Chester Marion Bell, IV v. State of Texas

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 31, 2012·No. 11-10-00279-CR·Published

Opinion

Opinion filed October 31, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-10-00279-CR __________

CHESTER MARION BELL, IV Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14054

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The jury convicted Chester Marion Bell, IV of capital murder of a child under six years of age. See former TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(8) (1993).1 The State waived the death penalty, and the trial court assessed an automatic punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life without the possibility of parole pursuant to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(2) (West 2011). We affirm.

1 Section 19.03(a)(8) now provides that a person commits capital murder if the person murders an individual under ten years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(8) (West Supp. 2012). Bell presents five issues for our review. In his first issue, Bell argues that he was denied his federal and state constitutional right to counsel and that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to appoint death penalty certified counsel under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.052 (West Supp. 2012). In his second issue, Bell asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to exclude extraneous offense evidence of sexual abuse of the victim when the State did not provide notice of its intent to offer evidence of sexual abuse as required under TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). Within this issue, Bell also argues that the trial court erred when it admitted photographs of the victim’s anal injuries over Bell’s objection under TEX. R. EVID. 403. Bell argues in his third issue that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it suggested that Bell sexually abused the victim. In his fourth issue, Bell contends that the trial court erred when it included an extraneous offense instruction in the jury charge. And in his fifth issue, Bell asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for capital murder. We will first address Bell’s fifth issue in which he contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for capital murder. We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences from it, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The testimony at trial showed that Bell lived in a bunkhouse on his father’s ranch with his girlfriend, Lauren, and her two-year-old son, B.O.M. On March 11, 2009, Lauren woke up early feeling congested and took some medicine. Bell left for work around 8:00 a.m. Lauren went back to sleep, and she and B.O.M. slept until 10:00 a.m. When they woke up, they snuggled in the recliner, ate cookies, and watched a movie. Lauren testified that B.O.M. was acting normally: “He was happy. He was interactive. He scolded me several times for taking a cookie without asking him first. He was -- he was Bubby.” Bell came home from work early, and Lauren asked him to watch B.O.M. and help him eat his lunch while she showered. Bell came into the bathroom twice while Lauren was in the shower to tell her that B.O.M. was not swallowing and that he was storing food in his cheeks

2 again. Lauren told Bell to just keep reminding B.O.M. to swallow. Bell came back into the bathroom a third time and told Lauren that he and B.O.M. were just going to go outside and play instead. Lauren got B.O.M. ready by putting on his jeans, vest, jacket, boots, and toboggan. B.O.M. gave her a kiss and a hug, grabbed Bell’s hand, and left. Lauren testified that, when B.O.M. left with Bell, he was still acting normally, he was happy to go outside, and he was walking and talking. While Bell and B.O.M. were outside, Lauren continued getting ready. When interviewed by police at the hospital, Lauren stated that she believed Bell and B.O.M. were outside for approximately ten minutes. At trial, she testified that she was extremely unfocused and stressed when she gave her statement to police and that she believed they were outside for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes. As she was getting ready, she heard yelling and started toward the door to see what was going on. Bell rushed into the house holding B.O.M. in his arms and yelling that B.O.M. was choking and that he did not know what to do. B.O.M.’s head was slightly back, his mouth was slightly open, his lips were a “purplish” color, and his body was “grayish blue.” Lauren noticed a bloody, grotesque wound under B.O.M.’s chin. She testified that, before B.O.M. left the house, the wound was a small reddish scrape. Lauren grabbed B.O.M. from Bell and did the baby Heimlich maneuver with no result. She yelled at Bell to call 911, but he did not want to call and instead wanted her to call. Lauren did not hear any sound from B.O.M.—no gurgling, no choking sound, nothing. He was completely unresponsive and limp and was not breathing. Lauren next tried the adult Heimlich, but again there was no response. She checked B.O.M.’s airway again, and he vomited. Lauren cleared his mouth and began CPR. During this time, she was still yelling at Bell to call 911. He was on the phone with someone else, but finally called. While he was on the phone with 911, he clicked over to answer another call; he eventually called 911 back. Lauren continued to do CPR until the response team arrived. She testified that she kept “thinking this isn’t choking. This isn’t like choking. I know choking. This isn’t like choking.” When the EMTs arrived, she got out of their way and tried to stay calm. Linda Calvin, a dispatcher for the Palo Pinto County Sheriff’s Department, received the 911 call from Bell at 1:28 p.m. Bell requested emergency medical attention for a two-year-old child that was choking and not breathing. Calvin sent an ambulance to the ranch. Calvin testified that Bell was excited and upset and did not want the child to die. During the 911 call,

3 Bell received another call and told her that he had to take that call. He hung up and called 911 back to reestablish the call. Robin Allen, the Mineral Wells Fire Chief, responded to the 911 call. Chief Allen oversees EMS in Mineral Wells and is a paramedic. When she arrived at the bunkhouse, Lauren was doing what appeared to be CPR on B.O.M. Chief Allen saw vomit on the carpet beside B.O.M.’s head and testified that it is normal for a person to vomit when receiving CPR. Bell was screaming and yelling and was very upset. Chief Allen testified that Bell’s behavior was not uncommon and that she had seen it before when responding to emergency calls. Bell and Lauren were also arguing about whether B.O.M. had been given the wrong dose of children’s Delsym, a cold medicine, or had been given a dose of adult Delsym. Chief Allen testified that giving him the wrong dose under either scenario was not consistent with the child’s condition. She asked Bell about B.O.M.’s condition prior to choking, and Bell reported that B.O.M. was fine. She picked B.O.M. up and took him to the ambulance. B.O.M.

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