legal rights of the State, of stockholders, or creditors; that one corporation may be, defacto, running and operating a line of street railway in the city of Chicago, although the title to that property may be de jure in another corporation.

The second question involved in this case is, whether the effect of the ordinance known as sections 1723 and 1725, if enforced over both the lines of appellant and the lines of the so-called Chicago Consolidated Traction Company as one system of railway, will be to so cut into the earnings of appellant as to constitute a taking of its property. Under this branch of the case the appellant contends that the ordinance if enforced, as has been done in these eig'ht cases, will deprive it of its property without due process of law, upon the alleged ground that the maximum rate of fare, fixed in the ordinance at five cents for a continuous trip, is unreasonable; that is to say, that its practical operation and effect will be to so cut into the earnings of the company, that there will be not only no profit for the stockholders, but an actual loss.

First—So far as section 1723 of the Revised Code of Chicago, passed by the common council on April 8, 1897, fixes the maximum rate of fare to be charged by street railroad companies within the limits of the city at five cents for each passenger over twelve years of age, and half fare for each passenger over seven and under twelve years of age, for one continuous trip, its validity is not here involved, but has been passed upon in the other case.

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Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago, 65 N.E. 470, 199 Ill. 579, 1902 Ill. LEXIS 2870 (Ill. 1902).

65 N.E. 470 (Chicago Union Traction Co. v. City of Chicago) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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