Chechele v. Morgan Stanley

896 F. Supp. 2d 297, 2012 WL 4490730, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138784
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedSeptember 26, 2012
DocketNo. 11 Civ. 4037(PGG)
StatusPublished

This text of 896 F. Supp. 2d 297 (Chechele v. Morgan Stanley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chechele v. Morgan Stanley, 896 F. Supp. 2d 297, 2012 WL 4490730, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138784 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

PAUL G. GARDEPHE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Donna Ann Gabriele Chechele brings this suit against Morgan Stanley (“Morgan Stanley”) and Morgan Stanley Subsidiaries 1 through 10 (“MS Subsidiaries”) (collectively, “MS Defendants”), and nominal Defendant Gramercy Capital Corp. (“Gramercy”), seeking to recover short-swing profits pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). The MS Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the MS Defendants’ motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

“Under § 16(b) of the Exchange Act ... a corporation or security holder of that corporation may bring suit against the officers, directors, and certain beneficial owners of the corporation who realize any profits from the purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the corporation’s securities within any 6-month period.”1 Credit [299]*299Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1414, 1417, 182 L.Ed.2d 446 (2012). “Shortswing trading is generally defined as ‘the purchase and sale (or vice versa) of a company’s stock within a six-month period by persons deemed to be ‘insiders’....’” Chechele v. Scheetz, 819 F.Supp.2d 342, 344 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Morales v. Quintet Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2001)). “The statute imposes a form of strict liability and requires insiders to disgorge these ‘short-swing’ profits even if they did not trade on inside information or intend to profit on the basis of such information.” Simmonds, 132 S.Ct. at 1417 (citing Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 122, 111 S.Ct. 2173, 115 L.Ed.2d 109 (1991)). Section 16(b) provides that suits must be brought within “two years after the date such profit was realized.” 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).

Although the Exchange Act does not define “beneficial owners,” SEC regulations create a “two-tiered analysis of beneficial ownership”:

SEC Rule 16a-l(a)(l) provides that “[sjolely for purposes of determining whether a person is a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities,” the term “beneficial owner” means ... “any person who is deemed a beneficial owner pursuant to section 13(d) of the Act and the rules thereunder.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(1). The borrowed definition from SEC Rule 13d — 5(b)(1), promulgated under Section 13(d), provides, in relevant part:
[W]hen two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership ... of all equity securities of that issuer beneficially owned by any such persons.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, under Section 13(d) and the corresponding regulations, “if two or more entities agree to act together for any of the listed purposes, a ‘group’ is ‘thereby’ formed.” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 507-08 (2d Cir.2007).

Scheetz, 819 F.Supp.2d at 346 (quoting Morales, 249 F.3d at 122).

II. THE COMPLAINT

Chechele is a New Jersey resident and a stockholder in nominal Defendant Gramercy, a Maryland corporation with its principal offices in New York, New York. (Cmplt. ¶¶ 3-4) At all relevant times, the common stock of Gramerey was registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act. (Id. ¶ 10)

Defendant Morgan Stanley, a multinational bank holding company that provides financial services, is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in New York, New York. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 13) Defendant MS Subsidiaries 1 through 10 are “direct or indirect subsidiaries] of Morgan Stanley that engaged in short-swing transactions in [Gramercy’s] common stock.” (Id. ¶ 6) The Complaint further alleges that SSF III Gemini, LP (“Gemini”) “is an indirect subsidiary of Morgan Stanley formed for the purpose of acquiring shares of [Gramercy’s] common stock.” (Id. ¶ 8) Both the [300]*300MS Subsidiaries and Gemini are “managed by Morgan Stanley employees and under Morgan Stanley’s control,” and Morgan Stanley has the “sole or shared power to vote and dispose of securities owned by Gemini or any MS Subsidiary and is thus deemed to beneficially own such securities for purposes of Sections 13(d) and 16” of the Exchange Act. (Id. ¶ 15)

In connection with the formation of the MS Subsidiaries and Gemini, “Morgan Stanley entered into one or more agreements with Gemini and such MS Subsidiary.” (Id. ¶ 16) The agreements — “which included management agreements, support agreements, stockholders agreements, partnership agreements, limited liability company agreements, or similar agreements” — served to “coordinate decision-making among Morgan Stanley, Gemini, and the MS Subsidiaries with respect to the acquisition, holding, voting, or disposition of issuer securities,” including shares of Gramercy’s common stock. (Id.)

Chechele further alleges that although “Morgan Stanley maintains information barriers” to “prevent the flow of information among certain of its affiliates,” these barriers were not in place among Morgan Stanley, Gemini, and the MS Subsidiaries.

Instead, employees of Morgan Stanley shared information and coordinated voting and other investment decisions with respect to shares of [Gramercy’s] common stock held by Morgan Stanley, Gemini, and the MS Subsidiaries.

(Id. ¶ 17)

As a result of these “arrangements, understandings, and agreements,” “a stockholder ‘group’ (the ‘MS Stockholder Group’) was formed among Morgan Stanley, Gemini, and the MS Subsidiaries with respect to [Gramercy’s] common stock within the meaning of Section 13(d) of the [Exchange] Act.” (Id. ¶ 18) “By virtue of its participation in the MS Stockholders Group, each of Morgan Stanley, Gemini, and the MS Subsidiaries was deemed at all relevant times to have beneficially owned all shares of [Gramercy’s] common stock owned by any member of the MS Stockholder Group.” (Id. ¶ 19)

On November 2, 2007, pursuant to a Subscription Agreement entered into by Gemini, Gramercy, and “certain affiliates of Morgan Stanley,” Gemini acquired 3,809,524 shares of Gramercy’s common stock. (Id. ¶ 20) These shares constituted approximately 11% of the outstanding shares of Gramercy’s common stock. (Id. ¶ 21)

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
896 F. Supp. 2d 297, 2012 WL 4490730, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chechele-v-morgan-stanley-nysd-2012.