UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LOREEN CHAVIS, Plaintiff, v. TYRONE GARRETT, in his official capacity as Executive Director of THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Civil Action No. 19-708 (CKK)
and
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION (December 30, 2019)
Pending before the Court is Defendants Tyrone Garrett and the District of Columbia
Housing Authority’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26. Defendants have moved to dismiss various
claims in the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 24, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. In particular,
Defendants contend that Ms. Chavis’s claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief are moot in
light of Defendants’ post-filing actions. Moreover, Defendants argue that Ms. Chavis has failed
to state a claim for a Fifth Amendment due process violation. Ms. Chavis opposes Defendants’
Motion, except, in part, to the extent that Defendants seek to dismiss Ms. Chavis’s claims against
Defendant Tyrone Garrett.
1 Upon consideration of the briefing, 1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a
whole, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. Insofar as Ms. Chavis’s claims seek injunctive
or declaratory relief, they are DISMISSED due to their mootness. Because Ms. Chavis has failed
to state a due process claim, that claim is DISMISSED. Lastly, as Ms. Chavis concedes that the
suit against Mr. Garrett should be dismissed without prejudice, that suit is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Chavis married Roger Avent on February 15, 2000 and they have three children
together. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. On or about December 1, 2017, Ms. Chavis and Mr. Avent received
an enhanced voucher under the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 (“HVCP”). Id.
¶ 24. Mr. Avent listed himself as the “head of household” on the voucher without Ms. Chavis’s
knowledge. Id. ¶ 25. While they lived together, Mr. Avent’s income accounted for one-third of
the household income and Ms. Chavis’s accounted for the remaining two-thirds. Id. ¶ 26.
On September 2, 2018, Ms. Avent verbally threatened Ms. Chavis’s life in the presence of
their children. Id. ¶ 27. Ms. Chavis subsequently contacted the police, filed a police report, and
obtained a Civil Protection Order against Mr. Avent. Id. Mr. Avent vacated the household while
Ms. Chavis and her children remained tenants. Id. ¶ 28. In the wake of this event, Ms. Chavis
became concerned that she might lose her housing voucher, and become unable to pay her rent,
because Mr. Avent was listed as the head of household. Id. ¶ 29.
1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following: • Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 26; • Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 27; and • Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 28. In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f). 2 A brief primer on the relevant federal and D.C. laws provides context for Ms. Chavis’s
concerns and actions. Under the federal Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), 34 U.S.C.
§ 12291 et seq., tenants that otherwise qualify for assistance under HVCP may not be denied that
assistance on the basis that they are or have been victims of domestic violence, id. § 12491(b)(1).
The implementing regulations specify that if an assisted family breaks up due to “an occurrence
of domestic violence,” the local housing authority “must ensure that the victim retains assistance.”
24 C.F.R. § 982.315(a)(2). The D.C. Housing Authority Administrative Plan further guarantees
that when families break up due to occurrences of domestic violence, the “victim of the violence
or offense shall continue to receive assistance.” 14 D.C.M.R. § 5317.6(b)(1); see id. § 5317.6.
The Administrative Plan also provides specific procedures for when it receives
documentation that the head of household committed domestic violence against another member
of the household. If the Housing Authority “receives conflicting certification documents of
domestic violence” from members of the household alleging that one or more other members was
the perpetrator, the Housing Authority undertakes a certain process to determine who will retain
assistance. See id. § 5317.6(c)(1)–(4). Before it can make any determination, the Housing
Authority must notify both individuals that only one part of the family will retain assistance, of
the process by which the Housing Authority will make its decision, and of what information the
involved persons can provide. Id. 5317.6(c)(1)–(2). Once it has made its determination, the
Housing Authority must notify both individuals in writing of its decision as well as the basis for
its decision. Id. § 5317.6(c)(3). The adult family member who will not receive assistance can
challenge the decision in an informal hearing. Id. § 5317.6(c)(4).
The D.C. Municipal Regulations independently provide that when the Housing Authority
takes adverse action against individuals, including decisions terminating assistance under HVCP,
3 the individuals adversely affected are entitled to notice and can challenge the adverse action in an
informal hearing. Id. § 8902.1. On November 29, 2018, the Housing Authority issued new
regulations that govern the family break-up process in the context of domestic violence and
clarifying the process for removing the head of household. Am. Compl. ¶ 34.
