Chauncey T. Lewis v. G. Segura, et al.

District Court, N.D. California·Decided December 16, 2025·No. 4:24-cv-01170·Unknown

Opinion

CHAUNCEY T. LEWIS, Case No. 24-cv-01170-JST

Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL v.

G. SEGURA, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff has filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), where he was previously housed. His second amended complaint (ECF No. 16) is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Procedural Background The initial complaint named as defendants Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) correctional officers sergeants G. Segura and D. Moreno, and officer J. Lopez, and had a single- sentence statement of claim: “I’ll like for the watch sergeant & officer D. Moreno / officer J. Lopez to be charge with a felony for falsified all documents date 4/26/22.” See generally ECF No. 1. The initial complaint sought money damages to compensate Plaintiff for “pain and suffering / emotional stress” and negligence. ECF No. 1 at 3. The Court dismissed the initial complaint with leave to amend because it did not allege a violation of federal constitutional or statutory law, as is required to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and because the allegations were too conclusory and vague for the Court to ascertain what the named defendants did, and how the actions or inactions of the named defendants harmed Plaintiff. ECF No. 12. The first amended complaint again named as defendants Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) correctional officers sergeants G. Segura and D. Moreno, and officer J. Lopez in the caption of the pleading, and, in Section II of the form complaint, added Natividad Medical Center staff doctor Joel Marshall as a defendant. The first amended complaint did not name sergeant Segura as a defendant. ECF No. 13 at 1. The Court dismissed the first amended complaint because the allegations were hard to follow. The first amended complaint alleged that Plaintiff had been an ADA “participant” since October 2019; that defendants Moreno and Lopez left him in violation of Plaintiff’s rights; a stent was placed in Plaintiff’s upper left arm without his consent; on April 26, 2022, Plaintiff was given RVRs for aggravated battery on defendant Moreno, gassing defendant Marshall, and destroying personal property, but was not provided with a copy of the RVR and a disciplinary hearing on this RVR within the required time period; Plaintiff was transferred to Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) in retaliation; and Plaintiff is being housed on an STG yard at KVSP despite not being in medical condition for STG placement. The first amended complaint also stated that there had been violations of CDO Penal Code § 2932(e)(1) and 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3320(a)(2). See generally ECF No. 13. The Court dismissed defendant Segura from this action with prejudice because the first amended complaint did not reference him and Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against him despite being given an opportunity to do so. The Court dismissed the due process claim against defendants Moreno and Lopez with prejudice because the failure to process an RVR within the time limits set forth in prison or state regulations does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court dismissed defendant Marhsall from the action without prejudice because the sole allegation regarding defendant Marshall was that the RVR was issued for inter alia gassing defendant Marshall, which did not state a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court dismissed the remainder of the complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 15. C. Second Amended Complaint The second amended complaint names as defendants SVSP officers D. Moren and J. Lopez, and Natividad Medical Center doctor Joel Marhsall. The second amended complaint’s statement of claim is as follows:

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Chauncey T. Lewis v. G. Segura, et al., (N.D. Cal. 2025).

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