Chevron Products Company v. Advanced Corrosion Technologies & Training, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: May 27, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-09095
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 CHEVRON PRODUCTS COMPANY, Case No. 20-cv-09095-CRB

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 10 v. DISMISS

11 ADVANCED CORROSION TECHNOLOGIES & TRAINING, LLC, 12 Defendant. 13 Plaintiff Chevron Products Company (“Chevron”) is suing Defendant Advanced Corrosion 14 Technologies & Training, LLC (“ACTT”) over ACTT’s contractual performance and services at 15 the Chevron Richmond Refinery. ACTT now moves to dismiss Chevron’s claim for negligent 16 misrepresentation and Chevron’s demand for punitive damages. As explained below, the Court 17 dismisses the negligent misrepresentation claim without prejudice and the demand for punitive 18 damages with prejudice. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 A. Underlying Contract 21 Chevron owns and operates the Chevron Richmond Refinery in Contra Costa County, 22 California. See Compl. (dkt. 1) ¶ 5. On August 1, 2017, Chevron entered into a contract with 23 ACTT in which ACTT “was required to perform non-destructive Positive Material Identification 24 (“PMI”) inspection services on piping circuits” at the refinery. Id. ¶ 6; Mot. (dkt. 23) Ex. A. The 25 purpose of these inspections was to “verify the chemical composition of metal alloys” and to 26 “prevent industrial accidents and maintain safety.” Compl. ¶ 6; Mot. at 3. The contract also 27 contained a provision limiting liability. It states: 1 In no event shall either Party be liable for, and each Party shall release the other Party from 2 and against, any punitive damages, exemplary damages, loss of profits, loss of opportunity, 3 or loss of production which may be suffered by such Party in connection with the performance of this Contract; provided that third party damages subject to indemnification 4 under this Contract will not be limited by this Section 7.4. 5 Mot. Ex. A at 32. 6 Chevron “paid ACTT approximately $4.6 million pursuant to the contract” for its services. 7 Compl. ¶ 6. ACTT’s contractual obligations began in November 2017. Id. ¶ 10. Chevron alleges 8 that it “subsequently discovered that a significant percentage of ACTT’s performance of the 9 [s]ervices was deficient” and that Chevron “gave ACTT notice of these deficiencies promptly after 10 discovery of these deficiencies and in October 2018 correspondence to ACTT.” Id. ¶ 11. 11 Specifically, Chevron claims that ACTT “failed to properly identify the metallurgy of the 12 components within the scope of its work.” Id. ¶ 11; see also Opp’n (dkt. 26) at 6. Chevron also 13 alleges that ACTT made false representations because its reports “contained inaccurate 14 descriptions of the work” and because ACTT “did not perform some of the PMI Services that it 15 stated had been performed.” Compl. ¶ 14; Opp’n. at 6. Chevron states that because of ACTT’s 16 failures and misrepresentations, Chevron “was required to hire a third party to redo and properly 17 perform the entirety of the Services.” Id. ¶ 15. 18 B. Current Suit 19 Chevron brought suit against ACTT for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, 20 and negligent misrepresentation. See generally Compl. ACTT now moves to dismiss Chevron’s 21 fourth cause of action, negligent misrepresentation, and Chevron’s demand for punitive damages. 22 See Mot at 1–2. Chevron has filed an opposition and ACTT has filed a reply. See Opp’n; Reply 23 (dkt. 28). 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be 26 dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 27 Rule 12(b)(6) applies when a complaint lacks either “a cognizable legal theory” or “sufficient facts 1 2019). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “must presume all factual allegations of the 2 complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher 3 v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). “[C]ourts must consider the complaint 4 in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 5 motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 6 matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 7 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).1 8 If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give leave” to 9 amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court nevertheless has discretion to 10 deny leave to amend due to, among other things, “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 11 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of 12 the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 13 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 ACTT moves to dismiss the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and the 16 demand for punitive damages. Mot. at 3. ACTT argues that Chevron’s negligent 17 misrepresentation allegations are subject to, and fail to meet, the heightened pleading standard of 18 Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 3–5. Additionally, ACTT argues that the 19 contract’s “Limitation of Liability” provision precludes any demand for punitive damages. See id. 20 Chevron argues that its negligent misrepresentation claim must only meet, and has met, the more 21 lenient pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the contract 22 does not bar its demand for punitive damages. See Opp’n. ACTT is persuasive on both points. 23 A. Negligent Misrepresentation Pleading 24 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint generally must meet the pleading 25 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) and must have “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 26 the pleader is entitled to relief” so that defendants can have “fair notice” of the claim. Fed. R. Civ. 27 1 P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, a party alleging 2 fraud must meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Bly-Magee 3 v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001). Under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must make 4 allegations “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is 5 alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny 6 that they have done anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F. 2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). 7 These claims should allege “an account of the ‘time, place, and specific content of the false 8 representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.’” Swartz v. 9 KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 10 In California, “the elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation of a 11 past or existing material fact, (2) made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) 12 made with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable 13 reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.” Ragland v. U.S. Bank National 14 Assn., 209 Cal. App. 4th, 182, 196 (2012). 