COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Callins UNPUBLISHED
Argued by teleconference
CHARLES GREGORY DOANE MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0282-25-3 JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN FEBRUARY 10, 2026 CHRISTINE JILL DOANE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY James W. Updike, Jr., Judge
Philip B. Baker (Sanzone & Baker, L.L.P., on brief), for appellant.
No brief or argument for appellee.
Charles Gregory Doane (husband) appeals the circuit court’s final decree of divorce
entered January 17, 2025. He contends that the circuit court erred by: (1) declining to impute
income to Christine Jill Doane (wife) and consequently awarding her spousal support;
(2) classifying the down payment made on the marital residence as wife’s separate property; and
(3) declining to allocate husband “sweat equity” for improvements made to the marital residence.
For the following reasons, we find no error in the circuit court’s judgment and affirm its
decision.
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). BACKGROUND1
The parties were married on March 9, 2008. They have one son together who was born in
2010. They separated on April 9, 2022, and husband filed for divorce on July 12, 2023.
Before her marriage to husband, wife purchased a house in Concord, Virginia (the
Concord house); her name was the only one on the deed and promissory note for that house.
Husband moved into the Concord house after they got married, and for the entire time they lived
there (about seven years), he paid somewhere between $250 and $400 per month to help with the
mortgage and utilities. In 2015, the pair moved to Forest, Virginia and purchased their marital
residence (the Forest house). Wife sold the Concord house and used the proceeds from that sale
to put a down payment of $13,652 on the Forest house.
At trial, husband testified that he made significant improvements to the Forest house
while he and wife lived there, namely by adding a garage and a rec room. For the garage, he
hired a concrete company to lay a twenty-by-twenty slab. He then purchased two-by-fours,
drywall, and siding, and “enclosed” the room by “run[ning] the electrical” and putting in
flooring, a ceiling fan, lights, windows, and a door. For the rec room, he had the concrete
company lay a sixteen-by-twenty slab, and then he painted the floors, built a loft, hung lights,
and ran electricity to it. Dodd Harvey, a certified real estate appraiser, assessed the value of the
garage at $17,000 and the rec room at $20,000, for a total of $37,000.
On March 8, 2024, wife was diagnosed with stage III breast cancer. She had surgery in
April to remove a tumor and several lymph nodes in her arm, to which the cancer had spread.
Her treatment plan included five months of chemotherapy, followed by radiation and adjuvant
1 “On appeal, ‘we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.’” Sobol v. Sobol, 74 Va. App. 252, 260 n.1 (2022) (quoting Mills v. Mills, 70 Va. App. 362, 368 (2019)). Accordingly, we review the record in the light most favorable to wife. -2- endocrine therapy. At the time of trial, she had applied for disability benefits, but the claim was
still being reviewed. She testified that she was unable to work full-time because of her cancer
treatment schedule and the side effects of the chemotherapy but admitted that none of her doctors
had told her that she could not work.
In the summer of 2024, wife was working for a law firm, and she and husband were in
the midst of a dispute over health insurance. She testified that he dropped her from his health
insurance while she was undergoing her cancer treatment.2 On August 1, 2024, wife went to
husband’s workplace around lunchtime and “severely damaged” his motorcycle. She was
arrested for destruction of property and consequently fired from the law firm.3
In its letter opinion and final decree of divorce, the circuit court, “[u]pon consideration of
[her] current medical condition,” did not find wife voluntarily unemployed and declined to
impute income to her. It therefore ordered husband to pay her $1,000 per month in permanent
spousal support. Concerning equitable distribution, the circuit court found that the $13,652
down payment on the Forest house was wife’s separate property, as it came from the sale of her
Concord house. Finally, the circuit court declined husband’s request to allocate to him a separate
contribution of “sweat equity” that enhanced the value of the Forest house by $37,000. The
court explained that “any materials used during construction of such enhancements were
presumably purchased with marital funds, and if there was any separate contribution on the part
of husband, . . . he has not sufficiently traced such contribution to a separate source.”