So, on October 10, 2018, Ms. Chavis, through counsel, contacted the Housing Authority to
initiate the family break-up process. Id. ¶ 30. On October 26, 2018, she and her counsel met with
three Housing Authority officials. Id. ¶ 31. They provided the officials with the copy of the Civil
Protection Order and a letter that Ms. Chavis had obtained from D.C. Survivors and Advocates for
Empowerment attesting that she was a victim of domestic violence and that she had sought relevant
services. Id. The Housing Authority said it would be in touch, but it did not contact Ms. Chavis
or her counsel for the next month. Id. ¶ 32.
On November 29, 2018, Ms. Chavis, through counsel, sent a letter to the Housing Authority
to confirm that Ms. Chavis would continue to receive assistance, but she received no response. Id.
¶ 33. She sent another letter, through counsel, on December 13, 2018, requesting that the Housing
Authority comply with the new regulations issued on November 29, 2018. Id. ¶ 35. She requested
a response by December 19, 2018 but received none. Id. Then, on December 21, 2018, Ms.
Chavis, again through counsel, sent a letter to Watson Fennell, who was the Director of the Office
of Fair Hearings at the Housing Authority, requesting an informal resolution or hearing regarding
the Housing Authority’s failure to act on her request. Id. ¶ 36.
On December 26, 2018, an official at the Housing Authority informed Ms. Chavis that she
was going to be issued a temporary voucher because she met “the VAWA definition.” Id. ¶ 37.
The Housing Authority specified that the voucher could be revoked based on a future hearing that
Mr. Avent had a right to request. Id. ¶ 38. It also explained that it would not initiate voucher
4 payments to her landlord due to the voucher’s temporary status. Id. After Ms. Chavis’s counsel
communicated further with the Housing Authority, the Housing Authority also stated that it would
not begin the recertification process to establish Ms. Chavis as temporary head of household so
that Mr. Avent’s income could be excluded for the purposes of calculating the assistance that Ms.
Chavis received. Id. ¶ 39. Ms. Chavis explains that this put her at risk of eviction due to
nonpayment of rent. Id. ¶¶ 40–43.
Subsequently, on January 9, 2019, Ms. Chavis requested a hearing with the Housing
Authority. Id. ¶ 43. The Housing Authority’s Fair Hearings Administrator issued a letter denying
her request for a hearing. Id. ¶ 44. The letter included the following:
[Y]our request for an informal hearing . . . [is denied because] . . . it has been determined according to our records that your client (Loren Avent) is not the head- of-household and therefore, not entitled to an administrative review.
The regulations governing the grievance process specifies that the head-of- household serves as the basis for income eligibility and rent determination as well as assumes legal responsibility for the household. For that reason, your client does not have standing to initiate the Housing Choice Voucher Program Informal Hearing Procedures under 14 DCMR § 8999.
While I am sympathetic to your client’s circumstances, the administrative grievance process does not entitle individual members of a household composition to request a hearing except, the head of household. Although an administrative review cannot be granted through DCHA’s grievance process, this decision does not affect your client’s rights to due process through the judicial system.
Id. The Housing Authority soon after denied Ms. Chavis’s request that she receive continued
assistance and halted sending any payments to Ms. Chavis’s landlord. Id. ¶ 46. On March 8, 2019,
Ms. Chavis’s landlord filed a Verified Complaint for Possession of her apartment because she had
failed to pay the full rent for January, February, and March 2019. Id. ¶¶ 47–48. Ms. Chavis filed
the first Complaint in this action on March 13, 2019, along with a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. Id. ¶ 50.
5 After the suit was filed, the Housing Authority paid back rent due to the landlord; the
landlord consequently dismissed the action for possession of the apartment. Id. ¶ 51. The Housing
Authority also issued a voucher to Ms. Chavis. Joint Status Report, ECF No. 19, at 2. The parties
continued to dispute the amount that Ms. Chavis would receive going forward, but ultimately, by
April 18, 2019, the parties agreed that the Housing Authority “had issued Ms. Chavis a housing
voucher in a legally sufficient amount.” Am. Compl. ¶ 51; see also Joint Status Report, ECF No.
22. Ms. Chavis withdrew her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Am. Compl. ¶ 51; Joint Status
Report, ECF No. 22.
