Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co.

227 F. 613, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1096
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedOctober 16, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 227 F. 613 (Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 227 F. 613, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1096 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).

Opinion

CHATFIELD, District Judge.

This action is based upon claim 3 of patent No. 612,702, issued October 18, 1898, upon an application filed March 12th of that year. The claim is as follows :

“3. Id an electrically controlled switch-operating mechanism, the combination with a trolley wire and trolley wheel, and. a double solenoid having a core armature connected with the switch point rail, of parallel contact strips supported at opposite sides of the trolley wire and having upward inclined ends, one of said strips being integral throughout and the other being divided into three sections, an electro-magnet having a spring armature and two-contact plates for said armature, the winding of .said electro-magnet being connected with the trolley wire and with the integral contact strip, a wire connecting the spriug armature with the middle section of the divided contact strip, and wires connecting the contact plates of said spring armature with the windings of the double solenoid, substantially as described.”

The same claim of this particular patent and claims 1, 2, and 4 of patent No. 917,541, issued April 6, 1909, to Mr. Cheatham, for an improved form of the same sort of device, were the basis of a suit in this court, tried with a jury, against the Transit Development Company, one of the defendants herein. Verdict therein for the plaintiff was affirmed upon, appeal. 194 Fed. 963, 114 C. C. A. 599.

[614]*614[1] One of the questions seriously urged by the plaintiff in this case is the proposition of res adjudicata. It may be assumed that a patent adjudicated valid in a prior action will be considered as valid in an action between the same parties. In any other action before the same court, where the issues and the testimony present substantially the same •questions as those previously decided, the previous determination would be taken as conclusive, unless some previously unnoted error or omission is presented for consideration. But in the latter case examination of the issue is not beyond the right of the court, as it would be if the question presented by the record had been finally adjudicated between the parties.

This proposition was discussed in connection with an action by the plaintiff herein to collect damages for infringement by the use of more of the devices held as infringements in the first action (in 197 Fed. 563) and to extend that decree to cover alleged violation of the injunction by the use of the switch (which is the basis of the present action and which is known as the “type 15 switch”) by the various roads comprising the Brooklyn Rapid Transit system in the borough of Brooklyn.

A motion to dismiss for alleged lack of jurisdiction over parties defendant in the second action was discussed in a decision reported in 191 Fed. 727. Decree in that action was based upon an opinion reported in 203 Fed. 285, and affirmed in an opinion reported in 209 Fed. 230, 126 C. C. A. 297. It will thus be seen that much discussion of these patents and of the relation of the parties has already been had both in this and the appellate court.

. Much point .has been made in this action because certain additional defendants, all of whom are integral members of the system which is controlled or leased and operated by the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, are made defendants in an endeavor to bring into the one suit all of the devices under operation on the various street railroads in tire borough of Brooklyn. If the question were important, it would be easy to hold, upon the evidence before the court, that identity of information, responsibility, and management was sufficiently shown to hold all of these parties, in the absence of new issues or newly discovered evidence, to any legal effects flowing from the existence of the judgments in the previous suits. On the other hand, there is sufficient» difference in the corporate identity of the parties to this action, so that entirely different corporate responsibilities might follow as to liability for the different parts of the judgment.

A decree is not res adjudicata as between other parties than those who have been involved in the preceding litigation, unless privity in the way. of succession to legal burdens is shown. The plaintiff has included the Transit Development Company (former defendant), and added the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, which appears to control or direct the activities of the constituent companies. It has also included all of these companies by which the switches are used, in order to prevent evasion of responsibility. In so doing, it seeks to, unite in one action all the alleged infringing devices, and to be able to show profits to the defendants, as well as damage to the plaintiff, from each device. It is thus avoiding multiplicity of suits, and, as has been stated, the [615]*615relations of the parties are such that their rights can be disposed of in the one action, particularly where the use of the devices is made substantially one by the participation of the Transit Development Company and the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company, and where community of knowledge is established.

But any of the new defendants could raise the separate issue of non-infringement, and anp of these defendants must be allowed to try the case, and to urge all the defenses, as if it had been sued independently of lliose defendants who were directly concerned or participated as parties in the preceding action.

But, though some of the defendants can therefore be heard upon the issue of validity of the patent in suit, it makes no substantial difference in the present case and upon the present record. Upon similar testimony to that presented in the former action, so far as this issue is concerned, and upon the presumption of the patent, the same result must be reached, while the court has also to take into account the fact that, in a suit in this court, this patent has been held valid. Further than this, the validity of the patent and of claim 3, so far as it is based upon an invention and that this invention was that of Mr. Cheatham, is not seriously contested..

[2] The defense of invalidity is restricted to, an attempt to narrow claim 3, with which we are concerned in this action, so as to exclude the structure used by the defendants herein, and thus to avoid the charge of infringement of that particular claim as so construed.

Again, the plaintiff claims that the decision of the trial before the jury renders this question res adjudícala against all the present defendants. But on this point the question of res adjudícala presents a slightly different issue.

It is contended by the plaintiff that the previous trial decided this patent to be a pioneer patent, and that the present defendants are bound thereby. As was pointed out in the decision in 197 Fed. 363, the verdict of the jury, in general form, upon all the issues presented, even against the same defendants, left to the court the right to determine just how far an issue had been presented to the jury and just what the effect of the determination of that issue might he.

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8 P.R. Fed. 472 (D. Puerto Rico, 1916)

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227 F. 613, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1096, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cheatham-electric-switching-device-co-v-brooklyn-rapid-transit-co-nyed-1915.