2 Husband testified that it was the insurance company’s choice, not his, to drop wife from his health insurance. 3 Because wife had pending criminal charges at the time of trial for the destruction of property, she asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify about many of the details of this event. She did, however, admit that she damaged husband’s motorcycle and that she was fired because of her arrest. -3- ANALYSIS
I. The Circuit Court Did Not Err by Awarding Wife Spousal Support Because It Properly Found That Wife Was Neither Voluntarily Unemployed nor Subject to Income Imputation
A. Standard of Review
“Spousal support determinations typically involve fact-specific decisions best left in the
‘sound discretion’ of the trial court.” Brandau v. Brandau, 52 Va. App. 632, 641 (2008)
(quoting McKee v. McKee, 52 Va. App. 482, 489 (2008) (en banc)). “Unless the trial judge
misapplies the legal standard or misallocates the burden of proof, the question of ‘[w]hether a
person is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed is a factual determination.’” Nielsen v.
Nielsen, 73 Va. App. 370, 383 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Broadhead v. Broadhead,
51 Va. App. 170, 180 (2008)). “Employing the most deferential standard of appellate review, we
reverse factual findings ‘only if plainly wrong or not supported by credible evidence.’” Id.
(quoting Broadhead, 51 Va. App. at 181).
Similarly, but separately, “[t]he decision to impute income is within the sound discretion
of the trial court and its refusal to impute income will not be reversed unless plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence.” deCamp v. deCamp, 64 Va. App. 137, 149 (2008) (quoting
McKee, 52 Va. App. at 489).
B. The Trial Court Was Within Its Discretion in Finding That Wife Was Neither Voluntarily Unemployed nor Subject to Income Imputation
“In setting or modifying spousal support or child support, a court may impute income to a
party voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.” Blackburn v. Michael, 30 Va. App. 95, 102
(1999). “The party seeking imputation has the burden of proving that their spouse was
voluntarily forgoing employment and ‘is required to present evidence “sufficient to enable the
trial judge reasonably to project what amount [of income] could be anticipated.”’” deCamp, 64
Va. App. at 150 (alteration in original) (quoting McKee, 52 Va. App. at 490). -4- Courts often consider a party voluntarily unemployed when their employment has been
terminated because of their own poor performance or misconduct. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lowry,
232 Va. 110, 113 (1986) (finding defendant voluntarily unemployed where he was fired for
stealing); Garrett v. Garrett, No. 1440-16-4, slip op. at 9-10, 2017 Va. App. LEXIS 104, at
*14-15 (Apr. 18, 2017) (finding husband voluntarily unemployed where former manager
“testified concerning [his] poor work performance and his ineligibility for rehire”)4; Parham v.
Parham, No. 2061-17-2, slip op. at 9-10, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 262, at *14 (Oct. 9, 2018)
(finding defendant voluntarily unemployed where he lost his job “because he neglected the
requirements of his employment”); cf. Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616, 631 n.3 (2015)
(finding incarcerated father voluntarily unemployed for child support purposes because “a parent
should not be permitted ‘to shift to his wife and children the consequences of his wrongdoing’”
(quoting Layman v. Layman, 25 Va. App. 365, 368 (1997))).
On the other hand, even where parties have technically “chosen” to leave their jobs,
courts have often declined to find them voluntarily unemployed if they had legitimate reasons for
quitting. For instance, in Nielsen, the trial court acknowledged that there “was no gun to his
head” when husband accepted a “voluntary separation package,” but concluded that he was
“impelled” to leave his job “because of circumstances outside his control,” including changes in
his responsibilities and job title. 73 Va. App. at 384. Likewise, in Department of Social
Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Bowyer v. Bowyer, No. 0071-96-4, slip
op. at 5, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 213, at *6-7 (Apr. 8, 1997), the trial court found that “father’s
decision to resign from his salaried position was not the result of a voluntary choice, but rather
was the result of ‘life-threatening’ medical problems.” We affirmed the trial court in that case
4 We cite unpublished cases for their persuasive value, not as binding authority. Rule 5A:1(f). -5- and—notably—rejected mother’s argument that the trial court’s reliance on father’s testimony
alone was insufficient to support its finding. Id., slip op. at 5, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 213, at *7.
But see O’Hara v. O’Hara, 45 Va. App. 788, 798 (2005) (affirming the trial court’s imputation
of income where wife had serious health issues but was still able to work and had left her job not
because of her health, but because of a dispute over compensation).