Ms. Chavis filed an Amended Complaint on May 16, 2019. See ECF No. 24. Her
Complaint alleges violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause (Count I), violation of
VAWA (Count II), and violation of Title 14 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations
(Count III). Am. Compl. at 13–18. She requests several types of relief. First, she requests a
permanent injunction requiring the Housing Authority “to maintain Ms. Chavis’s permanent
participation in the HVCP as required by law and to ensure that the amount of assistance is based
on her income as required by law.” Id. at 18. Second, she seeks a permanent injunction requiring
the Housing Authority to adopt policies and procedures consistent with the regulations it issued
on November 29, 2018 and its obligations under VAWA and related regulations. Id. Third, fourth,
and fifth, she requests that the Court issue declaratory judgments declaring that the Housing
Authority’s actions violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause, VAWA and related
implementing regulations, and Title 14 of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations. Id. at
18–19. She also requests compensatory damages for emotional distress and nominal damages for
the alleged violations. Id. at 19.
6 II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendants move to dismiss portions of Ms. Chavis’s Amended Complaint under both Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
A court must dismiss a case pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(1) when it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. In determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may “consider the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion
v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Herbert
v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc.
v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court may consider
materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.”)
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), courts must accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences that can be drawn from the facts alleged. See Settles v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“At the motion to dismiss stage, counseled
complaints as well as pro se complaints, are to be construed with sufficient liberality to afford all
possible inferences favorable to the pleader on allegations of fact.”); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (“We review here a
decision granting a motion to dismiss, and therefore must accept as true all the factual allegations
in the complaint.”); Koutny v. Martin, 530 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[A] court accepts
7 as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and may also consider ‘undisputed
facts evidenced in the record.’” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Mineta, 333 F.3d at 198)).
Despite the favorable inferences that a plaintiff receives on a motion to dismiss, it remains
the plaintiff’s burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Am.
Farm Bureau v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000).
“Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when
reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), [a] plaintiff[’s] factual allegations in the
complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)
motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163,
170 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grand Lodge of
Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001)), aff’d, 2008 WL
4068606 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2008). A court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation” or an inference “unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”
Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Papasam v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
B. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on grounds that it
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint
is not sufficient if it “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
8 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of plaintiff.” Nat’l Postal Prof’l Nurses v. U.S. Postal Serv., 461 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2006).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may consider “the facts alleged in the
complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint” or
“documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if the document is
produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.” Ward
v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp.
2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002); Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2009)).
The court may also consider documents in the public record of which the court may take judicial
notice. Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants advance two main arguments supporting why many of Ms. Chavis’s claims
should be dismissed. First, Defendants argue that her claims seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief are moot because Defendants have provided her the requested relief. Second, Defendants
propose that Ms. Chavis has failed to state a due process claim because she did not avail herself of
process available to her under District of Columbia law. Defendants lastly contend that the claims
against Mr. Garrett in his official capacity should be dismissed because they mirror the claims
brought against the Housing Authority. The Court will consider each argument in turn.
9 A. Mootness
To begin with, Defendants argue that Ms. Chavis’s claims, insofar as they seek injunctive
and declaratory relief related to her voucher, are moot. Defendants advance that they have issued
Ms. Chavis “the precise subsidy voucher she wanted in a ‘legally sufficient amount,’” and that as
a result, she has received the relief she sought and her claims seeking injunctive relief have been
mooted. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 14–15. Moreover, Defendants argue that her claims seeking
declaratory relief are also moot, as any declaratory judgment at this stage would be an advisory
opinion. Id. at 15–17. Lastly, Defendants contend that neither set of claims fall into the exceptions
for mootness. Id. at 17–21. The Court agrees with Defendants on these points. 2
1. General Mootness Principles
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III of the Constitution to the
adjudication of actual, ongoing cases or controversies. This limitation “gives rise to the doctrines
of standing and mootness.” Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see
Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Article III of the Constitution limits
the federal courts to adjudication of actual, ongoing controversies.”). Pursuant to the mootness
doctrine, it “is not enough that the initial requirements of standing and ripeness have been satisfied;
the suit must remain alive throughout the course of litigation, to the moment of final appellate
disposition. If events outrun the controversy such that the court can grant no meaningful relief;
the case must be dismissed as moot.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United
States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 59 F. Supp. 3d 91, 95 (D.D.C. 2014) (“PETA I”) (internal quotation
2 At times, Defendants appear to challenge Ms. Chavis’s due process claim under this same reasoning. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 15 (including claim seeking declaratory relief regarding due process rights). However, because the Court finds that Ms. Chavis has failed to plausibly state a due process claim, it does not reach whether her claims requesting injunctive and declaratory relief regarding her due process rights are moot. 10 marks and citations omitted) (quoting 13B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3533 (3d ed. 2014); McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council
Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir.
