1 O 2
6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8
9 CHAU NHU LE TRI, Case No.: 5:26-cv-00893-MEMF-AGR
10 ORDER GRANTING IN PART 11 PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR Petitioner, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND 12 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 2]
13 D. MARIN et al.,
15 Respondents. 16
19 Before the Court is the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion Preliminary 20 Injunction filed by Petitioner Chau Nhu Le Tri. Dkt. N o. 6 (“Motion”). For the reasons stated herein, 21 the M otion is DENIED. 22
26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 I. Background
2 A. Factual Background1
3 In 2010, Petitioner Chau Nhu Le Tri arrived in the United States. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”) at 4.
4 In 2023, Tri was found guilty of a criminal charge. Id. at 6.
5 Prior to February 1, 2026, Tri was held in the San Luis Obispo County jail. Id. at 2-3. After
6 his release from county jail on February 1, 2026, Tri was detained and subsequently transferred to
7 Adelanto Ice Processing Center. Id. Tri received a notice of revocation after being redetained, Dkt.
8 No. 10-2, and did not receive an opportunity to contest his redetention, Petition at 2-3. On February
9 13, 2026, an Immigration Judge ordered Tri be removed to Vietnam. Dkt. No. 10-1.
10 Tri is set to initiate the process of requesting a Vietnamese passport. Id. at 3. ICE has not
11 indicated that any travel documents have been procured or that Vietnam will accept Tri’s removal.
12 Id.
B. Procedural History 13 On February 23, 2026, Tri filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 in this matter. Petition. On February 23, 2026, Tri filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order2 15 as wel l as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Motion; Dkt. No. 3. On February 25, 2026, the 16 Magis trate Judge referred the case to the Federal Public Defender to consider appointment of 17 couns el. Dkt. No. 6. On March 3, 2026, the Federal Public Defender filed a Notice of No Intent to 18 Appea r. Dkt. No. 7. On March 3, 2026, the Court issued an Order preserving the Court’s jurisdiction 19 over T ri’s Habeas Petition. Dkt. No. 8. On March 4, 2026, Respondents filed an Opposition. Dkt. 20 No. 10 (“Opposition”). On March 30, 2026, Tri filed a Reply. Dkt. No. 16 (“Reply”). 21
22 II. Applicable Law 23 A. Preliminary Injunctions 24
25 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from the Hung’s Petition. Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”). This Court is not, at this time, making a final determination as to the veracity of the facts stated therein. 26 2 The Court notes that it appears that Tri did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1)(B) in filing his 27 Motion as the Motion does not include a declaration certifying “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). Given that Tri is detained and seeking emergency relief, and in light 28 of the fact that Respondents do not argue that the Motion should be denied for failure to comply with Rule 65, the Court 1 The analysis that courts must perform for temporary restraining orders and preliminary
2 injunctions is “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d
3 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of
4 a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary
5 remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To
6 qualify for injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
7 a likelihood that he will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips
8 in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. This Court cannot grant the
9 preliminary injunction “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”
10 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
11 The Ninth Circuit has held that injunctive relief may issue, even if the moving party cannot
12 show a likelihood of success on the merits, if “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance
13 of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction,
14 so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
15 injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th
16 Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied
17 if the probability of success on the merits is low. See Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670,
18 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[E]ven if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party,
19 it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.”).
20 B. Habeas Petitions in the Immigration Detention Context
21 District Courts are “generally prohibit[ed]” from “entering injunctions that order federal
22 officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out” 23 certain provisions of the INA, found in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 24 U.S. 543, 550 (2022). But “lower courts retain the authority to ‘enjoin or restrain the operation of’ 25 the relevant statutory provisions ‘with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual 26 [noncitizen] against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.’ Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 27 1252(f)(1)). This Court, therefore, may grant relief in “individual cases.” Reno v. American-Arab 28 Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1999). 1 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court established that courts should
2 treat a six-month period of detention as “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 700–01. It explained:
3 After this 6–month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 4 Re spondents must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for 5 detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, wh at counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every [noncitizen] not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, a [noncitizen] may be held in confinement 7 until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
8 reasonably foreseeable future.
Id. at 701. In other words, trial courts considering an immigration detainee’s habeas petition seeking 9
release must first ascertain if the detainee has demonstrated good reason to believe that, in the 10
reasonably foreseeable future, there is no significant likelihood of removal. Only then does the 11
burden shift to the Respondents to rebut that showing. 12
A different framework applies, however, once an immigrant has been “released under an 13
order of supervision.” 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(1). To “revoke an [noncitizen]’s release under this 14
section and return the [noncitizen] to custody,” the Service must “determine[] that there is a 15
significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. 16
§ 241.13(i)(2). “Upon revocation, the [noncitizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of 17
his or her release,” and is entitled to an initial interview after the immigrant’s return to custody to 18
allow the immigrant to respond, submit evidence, or otherwise demonstrate that “there is no 19
significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. § 241.13(i)(3). 20
III. Discussion 21 A. Applying the Winter factors, Tri is entitled t o a temporary restraining order. 22 Tri advances two grounds upon which a temporary restraining order should be granted. First, 23 Tri argues that ICE unequivocally failed to provide notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to Tri’s 24 re-detention. Petition at 12-13; Motion at 2-3. Second, Tri asserts that there have been insufficient 25 efforts to effectuate Tri’s removal to Vietnam, and there is an unlikelihood that removal to Vietnam 26 will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petition at 9-11; Motion at 2-3. As such, Tri alleges 27 that Respondents violated 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3). Petition at 12. 28 1 The Court addresses these grounds below.
2 i. The first Winter factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is met with respect to both grounds. 3 1. There is no significant likelihood of Tri’s removal to Vietnam in the 4 reasonably foreseeable future.
5 On his first ground, Tri argues that Respondents have failed to establish that his removal to
6 Vietnam is likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petition at 10; Motion at 3-4; Reply
7 at 2-3. Specifically, Tri asserts that there is no indication that travel documents to Vietnam have been
8 issued or the Government of Vietnam will accept Tri’s removal. Id. Respondents counter, stating
9 that they are not required to “pre-arrange” a noncitizen’s removal travel before arresting them and
10 thus, “[t]hat Petitioner does not yet have a specific date of anticipated removal does not make his
11 detention indefinite.” Opposition at 3.
12 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court established that a six-month period of detention was
13 presumptively reasonable. 533 U.S. at 701. Thus, in order to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
14 the merits, Tri has to indicate that there is good reason to believe that there is no likelihood of
15 removal in the near future. Id. However, because Tri is an immigrant released under an order of
16 supervision, Section 241.13 governs codifies how Zadvydas should apply:
17 This section establishes special review procedures for those [noncitizens] who are subject to a final order of removal and are detained under the custody review procedures 18 provided at § 241.4 after the expiration of the removal period, where the [noncitizen]
has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to the 19 country to which he or she was ordered removed . . . in the reasonably foreseeable 20 future.
8 U.S.C. § 241.13(a) (emphasis added).3 This therefore indicates that the subsection Tri relies 21
upon—241.13(i)(2)-(3)—only applies where the noncitizen has made the showing of “good reason 22 to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal.” And this mirrors Zadvydas: “[a]fter [the] 6- 23 24 3 Where it does not change the meaning, this Court will endeavor to use the term “noncitizen” in place of alien, 25 consistent with the practice of the United States Supreme Court. See Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 527 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[U]se of the term noncitizen has become a common practice of the Supreme Court . . . . [In addition,] [t]he word alien 26 can suggest ‘strange,’ ‘different,’ ‘repugnant,’ ‘hostile,’ and ‘opposed,’ Alien, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 53 (2002), while the word noncitizen, which is synonymous, see Alien and Noncitizen, American Heritage 27 Dictionary of English Language 44, 1198 (5th ed. 2011), avoids such connotations. Thus, noncitizen seems the better choice.”). 28 1 month period, once the [non-citizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
2 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Respondents must respond with
3 evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” 533 U.S. at 701.
4 Tri has provided good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in
5 the reasonably foreseeable future. Reply at 2-3. Under Section 241.13(i)(2), Respondents bear the
6 burden to establish that there is a significant likelihood that Tri may be removed in the reasonably
7 foreseeable future. As stated by Tri, it appears that Tri is beginning to “initiate the process of
8 requesting a Vietnamese passport,” to effectuate his removal. Motion at 3. But ICE has not
9 “procured travel documents” or demonstrated that “the Government of Vietnam has found [Tri]
10 eligible for repatriation.” Id. Respondents, acknowledging the “significant likelihood of removal” in
11 the “reasonably foreseeable future” standard, have not indicated that any action has been taken
12 toward Tri’s removal. Opposition at 3-4. Respondents only assert that Tri “is subject to a final order
13 of removal and has been detained for roughly one month, far less than the six month marker set out
14 in Zadvydas,” and that Vietnam is receptive to accepting pre-1995 immigrants. Id. at 4.
15 Tri acknowledges the 2020 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Vietnam,
16 which provides a process through which the Vietnamese government could consider pre-1995
17 Vietnamese immigrants for removal. Petition at 6-7; see 2020 Memorandum of Understanding
18 between the Department of Homeland Security of the United States of America and the Ministry of
19 Public Security of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam §§ 8(3), (4) (November 21, 2020),
20 https://www.nguoi-viet.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Vietnam-2020-MOU-redacted-1.pdf
21 (“2020 Memorandum”).4 But Tri emphasizes the 2020 Memorandum has not materialized in
22 effectuating the removal of pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants. Petition at 6-7. Tri points to: (1) 23 Hoang Trinh, et al v. Tae D. Johnson, No. 8:18-cv-316-CJC-GJS, Dkt. No. 161 at 3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24 7, 2021) where ICE acknowledged, in October 2021, that the current policy found that “pre-1995 25 26 4 Even if the Government can establish that Hung is removable under the 2020 Memorandum, Vietnam has total 27 discretion whether to accept particular non-citizens so the 2020 Memorandum is insufficient on its own to show a significant likelihood of removal. See Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 151 (D. Mass. 2025); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 28 25-CV-01740, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); Vu v. Noem, No. 25-CV-01366, 2025 WL 3114341, 1 Vietnamese immigrants . . . are not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future and
2 generally releasing pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants within 90 days of the entry of their final orders
3 of removal”; (2) ICE’s quarterly reports showing that only four pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants
4 were “given travel documents” and removed; and (3) the circumstances have not changed despite
5 ICE’s June 2025 statement rescinding the finding that pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants are unlikely
6 to be removed. Petition at 6-7; Asian Law Caucus, Resources on Deportation of Vietnamese
7 Immigrants Who Entered the U.S. Before 1995 (July 15, 2025),
8 (https://www.asianlawcaucus.org/news-resources/guides-reports/trinh-reports). Tri’s third contention
9 is supported by 2025 decisions which found that Vietnamese immigrants are unlikely to be timely
10 removed. Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F.Supp.3d 703, 723 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (finding petitioner provided
11 evidence indicating that the “process for procuring travel documents from Vietnam for pre-1995
12 immigrants continues to be uncertain and protracted”); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-01740-DC-
13 JDP, 2025 WL 1993771 at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding removals to Vietnam are not
14 reasonably foreseeable); Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F.Supp.3d 144, 151 (D. Mass. 2025) (same).
15 As it stands, Tri has gone a month without a travel document, after being redetained.
16 Although Respondents indicated a travel document is forthcoming in the near future, such anecdotal
17 evidence is insufficient for Respondent’s to establish their burden that Tri’s removal is reasonably
18 foreseeable, especially in light of Tri’s assertions and supporting evidence suggesting otherwise.
19 Notably, no travel document has been procured and Respondents have not provided any indication
20 beyond anecdotal accounts that removal is reasonably foreseeable. Petition at 2-3. Taken together,
21 Tri’s circumstances raise doubts that Vietnam will accept him.5
22 In sum, there is no “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 23 in the reasonably foreseeable future,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. This Court thus finds that Tri has 24 5 In Reply, Tri also raises questions as to whether his removal would comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 25 Reply at 3. Section 1231(b)(3) prohibits removal to a country if the noncitizen’s “life or freedom would be 26 threatened in that country because of the [noncitizen’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Respondents concede that Tri is a “refugee” which is defined as an 27 individual who is unable or unwilling to return to a country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 28 opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Thus, because Tri is a refugee of Vietnam, his removal to Vietnam could 1 demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits of the question of whether his detention is
2 unlawful under Zadvydas on this ground.
3 2. Tri was redetained without notice and was not provided an opportunity to be heard. 4 On this ground, Tri argues that Respondents failed to provide adequate notice or an 5 oppor tunity to be heard prior to Tri’s redetention. Petition at 12-13; Motion at 3-4. Respondents do 6 not co ntest that they properly gave notice to Tri prior to or on February 1, 2026, detailing the 7 chang ed circumstances warranting removal. See generally Opposition. Respondents also do not 8 contes t that Tri was not afforded an opportunity to be heard. Id. Instead, Respondents claim that their 9 discre tion to revoke Tri’s supervised release is “broad” and immediate release would not be 10 “narro wly tailored to the [alleged] wrong.” Opposition at 6-7. In Reply, Tri questions the finality of 11 his rem oval order, particularly the “the propriety of the proceedings in the immigration court to 12 justify detention pursuant to a purportedly final order of removal.”6 Reply at 3. 13 Respondents rely on Rodriguez v. Hayes, 578 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009), opinion 14 amend ed and superseded, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231 to posit that: (1) Tri’s 15 allege d due process violations are hypothetical because of Respondents’ broad discretion; and (2) 16 any pr ocedural harm “could be cured by means short of release.” Opposition at 6. The Supreme 17 Court , however, has held that “‘[t]he Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law’ 18 in the context of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (quoting Reno 19 v. Flo res, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). Accordingly, immigration detainees pending removal are 20 “entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard ‘approp riate to the nature of the case.’” Id. (quoting 21 Mulla ne v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). And Respondents’ cited 22 authority, Rodriguez, explicitly holds that a detainee is entitled to “some opportunity to respond to 23 the reasons for revocation.” 578 F.3d at 1044. 24 25 26 27 6 Tri indicates that he is “still in the process of trying to determine whether [his] waiver was valid,” namely whether he was informed of his right to appeal and knew he was giving up his right. Reply at 4. Although the 28 Court finds that Tri’s contentions have merit, the Court need not address the validity of waiver in light of the 1 As to Respondents’ first contention, Respondents do not, in their Opposition, claim that Tri
2 was: (1) provided notice of his revocation prior to his redentention; or (2) given an opportunity to be
3 heard prior to his redetention. See generally Opposition. In light of J.G.G., it appears that the
4 applicable regulations, namely 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l)(1) are the means by
5 which ICE has determined it will meet the due process rights of putative detainees. Respondents
6 provide no reason that this Court should find otherwise, and this Court declines to take the
7 extraordinary position that these individuals are not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard
8 in the absence of clear direction—in binding law, in the relevant statutes, or in the applicable
9 regulations—to that effect. See generally Opposition. Thus, the Court holds that Respondents’
10 admitted failure to provide Tri notice and an opportunity to be heard constitutes an unequivocal
11 violation of Section 241.13(i)(3).
12 This Court’s conclusion is consistent with that of other district courts. Particularly instructive
13 is the district court’s approach in McSweeney v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 3:25-
14 CV-02488-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL 2998376 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025). There, the Court found that a
15 detention which did not properly notify the petitioner of the reasons for revocation of release, or
16 grant him an interview to allow him to respond to the reasons for revocation, violated the petitioner’s
17 due process rights. Id. at *5–7. In McSweeney, it appears that the petitioner had received adequate
18 notice, unlike Tri; there, the petitioner was sent a notice of the reasons for revocation of his release.
19 Id. at *6. Still, because there was no interview opportunity following that notice, the Court found
20 that the procedural deficiencies constituted violations of procedural due process. Id. In its words,
21 “Petitioner could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation when he
22 had not yet even been informed of those reasons.” Id. 23 As to Respondent’s second argument, Tri’s prompt release is the remedy that will best return 24 Tri to the status quo and restore his position as it was prior to the detention that Tri contends was in 25 violation of his constitutional and statutory protections. The purpose of a temporary restraining order 26 is “to preserve the status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a 27 preliminary injunction.” 11A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2951 (3d ed.). 28 Though the Ninth Circuit has not opined on the matter of scope of preliminary relief in this specific 1 context, other courts in this Circuit have taken a similar approach. See, e.g., F.M.V. v. Wofford, No.
2 1:25-CV-01381, 2025 WL 3083934, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025).
3 In any event, this Court permits the Government to remedy the procedural deficiency at issue
4 through its Orders issued infra. This Court’s resolution of this Motion—to order Respondents to
5 release Tri from custody and not redetain him absent compliance with due process and his legal
6 protections—in effect permits the Government to follow the appropriate steps to reattempt Tri’s
7 detention.7
8 Today, the Court must determine whether Tri is likely to eventually prevail on the merits. For
9 the reasons described above, this Court finds that he is likely to succeed on the merits under both of
10 her arguments for habeas relief. In sum, the first Winter factor is met here under both of Tri’s
11 arguments for habeas relief.
12 ii. The second Winter factor, a demonstrated likelihood of irreparable harm absent an injunction, is met. 13 To establish the second Winter requirement, Tri must demonstrate a likelihood that he will 14 suffer irreparable harm without a temporary restraining order. This Court finds that he has done so. 15 As a threshold matter, Tri has “established a likelihood of irreparable harm by virtue of the 16 fact th at [he is] likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time.” 17 Herna ndez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). Respondents have provided no evidence 18 that T ri’s detention will not be prolonged or that Tri’s removal is likely to occur in the reasonably 19 forese eable future. See generally Opposition. Further, Respondents have failed to comply with the 20 legal process that is due to his as a detained noncitizen . J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 673. And “it is well 21 establ ished that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unque stionably constitutes irreparable 22 injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 23 347, 373 (1976)). Tri’s ongoing detention of indeterminate length—which may lead to a deportation 24 25
26 7 Respondents cite to Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1214 (9th Cir. 2022) and Ton v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV- 02033-SB-AGR, 2025 WL 2995068, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). These cases are unavailing. In Rodriguez, the 27 petitioner received a bond hearing and the challenge was to the hearing’s adequacy. 53 F.4th at 1214. In Ton, the petitioner presented “no procedural evidence” from which the Court could assess a due process violation. 2025 WL 28 2995068, at *4-5. Here, Tri was expressly states that he was not provided any opportunity to contest his revocation. 1 sometime in the future—inherently risks his irreparable harm, as it is not clear when he will be
2 processed, released, or removed.
3 Thus, as this Court has already found that Tri has a sufficient likelihood of success on the
4 merits of both of his challenges to his current detention—one of which has a basis in Tri
5 constitutional rights—this Court finds the second Winter factor is met.
6 iii. The third and fourth Winter factors, balancing the equities and considering the public interest, are met. 7 When, as here, the nonmoving party is a Respondents entity, the last two Winter factors 8 “merg e.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This Court then considers the third and fourth 9 factor s—whether the “balance of equities” is in Tri’s favor and whether an injunction is in the public 10 intere st—jointly. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135. 11 The balance of equities does appear to tilt strongly in Tri’s favor. The Court agrees that the 12 Gover nment has a strong interest in the enforcement of federal immigration law. Opposition at 7. 13 Howe ver, the Respondents have failed to comply with binding authorities, resulting in the violation 14 of Tri ’s constitutional rights against unlawful detainment. “‘[I]t is clear that it would not be equitable 15 or in t he public’s interest to allow the [Respondents] . . . to violate the requirements of federal law, 16 especi ally when there are no adequate remedies available.’” Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 17 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013). Given Tri’s unlawful detention, and without any reason to believe Tri’s 18 remov al or release will occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Court finds ample reason to 19 conclu de that “the balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.” Lopez v. Heckler, 713 20 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). And, for related reaso ns, an injunction is in the public interest. 21 “Publ ic interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all 22 citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th 23 Cir. 2005). 24 Accordingly, the third and fourth Winter factors are met here. 25 IV. Conclusion 26 27 28 1 For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART. Tri’s request for a temporary
2 restraining order is GRANTED. This Court will rule on the request for a preliminary injunction
3 following the Order to Show Cause hearing described below.
4 1. Respondents are ORDERED to release Tri from custody (and return to him his personal
5 belongings) within forty-eight (48) hours,8 and they may not redetain him without
6 compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), and 8 U.S.C. § 1231;
7 2. Respondents are enjoined from relocating Tri outside of the Central District of California
8 pending final resolution of this matter;
9 3. Respondents shall not impose any release restrictions on Tri, such as electronic
10 monitoring, unless deemed necessary at a future pre-deprivation bond hearing.9
11 4. This Court orders Respondents to show cause, in writing, as to why a preliminary
12 injunction should not issue.
13 a. Respondents’ brief is due at 5 PM on Tuesday, April 7, 2026.
14 Tri may file a response brief by Monday, April 13, 2026.
15 b. The parties may stipulate to a different briefing schedule via
16 joint stipulation filed by 5 PM on Monday, April 6, 2026.
17 Should the parties wish to extend either briefing deadline, the
18 parties should also stipulate that this temporary restraining
19 order may remain in effect (without converting to a preliminary
20 injunction) through this Court’s decision on the preliminary
21 injunction.
22 23 8 This Court understands, based on Respondents’ representations from hearings in similar immigration habeas cases, that 24 Respondents believe that forty-eight hours is a reasonable amount of time to effectuate release.
25 9 Restraints not shared by members of the public renders an individual in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa Clara County, California, 411 U.S. 345, 26 351 (1973) (holding that a person is in custody if the person “is subject to restraints ‘not shared by the public generally’” and the person’s “freedom of movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers”); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 27 236, 238-39 (1963) (finding that the “chief use of habeas corpus has been to seek the release of persons held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail. Yet English courts have long recognized the writ as a proper remedy even though the 28 restraint is something less than close physical confinement”). As such, prospective release restrictions, such as electronic 1 c. The parties’ briefing on the preliminary injunction should 2 address whether the granting of this TRO renders the PI 3 request, and the habeas petition itself, moot. 4 5. The parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report regarding the Respondents’ 5 compliance with this Order by Monday, April 6, 2026. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 Dated: March 31, 2026 9 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 10 United States District Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28