THOMSEN, Chief Judge.
This libel in rem against the Steamship Westhampton, her engines, boilers, etc., was filed on January 14, 1963, by Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, Trustee (Chemical), to foreclose what purports to be a first preferred mortgage on the vessel. The validity of the mortgage was questioned initially by the owner, Seatrade Corporation (Sea-trade), but its objections were withdrawn before the entry of the order of sale. The vessel was sold on March 28, 1963, for $2,602,000, the sale was confirmed, and the Marshal has paid the net proceeds of sale, amounting to $2,551,-104.14 into the Registry of the Court.
Pursuant to orders permitting interested parties other than the owner to contest the validity of the mortgage, several intervening libelants who assert liens on the vessel have challenged its validity.1
The issue is whether the so-called “First Preferred Mortgage and Indenture” (the mortgage) dated August 6, 1962, from Seatrade to Chemical, as Trustee, meets all the tests of a “preferred mortgage” set out in the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 911 et seq., particularly the requirement of sec. 922 (a) (5) that the mortgagee be a citizen [286]*286of the United States. Chemical is a citizen of the United States. Hamburgische Landesbank Girozentrale (Landesbank), .a corporation of Hamburg, Germany, the holder of the only bond issued under the deed of trust, is not a citizen of the Unit•ed States.
Contentions of the Parties
Chemical relies on sec. 911(5), which provides: “The term ‘mortgagee’, in the ease of a mortgage involving a trust deed and a bond issue thereunder, means the trustee designated in such deed.” Chemical’s principal argument is that the mortgage involves a trust deed and a bond issue thereunder, that Chemical is the trustee designated in the deed and is therefore the mortgagee, and that the citizenship of Landesbank is immaterial.
Objectors contend that the term “bond issue”, as used in sec. 911(5), means a public issue of bonds, and not a private issue or placement, where there is only one lender and bondholder; they argue that this construction of the Act is supported by the legislative history of the relevant statutes and by the early administrative rulings; and that it would thwart the purpose of the Act to permit a single alien lender, who could not qualify as a mortgagee, to use the device of a trust indenture and a single bond to circumvent sec. 922(a) (5), especially where the indenture gives the lender so great a measure of potential control as is given by the indenture in this case.2
Facts
Most of the facts have been stipulated, many exhibits have been filed, testimony has been taken, and the questions involved have been fully briefed and argued.
The SS Westhampton, a T-2 tanker, was converted to an ore carrier at the Stuelcken Shipyard in Hamburg, Germany, under a contract dated August 21, 1961, between the predecessor in interest of Stuelcken and Manuel E. Kulukundis, to whom Seatrade is successor in interest. The work was completed about August 1, 1962, but some months before that date Seatrade, which had become the owner of the vessel, indicated a de[287]*287sire to pay Stueleken only 30% of the contract price in cash, the balance to be secured by a mortgage on the vessel. Stueleken was a customer of Landesbank, a West German corporation with no place of business in the United States, and Landesbank agreed to finance the credit.
In May or June, 1962, Landesbank, which was a correspondent of Chemical, requested Chemical to act as “mortgagee-trustee” under a proposed preferred ship mortgage on the vessel. The reason for this request was that Landesbank was not a United States citizen and therefore could not qualify as a mortgagee under the Ship Mortgage Act, whereas Chemical could. 46 U.S.C.A. § 922(a) (5). Chemical agreed, and the original draft of the mortgage was prepared by New York attorneys for Landesbank. The Court finds as a fact that no economic or business reason affected the decision to use the form of transaction which was adopted in this case. The closing was held in New York on August 6, after Albrecht Roscher, a German attorney in the employ of Landesbank, had come to New York with a power of attorney from Landesbank to sign documents on its behalf.
Upon execution of the mortgage on August 6, Landesbank set up a deposit in favor of Stueleken in the amount of 70% of the shipyard’s bill. Seatrade acknowledged receipt of the consideration for the mortgage by letter to both Landes-bank and Stueleken. It is stipulated that so far as Chemical knows, Landesbank dispensed the proceeds of the loan to Stueleken in part payment of the latter’s charges to Seatrade for the conversion of the Westhampton. Stueleken confirmed to Seatrade that the deposit had been set up in Landesbank at Sea-trade’s request. The proceeds of the loan did not pass through Chemical’s hands and never left Germany.
A single bond in the full amount of the indenture, DM 3,836,000 (equivalent to approximately $960,000, but payable in German funds) was executed by Sea-trade, authenticated by Chemical, redelivered to Seatrade and then delivered to Landesbank by Seatrade. At the same time, Kulukundis, president of Seatrade, gave Landesbank his personal written guarantee of payment of the bond. Sea-trade also gave Landesbank ten promissory notes, each in the amount of an instalment of principal and interest, guaranteed by Kulukundis. There was a written agreement protecting Seatrade and Kulukundis against having to pay both the bond and the notes.
Landesbank has at all times been the owner of the bond. At the closing on August 6, Landesbank gave Chemical a written warranty that it was purchasing the bond for its own account as an investment, with the intention of holding the same until maturity, and agreed that it would not dispose of the bond or any portion thereof without Chemical’s consent. Such consent has never been requested or given. The bond was registered in the name of Landesbank as to both principal and interest. The indenture permitted multiple bonds not exceeding DM 3,836,000, but that is the usual practice even when it is intended that only a single bond will be issued initially. Landesbank never contemplated that its bond would be split into lesser denominations.
The bond was not registered under the Securities Act of 1933, because it was clearly exempt from registration as not “involving any public offering” within the meaning of sec. 4(1) of that Act.
The Westhampton is a vessel of the United States, as that term is used in the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 911 et seq. The mortgage was duly endorsed upon the vessel’s document on August 6, 1962, as required by sec. 922 (a) (1), and was recorded on the same day in the manner provided in sec. 921, as required by sec. 922(a) (2).
The mortgage indenture contains a number of clauses, customarily included in such documents, which give a considerable measure of control to Landes-bank as the sole bondholder. Sec. 4.1 provides that in case any one or more of the specified “events of default” shall [288]*288occur and be continuing, “then and in each and every such case the trustee may, and upon written request of the majority in principal amount of the bonds shall”, inter alia: 4.1(4), take and enter into possession of the vessel at anytime wherever the same may be, without legal process, and lease, charter, operate or otherwise use the vessel, accounting only for the net profits, if any, arising from such use; and 4.1(5), if it seems desirable, sell the vessel at any place and in such manner as the trustee may deem advisable, after specified notice, without a court proceeding. Most importantly, sec. 4.2 provides: “ * * * At any such sale, any holder of any Bonds may bid for and purchase such property and upon compliance with the terms of sale may hold, retain and dispose of such property without further accountability therefor.” Sec. 4.9 provides that after an event of default, the ship owner can cure the events of default only if the bondholders consent. Under sec. 5.5 the trustee may be removed at any time by the bondholder, but under sec. 5.4 any successor trustee must be a citizen of the United States within the meaning of the Act.
On January 2, 1963, Chemical cabled Landesbank that Seatrade had defaulted in sinking fund and interest payments due December 31, 1962. On January 11 Landesbank instructed Chemical to declare the loan due. Chemical did so by letter to Seatrade dated January 14. Pursuant to cabled instructions from Landesbank, Chemical filed the libel in this case on January 14. Landesbank thereafter advanced to Chemical funds to cover expenses incurred in preserving the vessel while it was in the Marshal’s custody. The vessel was sold under court order on March 28, 1963, and the proceeds have been paid into the Registry of this Court.
Applicable Statutes
The Ship Mortgage Act was enacted as part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which dealt with a great variety of maritime problems. The purpose and policy of the Act were stated in its first section, which, slightly modified, is now 46 U.S.C.A. § 861.3
That purpose is similar to the purpose of the Shipping Act, 1916, 4 which contained a number of provisions, still in effect, confining ownership and control of American-flag vessels to citizens of the United States. See. 2 (46 U.S.C.A. §§ 802 and 803) prescribes the requirements for corporations, partnerships or associations to qualify as citizens of the United States.5 Sec. 9 (46 U.S.C.A. § [289]*289808) makes it unlawful, without the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, “to sell, mortgage, lease, charter, deliver, or in any manner transfer” to any person not a citizen of the United States any vessel or any interest therein owned in whole, or in part, by a citizen of the United States and documented under the laws of the United States, or the last documentation of which was under the laws of the United States; subjects the vessel or any interest therein to forfeiture in case of a violation; and prescribes a criminal penalty for those who violate the requirements.6
The legislative history in notes 5 to 9 will be discussed below under the heading “Legislative History”.
The prohibition against mortgages to aliens was first inserted in see. 37 in 1918. It was explained by Mr. Alexander, Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, as follows (56 Cong.Rec. 8026):
“Not only sales and charters to foreigners, but mortgages to foreigners, without the consent of the Shipping Board, are made unlawful. This is because a mortgage has proved to be a common device by which foreign capital has sought to obtain control of American vessels.”
The prohibition, now 46 U.S.C.A. § 808, was enacted along with the Ship Mortgage Act as part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.7 While the Ship Mortgage Act was generally concerned with facilitating the private financing of vessels, its immediate objective was [290]*290to provide a basis for financing the disposal by the Government of war-built tonnage authorized under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.8
The legislative history of the Shipping Act, 1916, and of the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, does not disclose any specific statement that Congress intended either to permit or to exclude investments by aliens in bonds issued under trust deeds secured by mortgages to citizen trustees. There are instances in the legislative history of the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, however, indicating concern over vessels being transferred alien as a result of mortgages being held by aliens and the foreclosure of mortgages in foreign countries.9
The Ship Mortgage Act, as amended, is now codified as ch. 25 of Title 46, U.S.C., 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 911-984. Sec. 922(a) provides that a mortgage on a vessel of the United States shall have the status of a preferred mortgage if five requirements are met. The only dispute in this case is,about the fifth requirement that the mortgagee be a citizen of the United States. It appears from the stipulation and the evidence that all other, formal requirements of see. 922 have been met.
As noted above, sec. 911(5) provides:
“The term ‘mortgagee’, in the case of a mortgage involving a trust deed and a bond issue thereunder, means the trustee designated in such deed.”
The foreclosure provisions of the Act are set out in secs. 951-954.
The provisions prohibiting transfer to an alien of any rights under a mortgage appear in sec. 961. Sec. 961(d) and (e) read as follows:
“(d) No rights under a mortgage of a vessel of the United States shall be assigned to any person not a citizen of the United States without the approval of the Secretary of Commerce. Any assignment in violation of any provision of this chapter shall be void.
“(e) No vessel of the United States shall be sold by order of a district court of the United States in any suit in rem in admiralty to any person not a citizen of the United States.”
Discussion
1. Ordinary Meaning of “Bond Issue”
The term “bond issue” is not defined in the Ship Mortgage Act. The [291]*291evidence does not clearly establish that in 1920 10 or in 1962 11 the term “bond issue” was commonly understood either to include or to- exclude a private placement or private issue where there was only one bondholder. The terms “private placement” and “private issue” are sometimes used interchangeably; the evidence indicates that the term “private issue” is often used to include any issue where there are not more than ten bondholders.
Chemical has offered testimony that in the financial community the term “bond issue” is generally understood to include private issues and private placements whenever there is a trustee and a deed of trust with one or more bonds issued thereunder. The witnesses also testified that this was the generally accepted meaning in 1920. Their testimony is weakened, however, by the incredibly broad meaning two of the witnesses gave to the term, and by the fact that private issues and private placements were not so common in 1920 as they have become since the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933.
On the other hand, there is authority supporting Objectors’ contention that the term “bond issue” ordinarily has a narrower meaning. The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business Finance, Prentice Hall (1960), p. 73, defines “Bond Issue” to mean: “Class of bonds offered to the public at the same time. All the terms and conditions of the bond issue are set forth in the trust indenture”. At the hearings on the 1954 Amendments to Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, dealing with Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance, which will be discussed more fully below under the heading “Legislative History”, Rudolph Hecht, Chairman of the Committee of American Steamship Lines, who was sponsoring the bill, said:
The bond issue is really your second step. The shipowner or builder goes out and borrows $10 million in one lump, and it may well be that the Metropolitan Life, or John Hancock, or the New York Life, would be glad to keep the whole loan, and that is all there is to it.
“But on the other hand, if they fix a rate which is higher than some investment house would be willing to take it on for, and that investment house would then say, ‘All right. I will give you the $10 million and you make it payable to a trustee and I will split it up into small units and sell some of it to pension funds, and some of it to savings banks, and some of it to the individual investors in thousand dollar pieces, and then it may become a bond issue.’ It is entirely flexible.” House Hearing on H.R.8637, p. 18, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954).