2001)). “A case is moot when the challenged conduct ceases such that there is no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated in circumstances where it becomes impossible for the
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City
of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)).
Mootness is often described as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness).” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189–90 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). “Typically, an end to offending behavior
moots a case.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep’t of Agric. &
Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv. (“PETA II”), 918 F.3d 151, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Nevertheless, two important exceptions to the mootness doctrine distinguish it from standing. See
id. Both allow a district court to retain jurisdiction over a dispute if the halt in offending conduct
is more of a temporary reprieve than a bona fide resolution of the matter. These are the voluntary
cessation and the capable of repetition yet evading review exceptions. Ms. Chavis argues only
that Defendants’ actions fail to qualify for the first exception. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 14–25.
Under the voluntary cessation doctrine, if a defendant chooses to terminate the challenged
conduct after a lawsuit is filed, the defendant “bears the formidable burden of showing that it is
absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
11 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190. The voluntary cessation doctrine ensures “that a defendant is not ‘free
to return to his old ways’ after it takes unilateral action that moots a case.” PETA I, 59 F. Supp.
3d at 96 (citing U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). When the defendant claims
that it has terminated the challenged conduct, the “heavy burden of persuading the court that the
challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting
mootness[.]” PETA II, 918 F.3d at 157. This “principle must be read in light of the ‘presumption
of legitimacy accorded to the Government’s official conduct[.]’” Id. at 157 (quoting Nat’l
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004)). The “presumption of regularity
supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174
(quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).
2. The Claims Seeking Injunctive Relief
Defendants argue that the offending behavior has concluded here and that, as a result, her
claims for injunctive relief are now moot. Ms. Chavis acknowledges that her landlord has been
paid back rent and that the amount of the housing voucher issued to her is correct. See Joint Status
Report, ECF No. 22 (“Defendants have increased the amount of the subsidy to $997 per month,
and Plaintiff agrees that the new subsidy amount is correct under the current facts and applicable
legal requirements.”); Pl.’s Opp’n at 13 (acknowledging that landlord was paid back rent); id.
(agreeing that on April 18, 2019, Ms. Chavis was issued “a housing voucher in a legally sufficient
amount”). She does not argue that this relief afforded to her is insufficient. Instead, she contends
that Defendants have failed to show that the alleged violations will not recur, and that Defendants
have failed to eradicate the violations’ effects. Defendants have, however, met their heavy burden
as to Ms. Chavis’s claims seeking injunctive relief.
12 When the voluntary cessation analysis is at issue, “the court must define the wrong that the
defendant is alleged to have inflicted.” Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 887 F. Supp. 2d 247, 252 (D.D.C.
2012) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d
699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1990 (en banc))). “The opportunities for manipulation are great. The more
broadly [the Court] define[s] the wrongful conduct, the more numerous are the possible examples,
and the greater the likelihood of repetition.” Clarke, 915 F.2d at 703. Ms. Chavis has alleged two
relevant wrongs. The Court considers both alleged wrongs and the corresponding relief.
First, she has alleged that her own rights were violated. For this wrong, she requests that
this Court issue “a permanent injunction requiring the Housing Authority to maintain Ms. Chavis’s
permanent participation in the HCVP as required by law and to ensure that the amount of assistance
is based on her income as required by law.” Am. Compl. at 18 ¶ A. To the extent that Ms. Chavis
seeks this relief, her claim is moot. Defendants have demonstrated that the conduct outlined in the
Complaint will not reasonably be expected to recur. The sequence of events leading to the alleged
violation was unique, and the circumstances underlying those events no longer exist and are
extremely unlikely to occur again. For one, Ms. Chavis is head of household and currently in
possession of the most permanent voucher that the Housing Authority can provide, and the subsidy
is for what both parties acknowledge to be a legally sufficient amount. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 13; see
also Pl.’s Opp’n at 18 n.5 (explaining that Ms. Chavis understands that voucher issued to Ms.
Chavis is permanent and not temporary, and that it is subject to other conditions).
Moreover, while Ms. Chavis argues that the series of missteps underlying the Housing
Authority’s conduct shows that the conduct may reoccur, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 16 (citing Am. Compl.
¶¶ 36–46), it actually shows how implausible it is to claim that Ms. Chavis could lose access to
her voucher for the same reasons related VAWA protections again. For example, the declaration
13 submitted by Defendants lists a series of events and communications with both Mr. Avent and Ms.
