Charlotte Weatherford v. Nevada Rural Housing Authority

Ninth Circuit

Charlotte Weatherford v. Nevada Rural Housing Authority

588 F. App'x 709

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedDecember 22, 2014

Docket13-16173

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 588 F. App'x 709 (Charlotte Weatherford v. Nevada Rural Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Charlotte Weatherford v. Nevada Rural Housing Authority, 588 F. App'x 709 (9th Cir. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Charlotte Weatherford appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action brought under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and other federal laws. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Weatherford’s discrimination claims under the FHA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because Weatherford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants discriminated against her on the basis of a disability. See Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir.2003) (elements of disability discrimination claim under FHA); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.2002) (elements of disability discrimination claim under Rehabilitation Act).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Weatherford’s retaliation claim under the FHA because Weath-erford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants engaged in any coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference. See Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir.2001) (elements of retaliation claim under the FHA).

Summary judgment was proper on Weatherford’s regulatory claims because Weatherford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants discriminated against her on the basis of a disability, and as to whether defendants denied her a hearing to which she was entitled. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.11, 8.28, 8.33, 982.505, 982.555; Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”)

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Charlotte Weatherford appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action brought under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and other federal laws. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Weatherford’s discrimination claims under the FHA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because Weatherford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants discriminated against her on the basis of a disability. See Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir.2003) (elements of disability discrimination claim under FHA); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir.2002) (elements of disability discrimination claim under Rehabilitation Act).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Weatherford’s retaliation claim under the FHA because Weath-erford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants engaged in any coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference. See Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir.2001) (elements of retaliation claim under the FHA).

Summary judgment was proper on Weatherford’s regulatory claims because Weatherford failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants discriminated against her on the basis of a disability, and as to whether defendants denied her a hearing to which she was entitled. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.11, 8.28, 8.33, 982.505, 982.555; Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”)

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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588 F. App'x 709, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charlotte-weatherford-v-nevada-rural-housing-authority-ca9-2014.

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