Additionally, even where a court finds that a party is voluntarily unemployed, income
imputation is never mandatory. See Murphy v. Murphy, 65 Va. App. 581, 586 (2015) (“The law
does not require a trial court to impute income in all cases of voluntary under-employment, as
this would usurp the discretion expressly granted to the trial court by the legislature.”); Saleem v.
Saleem, 26 Va. App. 384, 393 (1998) (“A trial court has discretion to impute income to [a party]
who is voluntarily unemployed.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Bennett v.
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 684, 691 (1996))).
Here, wife’s arrest and ensuing termination—which she concedes were caused by her
own willful misconduct—would likely suffice for a finding of voluntary unemployment. See
Edwards, 232 Va. at 113. But the circuit court was still within its discretion to decline to find
wife voluntarily unemployed in light of her medical issues.
Husband argues that wife’s medical evidence (her doctors’ medical notes and her own lay
testimony) was insufficient to “refute[]” his income imputation argument because there was no
indication that she “was unable to work or was taken out of work by her physician.” But he cites
no authority—nor is there any—to support the proposition that one who chooses not to work
because of their health issues is necessarily voluntarily unemployed unless their doctor has
verified that they are entirely incapable of working. On the contrary, medical evidence,
including lay testimony as to one’s own condition, has been found to be a sufficient reason to
decline to impute income. See, e.g., Bowyer, slip op. at 5, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 213, at *6-7;
-6- see also Mullin v. Mullin, 45 Va. App. 289, 302-03 (2005) (affirming modification of child
support where mother’s uncontradicted lay testimony about son’s disability was sufficient to
infer that son could not “live independently and support himself”).
Further, even if the circuit court agreed with husband that wife was voluntarily
unemployed, it still would not have been required to impute income to her. Murphy, 65 Va. App.
at 586. In other words, even if the court found wife’s medical evidence lacking when
determining whether she was voluntarily unemployed, it still could have considered that
evidence when making its separate “discretion[ary]” decision on income imputation. Id.
Considering the facts in the light most favorable to wife, the circuit court’s decision not
to impute income to her was not “plainly wrong,” nor was it “unsupported by the evidence.”
deCamp, 64 Va. App. at 149. The court therefore did err by awarding wife spousal support.
II. The Circuit Court Correctly Classified the Down Payment as Wife’s Separate Property
Upon decreeing a divorce, the circuit court must determine “the ownership and value of
all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, of the parties and . . . consider which of such
property is separate property, which is marital property, and which is part separate and part
marital property.” Code § 20-107.3(A). “A circuit court’s classification of property or debt is a
finding of fact that ‘will not be reversed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it.’” Price v. Peek, 72 Va. App. 640, 647 (2020) (quoting Ranney v. Ranney, 45
Va. App. 17, 31-32 (2005)).
As relevant here, separate property includes “all property, real and personal, acquired by
either party before the marriage,” while marital property includes “all other property acquired by
each party during the marriage which is not separate property,” including, in most cases, income
earned during the marriage. Code § 20-107.3(A)(1) and (2); see Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App.
98, 104 (1996) (“[P]roperty acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital and property -7- acquired before marriage is presumed to be separate.”). Finally, Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d)
provides:
When marital property and separate property are commingled by contributing one category of property to another, resulting in the loss of identity of the contributed property, the classification of the contributed property shall be transmuted to the category of property receiving the contribution. However, to the extent the contributed property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, such contributed property shall retain its original classification.
Husband argues that the circuit court erred by classifying the $13,652 down payment on
the Forest house as wife’s separate property. It is undisputed that husband contributed up to
$400 per month to the mortgage and utilities at the Concord house before he and wife moved.
Husband explains that these funds helped generate “sufficient equity in the Concord property to
fund a portion of the Forest residence down payment.” He argues that because his payments
were commingled with wife’s existing equity in the Concord house, the funds are not traceable
and should be considered marital property, subject to equitable distribution. We disagree.