Chavis that are unlikely to arise again, as Ms. Chavis is in possession of a non-temporary voucher,
is designated head of household, and is no longer married to Mr. Avent. See Decl. of Caleb
Raymond, ECF No. 26-2. Defendants even admit that they made errors in handling Ms. Chavis’s
voucher situation. See, e.g., id. ¶ 21 (stating that letter sent to Plaintiff denying her informal
hearing was sent in error). It is nearly impossible to imagine that a similar series of events could
unfold again.
Accordingly, because she obtained the relief she asked for, because the effects of that relief
addressed by her request for injunctive relief have been eradicated, and because it is clear that the
alleged behavior will not recur as to her, this claim is moot. See Isenbarger v. Farmer, 463 F.
Supp. 2d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that although there had been one violation, and although
defendant maintained “that other future events could theoretically affect” plaintiff’s rights, there
was no “sufficient basis for placing th[e] case within the voluntary cessation exception” when
requested relief had been provided).
Ms. Chavis’s second alleged wrong hinges on her “continuing policy or practice” theory.
In short, Ms. Chavis argues that the alleged events further evidence “a complete breakdown in
Defendants’ processes” and constitute a “continuing policy or practice of DCHA to deny domestic
violence victims” not designated as heads of household their “right to continued housing assistance
following a family breakup, including their right to a fair hearing.” See Pl.’s Opp’n at 17 (citing
Am. Compl. ¶ 45). Defendants’ actions, she claims, have done “nothing to reassure Ms. Chavis
or this Court that the systemic breakdowns” will not recur again to her or “similarly situated
victims of domestic violence.” Id. To redress this alleged wrong, she requests that this Court
issue:
14 a permanent injunction requiring the Housing Authority to adopt policies and procedures that are consistent with (1) the regulations it issued on November 29, 2018 governing the family breakup process in cases of domestic violence, and detailing the process for removing the head of household; and (2) its obligations under the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 34 U.S.C. § 12291 et seq. and regulations promulgated thereunder at 24 C.F.R. part 5; and 24 C.F.R. part 982[.]
Am. Compl. at 18 ¶ B. It is unclear whether the voluntary cessation doctrine squarely applies
under these circumstances, as Ms. Chavis has brought a suit solely on her own behalf; she does
not allege to represent a class of similarly situated people. See Toor v. Holder, 717 F. Supp. 2d
100, 106 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The voluntary cessation exception is typically invoked when there is a
threat that the defendant will reestablish the challenged and ceased practice against the plaintiff
after dismissal of the suit.”). Nor does she bring a claim under FOIA. See Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Tidwell, 239 F. Supp. 3d 213, 226 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[Plaintiff’s pattern and practice]
allegation is based on Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, a case brought pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act, and therefore of questionable applicability to Plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to FACA and the APA.”). Regardless, without deciding whether such a claim could be
brought in these circumstances, the Court finds that there is no pattern or practice of violations
apparent from the record and that Ms. Chavis has failed to plausibly allege that there is such a
pattern or practice.
Ms. Chavis bases her argument, in part, on language in the letter sent to her. In this letter,
the Housing Authority’s Fair Hearings Administrator stated that “[t]he regulations concerning the
grievance process specifies that the head-of-household serves as the basis for income eligibility
and rent determination as well as assumes legal responsibility for the household.” Am. Compl.
¶ 44. According to Ms. Chavis, the “letter stated a continuing policy or practice of the Housing
Authority to deny hearings” to “all victims of domestic violence who are not listed on vouchers as
the head of household prior to a family breakup.” Id. ¶ 45. She also claims that the series of 15 actions in her case were not “isolated incidents” but instead evidence of this pattern or practice.
Pl.’s Opp’n at 16–17.
These allegations, however, are insufficient to demonstrate a continuing pattern or practice
that qualifies for the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. So too does the record lack indicia
of a pattern or practice. The Amended Complaint does not include allegations about any other
victims of domestic violence who have encountered the same alleged policy as Ms. Chavis did.
The events included in the Amended Complaint also only span a few short months; in other words,
the violation occurred in a specific and discrete circumstance, and not continually or repeatedly.
While Ms. Chavis relies upon the quoted portion of the letter, the actual language in the letter does
not address that Ms. Chavis was a victim of domestic violence. Nor does it state that this is the
policy specifically applicable to domestic violence victims. See Am. Compl. ¶ 44. This letter
alone is therefore insufficient to support a plausible claim that there is a continuing pattern or
practice here, especially in light of the “general presumption that a federal agency will follow its
own regulations,” Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 79 (D.C. Cir.
