Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

919 F.2d 158, 287 U.S. App. D.C. 49
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedNovember 16, 1990
DocketNos. 86-1433, 86-1434 and 89-1686
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 919 F.2d 158 (Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States Environmental Protection Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 919 F.2d 158, 287 U.S. App. D.C. 49 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge WALD.

WALD, Chief Judge:

Petitioner Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics Company, Inc. (“Union Carbide”)1 [51]*51challenges certain aspects of two sets of regulations governing the time for closure of hazardous waste facilities promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) pursuant to its authority under § 3004(a) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a). Union Carbide asserts that the regulations are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). More specifically, Union Carbide alleges that: (1) the EPA violated the express intent of Congress in promulgating the contested regulations; and (2) the EPA failed to justify adequately the regulatory choices it made, acted irrationally and inconsistently in adopting the regulations, and applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the need for the regulations. We conclude that the challenged regulations are consistent with congressional intent and that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in promulgating them. Accordingly, we deny the petitions for review.

I.Background

Subtitle C of the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-39b, creates a comprehensive framework for the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes. Under § 3004(a) of the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a), the EPA is required to “promulgate regulations establishing such performance standards [for hazardous waste facilities] as may be necessary to protect human health and the environment.” Under § 3005(a) of the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a), compliance with the performance standards promulgated by the EPA is required for issuance of a permit authorizing the construction or operation of a hazardous waste facility. Facilities already in operation as of November 19, 1980, known as “interim status” facilities, are required to meet all applicable performance standards promulgated under § 3004(a) and to apply for permits if they wish to remain in operation, but they are to be treated as having been issued a permit until final administrative action has been taken on their permit applications. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e).

In May 1980, the EPA promulgated final regulations under the authority of § 3004(a) pertaining to the closure of interim status hazardous waste facilities. See 45 Fed.Reg. 33,242-43 (May 19, 1980). In January 1981, the EPA issued final closure regulations for “permitted” facilities (i.e., those facilities actually issued permits under the RCRA); these regulations also revised the regulations governing interim status facilities. See 46 Fed.Reg. 2849-51, 2875-77 (Jan. 12, 1981) (the “1981 closure regulations”). The regulations required both permitted and interim status facilities to treat, remove, or dispose of all hazardous wastes within 90 days after receiving the final volume of “hazardous wastes.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.113(a), 265.113(a) (1981).2 Companion provisions required facilities to complete closure within 180 days after receiving the final volume of “wastes.” 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.113(b), 265.113(b) (1981).3 These provisions remained essentially unchanged until 1986.

Congress extensively modified the RCRA in the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (the “1984 Amendments” or “Amendments”). A major purpose of the 1984 Amendments was to discourage the use of land facilities for the storage and disposal of hazardous wastes. See RCRA [52]*52§ 1002(b)(7)/ 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(7). Among the specific provisions added by the Amendments was one requiring new surface impoundments and landfills used for the management of hazardous wastes to meet certain minimum technological requirements, including the use of double liners and leak detection systems. RCRA § 3004(o), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o). A related provision requires that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, surface impoundment facilities that were classified as interim status on November 8, 1984, must not “receive, store, or treat hazardous waste” after November 8, 1988, unless they are retrofitted to meet the minimum technological requirements applicable to permitted facilities. RCRA § 3005(j), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(j).

In March 1985, the EPA proposed revising §§ 264.113(b) and 265.113(b) to mandate closure within 180 days after the final receipt of “hazardous wastes,” rather than within 180 days after the final receipt of “wastes,” as provided in the original regulations. The Chemical Manufacturers Association (“CMA”) and Union Carbide argued in comments to the EPA on the proposed regulations that it was environmentally unnecessary to require closure of facilities that cease receiving hazardous wastes and intend to receive only non-hazardous wastes thereafter. They also argued that the proposed regulations were inconsistent with the 1984 Amendments because the legislative history of those amendments showed that Congress intended to authorize the receipt of non-hazardous wastes by unretrofitted surface impoundments that have ceased to receive hazardous wastes. See Comments of Union Carbide Corporation (May 14, 1985), reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 33-39; Comments of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (May 20, 1985), J.A. 40-62.

The EPA promulgated a final set of regulations in May 1986 (the “1986 closure regulations”) that included the contested revisions and made certain other minor changes to the prior regulations. See 51 Fed.Reg. 16,445, 16,452-53 (May 2, 1986).4 In response to the comments from Union Carbide and CMA, the EPA asserted that the closure provisions were environmentally necessary and rejected the argument that the revisions were inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the 1984 Amendments. Id. at 16,432. In addition, the EPA argued that the revisions merely clarified an ambiguity in the regulations as originally promulgated, which it claimed were in fact intended to require hazardous waste facilities to close within 180 days of their final receipt of hazardous waste. Id. at 16,431. Union Carbide, by contrast, asserts that the absence of the word “hazardous” from paragraph (b) of each relevant provision prior to the 1986 revisions allowed those facilities that stopped receiving hazardous wastes to continue receiving non-hazardous wastes, so long as they complied with the requirements of paragraph (a).

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Bluebook (online)
919 F.2d 158, 287 U.S. App. D.C. 49, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chemical-manufacturers-assn-v-united-states-environmental-protection-cadc-1990.