Two of our cases in this area are instructive. First, in Moran v. Moran, 29 Va. App. 408
(1999), the wife owed a separate debt on property that she purchased before her marriage. Id. at
411. After she got married, she and her husband used marital funds to pay down that debt. Id.
On appeal, this Court held that the property at issue was correctly classified as hybrid property—
part separate, part marital. Id. at 413-14. The Court acknowledged that the parties “commingled
marital funds with separate property, resulting in the presumption that the marital funds were
transmuted to separate property,” but found that the husband satisfactorily traced the marital
funds to a corresponding reduction in the principal of the debt owed. Id. at 413 (“[T]o the extent
the marital funds reduced the principal of the mortgage, that amount is traceable from the
separately acquired equity.”). The traceable portion of the equity was marital property—it was
not transmuted to separate property—while the remainder was the wife’s separate property. Id. -8- Second, in Duva v. Duva, 55 Va. App. 286 (2009), the husband owned separate property
in Rhode Island that he had purchased before marriage. Id. at 292. The parties lived in that
property for about one year. Id. When they moved, they leased the property, depositing the
rental income into a joint account. Id. The husband also deposited his paycheck into that
account. Id. Marital funds in that account—including the husband’s paychecks, properly
classified as marital property—were eventually used to pay the mortgage on the Rhode Island
property. Id. This Court held that “[u]nder Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d), the marital funds, by
paying the mortgage on the separate property, were commingled with the Rhode Island property
(the receiving property) and were transmuted into th[at] separate property.” Id. at 294. It was
then the wife’s burden to “trace the contribution for the marital funds to retain the classification
of marital property.” Id. She did not meet that burden. Id.
Here, wife purchased and took title to the Concord house before she married husband.
See id. at 299 (holding that the date of acquisition is when the owner takes title to property).
That house was her separate property. Code § 20-107.3(A)(1). For the seven years the pair lived
at the Concord house, husband contributed around $400 of his income every month to help pay
the mortgage and utilities at the Concord house. His income was marital property. Code
§ 20-107.3(A)(2). Under Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(d), then, the classification of the contributed
property was transmuted to the category of the receiving property. In other words, because he
contributed it to the mortgage on the Concord house, husband’s income was transmuted from
marital property into wife’s separate property.
Because the parties “commingled marital funds with separate property, resulting in the
presumption that the marital funds were transmuted to separate property,” it was husband’s
burden to trace his contributions by a preponderance of the evidence in order to retain their
classification as marital property. Moran, 29 Va. App. at 413. He failed to meet that burden.
-9- Although the parties agreed at trial that husband contributed up to $400 each month to the
mortgage and utilities while they lived at the Concord house, husband never indicated how much
of that went to the mortgage and how much went to utilities. Nor did he provide any evidence
showing that his contributions reduced the principal of the mortgage rather than the interest. See
id. (“[T]o the extent the marital funds reduced the principal of the mortgage, that amount is
traceable from the separately acquired equity.” (emphasis added)).5
Husband failed to trace his contributed property, so it was transmuted to wife’s separate
property. The proceeds from the sale of the Concord house were her separate property, and she
then sufficiently traced her contribution of $13,652 to the Forest house. See Code
§ 20-107.3(A)(3)(e) (requiring tracing to retain classification as “separate property” where
“marital property and separate property are commingled into newly acquired property”). Thus,
the circuit court correctly classified the $13,652 down payment on the marital residence as wife’s
separate property.
III. The Circuit Court Did Not Err by Declining to Allocate a Separate Contribution to Husband Based on His Claim of “Sweat Equity”
“In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we have recognized that the trial
court’s job is a difficult one, and we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge in weighing
the many considerations and circumstances that are presented in each case.” Stark v. Dinarany,
73 Va. App. 733, 749-50 (2021) (quoting Wright v. Wright, 61 Va. App. 432, 449-50 (2013)).
“Accordingly, ‘decisions concerning equitable distribution rest within the sound discretion of the
trial court[.]’” Id. at 750 (alteration in original) (quoting Wright, 61 Va. App. at 450). “The
5 Husband suggests that if we find that the down payment was composed of both separate and marital property, we should remand the case to determine what portion of the $13,652 was attributable to husband and what portion to wife. But that was exactly what husband should have done—yet failed to do—at trial. This appeal is not an opportunity for him “to take a mulligan.” Slusser v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 761, 778 (2022) (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 282 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). - 10 - circuit court’s ‘discretion is limited only in that the circuit court must consider all of the factors
in Code § 20-107.3(E).’” Id. (quoting Fadness v. Fadness, 52 Va. App. 833, 842 (2008)). And
the trial court is not required “to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has
given to each of the statutory factors.” Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 19 Va. App. 77, 94 (1994). “If the
circuit court considers all the factors and bases its findings on credible evidence, we will not
disturb its decision on appeal.” Stark, 73 Va. App. at 750 (quoting Fadness, 52 Va. App. at 842).
