Cherry-El v. Martin

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3456
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DWANE CHERRY-EL,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-3456 (RDM) v.

SABRINA MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Sabrina Martin and Arturo

Vazquez, whom he describes as “manager[s]” of what the Court understands to be Plaintiff’s

place of employment. Dkt. 1 at 1–2 (Compl.). The Complaint contains little to no factual detail.

Plaintiff alleges that his claim arises under the “Civil Rights Act of 1965,” Dkt. 1 at 3, and he

alleges as follows: “From the [beginning,] the manager has tr[ied] to bring harm and [to] create

a hostile work environment;” has engaged in “discrimination to the other employee;” has

“violat[ed] . . . policy by allow[ing] resident abusive work environment;” and has failed to

“allow . . . time to take train[ing] classes.” Id. at 4. He seeks $1,000,000 in damages and an

order “allow[ing] [him] to work in a non-abusive workplace” and requiring Defendants to “pay

money for . . . travel mileage.” Id. As another point in his complaint, Plaintiff refers to “being

treated as a “non-citizen” and to the non-payment of wages. Id. at 3.

Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will hold his pleadings “to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although there is no evidence that either of the two defendants have been served, the Court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where “it is patently obvious” that the plaintiff

cannot “prevail[] on the facts alleged in his complaint.” Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n,

916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Strunk v. Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.

2011). This is such a case.

Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, the Court can assume that he intends to bring

suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and not under the Civil Rights Act of 1965,

which protects voter from racial discrimination). But even with that benefit, the complaint does

not allege that the “hostile work environment” was the product of Plaintiff’s race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Moreover, according to the complaint,

Plaintiff and both defendants reside in Maryland. Dkt. 1 at 1–2. Under Title VII, however, an

action may be brought only in the judicial district in which the allegedly unlawful employment

practice occurred or where the relevant employment records are maintained, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

5(f)(3), and the complaint fails to identify any action that occurred in the District of Columbia or

any employment records that are maintained here.

Most fundamentally, the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requirement “ensures that the opposing

party will receive ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Jones v. Changsila, 271 F. Supp. 3d 9, 21 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 93 (2007)). “Where a complaint is insufficiently focused, it places an undue burden on the

defendant to answer or move[,] and it invites unnecessary delay and confusion in the

proceedings.” Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 109 F. Supp. 3d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2015).

2 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint contains a handful of vague, legal conclusions, such as the

conclusion that Defendants created a hostile work environment and discriminated. But, even

when considered liberally, the complaint offers no indication of what happened or of why that

series of events, if accepted as true, would entitle Plaintiff to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). It says nothing about what Defendants allegedly did to

create a hostile work environment or why they did so. It says nothing about the alleged

discriminatory treatment of “the other employee,” and, indeed, does not even indicate whether

that other employee was favored or disfavored or whether that discriminatory treatment was

based on the other employee’s race, color, religion, or national origin. It says nothing about who

employed Plaintiff and Defendants or about why Defendants’ status as “managers” subjects them

to liability under Title VII. And it says nothing about what job Plaintiff was hired to perform or

about what term, condition, or privilege of employment he was denied based on a protected

status. In short, the complaint leaves the reader without any notice regarding the nature or

substance of Plaintiff’s claim. As a result, it cannot withstand even minimal scrutiny under

Rules 8 and 12(b)(6).

The Court will, accordingly, DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rules 8 and

12(b)(6).

A separate order shall issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: February 26, 2025