Chase National Bank v. Healy

156 A. 396, 103 Vt. 495, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 198
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedOctober 6, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 156 A. 396 (Chase National Bank v. Healy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chase National Bank v. Healy, 156 A. 396, 103 Vt. 495, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 198 (Vt. 1931).

Opinion

Moulton, J.

This is an action upon a promissory note, a renewal of one of like amount, signed by the defendant and payable to the order of the Manchester Manufacturing Company, and indorsed by that company while current to the Equitable Trust Company óf New York, as a part of the collateral security for a loan from the Trust Company to it. The Equitable Trust Company merged with the Chase National Bank, which became the holder of the note subject to the ownership rights of the Trust Company. At the close of all the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for" the-plaintiff, and the case is before us on the defendant’s exception to'-thiV idling.

*497 The execution of the note and the fact that it is unpaid are conceded. The original note was given in payment for certain shares of stock in the Manchester Manufacturing Company. The defendant claimed, and his evidence tended to show, that it was obtained from him by certain false representations made by two of the officers of the Company, upon which he relied, and that he did not discover the fraud that had been practiced upon him until after he had given the renewal note upon which this action is based.

The note was complete and regular upon its face; the Equitable Trust Company became a holder of it before it was overdue and for value; it had not been previously dishonored; and it is not suggested that at the time it was negotiated the Trust Company had notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the Manchester Manufacturing Company. The defense is that - the Equitable Trust Company was not a holder in due course, because it did not take the note in good faith as required by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. G. L. 2921. Since the defendant came forward with evidence sufficient for the jury tending to show fraud in the inception of the note, the burden upon this issue was cast upon the plaintiff, and it devolved upon it to disclose the facts and circumstances attending the tranfer by which it took the instrument from which good or bad faith might be inferred. Howard National Bank v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 451, 453, 120 Atl. 889; Harponola Co. v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 427, 436, 120 Atl. 895. “To show knowledge of such facts that the taking would amount to bad faith it is not necessary that the representatives of the bank should know the exact fraud that was practiced upon the defendant, but the defense would be available if the facts within their knowledge tended to show that there was something wrong with the transaction. * * * * To support a verdict for the defendant, there-would have to be evidence of circumstances attending the taking of the note, known at the time to the representatives of the bank having to do with the taking, at least sufficient to occasion suspicion of wrong doing. Short of this, certainly there would be no reasonable basis of an inference other than of good faith.” Howard National Bank v. Wilson, supra, 96 Vt. pages 453, 454, 120 Atl. 889, 895.

The loan from the Equitable Trust Company to the Manchester Manufacturing Company was in the sum of $50,000. *498 The latter company was then recently incorporated and had acquired the plant of the Manchester Lumber Company, at Manchester Depot, Vermont, and was about to start operations. Payment was secured by the deposit of bonds of the Manufacturing Company in the amount of $100,000 and by the transfer of several notes payable to the order of the Company, -aggregating $10,000 of which the note given by the defendant was one. In addition the note given by the Manchester Manufacturing Company was also indorsed and guaranteed by four individuals, Messrs. Colvin, Helitzer, Hopes, and Trumbull, all of whom were interested in the company. It has not been 'paid. The loan was approved by the directors of the Trust Company, a few days after it was made.

The principal negotiator for the loan was Mr. Colvin, president of the Glens Falls Trust Company, of Glens Falls, N. Y., 65 years of age, and an experienced and responsible business man, who had been a substantial and satisfactory customer of the Equitable Trust Company for fifteen to twenty years. Before making the loan the Trust Company made an investigation of the value of the property of the Manufacturing Company and its personnel and business prospects. A report from the company showed real estate values at $75,000 and machinery valued at $80,000, besides cash or other liquid assets. The value of the real estate and machinery was stated by Mr. Colvin at the same figures. An inquiry addressed to Factory Point National Bank of Manchester concerning the value of the plant was answered as follows:

“Hard to say as to its value. Physical condition is first rate and could not be built for $40,000, and perhaps not for that. There is more or less machinery that can be used to advantage by any manufacturing concern. Location is good and local conditions are good and any new concern would receive support.”

An estimate of the cost of the overhead expense in manufacturing a given quantity of the product of the company was also obtained, and showed an anticipated profit. The individual indorsers of the note, with the exception of Mr. Colvin, whose responsibility was already known to the bank were called upon for statements of their financial standing. They were made as *499 follows: Mr. Helitzer $102,700; Mr. Hopes $148,125; and Mr. Trumbull $44,821, although the net worth of the last was apparently considered to be reduced by the fact that the sum of $25,000, which he had included in his statement of assets, was to be paid by him for stock in the Manufacturing Company. Mr. Colvin informed the Trust Company that the makers of the notes assigned as collateral were small business men, but responsible. As to one of them, whose note was for $5,000, the Trust Company was advised from another source that he was believed to be honest, owned a little property, but was of no large financial responsibility and was a fairly good business manager. No further investigation of the signers of these notes was made, but no question is made by the defendant as to the responsibility of any of them except the one mentioned. The Trust Company understood that all of these’notes were given as subscriptions to the stock or bonds of the Manufacturing Company.

All this appeared without contradiction from the exhibits in the case and from the testimony of Mr. Bobert Kerr, who, at the time of the loan, was in charge of the collateral loan department of the Equitable Trust Company. All of the files of the Trust Company bearing upon the transaction were produced and marked as exhibits.

The defendant argues that the discrepancy between the estimate of value of the plant and its replacement cost given in the report of the Manufacturing Company, and by Mr. Colvin, and that given by the Factory Point National Bank is evidence tending to show a lack of good faith, but we do not so regard it. The discrepancy is not so apparent as he claims. The former estimate included the buildings and sprinkling system and land; the latter referred to the building alone. The machinery mentioned by the Company and Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
156 A. 396, 103 Vt. 495, 1931 Vt. LEXIS 198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chase-national-bank-v-healy-vt-1931.