Chery v. Enfield Police Dept.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedOctober 2, 2024
Docket3:19-cv-01592
StatusUnknown

This text of Chery v. Enfield Police Dept. (Chery v. Enfield Police Dept.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chery v. Enfield Police Dept., (D. Conn. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT --------------------------------------------------------------- x ELISEE CHERY, : : Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM : DECISION ON -against- : MOTIONS IN LIMINE : AND OBJECTIONS TO TOWN OF ENFIELD, : EXHIBITS AND : WITNESSES Defendant. : --------------------------------------------------------------- x 3:19-CV-1952 (VDO) VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge: As discussed during the pretrial conference held on October 1, 2024 before this Court, the Court rules on the motions in limine and objections to witnesses and exhibits as follows. I. MOTIONS IN LIMINE A. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine at ECF No. 118 Plaintiff’s motion in limine to preclude Defendant from “introducing evidence that contradicts or supplements Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment beyond the reason articulated by Defendant in Court filings” at ECF No. 118 is DENIED. As Defendant correctly points out in its opposition, nowhere in Defendant’s Answer does Defendant admit any facts regarding the reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment. Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on Defendant’s Local Rule 56(a) Statement is misplaced because judicial admissions only arise where facts are admitted in a pleading and, in any event, the cited paragraphs in the Defendant’s Local Rule 56(a) Statement do not purport to set forth the reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. By seeking to preclude Defendant from providing additional or conflicting evidence to support its reason(s) for Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff is, in effect, improperly asking the Court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence to support a particular claim or defense.

However, “[a]ssessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court[.]” Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 622 (2d Cir. 1999). B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine at ECF No. 129 Defendant’s motion in limine at ECF No. 129 to preclude Plaintiff “from offering any testimony, evidence or expert opinions regarding any diagnoses of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and/or that any

such diagnoses are causally related to the incidents which are the subject matter of this action” is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART. Defendant’s motion in limine as to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 102 is granted. Plaintiff may offer Exhibit 102 for the limited purpose of demonstrating that he sought mental health treatment after his termination, and not as evidence of any diagnoses, prognosis, or of causation, since Plaintiff’s treater, Gladys Anderson, is not available for cross-examination. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall redact from Exhibit 102 any mention of a diagnosis or prognosis

for inclusion in the finalized set of exhibits. Because Anderson has passed away and Plaintiff never sought to designate her as an expert, Defendant’s Daubert motion is denied as moot. C. Defendant’s Motion in Limine at ECF No. 130 Defendant’s motion to preclude Plaintiff from offering any testimony, argument, and/or evidence by the 23 newly disclosed witnesses at trial is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED AS MOOT IN PART.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), a party’s non-compliance with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26 generally results in the preclusion of improperly disclosed witnesses, unless the Court finds that the non-compliance was “harmless.” When evaluating whether to preclude witness testimony, the Court considers “the following factors: (1) the party’s explanation for the failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the importance of the testimony of the precluded witness(es); (3) the prejudice suffered by the opposing party as

a result of having to prepare to meet the new testimony; and (4) the possibility of a continuance.” Reilly v. Natwest Markets Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 269 (2d Cir. 1999). Considering these four factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the Rule 26(a) disclosure requirements was not “harmless” and thus, preclusion is necessary under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Plaintiff’s argument in opposition that new counsel was retained in November 2023 upon which further investigation was made into additional witnesses is not a sufficient explanation for his failure to comply with Rule 26(a), as Plaintiff

nevertheless had the last ten months to supplement his initial disclosures. Plaintiff also argues in his responses to Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s witness list that he identified these 23 witnesses in supplemental IEDP responses and/or responses to Defendant’s interrogatories. However, these actions do not erase Plaintiff’s non-compliance with Rule 26(a). Nor has Plaintiff reasonably explained why these late-disclosed witnesses’ testimonies are important and not cumulative of the testimony of other witnesses Plaintiff intends to call at trial. Finally, in light of the fact that trial is scheduled to proceed in two weeks, the delay in disclosing these witnesses prejudices Defendant. Accordingly, the following four witnesses shall not be allowed to testify at trial:

Lieutenant Podpolucha, Elvin Rodriguez, Jonathan Rodriguez, and Pastor Elijah Oliver. Plaintiff filed an updated witness list on September 30 that excludes the following witnesses: Sergeant Edgar J. Ferreras, Carthon Danzinger, Kevin Magdycz, Alex Peck, Lamarre Davidson, Eddie Paul, Tonie Brown, Eric Rodriguez, Marvin Riviera, Kenya Allen, Charles Carvines, Michelle Perry, Elizabeth Rivera-Pirela, Wallesca Rivera, Denis Blan, Levon Freeman, Ernest Landers, Jason Walker, and Joe Willis. Therefore, Defendant’s motion in limine as to these nineteen witnesses is denied as moot.

D. Defendant’s Motion in Limine at ECF No. 131 Defendant’s motion to preclude Plaintiff’s Exhibits 104-159, 167-182, 192-216, and 235-238 on the basis of belated disclosure is DENIED. However, the Court makes the following additional findings regarding Defendant’s objections to these exhibits: • Defendant’s objections to Exhibits 104, 117, and 119-159 are overruled. These exhibits are highly relevant and probative under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 as to whether Officer Roche was similarly situated to Plaintiff.

• Plaintiff states Exhibits 167-182 will not be presented to the jury. Accordingly, Defendant’s objections to Exhibits 167-182 are denied as moot. • Plaintiff states that he withdraws Exhibits 105, 106, and 192; therefore, Defendant’s objections to these exhibits are denied as moot. • Defendant’s objections to Exhibits 193-216 are sustained except for Exhibits 197 and 216. • Defendant’s objection to Exhibit 237 is sustained except for the Bates-stamped

pages ending in 2199 and 2200. • Defendant’s objection to Exhibit 238 is sustained. Hall’s letter of reference does not provide any relevant or probative information related to Plaintiff’s allegations, including his qualifications, in this case. • The Court’s Initial Discovery Protocols at ECF No. 5 delineate the categories of discovery the parties must produce in Initial Discovery, which include

“Plaintiff’s current resume(s),” and “[w]orkplace policies or guidelines relevant to the adverse action in effect at the time of the adverse action.” The Initial Discovery Protocols further provide that “[t]his Initial Discovery is not subject to objections except upon the grounds set forth in F.R.C.P.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Annie Hester v. Bic Corporation
225 F.3d 178 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp.
110 F.3d 898 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc.
983 F.2d 1204 (Second Circuit, 1993)
Bart v. Golub Corp.
96 F.4th 566 (Second Circuit, 2024)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Chery v. Enfield Police Dept., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chery-v-enfield-police-dept-ctd-2024.