Chewning v. Shumate
This text of 32 S.E. 544 (Chewning v. Shumate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Under the terms of the will, as above set out, each of the daughters of the testator took a vested remainder in the estate of their father, subject to be divested by her death without leav[753]*753ing issue. The words “ and the heirs of their bodies” are words of limitation and not of purchase. Mrs. Ayers, being one of the daughters and having a vested remainder in the land, had the right to dispose of her remainder as soon as tire will went into effect. The question as to the meaning of “bodily heirs” and such expressions in such a will as this has been so often discussed by this court that we deem it unnecessary to do more than refer to the able discussion and reasoning of Mr. Chief Justice Bleckley in the case of Ewing v. Shropshire, 80 Ga. 374, where he deals, in part of his opinion, with the identical question now before the court, and decides that these words are words of limitation and not of purchase, and that the first taker takes an absolute fee. See also the cases of Whatley v. Barker, 79 Ga. 790; Craig v. Ambrose, 80 Ga. 134; Griffin v. Stewart, 101 Ga. 720.
Judgment affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
32 S.E. 544, 106 Ga. 751, 1899 Ga. LEXIS 744, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chewning-v-shumate-ga-1899.