Filed 8/28/26 Cheifer v. Aliento Master Assn. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
ARNE CHEIFER, B345163
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21CHCV00496)
v.
ALIENTO MASTER ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gary I. Micon, Judge. Affirmed.
Arne Cheifer, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Freeman Mathis & Gary, David G. Molinari and Christopher J. Fleissner for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________
Arne Cheifer sued Aliento Master Association, the homeowners association that manages the common interest development in which Cheifer lives. Cheifer sued because Aliento did not grant his request to deviate from association rules requiring residents to park their cars in their garages. Cheifer wanted Aliento to permit him to park in a guest parking spot as an accommodation to his disability. A jury determined Cheifer did not need the requested accommodation to equally enjoy his residence and judgment was entered in Aliento’s favor. Cheifer appeals; we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Cheifer’s home has a two-car garage. However, finding the garage too narrow for him to fully open his car door and comfortably enter and exit his vehicle when both his car and his wife’s car were parked inside, Cheifer preferred to park in the community’s shared guest parking. This violated Aliento’s rules, which required residents to park their vehicles inside their garages.
Cheifer asked Aliento to permit him to park in the guest parking as an accommodation for his disability. After viewing the inside of Cheifer’s garage, Aliento responded that it appeared Cheifer would have sufficient room to fully open his car door when two cars were parked in the garage if items stored in his garage were removed. Aliento advised Cheifer, “Your requested accommodation is not reasonable because you have other options such as clearing out your garage so that the car doors can fully open.”
Cheifer sued Aliento and obtained a preliminary injunction permitting him to park in guest parking.
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In his first expert witness declaration, Cheifer designated as a non-retained expert witness an orthopedic specialist, Todd Molnar, who had treated Cheifer and written a letter stating Cheifer “should be allowed to park in guest parking to allow full door opening to avoid risking his back and aggravating his sciatic condition.”
Aliento’s counsel deposed Molnar well before trial. While the deposition transcript is not part of the record on appeal, counsel for Aliento represented to the court, and Cheifer’s counsel did not dispute, the following characterization of Molnar’s deposition: Molnar testified the wording of the letter had been provided to him by Cheifer. When shown a photograph of Cheifer’s car door open in the garage, Molnar testified the photograph did not match the parking situation as Cheifer had described it. Molnar opined, based on the photograph, that Cheifer’s requested accommodation was not reasonably necessary.
Prior to trial, Cheifer’s counsel and Molnar had a dispute over whether or not Molnar should be paid an expert witness fee, and Cheifer’s counsel did not pay him. Cheifer’s counsel subpoenaed Molnar as a percipient witness only. Molnar contacted Aliento’s counsel and alerted him that he was going to provide only percipient witness testimony at trial; if Aliento wanted him to testify as an expert, Aliento would have to pay his expert fee. Aliento either paid Molnar his expert witness fee or agreed to do so, then advised the court of the situation before trial.
Cheifer’s counsel maintained he was only attempting to obtain percipient witness testimony from the doctor, but when he described the anticipated testimony, the court observed it
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included expert conclusions reliant on Molnar’s medical knowledge. Cheifer’s counsel also indicated that because he was eliciting only percipient witness testimony from the doctor, he would argue Aliento could not question Molnar as an expert witness.
Aliento’s counsel argued this was a strategic attempt to block unfavorable expert witness testimony. After Aliento made an offer of proof as to Molnar’s anticipated testimony, the court ruled that Aliento could call him as an expert witness. The court told Cheifer, “[Y]ou designated him as a non-retained expert. If you have an issue with him because you didn’t have the right arrangement with him in terms of compensating him for his testimony as an expert, I think that’s on you.” The court opined it would be “incredibly difficult to limit [the doctor] to anything that would remotely be simply percipient witness testimony, as opposed to expert witness testimony,” and concluded, “[H]e was designated as an expert. He was deposed as an expert, and I think it’s fair game. So it’s going to be allowed.”
As augmented by Aliento, the record on appeal includes Aliento’s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of Cheifer’s preliminary injunction at trial. The record does not include Cheifer’s opposition, a transcript or settled statement of the hearing on the motion in limine, or the court’s ruling on the motion, although the parties agree in their appellate briefing that the court granted the motion.