The adjudicated cases do not furnish a clear definition. In Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 55 S.Ct. 31, 79 L.Ed. 176 (1934), discussing related problems under the Ship Mortgage Act, the Supreme Court said: “In placing ship mortgages upon a stronger basis as securities, the Congress had in mind, and expressly included, trust-deeds securing issues of bonds to the public.” 293 U.S. at 40, 55 S.Ct. at 37. The Court did not refer to private issues. On the other hand, in Moon Engineering Co. v. American Steamship Valiant Power, E.D.Va., 214 F.Supp. 555 (1963), Judge Hoffman held that the term “bond issue”, as used in sec. 911 (5), is not limited to a “public” bond issue. Judge Hoffman quoted from The Thomas Barium, but failed to refer to that portion of the opinion which is quoted above. The other cases cited by Chemical and by Objectors on this point are not particularly helpful.12
[292]*292In McLouth Steel Corp. v. United States, Ct.Cl., 319 F.2d 167 (1963), a case not under the Ship Mortgage Act, but cited by Chemical in support of the proposition (with which this Court agrees) that the instrument held by Landesbank in this case is a bond, the Court of Claims, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed (Ret.), said:
“The presence of an indenture and trustee is commonly regarded as differentiating a bond from a promissory note. The latter is a two-party agreement, whereas the presence of a trustee brings a third party into the transaction. Promissory notes are ordinarily used ‘when there is a private deal and only one or a very few investors.’ Childs, Long-Term Financing 119. On the other hand, an indenture and a trustee are normally used in connection with an issue which is designed to be widely traded, in order to safeguard the rights of the many holders who are often unable effectively to protect themselves and to eliminate the necessity for a separate contract each time the bond is traded. Id., at 91-93; Guthmann & Dougall, supra, at 170-71, 176-77; Baker & Cary, Cases on Corporations 1016 (3d ed. 1959); compare Berle & Warren, Cases on Business Organization 862.” 319 F.2d at 172.
The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that an indenture and a trustee are normally used where there are multiple bondholders, for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Reed, but that a trustee may sometimes be provided for when there is only a single bondholder, if a trustee furnishes some practical, economic advantage to the lender. The Court has found as a fact that no such economic purpose dictated the use of a trustee in this case, but that a trustee was used in an effort to avoid the provisions of sec. 922(a) (5).
This Court concludes that the commonly understood meaning of the term “bond issue” is not so clear that the purpose of the statute and its legislative history can be ignored. The Court must construe the applicable statutes, in the light of their legislative history, the legislative history of related statutes, and administrative rulings over the years.
2. Purpose and Intent of the Applicable Statutes
a. Legislative History
It appears from the Ship Mortgage Act as a whole, from its legislative history and from the legislative history of the 1916 and 1918 acts, that when the Ship Mortgage Act was adopted in 1920 Congress was primarily interested in building up and preserving an American merchant marine. Congress wished to encourage the investment by United States citizens in United States flag vessels, by way of mortgage loans as well as by equity investment. It also wished the vessels to remain American vessels, available for use by the government in case of war or other emergency. Congress did not object to some foreign money being invested in a vessel, so long as such investment by aliens did not endanger the control of the vessel by the American investors; but Congress wanted to be sure that, if and when it might become necessary, the United States government would be able to control the use of the vessels. Congress was concerned about the actual control of the vessels; it was interested in legal title only so far as legal title involves control, and was interested in mortgages because they involve potential control.
These conclusions are supported by the provisions of the Shipping Act, 1916, the amendments thereto, and the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, which are set out under the heading “Applicable Statutes”, above.13 They are also supported by the legislative history of the 1916, 1918 and 1920 Acts, cited under that [293]*293heading and set out in footnotes 6 to 9 of this opinion.
The legislative history, particularly the comment of the Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries that “a mortgage has proved to be a common device by which foreign capital has sought to obtain control of American vessels”, and the comments set out in footnotes 7 and 9, show the concern which Congress had in the potential control which might be exercised by mortgagees.
The legislative history also shows that the principal purpose of sec. 911 (5) is to provide for a situation where there are many bondholders, who ordinarily are not in touch with each other.14 Where there are numerous bondholders a trustee serves various useful functions, some of which are referred to in the reports and debates cited in footnote 14, and in the discussion under the heading: “Ordinary Meaning of ‘Bond Issue’ ”, above; see particularly the passage quoted from Mr. Justice Reed’s opinion in the McLouth Steel Corp. case, 319 F.2d at 172. Where there is a single lender, there is seldom any reason for a deed of trust and the issuance of one or more bonds thereunder, unless the lender contemplates the possibility of selling or transferring a part of his loan. That reason does not exist in this case.
Another purpose of sec. 911(5) may have been to prevent a possible forfeiture of the vessel under other provisions of the statutes, see secs. 808, 961(b), 961 (d), if some of the bonds, originally sold to citizens of the United States, should fall in the hands of aliens by inheritance, sale, or otherwise. This possibility is emphasized by a ruling made in 1924 by Chauncey G. Parker, General Counsel of the Shipping Board (the predecessor of Maritime), quoted below, which is the earliest administrative ruling cited or found.
b. Administrative Rulings
In his 1924 ruling the General Counsel of the Shipping Board said:
“It could hardly be claimed that if negotiable bonds should be issued secured by a mortgage upon a vessel and one or more of the bonds should be assigned, the effect of such an assignment if legal would not vest in the assignee of the bond a right under the mortgage upon the vessel, because, as I understand the law, the debt secured by the mortgage is the principal thing and the mortgage is entirely incidental to [294]*294the debt so that while the debt may be assigned and such assignment would carry the mortgage secured by the debt, on the other hand the mortgage could not be assigned if the debt was not so assigned. Is it not therefore clear that Congress had in view the prohibition against an interest and a right under a mortgage being assigned either directly or as incidental to the assignment of the debt? It is easy to imagine that a person not a citizen of the United States might acquire all of the bonds secured by a mortgage. It would thus become the owner of the entire interests under the mortgage and obviously such a transaction is the very one which Congress sought to prohibit.” 15
A similar ruling was made in 1927.16 The record indicates that these rulings remained in effect until 1949. In its brief, Maritime states: “As hereinabove indicated, there has been no change in the requirement of the Ship Mortgage Act that the mortgagee (including the trustee in the case of a trust deed and bond issue thereunder) be a citizen. This requirement, together with the provision prohibiting the assignment of rights under mortgages to non-citizens without approval and restricting the sale of vessels by the district courts in suits in rem in admiralty to citizens, are clear indications of the infusion into the 1920 Act of the policy of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, of isolating American-flag vessels from alien control. This policy appears to have been recognized as controlling in the two administrative rulings of the United States Shipping Board during the pre-1938 period * *. These rulings were that mortgage bonds issued under trust deeds constitute rights under mortgages within the meaning of 46 U.S.C. § 961(d) and should not, therefore, be sold to non-citizens without approval. In effect it was ruled that bonds held by aliens were prohibited rights under mortgage unless approved. These rulings were of course made under circumstances then prevailing and could not have taken into account the governmental policy of facilitating private financing as an alternative to direct Government financing which later developed and came to the fore in the middle 1950s.”
The last sentence refers to Title XI, dealing with Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance, which was added to the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, in 1938, and was amended in 1954 (see 68 Stat. 1267, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1273, 1274, 1276), and to various rulings and interpretations of the 1916, 1920 and 1936 Acts since 1938. The 1938 and 1954 statutes have been considered by the Court in this case, but the Court has also noted that the 1938 and 1954 statutes did not purport to amend the provisions of the 1920 Act which controls this case.
In the original enactment of Title XI in 1938 (52 Stat. 969), the term “mortgagee” was defined to include “the original lender under a mortgage and his successors and assigns approved by the [United States Maritime] Commission.” 17 That definition of “mortgagee” continued until 1954, when the definition was changed to its present form, namely: “The term ‘mortgagee’ includes the original maker of a loan secured by a mortgage and his successors and assigns, except that in the case of a mortgage involving a trust indenture and an issue of bonds or notes thereunder, it means the trustee designated in such [295]*295trust indenture and his successors and assigns as trustee, but does not include the holders of the bonds or notes issued under such trust indentures; * * 18
The purpose of the 1954 amendments to Title XI, including the change in the definition of mortgagee, was to stimulate private as opposed to government financing.
In its brief, the Government states that it has been unable to find in the i legislative history of Title XI any specific statement that the Congress intended, in providing for trust indenture financing, either to permit or to exclude investment by aliens, but that there are statements indicating a desire for “a wide dispersion of these securities among the general public in all sections of the country.” 19
The rulings upon which Chemical and Maritime rely are cited in note 20. They [296]*296indicate that since 1949, and particularly since 1954, Maritime has taken the position that the citizenship of the trustee controls, and has generally either ignored the citizenship of the bondholders or stated that the citizenship of the bondholders is immaterial. Many of those rulings deal with ship mortgage insurance, where the provisions of Title XI, Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as enacted in 1938 and amended in 1954, directly apply. Some of them, however, deal with the 1920 Act, which alone is involved in this case. The latter rulings .ignore completely the 1924 and 1927 rulings and the contemporaneous construction and administration of the 1920 Act.
The rulings by the Bureau of Customs have simply given effect to the rulings made .by Maritime. More importantly, it appears that the positions taken in recent years by Maritime have not always been consistent.21
[297]*297Chemical and Maritime argue that great weight should be given to the present administrative interpretations, rather than to the earlier interpretations. The rule, ^ however, is that ^ administrative practice has greater weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute, because the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion were in a good position to know the congressional purpose, A subsequent reversal would not be entitled to such weight, especially if different personnel make the later interpretation.
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) ; United States v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). See also Note, Judicial Review of Reversals of Policy by Administrative Agencies, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1251, 1257 (1955); Power Reactor Development Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 6 L.Ed.2d 924 (1961); United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U.S. 19, 24, n. 4, 79 S.Ct. 944, 3 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1959). This is not a case where the agency’s interpretation has been consistent throughout.
c. Questions Presented, and Statement of the Ultimate Question to be Decided
j£ ear¡ier administrative rulings were correct, a bond is a right under a mortgage, and cannot legally be transferred to an alien without the approval of the Secretary (acting through Maritime). A fortiori, the original issue of a bond to an alien would also require such approval. It is true that in the Valiant Power, supra, Judge Hoffman stated: “In the language of § 911(5), Congress did not suggest that the bond would be invalid if it fell into the hands Persons who do not qualify as citizens under § 802” 214 F.Supp. at 558. It does not aPPear, however, that Judge Hoffman was asked to consider or did consider the 1924 and 1927 rulings of General Counsel. Nor does it appear that they were cited to or considered Judge Solomon in his dictum in Brock v. S. S. Southampton, 231 F.Supp. 278, D.Ore. (1964).22
It jg not necessary to decide in this case whether the transfer to an alien of one or more bonds originally issued to a citizen of the United States requires the approval of the Secretary. That is the question which would affect the market[298]*298ability of the bonds, about which Chemical and Maritime express concern. But that is not the question in this ease. The question here is whether Congress intended the term “bond issue”, as used in sec. 911(5), to cover the case of a single lender, an alien, and a trust indenture which gives that alien lender, as the holder of the only bond issued under the indenture, a considerable measure of potential control over the operation of the vessel.23
d. Conclusion
The provisions of the mortgage indenture in this ease, summarized in the statement of “Facts”, above, show that although Landesbank did not have all of the powers which an ordinary mortgagee would have, it did have a considerable measure of potential control. How great a measure of potential control Landesbank had would depend in part upon when and where and under what circumstances Landesbank would attempt to exercise it. A German admiralty court or an admiralty court in some other country might feel that the interests of the lender, the • sole bondholder, the equitable mortgagee, should not be limited by the interests of the United States.24 Certainly, the legislative history quoted in the notes shows that Congressmen in 1920 were worried about this possibility. Although, as Chemical and Maritime argue, some of the general objectives sought by Maritime and by Congress may have changed over the years, that does not justify a change in the proper construction of the 1920 statute; nor indeed does it indicate that Congress has lost its concern over the potential control of the vessels by foreign mortgagees, which is so apparent from the legislative history. Congress has never amended the controlling provisions of the 1920 Act.
The foregoing considerations compel the conclusion that Congress did not intend the term “bond issue” in sec. 911(5) to include the private issue of a single bond to a foreign lender, who could not qualify as a mortgagee under sec. 922(2) (5). Even if the literal meaning of sec. 911(5) were clear, which it is not, it has long been the law of the Fourth Circuit that the literal interpretation of a statute is not permissible if it leads to a result the Congress could not have intended. United States v. 21 Pounds, etc., 4 Cir, 147 F.2d 78, 83 (1945).
In Meacham Corp. v. United States, 4 Cir, 207 F.2d 535 (1953), cert. granted 347 U.S. 932, 74 S.Ct. 631, 98 L.Ed. 1083 (1953), dismissed per stipulation 348 U.S. 801, 75 S.Ct. 17, 99 L.Ed. 633 (1954), the Court, speaking through Judge Sop-er, prevented the circumvention of the purpose of sees. 802 and 808 by refusing to approve a device which, although within the letter of the Shipping Act, violated its intent and spirit. In the present case, Landesbank and Chemical have attempted to circumvent the intent and spirit of the Ship Mortgage Act.
This Court concludes that the proper construction of the relevant statutes, in the light of their legislative history and of applicable legal principles, does not permit a foreign lender to obtain preferred status for his mortgage by the device used in this case. Properly construed, the statutes do not grant preferred status to the mortgage from Sea-trade to Chemical, Trustee.
[299]*299The Court therefore holds that the mortgage from Seatrade to Chemical, Trustee, is not a preferred mortgage under sec. 922, entitled to the preferred status given by sec. 953.