Chauvin v. Town of Franklinton Mayor Gregory Route

• Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02485
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SEENA CHAUVIN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2485

TOWN OF FRANKLINTON, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is defendants Town of Franklinton, Mayor Gregory Route and Town of Franklinton City Hall’s unopposed motion for dismissal1 and unopposed motion for summary judgment.2 For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment and denies as moot the motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND On December 17, 2022, Seena Chauvin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that she was subjected to sexual harassment, discriminated against based on sex, and retaliated against during her employment with the Town of

1 R. Doc. 26. 2 R. Doc. 31. Franklinton.3 On September 26, 2023, the EEOC issued Chauvin a formal notice of right to sue.4 The notice explicitly provided that any lawsuit in

federal or state court related to the charge “must be filed WITHIN 90 days of your receipt of this notice.”5 On December 29, 2023, Chauvin filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that she was unlawfully terminated

after asking for reasonable accommodations, harassed, and discriminated against based on sex.6 She alleged that the “toxic environment” had been ongoing for at least three years.7 On June 24, 2024, the EEOC issued another

formal notice of Chauvin’s right to sue.8 The EEOC notice explicitly provided that Chauvin had 90 days to bring suit.9 On September 20, 2024, eighty-eight days after the second notice but more than eleven months after the first, Chauvin sued the Town of

Franklinton, Mayor Gregory Route, and the Town of Franklinton City Hall pro se in state court.10 Plaintiff alleges that she was fired after asking for

3 R. Doc. 8-3 at 1. 4 R. Doc. 8-4 at 1. 5 Id. 6 R. Doc. 8-5 at 1. 7 Id. 8 R. Doc. 8-6 at 1. 9 Id. 10 See R. Doc. 1-2. reasonable accommodations and that she was the subject of discrimination and retaliation based on sexual harassment.11 Defendants removed the case

on October 16, 2024.12 On November 25, 2024, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation as time-barred following her failure to sue within 90 days of the first notice of right to sue.13

Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. The Court granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation occurring before December 17, 2022, and dismissed those claims

with prejudice.14 Defendants now move for dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3715 and for summary judgment on plaintiff’s remaining claims.16 Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that

defendants complied with the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) under which plaintiff was on medical leave from fall 2022, until the

11 Id. 12 See R. Doc. 1. 13 R. Doc. 8. 14 R. Doc. 12. 15 R. Doc. 26. 16 R. Doc. 31. termination of her position in early 2023.17 Plaintiff does not oppose either motion. The Court considers defendants’ motions below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness

Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

17 See generally R. Doc. 31-1. § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmoving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence

which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948,

951 (D. Colo. 1991)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to

return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265. If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for

resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)). In the Fifth Circuit, a district court may not grant a “default” summary judgment on the ground that it is unopposed. Morgan v. Fed. Express Corp.,

114 F. Supp. 3d 434, 437 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (collecting cases). Even in the context of unopposed motions for summary judgment, the movant must still show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50

F.3d 360, 363 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). When a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, a court may accept the movant’s evidence as undisputed. Morgan, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Long, 227 F. Supp. 2d 609 (N.D. Tex. 2002)). Nevertheless, if the moving party

fails to meet its burden, the Court must deny its motion for summary judgment. Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 362 n.3. B. Dismissal Under Rule 37 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 permits a district court to “dismiss[]

[an] action in whole or in part” where a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Before a court may dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 37, “two criteria must be met.” United States v. $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2003). “First, the

penalized party’s discovery violation must be willful.” Id. Second, the “drastic measure [of dismissal] is only to be employed where a lesser sanction would not substantially achieve the desired deterrent effect.” Id.

“The reviewing court may also consider whether the discovery violation prejudiced the opposing party’s preparation for trial, and whether the client was blameless in the violation.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION In her second EEOC charge of discrimination, plaintiff alleges that she was terminated after asking for reasonable accommodations for her return- to-work post mental health leave.18 Defendants contend that plaintiff was

18 R. Doc. 8-5. terminated from her position after failing to return to work prior to the expiration of her leave under FMLA.19

Plaintiff applied for medical leave from her employer, the Town of Franklinton, under FMLA on August 5, 2022.20 Plaintiff’s original return to work date was October 29, 2022.21 Plaintiff requested, and the Town granted three extensions of plaintiff’s leave.22 The first extension provided plaintiff

until November 10, 2022, the second until January 20, 2023, and the third and final extension until February 1, 2023.23 On February 1, 2023, plaintiff did not return to work and she had not requested an additional extension on

or before that date.24 Thereafter, plaintiff’s position as a 911 dispatcher was filled.25 As a preliminary matter, the Court has already dismissed plaintiff’s claims for sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation

19 R. Doc. 31. 20 R. Doc. 31-2 at 2. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3), “[a] matter is admitted” if a party does not respond to a request for admission within 30 days. On June 9, 2025, the Court confirmed that all matters in defendants’ requests for admission were deemed admitted following plaintiff’s failure to timely respond. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. at 3. 25 R. Doc. 31-1 at 4. occurring before December 17, 2022.26 Plaintiff began her medical leave prior to this date.27 Plaintiff has not alleged that there was continued

harassment during the period that she was out on leave. Thus, the only allegation that remains is that plaintiff was fired after asking for reasonable accommodations for her return to work following mental health leave. The Court considers this allegation below.

A. The ADA and the LEDL Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions violated the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 to 12117, and La. Rev. Stat. §§ 23:322 and 23:323 (portions of LEDL) by firing her after she asked for reasonable accommodations.28 For claims stemming from improper treatment of a disabled employee, the LEDL is modeled after federal law and

should be construed in light of federal precedent. See, e.g., Smith v. Thurman Oils, Inc., 951 So.2d 359, 361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2006) (“In interpreting Louisiana’s employment discrimination laws, our courts have relied upon similar federal statutes and the interpreting federal

jurisprudence.”). Here, the Court’s analyses under the LEDL and the ADA

26 R. Doc. 12. 27 R. Doc. 31-2 28 R. Doc. 1-2 at 5. are the same. See Leaumont v. City of Alexandria, 582 F. App’x 407, 410– 11 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying the same standard to a claim for disability

discrimination under the LEDL and ADA).

1. Failure to Accommodate To recover on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must establish

that “(1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and (3) the employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’

for such known limitations.” Feist v. Louisiana, Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)). In plaintiff’s complaint, she alleges that she has PTSD and Major

Depressive Disorder. However, plaintiff has not pointed to evidence showing that her employer knew of her alleged disabilities and their limitations, nor that it failed to make “reasonable accommodations” for known limitations. Plaintiff has therefore failed to carry her burden of proof at the summary

judgment stage. See Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the non-moving party can point to nothing in the record supporting its claim, summary judgment is appropriate.”). Thus, the Court must grant summary judgment as to plaintiff’s reasonable accommodations claim.

2. Disability Discrimination The Fifth Circuit applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to employment disability discrimination ADA claims. Nall v.

BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019). Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie claim of discrimination. Id. at 341. If she succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant

to articulate a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the action. Id. Finally, if defendant satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show pretext. Id. at 342. To carry her initial burden of establishing a prima facie discrimination

claim under the ADA, plaintiff must show “(1) [s]he has a disability or was regarded as disabled; (2) [s]he was qualified for the job; and (3) [s]he was subject to an adverse employment decision because of his disability.” Id. at 341 (citing Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transp., 826 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 2016)).

Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to suggest that she was fired for any reason other than failing to return to work before her FMLA leave expired. Even if plaintiff established a prima facie claim of discrimination, she has failed to raise an issue of material fact that defendant’s non- discriminatory reason for firing her, that she did not return to work after

exhausting her FMLA leave, was pretextual. See Owens v. Calhoun Cnty School Dist., 546 F. App’x 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that pretext was not established in an ADA claim where the record reflected that plaintiff did not return to work prior to the expiration of FMLA leave). Thus, the

Court must grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.

B. Title VII

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must establish that (1) she participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004). Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose for the employment action.” Id. If the defendant meets the burden, then plaintiff

“must prove that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse action was merely a pretext for the real, discriminatory purpose.” Id. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff again fails to raise an issue of material fact that

defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for firing her, that she did not return to work after exhausting her FMLA leave, was pretextual. Accordingly, the Court must grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.

C. Motion for Dismissal Under Rule 37 Because the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s remaining claims, it need not decide whether the

“drastic measure” of dismissal under Rule 37 is warranted. Accordingly, the Court denies as moot defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 37. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and DENIES as moot defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff's complaint.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 28th day of August, 2025. here Vives SARAH S. VANCE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE