CHEN v. WANG

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedApril 30, 2023
Docket3:22-cv-04708
StatusUnknown

This text of CHEN v. WANG (CHEN v. WANG) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CHEN v. WANG, (D.N.J. 2023).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

XIONGJIAN CHEN, : Plaintiff, ! ! Civil Action No. 22-4708 (MAS) (JBD) | MEMORANDUM OPINION PETER ZUGUANG WANG, ef al., Defendants. :

SHIPP, District Judge This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Peter Zuguang Wang (“Wang”), Cenntro Automotive Group Limited, a Cayman Islands corporation (“CAG”), Cenntro Enterprise Limited, a Hong Kong company (“CEL”), and Cenntro Electric Group Limited f/k/a Naked Brand Group Limited’s, an Australian corporation (“CENN”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Xiongjian Chen’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 21), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 24). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND! A. The Parties Wang is the former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of CAG, a designer and manufacturer of electric vehicles, and he is currently the owner and Chairman of CEL, CAG’s controlling stockholder. (Compl. {ff 10-11, ECF No. 1.) In 2021, CAG sold its operating subsidiaries to NBG, a publicly-traded Australian clothier, in exchange for NBG stock (the “Transaction”). (See id. J 26-27.) NBG also changed its name to CENN. (/d. J 27.) Wang serves as CENN’s Chairman and CEO. (/d. 4 10.) CEL holds a majority of seats on CENN’s Board of Directors. Ud. § 27.) Plaintiff is the former Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of CAG. Cd. $9 7-8, 15, Ex. A.) Plaintiff served in that position for approximately three and a half years, until his resignation on February 28, 2021. (id. § 22.) Thereafter, he transitioned to the role of a consultant to CAG, serving in that capacity until his termination on September 26, 2021. Ud. J 25.) B. CAG Grants Plaintiff Millions of Stock Options On July 15, 2017, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with CAG to serve as the company’s COO (the “Employment Agreement”). Ud. § 15.) According to Plaintiff, the Employment Agreement provided him “6,300,000 options with a $1.65 exercise price, from the available pool of CAG options, to be vested in five installments over four years (with 1,260,000 vested options

| The relevant facts are derived from the Complaint and assumed true for the purposes of this motion.

granted immediately, and 1,260,000 vesting each year thereafter)” (the “Employment Agreement Options”). Ud. J 9, 15, Ex. A.” At the same time, Plaintiff also purportedly entered into a separate agreement with Wang and CEL (“the CEL Agreement”) that provided Plaintiff with “2,700,000 options in CAG, with a $1.65 exercise price, to be provided by CEL and to be vested in five installments over four years (with 540,000 vested options granted immediately, and 540,000 vesting each year thereafter that Plaintiff provided service to CEL)” (the “CEL Agreement Options”). (/d. J 15, Ex. B.) In total, the CAG Employment Agreement and the CEL Agreement Options (together, the “Options Agreements”) granted Plaintiff 9 million CAG options. (/d.) C. CAG Purportedly Attempts to Restrict and Alter Plaintiff’s Options In December 2019, CAG’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) allegedly provided Plaintiff with a document titled “[CAG] Incentive Stock Option Agreement” (the “2019 Stock Option Agreement”). Ud. § 17.) By this time, 5.4 million of Plaintiffs 9 million options had vested. According to Plaintiff, the 2019 Stock Option Agreement materially differed from the Options

* It is undisputed that the Employment Agreement contains a Delaware choice-of-law provision. Delaware law allows a corporation to issue stock options. Telxon Corp. v. Bogomolny, 792 A.2d 964, 976 (Del. Ch. 2001) (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 157). “An option is a right to purchase a stock at a given price.” AT&T Corp. v. Lillis, 953 A.2d 241, 244 n.1 (Del. 2008). The designated price “is known as the exercise price.” Id. Typically, when a stock option “vests,” the option holder has an immediate right to “exercise” the option and convert it into stock by paying the exercise price. The option, therefore, does not automatically become stock at the time of vesting; the holder must usually take an action—the “exercise’—1to obtain the promised shares. See, e.g., Eluv Holdings (BVT) Ltd. v. Dotomi, LLC, No. 6894, 2013 WL 1200273, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2013) (drawing a distinction between the vesting and actual exercise of options); Knight v. Caremark Rx, Inc., No. 1750, 2007 WL 143099, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2007) (interpreting a stock option provision that provided for accelerated vesting upon an employee’s departure following a change in control of the entity). The terms of stock options must be “set forth or incorporated by reference in the instrument or instruments evidencing such . . . options.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 157 (West 2017). For Plaintiffs stock options, here, he alleges that the terms are contained in two agreements: the Employment Agreement and the CEL Agreement (as later defined). (Compl. Jf 15, 24.)

Agreements in three ways: (1) it stated that the Employment Agreement granted Plaintiff 5.8 million options rather than 6.3 million options; (2) it “made no mention of Plaintiff's CEL Options at all”; and (3) it stated that Plaintiff would forfeit his options if he did not exercise them within three months of his termination or disaffiliation from CAG. (/d. 18.) Plaintiff purportedly raised these issues to CAG’s CFO, but he received no response. (/d.) As a result, Plaintiff did not sign the 2019 Stock Option Agreement. (/d.) Four months later, on April 27, 2020, Wang organized a Zoom meeting among key CAG executives, including Plaintiff. Ud. § 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Wang proposed to convert all CAG options into shares of CAG common stock to “speed up the process of a prospective merger and facilitate the conversion of CAG’s options into publicly traded common stock.” (/d.) On May 5, 2020, CAG’s CFO alerted Plaintiff that CAG was “making preparations for a deal with a special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”).” Ud. § 20.) Plaintiff alleges that he “preliminarily agreed” with Wang to “return his 3,500,000 unvested Options to the available pool of CAG options and retain his 5,500,000 already-vested Options.” (/d.) According to Plaintiff, he understood that the already-vested Options would be “converted into freely tradeable stock in the prospective SPAC deal.” (/d.) The agreement was further contingent on Plaintiff's understanding from Wang that the vested Options would be “treated equally alongside other CAG options in a SPAC deal or similar transaction.” (/d.) In or around June 2020, CAG purportedly presented Plaintiff with an “Option to Stock Agreement” that would “cancel his existing vested and unvested Options in exchange for alternative share-based compensation to be issued once CAG’s stock was publicly traded.” (d. { 21.) According to Plaintiff, CAG’s Human Resources department represented that the Option to Stock Agreement did not include any forfeiture provision that would divest Plaintiff of options

upon his termination or disaffiliation from CAG. (/d.) Relying on CAG’s purported representations, Plaintiff signed the Option to Stock Agreement. (/d.) D. Plaintiff's Resignation as COO On February 28, 2021, Plaintiff resigned from his position as COO of CAG and assumed the role of a consultant to CAG. Ud. J 22.) On March 5, 2021, CAG’s CFO informed Plaintiff that the Option to Stock Agreement was purportedly invalid and requested that Plaintiff sign the 2019 Stock Option Agreement that he had previously refused to sign.

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CHEN v. WANG, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chen-v-wang-njd-2023.