OPINION
DONOFRIO, Judge.
This case comes to us for a determination of whether or not the hearing officer correctly determined that petitioner, Melisendro Chavez, suffered no permanent disability attributable to his industrial injury of July 9, 1971. This is the second time petitioner has been before this Court regarding his 1971 injury. Our earlier decision, Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 21 Ariz.App. 501, 520 P.2d 1178 (1974), affirmed a finding of no permanent disability and found that petitioner’s failure to timely protest an average monthly wage determination by the Commission had resulted in that determination becoming final and res judicata. On review before the Supreme Court, however, petitioner prevailed and his untimely protest of the average monthly wage determination was excused. Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364, 529 P.2d 1181 (1974). The Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals finding as to lack of permanent disability attributable to the 1971 episode, but because of its determination that the untimely protest should have been excused, it set aside the award of the Industrial Commission.
Two hearings de novo were held following the Supreme Court’s decision at which petitioner and two physicians, Mark Frankel, M.D., and Melvyn L. Goldsmith, M.D., testified regarding petitioner’s physical condition and the presence or absence of a permanent disability. Additionally, the deposition testimony of two out-of-state witnesses was received into evidence. This testimony concerned petitioner’s job functions at the time of the hearing. Following these hearings, an award was issued by the hearing officer. Again, there was a finding [143] of no permanent disability, and there was a setting of petitioner’s average monthly wage. After the award was affirmed on review, petitioner brought this special action which is limited to questioning the propriety of the hearing officer’s determination regarding permanent disability.
Petitioner injured his back at the level of L4-5 in the course and scope of his employment with respondent, Christy Construction Company, on July 9, 1971. As a result, a partial laminectomy was performed by John W. McCracken, Jr., D.O., who later discharged petitioner without permanent impairment attributable to this injury. Petitioner had previously injured the same part of his back in an industrial episode in 1966, and he had undergone a laminectomy at that time as well. He was eventually discharged from that injury with a 15% disability, but returned to his regular employment without restrictions.
Dr. McCracken was the only medical witness at the hearing held prior to petitioner’s first appeal and it was on the strength of this testimony alone that we were compelled to conclude the Commission’s finding could not be disturbed on review by this Court as being without foundation.
Respondents have argued in their brief, and have maintained throughout these proceedings, that our earlier decision regarding the absence of a permanent disability constitutes the law of the case. They reason, therefore, that petitioner was not entitled to a new hearing on that issue, but was limited to the average monthly wage issue. We find this argument to be without merit. Respondent’s reliance on Janis v. Industrial Commission, 27 Ariz. App. 76, 551 P.2d 66 (1976), is misplaced. We were there faced with a situation where our Supreme Court had set aside a finding by the Industrial Commission that it was without jurisdiction to consider a late request for review and ordered the Commission to consider whether the facts of that case warranted relief from failing to timely file the request for review. Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362, 529 P.2d 1179 (1974). As we stated in our opinion:
“We can find nothing in the Arizona Supreme Court’s prior decision to indicate that it intended to set aside the prior award on the merits of the causation issues, since such issues are not even discussed in the opinion. Petitioner has had his hearing on the merits of the reasons for the delay, and in fact, after a finding by the hearing officer on this issue in his favor, the Commission has now proceeded to consider the petition for review on the causation merits which is what petitioner sought, and all he would have been entitled to, in the first instance.” 27 Ariz. App. at 78, 551 P.2d at 68.
The instant case is one where the Commission’s award was set aside on its merits since the average monthly wage issue had to be litigated in hearings before the Industrial Commission. We are, thus, in a situation common in Industrial Commission eases where the setting aside of an award on whatever basis entitled the petitioner to a complete hearing de novo. The appropriate rule relating to law of the case in such instances has recently been stated by this Court in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 439, 565 P.2d 1300 (App.1977) [Review Denied June 15, 1977] as follows:
“The effect of setting aside an award of the Commission results in the Commission conducting hearing de novo wherein new evidence bearing on the issues of the case may be presented. King v. Alabam’s Freight Co., 40 Ariz. 363, 12 P.2d 294 (1932). If on the new hearing the facts are not shown to be different, then the conclusion is that the Commission must follow the law already applied to substantially identical facts. Kasprowiz v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App. 116, 510 P.2d 427 (1973); Neitman v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App. 53, 510 P.2d 52 (1973). Correspondingly, if different evidence is presented in the hearings de novo, then the factual matter should be evaluated against this new evidence and the law of the case might well not be applicable since its application is condi[144] tioned upon substantial identicality of facts, issues and evidence.” 115 Ariz. at 442, 565 P.2d at 1303.
The Commission would only be bound by the law of the case doctrine here if the facts at the de novo hearing were the same as the facts previously presented.
Petitioner was entitled to present new evidence relating to the existence of a permanent disability. Since the evidence he presented was different in some respects from that at the original hearing in this matter, the hearing officer was not bound by the law of the case.
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OPINION
DONOFRIO, Judge.
This case comes to us for a determination of whether or not the hearing officer correctly determined that petitioner, Melisendro Chavez, suffered no permanent disability attributable to his industrial injury of July 9, 1971. This is the second time petitioner has been before this Court regarding his 1971 injury. Our earlier decision, Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 21 Ariz.App. 501, 520 P.2d 1178 (1974), affirmed a finding of no permanent disability and found that petitioner’s failure to timely protest an average monthly wage determination by the Commission had resulted in that determination becoming final and res judicata. On review before the Supreme Court, however, petitioner prevailed and his untimely protest of the average monthly wage determination was excused. Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364, 529 P.2d 1181 (1974). The Supreme Court adopted the Court of Appeals finding as to lack of permanent disability attributable to the 1971 episode, but because of its determination that the untimely protest should have been excused, it set aside the award of the Industrial Commission.
Two hearings de novo were held following the Supreme Court’s decision at which petitioner and two physicians, Mark Frankel, M.D., and Melvyn L. Goldsmith, M.D., testified regarding petitioner’s physical condition and the presence or absence of a permanent disability. Additionally, the deposition testimony of two out-of-state witnesses was received into evidence. This testimony concerned petitioner’s job functions at the time of the hearing. Following these hearings, an award was issued by the hearing officer. Again, there was a finding [143] of no permanent disability, and there was a setting of petitioner’s average monthly wage. After the award was affirmed on review, petitioner brought this special action which is limited to questioning the propriety of the hearing officer’s determination regarding permanent disability.
Petitioner injured his back at the level of L4-5 in the course and scope of his employment with respondent, Christy Construction Company, on July 9, 1971. As a result, a partial laminectomy was performed by John W. McCracken, Jr., D.O., who later discharged petitioner without permanent impairment attributable to this injury. Petitioner had previously injured the same part of his back in an industrial episode in 1966, and he had undergone a laminectomy at that time as well. He was eventually discharged from that injury with a 15% disability, but returned to his regular employment without restrictions.
Dr. McCracken was the only medical witness at the hearing held prior to petitioner’s first appeal and it was on the strength of this testimony alone that we were compelled to conclude the Commission’s finding could not be disturbed on review by this Court as being without foundation.
Respondents have argued in their brief, and have maintained throughout these proceedings, that our earlier decision regarding the absence of a permanent disability constitutes the law of the case. They reason, therefore, that petitioner was not entitled to a new hearing on that issue, but was limited to the average monthly wage issue. We find this argument to be without merit. Respondent’s reliance on Janis v. Industrial Commission, 27 Ariz. App. 76, 551 P.2d 66 (1976), is misplaced. We were there faced with a situation where our Supreme Court had set aside a finding by the Industrial Commission that it was without jurisdiction to consider a late request for review and ordered the Commission to consider whether the facts of that case warranted relief from failing to timely file the request for review. Janis v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 362, 529 P.2d 1179 (1974). As we stated in our opinion:
“We can find nothing in the Arizona Supreme Court’s prior decision to indicate that it intended to set aside the prior award on the merits of the causation issues, since such issues are not even discussed in the opinion. Petitioner has had his hearing on the merits of the reasons for the delay, and in fact, after a finding by the hearing officer on this issue in his favor, the Commission has now proceeded to consider the petition for review on the causation merits which is what petitioner sought, and all he would have been entitled to, in the first instance.” 27 Ariz. App. at 78, 551 P.2d at 68.
The instant case is one where the Commission’s award was set aside on its merits since the average monthly wage issue had to be litigated in hearings before the Industrial Commission. We are, thus, in a situation common in Industrial Commission eases where the setting aside of an award on whatever basis entitled the petitioner to a complete hearing de novo. The appropriate rule relating to law of the case in such instances has recently been stated by this Court in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 439, 565 P.2d 1300 (App.1977) [Review Denied June 15, 1977] as follows:
“The effect of setting aside an award of the Commission results in the Commission conducting hearing de novo wherein new evidence bearing on the issues of the case may be presented. King v. Alabam’s Freight Co., 40 Ariz. 363, 12 P.2d 294 (1932). If on the new hearing the facts are not shown to be different, then the conclusion is that the Commission must follow the law already applied to substantially identical facts. Kasprowiz v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App. 116, 510 P.2d 427 (1973); Neitman v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App. 53, 510 P.2d 52 (1973). Correspondingly, if different evidence is presented in the hearings de novo, then the factual matter should be evaluated against this new evidence and the law of the case might well not be applicable since its application is condi[144] tioned upon substantial identicality of facts, issues and evidence.” 115 Ariz. at 442, 565 P.2d at 1303.
The Commission would only be bound by the law of the case doctrine here if the facts at the de novo hearing were the same as the facts previously presented.
Petitioner was entitled to present new evidence relating to the existence of a permanent disability. Since the evidence he presented was different in some respects from that at the original hearing in this matter, the hearing officer was not bound by the law of the case.
Turning to the substantive issues presented by petitioner, he initially attacks Dr. McCracken’s failure to rely on the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as required by Industrial Commission Rule 13(d) and our Supreme Court’s opinion in Adams v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 294, 552 P.2d 764 (1976). Adams only requires that the AMA Guides be used to the extent that they cover the specific impairment and provide a percentage rating therefor. None of the physicians who testified felt that AMA Guides were useful in a situation such as this where there has been a re-entry into the same surgical level as was involved in petitioner’s 1966 industrial injury. We agree and decline to require medical practitioners to follow the guides where there is unanimity that they are inapplicable to the problem in question.
The main thrust of petitioner’s argument seems to be that the Commission should have awarded him a new permanent disability based on his 1971 injury. Both Dr. McCracken at the original hearing and Dr. Goldsmith at the later hearings testified that petitioner had suffered no new permanent impairment as a result of his 1971 industrial injury. Dr. Goldsmith testified that the 1971 incident constituted a temporary aggravation of the 1966 episode and that petitioner had returned “to essentially the same status and preceding [the 1971] episode.” As we noted in an earlier opinion in this case, Dr. McCracken was likewise steadfast in his opinion that no new impairment resulted from the 1971 injury and we, as laymen, are unable to say that his opinion was without foundation.
Even Dr. Frankel, petitioner’s medical expert, testified he would not rate petitioner’s permanent impairment at more than 15%, although he would have attributed part of that to the injury in 1971.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the award of the Industrial Commission (Micucci v. Industrial Commission, 108 Ariz. 194, 494 P.2d 1324 (1972)) and recognizing that it is the duty of the Commission to resolve conflicts in the medical testimony (Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 96 Ariz. 356, 395 P.2d 712 (1964)), we find that there was more than sufficient medical evidence to support the hearing officer’s findings. We, therefore, affirm the award.
In view of our holding that the medical testimony alone is sufficient to support the award, it is unnecessary to discuss petitioner’s other allegations of error.
The award is affirmed.
OGG, P. J., concurs.