15 “The Ninth Circuit has not yet explicitly decided whether Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 16 standard applies to a claim for negligent misrepresentation.” Gilmore v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 17 75 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1269 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014). Moreover, district courts within the Ninth 18 Circuit are “divided on [this] question.” Njoku v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., Case No. 19-cv-07757- 19 JST, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221993, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2020). 20 In deciding whether to use a heightened pleading standard for negligent misrepresentation 21 claims, district courts have taken at least three different approaches. First, some district courts 22 have applied the heightened standard only if the specific allegations pleaded include fraud claims 23 or claims “based in fraud.” See, e.g., United States Capital v. AHMSA Int’l, Inc., Case No. 12- 24 6520 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20245, at *10 (N.D. Cal., Feb 14, 2013); Najarian Holdings 25 LLC v. Corevest Am. Fin. Lender, LLC, Case No. 20-cv-00799-PJH, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26 188667, at *14–15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2020). This approach requires the court to analyze the 27 pleadings on a case-by-case basis before deciding on the pleading standard. See AHMSA Int’l, 1 claim, if plaintiffs are alleging conduct “grounded in fraud . . . the pleading of that claim as a 2 whole must satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 3 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009). 4 Second, some courts have ruled that negligent misrepresentation always “sounds in fraud” 5 and is subject to a heightened pleading standard, even though “the claim does not require 6 demonstrating an intent to deceive or defraud.” See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Hon Hai Precision 7 Indus. Co., Case No. 19-cv-01279-LHK, 2020 WL 5128629, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2020); 8 Gilmore, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 1270. Additionally, some California courts have stated that both 9 “intentional and negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud.” See e.g., Daniels v. Select Portfolio 10 Servicing, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 4th 1150, 1166 (2016). Third, some courts have concluded that 11 Rule 9(b) “applies only to allegations of fraud and not to allegations of negligent 12 misrepresentation.” See, e.g., Peterson v. Allstate Indem, Co., Case No. SACV 11-1987 DOC, 13 281 F.R.D. 413, 415 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also South City Motors, Inc. v. Automotive Industries 14 Pension Trust Fund, Case No. 15-cv-01068-JST, 2015 WL 4638251, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 15 2015) (“Negligent misrepresentation differs with fraud in regards to one essential element: mental 16 state.”). 17 Because the Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the pleading standards for negligent 18 misrepresentation claims, and because negligent misrepresentation claims vary in degree, this 19 Court will use the case-by-case approach. 20 Although there is no explicit fraud claim in the complaint here, the complaint arguably 21 includes claims based on knowing misrepresentations. Chevron alleges that ACTT submitted 22 false reports to Chevron because ACTT signed reports even though “ACTT did not perform some 23 of the PMI Services that it stated” and that “the reports contained inaccurate descriptions of the 24 work that had been performed.” Compl. ¶¶ 38–39 (emphasis added). While Chevron alleges at 25 one point that “ACTT may have honestly believed that the representations in its reports were 26 true,” it also alleges that “ACTT had no reasonable grounds for believing the representations were 27 true when it made them” and that “ACTT intended that [Chevron] rely upon the representations” 1 See id. ¶ 7. “The Supreme Court of California has held that nondisclosure is a claim for 2 misrepresentation in a cause of action for fraud”2 and therefore “it (as any other fraud claim) must 3 be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b).” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1127. The Court concludes 4 that both the allegations of explicit misrepresentation and the allegations of nondisclosure here are 5 subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). 6 Chevron fails to meet Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard because the complaint does not 7 specifically allege the time, place, identities, and content of the misleading representations. See 8 Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764. Chevron alleges that ACTT failed to accurately report its work, but does 9 not specify which of the reports ACTT submitted during the year and a half that the contract was 10 in place were incorrect,3 who signed those incorrect reports, nor the specifics of what was 11 incorrect in the reports. See Compl. ¶¶ 37–44. Additionally, Chevron claims that some reports 12 contained work that was never done while other reports just misrepresented the work done, 13 without specifying which reports fell into each category. See Compl. ¶¶ 38–39. These allegations 14 are not specific enough to give ACTT notice of the “particular misconduct alleged” or give ACTT 15 the ability to defend itself against any specific charges. See Semegen, 780 F. 2d at 731. 16 Chevron asserts that it can provide more details for this claim if given an opportunity to 17 amend. See Opp’n. at 5. Therefore, the Court dismisses the negligent misrepresentation claim 18 without prejudice. 19 B. Contractual Waiver 20 Finally, ACTT argues that the contractual “Mutual Waiver of Punitive and Exemplary 21 Damages” bars punitive damages.4 Mot. at 6, Ex. A at 32. The Court agrees. Both Chevron and 22 ACTT agree that the relevant provision in the contract, Section 7.4, relates to any party’s liability 23 for damages suffered “in connection with the performance of th[e] Contract.” Mot. Ex. A at 32 24 (emphasis added); see Opp’n at 12. However, Chevron argues that its claims concern ACTT’s 25 2 Kearns involved fraudulent misrepresentation, not negligent misrepresentation. See Kearns, 567 26 F.3d at 1127. 3 It is not clear from the complaint how many reports ACTT filed during this time period: three? 27 Fifty? 1 || non-performance, and that non-performance is inherently different from performance of the 2 || contract. See Opp’n at 12. Not so. By alleging non-performance, Chevron is arguing that ACTT 3 || broke its contractual obligations, which is directly connected with the “performance of th[e] 4 || Contract.” See Mot. Ex. A at 32. Amendment would be futile. The Court therefore dismisses the 5 || demand for punitive damages with prejudice. 6 || IV. CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Chevron’s fourth cause of action without 8 || prejudice and DISMISSES Chevron’s demand for punitive damages with prejudice. 9 IT ISSO ORDERED. = 10 Dated: May 27, 2021 — CHARLES R. BREYER 11 United States District Judge 3s 12

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