2011), including the Housing Authority’s regulations concerning the family break up process,
which Ms. Chavis does not contest align with applicable protections under VAWA and D.C. law.
The cases upon which Ms. Chavis relies do not suggest otherwise. In Young v. District of
Columbia Housing Authority, 31 F. Supp. 3d 90 (D.D.C. 2014), this Court found that the Housing
Authority’s actions were insufficient in light of its previous conduct, id. at 96–99. At issue in the
case was the Housing Authority’s provision of American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreters to
the plaintiffs in addition to their failing to provide vouchers. See id. The Court found that the
Complaint set forth “a multi-year history of Defendant repeatedly failing to facilitate effective
communication with Plaintiffs despite repeated requests by Plaintiffs for ASL interpreters and
16 despite assurances from Defendant on several occasions that ASL interpreters would be provided.”
Id. at 96. Only once the suit had begun did the Housing Authority began to remedy the situation,
which included not only issuing vouchers to the plaintiffs but also implementing a notification
system to notify staff members of needs for ASL interpreters. See id. The Court concluded that
although the vouchers had already been issued, the notification system could have “easily be[en]
undone.” Id. Because the plaintiffs would continue to have ongoing contact with the Housing
Authority, the fact that the notification system could be undone was enough to keep the case from
being moot. See id. at 96–97.
Young is inapposite here. Ms. Chavis has not alleged a multi-year pattern of misbehavior.
Instead, she alleged a single series of events that she claims amounted to a violation of her rights.
That past series of events, as explained above, will not affect her future contact with the Housing
Authority, unlike in Young. There is no system here that could be easily undone as to Ms. Chavis
that would result in a lack of effective communication, as in Young. Nor is there a chance that a
violation could inadvertently occur as to Ms. Chavis again, as was the case with the plaintiffs in
Young in the case of unscheduled visits to the Housing Authority. See id. at 98–99. Moreover,
this Court in Young actually suggested that providing a voucher wrongfully withheld may moot a
case that was solely about being denied a voucher. See id. at 97 (finding case was not moot “even
though DCHA has given Plaintiffs the Vouchers they sought and provided ASL interpreters so that
Plaintiffs could access information related to those specific Vouchers”); id. at 98 (explaining that
complaint included claims not just relating to vouchers, but also to persistent violations regarding
effective means of communication).
Ms. Chavis also relies upon DL v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016).
DL was a case brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),
17 Rehabilitation Act, and other statutes in which numerous plaintiffs alleged that the district had
failed to abide by those statutes with respect to their children’s education. Id. at 4. Like the
defendant in Young, the District in DL had an ongoing responsibility with respect to ensuring that
the children were able to receive the appropriate education under the relevant statutes. See id. at
11–12. The court in Young determined that the District was aware of its behavior and only
“changed its conduct during th[e] litigation in an effort to escape liability.” Id. at 12. In fact, “the
District’s period of prior non-compliance with the Rehabilitation Act span[ned] over a decade.”
Id. The case itself had been pending for ten years. Id. (discussing how District fought liability for
“the ten years that these claims have been pending”). These attributes are absent from the present
case, in which the alleged violation was with respect to one person—Ms. Chavis—and in which
the alleged violation only spanned a few months. The DL court even distinguished cases in which
there is “a single infraction or isolated occurrence.” Id. at 13. At bottom, neither Young nor DL
convince this Court that Defendants’ conduct has not met their burden here.
Accordingly, as the Court cannot afford Ms. Chavis meaningful relief, this Court finds that
certain of Ms. Chavis’s claims are moot. These are specifically her claims that seek the relief in
Paragraphs A and B of the relief portion of her Complaint. See Am. Compl. at 18 ¶¶ A–B; see
also Tidwell, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (finding insufficient conclusory assertion that future violations
would occur when just one violation was in front of court); PETA I, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 98 (finding
that bare assertions of pattern or practice in complaint were insufficient); Sharp v. Rosa Mexicano,
D.C., LLC, 496 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that ADA claim was moot when there
was single violation and defendant claimed that it had resolved the alleged violation). Her claims
are therefore dismissed to the extent that they seek this injunctive relief.
18 3. The Claims Seeking Declaratory Relief
Defendants also challenge Ms. Chavis’s related claims seeking declaratory relief regarding
the same violations, which are in Paragraphs D and E of the Prayer for Relief Portion of Ms.
