Chester v. United States Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 11, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3321
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JASON PAUL CHESTER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-03321 (UNA) ) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) OF JUSTICE, ) ) Defendant, )

Memorandum Opinion

Plaintiff has filed a pro se complaint and an application for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 1, 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application and , for the reasons

below, dismisses this matter without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Puyallup, Washington, sues the U.S. Department of Justice. See ECF

No. 1 at 1, 5. Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. Attorney’s Offices, particularly the one located in the

Western District of Washington, have been negligent, interfered with his rights, and have

“perpetrated” crimes against him, causing him undue stress that has included a hospitalization and

rehabilitation. See id. at 1–3. He contends that several U.S. Attorneys have engaged in myriad

wrongdoing in various cases filed in the Western District of Washington, including intentional

disclosure of information and records, operating from a position of bias, improper revocation of

his passport, and failure to prosecute a “[t]errorist attack on [the] Islamic center of Tacoma.” See

id. at 1–4. He argues that these alleged actions are crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1001, and

complains that Defendant has failed to investigate or prosecute his criminal complaints. See id. at

2–4. He demands $25 million in damages. See id. at 5. Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule 8(a) requires complaints

to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–

71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8(a) standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claims

asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine

whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).

Additionally, “each allegation [in a pleading] must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(d)(1).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy these requirements. The complaint is difficult

to decipher and contains conclusory, seemingly unconnected statements with little to no supporting

context. See ECF No. 1 at 1–4. See Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169

(D.D.C. 2014) (“A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not

comply with the requirements of Rule 8.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A

complaint must be dismissed where it falls short of Rule 8 because it is “confusing, ambiguous,

redundant, vague and, in some respects, unintelligible.” See Brown, 75 F.R.D. at 499 (collecting

cases) (citation omitted).

In addition, Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify an applicable civil cause of action.

Federal Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of claims that have no legal basis, “without regard to

whether [the claims are] based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing

one.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n,

916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (authorizing sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (same for IFP cases). Here, Plaintiff cites 18 U.S.C.

§§ 242, 1001, but those are criminal statutes and do not afford a private right of action. See Prunte

v. Universal Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[The] Supreme Court has

refused to imply a private right of action in a bare criminal statute.”) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 248 F. Supp.

2d 17, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2003) (no private right of action under § 242); Lee v. U.S. Agency for Int’l

Devel., C.A.D.C.2017, 859 F.3d 74, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (no private right of action

under § 1001); Abou-Hussein v. Gates, 657 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2009) (same), aff’d, 2010

WL 2574084 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2021) (per curiam), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1201. Insofar as

Plaintiff seeks to compel a criminal investigation by federal law enforcement, “an agency’s

decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision

generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831

(1985).

This case is accordingly dismissed without prejudice. A separate order accompanies this

memorandum opinion.

Date: February 11, 2025 /s/______________________ AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge