Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Judith Pontius

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 30, 2018
Docket340487
StatusUnpublished

This text of Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Judith Pontius (Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Judith Pontius) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Judith Pontius, (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF YPSILANTI, UNPUBLISHED October 30, 2018 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 340487 Washtenaw Circuit Court JUDITH PONTIUS, LC No. 16-000800-CZ

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and MARKEY and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Charter Township of Ypsilanti, appeals as of right from the trial court’s order declaring plaintiff’s zoning ordinance in conflict with the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), MCL 333.26421 et seq., and, therefore, preempted by the MMMA. The trial court held that plaintiff’s zoning ordinance was void and unenforceable to the extent that it prohibited registered primary caregivers who complied with the MMMA from growing medical marijuana1 in residential districts for their qualified patients. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq., plaintiff adopted zoning ordinance regulations specifying that medical marijuana dispensaries and medical marijuana nurseries were prohibited as “home occupations” in single-family residential districts. Ypsilanti Code §§ 401(6)(c)(7) and (8).2 Relevant to this appeal, the zoning code provided the following definitions:

1 Although the spelling “marihuana” is used throughout the MMMA and Ypsilanti Zoning Code, “this Court uses the more common spelling, ‘marijuana,’ in its opinions,” People v Anderson (On Remand), 298 Mich App 10, 12 n 1; 825 NW2d 641 (2012), unless quoting legislative sources. 2 We note that the Ypsilanti zoning code was substantially amended by Ypsilanti Ordinance No. 2018-476, effective March 1, 2018. See Ypsilanti Ordinance No. 2018-476, available at

-1- Home occupation: An occupation carried on by an occupant of a dwelling unit as a secondary use which is clearly subservient to the use of the dwelling for residential purposes.

* * *

Medical marihuana dispensary: Any structure used for dispensing marihuana by a primary caregiver or caregivers to one or more qualifying patient(s). A medical marihuana dispensary does not include a qualifying patient’s residence if the marihuana transferred is exclusively for the qualifying patient’s use.

Medical marihuana nursery: Any structure which is used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, producing, processing, preparing, packaging, repackaging, or storing medical marihuana for one or more qualifying patients. A medical marihuana nursery does not include a qualifying patient’s residence if the marihuana is exclusively for the qualifying patient’s use. [Ypsilanti Code § 201.]

Although plaintiff’s zoning code did not permit a medical marijuana dispensary or nursery in a residentially zoned district, such uses were permitted in districts zoned for light industrial use, subject to special conditions. Ypsilanti Code § 1402(8).

Plaintiff’s zoning code provides civil penalties for violations as follows:

Any person, firm or corporation violating any provision of this ordinance shall be responsible for a civil infraction and shall be subject to a fine as follows:

(1) The fine for any first violation shall be $100.00;

(2) The fine for any violation which the violator has, within the past two years, been found in violation of once before, shall be $250.00;

_of_ordinances?nodeId=881651> (accessed October 24, 2018). Although the code has been largely reorganized, the substance of the relevant provisions remains the same. See current Ypsilanti Zoning Code §§ 201 (defining relevant terms), 306(3) (providing schedule of uses for residential districts), 306(6) (providing schedule of uses for industrial districts), 1802(c)(7) (prohibiting medical marihuana dispensaries as home occupations), and 1802(c)(8) (prohibiting medical marihuana nurseries as home occupations), 1841 (stating specific use conditions applicable to medical marihuana dispensaries and nurseries), and 3100 through 3103 (providing penalties for violations of zoning code). All citations to the Ypsilanti zoning code in the body of this opinion refer to the relevant provisions as codified before the 2018 amendment.

-2- (3) The fine for any violation which the violator has, within the past two years, been found in violation of twice before, shall be $500.00. [Ypsilanti Code § 3100.]

In addition, property uses in violation of plaintiff’s zoning code could be declared a public nuisance that could be abated by order of any court of competent jurisdiction. Ypsilanti Code § 3101. Under §§ 3102 and 3103, owners of properties that violated plaintiff’s zoning use restrictions were subject to fines that were imposed for each day that a violation occurred.

Plaintiff initiated this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant, Judith Pontius, a registered medical marijuana primary caregiver and qualified patient, to abate a public nuisance at her residential property located within the township, alleging that she grew medical marijuana in her basement for her registered qualified patients. According to plaintiff, its zoning code permitted caregivers who were also patients to cultivate medical marijuana in their homes for their personal use, but they could not do so as a “home occupation” for any of their patients.

Both parties moved for summary disposition. Plaintiff argued that, under the MZEA, it was allowed to limit the areas in which caregivers may cultivate medical marijuana for their qualified patients and that its home occupation ordinance did not conflict with the MMMA and, therefore, was not preempted by it. Plaintiff asserted that defendant could not rely on the MMMA’s immunity provision because she was operating a commercial medical marijuana operation at her residence, a location it could regulate. Defendant, on the other hand, argued that plaintiff’s prohibition of rights and privileges she had under the MMMA as a registered primary caregiver directly conflicted with the MMMA and, therefore, the relevant zoning code provisions were void and unenforceable against her. She also asserted immunity under § 4 of the MMMA. See MCL 333.26424(b). The trial court agreed with defendant and granted summary disposition in her favor. Plaintiff now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling regarding a motion for summary disposition de novo to determine whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint based upon the pleadings alone. Id. at 119-120. “All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. at 119. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The motion is

-3- properly granted if “there is no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

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Bluebook (online)
Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. Judith Pontius, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charter-township-of-ypsilanti-v-judith-pontius-michctapp-2018.