At trial, the jury found Cheifer had a physical disability that limited major life activities and Aliento knew of his disability. The third question on the verdict form was, “In order to afford Arne Cheifer to equally use and enjoy the Cheifer Property, was it necessary to allow Arne Cheifer to park one of
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his cars in a street guest parking spot instead of inside his garage?” The jury answered no to this question. Based on the jury’s verdict, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction and entered judgment for Aliento. Cheifer appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Failure to Comply with Rules of Appellate Procedure We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding of the rules on appeal is, as a practical matter, more limited than that of an experienced appellate attorney. Whenever possible, we do not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. However, when, as here, total lack of compliance with the California Rules of Court results in our inability to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision, we cannot ignore the essential rules of appellate practice. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984– 985 [“the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation”].)
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608– 609.)
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Accordingly, the party seeking to challenge a judgment on appeal has the burden to provide an adequate record to assess error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295 (Maria P.).) Cheifer has failed to do so. He elected to proceed on a clerk’s transcript only, and he submitted no settled or agreed statement of any trial court proceedings. Because Cheifer designated only one additional document beyond those automatically included in the clerk’s transcript (the verdict form), the clerk’s transcript omits all documents in the case prior to the verdict. For instance, we lack the operative complaint and answer, all motions and briefing, and all minute orders. This minimal, inadequate record severely limits this court’s ability to evaluate claims of error and precludes Cheifer from raising arguments that rely on matters not included in the record on appeal—and, problematically, many of Cheifer’s arguments are based on factual assertions not supported by the record he provided. “ ‘[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
To provide responsive briefing in compliance with appellate rules, Aliento moved to augment the record on appeal to include the reporter’s transcript from the trial and one of its motions in limine. We granted this request. While this augmentation remedies some of the record deficiencies, Cheifer’s briefing itself is also in dramatic noncompliance with appellate rules.
It is the appellant’s duty to refer a reviewing court to the portion of the record that supports their contentions on appeal. (Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 789, 797.) Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court requires that all appellate briefs must “[s]upport
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any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” Not a single factual assertion in Cheifer’s opening and reply briefs is supported by a citation to the record, in violation of this rule. “The claimed existence of facts that are not supported by citations to pages in the appellate record . . . cannot be considered by this court” (Mueller v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 809, 816, fn. 5) and arguments not supported by the necessary citations to the record are forfeited. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
Cheifer’s arguments are also legally insufficient to carry his burden on appeal. Each point made in an appellate brief must be supported by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) “The obligation to support points with argument and citations to authority requires more than simply stating a bare assertion that the challenged judgment or order is erroneous and leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why.” (Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 39.) An appellant must offer argument as to how the court erred, rather than citing general principles of law without applying them to the circumstances before the court. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699.) “A conclusory assertion of legal error, without citation and application of pertinent authority, results in forfeiture of the claim.” (Siskiyou Hospital, at p. 39.) Moreover, “ ‘[a]rguments should be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review.’ [Citation.] Failure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.)
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Cheifer’s arguments are conclusory, his legal discussions lack meaningful analysis, and he fails to acknowledge the applicable standard of review. In the interest of justice, we address Cheifer’s arguments to the extent they are identifiable. However, to the extent we fail to address a point made in the opening brief, the issue is treated as forfeited.1 II. Verdict Form Question No. 3 The third question on the verdict form was whether it was necessary to allow Cheifer to park one of his cars in a guest parking spot instead of inside his garage in order to allow him to equally use and enjoy his home. Cheifer argues it was “judicial error” to include this question on the verdict form because, under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.), a jury “cannot tell a disable[d] person where or where not to park in a housing situation,” nor may it “dictate specific parking assignments.” Relying on the Fair Housing Act’s provision stating that it constitutes discrimination to refuse to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled person when such accommodations are necessary to afford the person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling (42 U.S.C. § 3604, subd. (f)(3)(B)), Cheifer asserts that because he was disabled and Aliento knew it, a reasonable accommodation was required; the reasonable accommodation he requested was to park in guest
1 Cheifer’s reply brief contains multiple matters not raised in the opening brief. “As a general rule, points not addressed until a reply brief will not be considered unless good reason is shown for failing to address them earlier.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852, fn. 10.) None has been shown here.
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parking; and the “denial of this request for reasonable accommodation, is wrong as a matter of law.”
This question was appropriately put to the jury. Under both the Fair Housing Act and the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, the refusal to provide “reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services” is discrimination when such “accommodations may be necessary to afford [a person with a disability] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” (42 U.S.C. § 3604, subd. (f)(3)(B); Gov. Code, § 12927, subd. (c)(1).) Whether a requested accommodation is a “reasonable accommodation for a disability is a question of fact, not a matter of law.” (Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1595.) As stated in CACI No. 2548, which was given to the jury with the consent of Cheifer’s counsel, one of the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish discrimination by refusal to make reasonable accommodation in housing is that “in order to afford [the plaintiff] an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the [dwelling], it was necessary” to make the accommodation in question. There was no error in the inclusion of this question on the jury form. III. Exclusion of Evidence Cheifer argues it was error for the trial court to exclude evidence that he had been parking in guest parking for years and that he had obtained a preliminary injunction allowing him to park there. He claims that the jury found the guest parking spot was not necessary because they assumed he had parked in his garage for years, and if jurors had known where he was parking before and during trial and about the preliminary injunction, they would have determined that parking in guest parking was
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necessary for him to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his home. The record is inadequate to permit us to review these claims.
Because we granted Aliento’s motion to augment the record, the record on appeal includes Aliento’s motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of or reference to the preliminary injunction, but we have nothing more. Cheifer did not provide this court with his opposition to the motion in limine, the court’s ruling, or a reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine, and the record does not include an agreed or settled statement in lieu of a reporter’s transcript of that hearing. We therefore do not know “ ‘what grounds were advanced, what arguments were made and what facts may have been admitted, mutually assumed or judicially noticed at the hearing.’ ” (Snell v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 44, 49.) The absence of a reporter’s transcript or settled statement precludes Cheifer “from raising any evidentiary issues on appeal.” (Hodges v. Mark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 651, 657; see also Maria P., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1295–1296 [failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against the appellant].)
We have even less to go on with respect to Cheifer’s claim that the court erroneously excluded evidence he had been parking in guest parking for years. Cheifer does not identify any location in the record where he attempted to introduce such evidence, any motion in limine seeking to exclude it, the context in which he attempted to present this evidence, the basis advanced for admitting or excluding it, or what offer of proof, if any, he made in support of his position that this evidence was admissible. We therefore are unable to determine whether this evidence was
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properly excluded and whether, if erroneously excluded, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See Evid. Code, § 354.) IV. Expert Witness Testimony Cheifer states he believes Aliento’s payment of Molnar’s expert witness fee was “a bribe to change the way my doctor would talk about my personal condition.” This is speculation, and “[s]peculation does not demonstrate error.” (People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 39.) Moreover, Molnar’s trial testimony was not a last-minute change of opinion that could have been the result of the payment of the expert witness fee right before trial: as Aliento’s counsel advised the court when seeking to call Molnar as an expert witness, Molnar had testified at his deposition that Cheifer’s requested accommodation was not medically necessary.
In his opening brief Cheifer notes that the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.4(b) prohibits attorneys from offering an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law; California’s Rules of Professional Conduct forbid directly or indirectly paying, offering to pay, or acquiescing in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness’s testimony or the outcome of the case (Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.4(d), formerly rule 5-310(B)); and State Bar Formal Opinion No. 1997-149 provides that payments to non-expert witnesses for time spent preparing for a deposition or trial must be reasonable and cannot be contingent on the content of the witness’s testimony or on the outcome of the matter. In his opening brief, however, Cheifer does not allege any violation of these rules—he merely opines that a “payment on the eve of trial to a crucial witness for the opposing side,” especially for their “ ‘opinion,’ ” raises red flags about potentially
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influencing their testimony. “[M]ere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles” are insufficient to present a cognizable ground for appeal. (Lowery v. Robinson (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 36, 39.) Cheifer has failed to demonstrate error in permitting Molnar to testify as an expert witness.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
SCHERB, J.