We will overturn an equitable distribution award only if we find “an abuse of discretion,
misapplication or wrongful application of the equitable distribution statute, or lack of evidence to
support the award.” Wiencko v. Takayama, 62 Va. App. 217, 229-30 (2013) (quoting McIlwain
v. McIlwain, 52 Va. App. 644, 661 (2008)).
Code § 20-107.3(E) lists several factors that a court must consider when making an
equitable distribution award. Among those factors are “[t]he contributions, monetary and
nonmonetary, of each party in the acquisition and care and maintenance of [the] marital property
of the parties.” Code § 20-107.3(E)(2); see Stark, 73 Va. App. at 750-51 (noting that wife made
“substantial nonmonetary contributions” by working with the realtor to find and purchase the
marital home and working with contractors on kitchen and bathroom renovations).
Husband argues that the circuit court erred in declining to allocate a separate contribution
of $37,000 to him based on his construction of the garage and rec room at the Forest house. We
disagree and find no error in the circuit court’s decision.
First, as far as monetary contributions, the court explained that “any materials used
during construction of [the] enhancements were presumably purchased with marital funds” and
found that “if there was any separate contribution on the part of husband, . . . he has not
sufficiently traced such contribution to a separate source.” The classification of the monetary
- 11 - contributions is a factual finding supported by the evidence in the record, so we defer to the
circuit court’s holding. Price, 72 Va. App. at 647.
Second, husband made no effort to distinguish between monetary contributions (i.e., the
marital funds he used to pay the concrete company and purchase materials) and nonmonetary
contributions (i.e., his own labor, or what he calls “sweat equity”). Rather, he simply added up
the value of the garage and the rec room and asked for an allocation of the total sum. Had
husband provided evidence delineating the value of his individual labor, the circuit court could
have classified that amount as husband’s separate property. But absent such evidence, the court
was not required to speculate about the value of husband’s labor or to allocate to him the full
$37,000 he requested. True, Code § 20-107.3 “‘mandates’ that trial courts determine the
ownership and value of all real and personal property of the parties.” Bowers v. Bowers, 4
Va. App. 610, 617 (1987) (quoting Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 516 (1986)). But “the
litigants have the burden to present evidence sufficient for the court to discharge its duty.” Id.
And “[r]eviewing courts cannot continue to reverse and remand . . . [equitable distribution] cases
where the parties have had an adequate opportunity to introduce evidence but have failed to do
so. Parties should not be allowed to benefit on review for their failure to introduce evidence at
trial.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 448 N.E.2d 545, 550 (Ill.
1983)).
Lastly, while the circuit court did not expressly discuss husband’s nonmonetary
contributions in its letter opinion, it was not required “to quantify or elaborate exactly what
weight or consideration it has given to each of the statutory factors.” Gottlieb, 19 Va. App. at
94. Moreover, “[a]lthough the separate contribution of one party to the acquisition, care, and
maintenance of marital property is a factor that the trial court must consider . . . , Code
§ 20-107.3 does not mandate that the trial court award a corresponding dollar-for-dollar credit
- 12 - for such contributions.” von Raab v. von Raab, 26 Va. App. 239, 249-50 (1997); see also Payne
v. Payne, 77 Va. App. 570, 597 (2023) (“[Code § 20-107.3(E)] does not prescribe a set formula
that trial courts must apply when dividing assets and liabilities.”). The court here found that
husband failed to show any separate monetary contributions and determined, in its discretion,
that husband’s nonmonetary contributions did not warrant an allocation of $37,000.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion and there is sufficient evidence in the record
to support its equitable distribution award.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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