Chavis’s Amended Complaint. Am. Compl. at 18–19 ¶¶ D–E. The Court agrees that these claims
are also moot. “[T]he D.C. Circuit has indicated that where a plaintiff seeks both declaratory and
injunctive relief pertaining to unlawful agency action, and where the latter has been mooted, an
outstanding request for the former will not operate to bar mootness[.]” Cierco v. Lew, 190 F. Supp.
3d 16, 27 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Cierco v. Mnuchin, 857 F.3d 407 (D.C.
Cir. 2017). The D.C. Circuit has found that there are “three potential outcomes to a request for
declaratory relief” when “a plaintiff’s specific claim is moot.” City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The first of those three outcomes is the
relevant outcome here. 3 As the D.C. Circuit has explained:
if a plaintiff has made no challenge to some ongoing underlying policy, but merely attacks an isolated agency action, then the mooting of the specific claim moots any claim for a declaratory judgment that the specific action was unlawful, unless the specific claim fits the exception for cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” or falls within the “voluntary cessation” doctrine.
Id. at 1429–30 (citations omitted). This is because declaring that an agency’s past conduct that
has since been rectified was illegal would “accomplish nothing—amounting to exactly the type of
advisory opinion Article III prohibits.” Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
3 The second outcome applies when “a plaintiff challenges an ongoing agency policy by seeking declaratory relief, but lacks standing to attack future applications of that policy.” City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1429–30. The third outcome applies to pattern and practice claims and related declaratory relief. See id. The Court found above that there is no such plausible claim in this case. See Section III.A.2. Moreover, Ms. Chavis has not sought any declaratory relief specifically related to the alleged policy or practice. Indeed, Ms. Chavis does not seek forward-seeking declaratory relief here. The only declaratory relief she seeks is in relation to Defendants’ past conduct. See Am. Compl. at 18 ¶¶ C–E. These two outcomes are therefore inapplicable in this case. 19 The declaratory relief that Ms. Chavis seeks relates only to the isolated action with respect
to her, and not with respect to her broader pattern and practice claim. See Am. Compl. at 18–19
¶¶ D–E. In particular, she asks for “a declaratory judgment declaring that the Housing Authority’s
actions providing temporary and inadequate assistance have violated Plaintiff’s rights under the
Violence Against Women Act and related implementing regulations.” Id. at 18 ¶ D. She also
requests “a declaratory judgment declaring that the Housing Authority’s actions providing
temporary and inadequate assistance have violated Plaintiff’s rights under Title 14 of the District
of Columbia Municipal Regulations.” Id. at 19 ¶ E. The Court found that her analogous injunctive
relief claims have been mooted and that they do not qualify for the voluntary cessation exception
to mootness. See Section III.A.2. Accordingly, to the extent her claims seeking the declaratory
relief outlined in Paragraphs D and E of her Prayer for Relief, they are similarly moot. These
claims are therefore dismissed to the extent that they seek this declaratory relief.
B. Procedural Due Process Claim (Count I)
Defendants also contend that Ms. Chavis has failed to plausibly state a Fifth Amendment
due process claim because she did not avail herself of available process. See Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss at 24–25. According to Defendants, Ms. Chavis does not allege that she availed herself
of processes available under state law, including the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations
(“DCMR”) or the District of Columbia Administrative Procedures Act (“DCAPA”). See id. at 24.
In response, Ms. Chavis argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which she brings her due process
claim, does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Pl.’s Opp’n at 25. This response
misunderstands Defendants’ argument. Rather than arguing that Ms. Chavis failed to exhaust her
remedies, they argue that she cannot plausibly state a claim for a violation of her due process rights
when she failed to avail herself of the process available to her under District of Columbia law.
20 The Second Circuit’s opinion in New York State National Organization for Women v.
Pataki, 261 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001), illustrates the difference. In Pataki, the Second Circuit found
that in conducting its analysis under Matthews v. Elbridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the district court
had “failed to consider the availability of other procedures that could have prevented” the
procedural violation (delay) alleged by the claimants. 261 F.3d at 168. In particular, the Second
Circuit highlighted that New York law empowered New York state courts to issue writs of
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. Id. The claimants had failed to use those procedures when
the alleged delay became apparent, which could have “substantially reduced, if not eliminated, the
risk of prejudice to their claims from further delay.” See id. The claimants could have even
brought a suit under those state laws before prejudice was apparent, unlike with § 1983. See id. at
168–69. The Second Circuit found that those procedures were sufficient to afford the claimants
due process and that their claim could not succeed because they had failed to avail themselves of
available procedural remedies. Id. at 169. Moreover, the Second Circuit explained that it was “not
contravening the general rule that exhaustion is not required for § 1983 claims.” Id. Rather,
exhaustion was “analytically distinct from the requirement that the harm alleged has occurred.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Under prevailing law, “a procedural due process violation cannot have occurred when the
governmental actor provides apparently adequate procedural remedies and the plaintiff has not
availed himself of those remedies.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alvin, 227 F.3d
at 116)).
This Court, like other courts in this circuit, finds this reasoning to be persuasive and adopts
it here. See Badgett v. District of Columbia, 925 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2013) (“However,
where, as here, procedural safeguards exist to obviate prejudice from delay and a plaintiff fails to
21 take advantage of those measures, no such constitutional violation occurs.” (citing Pataki,
261 F.3d at 169)); Medina v. District of Columbia, 517 F. Supp. 2d 272, 284 (D.D.C. 2007) (“This
Court agrees with the reasoning of the Second Circuit. Plaintiff still had avenues of relief open to
him in the D.C. Court of Appeals through a writ of mandamus or DCAPA proceeding.”).
This Court agrees with Defendants. Because Ms. Chavis has not alleged that she availed
herself of available procedures under District of Columbia law, she cannot plausibly state a claim
under § 1983 for violation of her due process rights. In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Chavis
alleges that she asked for a hearing and was improperly denied one. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53–61
(outlining Fifth Amendment due process claim). At no point does she allege that she availed
herself of relevant procedures available to her under District of Columbia law. There are at least
two avenues that she could have accessed. The first is through DCAPA. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under DCAPA to hear contested cases arising from the Housing
Authority’s denial of a voucher, even if no trial-type hearing was ever actually held. See Mathis
v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d 1089, 1100 (D.C. 2015). Ms. Chavis therefore could have requested
judicial review to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” D.C.
Code § 2-510(a)(2); see D.C. Code § 11–722 (granting District of Columbia court of Appeals
jurisdiction in accordance with DCAPA). Second, Ms. Chavis could have sought a writ of
mandamus under Rule 21 of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See D.C.
Court of Appeals Rule 21(a); Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 981 n.3 (D.C. 1985) (“[T]he writ
of mandamus is technically used as a form to require an official to perform an affirmative[.]”).
Ms. Chavis, however, pursued neither of these procedural alternatives, which afforded her
sufficient procedural safeguards.
22 Accordingly, Ms. Chavis’s Fifth Amendment due process claim cannot survive
Defendants’ Motion. See Badgett, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“Plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of
either of these procedural safeguards. The Court cannot find the OEA’s delay amounted to a
violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights where Plaintiffs had at their disposal state
procedural remedies to mitigate the prejudice of delay but failed to employ those safeguards.”);
Medina, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (“These procedures afforded plaintiff all the process he was due
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Plaintiff’s choice not
to pursue these matters in a D.C. court means plaintiff cannot support a claim for a violation of
procedural due process.”). It is therefore dismissed.
C. Claims Against Mr. Garrett
Lastly, Defendants seek to have dismissed Ms. Chavis’s claims against Mr. Garrett on the
basis that the suit is against Mr. Garrett in his official capacity and that the suits are identical. See
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 26; see also Jefferies v. District of Columbia, 917 F. Supp. 2d 10, 29
(D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing claims against official in official capacity because it was “redundant”
and “inefficient”). Ms. Chavis does not oppose this portion of Defendants’ Motion “on the sole
ground that such claims are duplicative of the claims against DCHA, and on the specific condition
that such dismissal has no effect on the claims asserted against DCHA and is without prejudice.”
Pl.’s Opp’n at 14 n.4. Accordingly, with Ms. Chavis’s consent, this claim is dismissed without
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. In
particular, the Court DISMISSES Ms. Chavis’s claims insofar as they seek the injunctive and
declaratory relief listed in Paragraphs A, B, D, and E of her Prayer for Relief. The Court further
23 DISMISSES the Fifth Amendment due process claim in Count I of her Complaint, and also
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her claims against Mr. Garrett with her consent. As
Defendants have not challenged Ms. Chavis’s claims in Count II and Count III to the extent that
they seek nominal or compensatory damages, those claims remain. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: December 30, 2019 /s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge