In the
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
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No. 25-2235 CHARLES P. GOLBERT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MARC D. SMITH, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:23-cv-00300 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
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ARGUED MAY 21, 2026 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 8, 2026
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Before ROVNER, ST. EVE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this appeal we must decide whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim against state officials in their official capacities—which would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment—or in their personal capacities, which would not. We find the complaint asserts personal-capacity claims not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity and therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal.
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I.
The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) holds custody over some of the children confined at the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) in Chicago. There is no dispute that there have been many instances in which a judge has released those children from detention but, because DCFS lacks placements, they remained at the facility . 1 Sometimes those unjustified detentions continue for months, and in one case, for more than 300 days. This is not an isolated problem. In 2021, for example, more than 80 children remained detained after being released from court-ordered detention. There can be no doubt that detention without cause violates the children’s due process rights, and that the harms of unjustified imprisonment in a juvenile facility are significant and troubling. The plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants were aware of this widespread problem, had responsibility to ensure timely residential placements, and yet failed to take the necessary and available steps to do so. The defendants named in the complaint include both current and former DCFS employees in various roles including deputy directors, placement managers, and other administrators . Those defendants responded to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss arguing that although the plaintiffs pled an individual-capacity lawsuit premised on the defendants’ personal involvement in the deprivation of constitutional rights,
1 This case addresses a pure legal question: whether the plaintiffs sued
the individual defendants in their personal or official capacities. Nevertheless , in conveying the facts, we assume the truth of the facts set forth in the well-pleaded complaint and construe all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs who oppose the motion to dismiss. See Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024).
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the claim was in fact “a Monell claim challenging the policies and practices of a State agency,” and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. R. 16 at 1. They asserted, in the alternative, qualified immunity—a defense available in personal-capacity suits.
Because the question here is purely legal—whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies—we need not catalog the harms these children have suffered. We note only that all were in DCFS care or custody because of abuse or neglect and thus had been exposed to significant adverse childhood experiences before their detentions were unjustifiably extended.
Charles Golbert, the Cook County Public Guardian, brought this suit on behalf of nine minors, and a putative class of those similarly situated, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs asserted their due process claims against the twelve individual defendants and pursued their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against DCFS.
The district court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against DCFS but dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims against the individual defendants on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, finding that the claims were actually against the state and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment . The district court entered the dismissal as a final order, concluding that the facts necessary for the due process claim did not overlap with the other claims, resolution of the claims against DCFS would have no bearing on the disposition of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, dismissal of the § 1983 claims was a final judgment, and that therefore there was no reason to 4 No. 25-2235
delay the appeal. Because the district court “made clear that it thought it was done with the case” and the dismissal was “not based on a defect that could have been cured by amending the complaint,” the dismissal without prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds amounts to an appealable final judgment. Nuñez v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 817 F.3d 1042, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016). The ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against DCFS remain pending in the district court.
After the district court granted the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. We review de novo the grant of the motion to dismiss. Wertymer v. Walmart, Inc., 142 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2025).
II.
The individual defendants ask the court to dismiss the claims on the grounds that they are, in reality, against the state and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The sole question in this case, therefore, is whether the plaintiffs sued the defendants for Fourteenth Amendment violations in their official capacities or their personal capacities.
The Fourteenth Amendment, enforced through § 1983, protects individuals from unconstitutional action taken by government officers acting under color of state law. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). The government violates a child’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when it takes a child into custody, and intentionally and without justification places that child in danger. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989); K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990). And there can be no doubt that detaining a child without court authorization violates the child’s rights. The
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plaintiffs can enforce their right to be free of governmentcaused constitutional violations through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the same time, however, the Eleventh Amendment protects states from suit by granting immunity from private suits against states and their entities without their consent. See Nuñez, 817 F.3d at 1044. In balancing those various rights, the Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the state sovereign immunity doctrine prohibits personal-capacity suits pursuant to § 1983 that seek money damages from the personal assets of state officials for committing federal constitutional torts. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991). 2 We must decide, therefore, whether the plaintiffs here have sued the defendants in their official or personal capacities.
Official-capacity suits name a government official but are in reality against the official’s office and thus against the governmental entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). As a result, if an official is sued in that capacity in federal court and dies or leaves office, that official’s successor automatically assumes the role in the litigation. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1); S. Ct. R. 35.3). By contrast, a personal-capacity suit (also called an individual-capacity suit) seeks to impose individual liability on a government officer for actions taken
2 Sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity are re-
lated concepts. Sovereign immunity is the broader, pre-constitutional principle that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent, rooted in the structure of the original Constitution itself. The Eleventh Amendment, by contrast, is a specific textual provision that confirmed and exemplified that broader immunity in the context of federal court jurisdiction. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999).
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under color of state law. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165. In official- capacity suits, any monetary award is paid by the governmental entity, whereas in a personal-capacity suit, damages awards “can be executed only against the official’s personal assets.” Id. at 166. 3 Each type of suit presents a unique challenge for a plaintiff . To establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Id. In an official -capacity suit, on the other hand, the government must be the “’moving force’ behind the deprivation”—and consequently must demonstrate that the governmental entity had a policy or custom that caused the violation of federal law. Id. (quoting Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).
In addition, plaintiffs in these respective suits will face different challenges with respect to the possible defenses. In official -capacity suits, the defendant can assert immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which immunizes non-consenting states from suit in federal court. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking prospective injunctive relief. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). In personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, the individual-defendant officials can assert the defense of qualified immunity—that is, that they reasonably relied on
3 As we discuss below, a state may decide to voluntarily indemnify its
employees, but this does not transform a suit against individual defendants into a suit against the state. Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d 775, 778–79 (7th Cir. 1991).
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existing statutory or constitutional law in acting as they did. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
With that background, we can summarize what a court might look for as indicia of the two types of suits. An official- capacity suit typically seeks prospective injunctive relief and substitutes successors when officials leave office. A personal- capacity suit seeks money damages from officials’ personal assets. Here, however, the district court, sua sponte and without briefing, applied a Fourth Circuit test used to determine whether, under the statutory schemes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, a claim is brought against a state or an individual. Golbert v. Smith, No. 23–CV–00300, 2025 WL 963914, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2025) (citing Cunningham v. Lester, 990 F.3d 361, 366 (4th Cir. 2021) and Martin v. Wood, 772 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014)). (The district court refers to the Fourth Circuit test as the Cunningham test, but we will refer to it as the Martin test, as several Fourth Circuit opinions do.)
We need not enumerate these Martin test factors, because the Fourth Circuit has held repeatedly that the Martin test is inapplicable to federal constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983, as is the one brought by the plaintiffs here. Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2018) (“We refuse to apply to § 1983 claims [the Martin] factors, which we articulated for use in considering claims under a very different statute, and which would undermine the very purpose of § 1983.”); Gibbons v. Gibbs, 99 F.4th 211, 215 (4th Cir. 2024) (refusing to apply the Martin factors to a § 1983 claim). The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have confirmed that the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity doctrine pose no obstacle to suits seeking money damages for federal 8 No. 25-2235
constitutional torts from state officials sued individually for their personal assets pursuant to § 1983. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30–31 (“The Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability on state officials under § 1983.”) (cleaned up); Gibbons, 99 F.4th at 215 (“Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the broader doctrine of state sovereign immunity it reflects forbids suits to impose individual and personal liability on state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (internal citation omitted). 4 The Martin test cannot apply to constitutional claims under § 1983 because doing so would violate the very purpose of § 1983 which is “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). Section 1983 authorizes “suits to redress deprivations of civil rights by persons acting ‘under color of any [state] statute, ordinance , regulation, custom, or usage.’” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In other words, § 1983 allows
4 In addition to the Supreme Court, every federal circuit to consider
the issue has also concluded that the Eleventh Amendment does not pose a barrier to suits against state actors in their personal capacity asking for money damages from their personal assets. See, e.g., Mulero–Carrillo v. Roman –Hernandez, 790 F.3d 99, 108–09 (1st Cir. 2015); State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 718 F.3d 126, 137 (2d Cir. 2013); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1112 (3d Cir. 1989); Goodman v. Harris Cty., 571 F.3d 388, 394–96 (5th Cir. 2009); Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1992); Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by S.A.A. v. Geisler, 127 F.4th 1133 (8th Cir. 2025); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472–73 (9th Cir. 1992); Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1993); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 603 (11th Cir. 1987).
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private litigants to sue state officials precisely because those officials have taken action as part of their state duties. And when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he ‘comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.’
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). In this way, an official-capacity claim under § 1983 “is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26.
The Martin test, in contrast, presumes that if a government official takes action pursuant to official duties (i.e., under color of state law), this is an indication that the suit is against the state and thus the state is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. (The first Martin factor asks a court to consider whether “the allegedly unlawful actions of the state of- ficials [are] tied inextricably to their official duties.”). For purposes of § 1983, however, a defendant’s personal capacity liability attaches precisely because the defendant acted pursuant to state authority. But under the Martin factors, acting under color of law is what insulates the defendant from suit. If the Martin test applied to § 1983, there could be no viable § 1983 10 No. 25-2235
claims at all—an application of such a test would “absolutely immunize state officials from personal liability for acts within their authority and necessary to fulfilling governmental responsibilities .” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 28. The Fourth Circuit therefore has correctly refused to apply the Martin factors to § 1983, and the district court therefore erred by applying it here. To what indicia should the court have looked instead? Sometimes , a plaintiff explicitly states in the complaint that the defendants are sued in their personal capacities, or that the plaintiffs seek damages from the individual defendants’ “personal assets.” But there is no rigid requirement that a complaint contains this precise language. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14; Orr v. Shicker, 147 F.4th 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2025). If the complaint does not specify whether the suit is against officials in a personal or official capacity, a court must evaluate the complaint in its entirety, considering the alleged conduct and the course of the proceedings. Orr, 147 F.4th at 739; Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14; Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (7th Cir. 1991). In doing so, we must consider whether the claim, although labeled a personal-capacity claim, is substantially against the state. Gerlach v. Rokita, 95 F.4th 493, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1044 (2025). “A plaintiff cannot circumvent the sovereign immunity enjoyed by states and their employees in their official capacities simply by pleading a cause of action against those same employees as individuals.” Id.
As we consider the alleged conduct and the course of the proceedings, we note that typically we can assume that a suit seeking injunctive relief from official policies or customs is an official-capacity suit, and a complaint alleging tortious conduct of an individual acting under color of state law, brings a
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personal-capacity claim. Hill, 924 F.2d at 1373–74. Consequently , we look first and foremost to the relief the plaintiffs sought in their complaint. Because money damages can be recovered only in personal-capacity suits, a complaint seeking only compensatory and punitive damages suggests an intent to sue the officers in their personal capacities. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26–27; Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (the plaintiff’s “request for punitive damages suggests an intent to sue the officers in their individual capacities”); Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) (a suit for punitive damages indicates that it is one against officers in their personal capacities); Hill, 924 F.2d at 1374 (concluding that the suit must be one of individual capacity because of, among other things, the request for punitive damages which can only be recovered against a government actor in an individual-capacity suit).
Here, the complaint requests compensatory and punitive damages and no injunctive relief. See R. 1 at 3, 31. Nevertheless , the district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ “stated objective ” is to deter further violations of the due process rights of children in DCFS care. It is true that plaintiffs’ complaint expressed a desire that their lawsuit will deter similar misconduct and “prevent more children from suffering wrongful incarceration .” R. 1 at 3. But such a desire does not convert a personal-capacity suit into an official-capacity suit. Imagine a lawsuit in which a person injured by her neighbor’s cracked sidewalk seeks compensation in the form of money damages. She might also wish that a large sum of compensatory and punitive damages will cause enough financial pain to the neighbors that it encourages them to repair the sidewalk so that no one else is harmed. But that desire does not turn the suit for money damages into one for injunctive relief. The 12 No. 25-2235
money damages are enforceable by court order; behavioral changes are not. If a court were to award the compensatory and punitive damages in this case, that order could be enforced by the court. Any policy changes that DCFS happened to make to avoid future payments would not be. Put another way, if the defendants offered to settle for the full amount of requested damages while refusing to alter any policies or practices, this lawsuit would end. That is a definitive sign that this is a suit brought against the officials in their personal capacity for money damages, even if the plaintiffs also have a personal desire that policies within the state change.
Indeed, the deterrent effect of a § 1983 lawsuit is baked into the very essence of the claim. Section 1983 “was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations.” Owen v. City of Indep., Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980); see also, Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161 (Section 1983 exists to “deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”). In this way, the desire for deterrence is not a sign of an officialcapacities suit, but rather a sign that § 1983 is operating exactly as intended in allowing the plaintiffs to sue the defendants in their personal capacity.
Moreover, an indirect effect on state coffers also does not convert a personal-capacity § 1983 claim into an official-capacity one. As we noted, a state might voluntarily decide to indemnify its officials so that the state employees do not actually pay the costs of monetary awards in personal-capacity suits. But such indemnification—even though it might mean that the funds for payment of the damages ultimately come
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from the state coffers—is not, on its own, indicative of an official -capacity suit. Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 165–66 (2017); Stoner v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 50 F.3d 481, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1995). As the Supreme Court in Lewis explained , “[t]he critical inquiry is who may be legally bound by the court’s adverse judgment, not who will ultimately pick up the tab.” 581 U.S. at 165. Likewise, defendants might make changes that reduce their liability for future money damages (like hiring more staff or building new facilities), and those changes might cost the state money, but this would not be at the behest of the plaintiffs’ complaint or by order of any court granting relief in this case. The plaintiffs have asked only for compensatory and punitive damages—thus indicating an intention to sue the defendants in their personal capacities.
A second decisive indicator of a personal-capacity suit is the fact that the plaintiffs sued both current and former DCFS employees. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the rules of this court and the Supreme Court, provide that if an official is sued in an official capacity in federal court and dies or leaves office, the successor automatically assumes the role in the litigation. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1); S. Ct. R. 35.3). The plaintiffs here named several defendants who had left their roles with DCFS prior to the filing of the complaint and therefore could be sued only in their personal capacities. Moreover, the defendants have not moved to substitute the current position holders, indicating their understanding that they were sued in their personal capacities. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that if the state attorney general’s office had thought the suit was against the defendants in their official capacities they would have moved the court to substitute their successors in office as defendants 14 No. 25-2235
in their place), abrogated on other grounds as noted in Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 n.11 (“In an official-capacity action in federal court, death or replacement of the named official will result in automatic substitution of the official’s successor in office.”).
In assessing personal-versus-official-capacity lawsuits, courts also look to allegations of personal involvement by the individual defendants in constitutional violations and the absence of references to governmental policies or customs. Hill, 924 F.2d at 1374 (concluding that the suit must be a personal- capacity suit because of, among other things, the allegations involving the officials individual actions and lack of allusion to an official policy or custom); Wynn, 251 F.3d at 592 (finding that a suit was a personal-capacity suit where the plaintiff did not allege that an official policy or custom violated his constitutional rights but rather complained about the unconstitutional acts of two officials and asked for punitive damages); Miller, 220 F.3d at 494 (Noting that the plaintiff filed suit against officers for their individual torts—never espousing a custom or policy by the governmental entity); Conner v. Reinhard , 847 F.2d 384, 394 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the plaintiff did not assert that the defendants followed a policy or custom of the governmental entity which is a necessary showing in an official-capacity suit).
The complaint alleges that the individual defendants received ongoing warnings about the problem of children being incarcerated in the JTDC after receiving orders for their release and received notice during their tenure of every wrongfully incarcerated child in DCFS custody or care. The plaintiffs further alleged that these defendants had decision-making authority and responsibility to provide appropriate
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placements for children in DCFS care, yet knowingly and personally failed to exercise that authority and fulfill those duties .
Finally, plaintiffs contend that the defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity—a defense not available in official -capacity suits—and therefore must have interpreted the complaint as alleging personal-capacity claims. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer Cty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that because the defendants asserted a defense of qualified immunity thus treating the suit as a personal-capacity claim, the court would too). The defendants, however, asserted this defense in the alternative and arguments made in the alternative are not concessions to the opposing party’s framing of the issues.
In challenges to personal-capacity suits, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “imposing personal liability on state officers may hamper their performance of public duties. But such concerns are properly addressed within the framework of our personal immunity jurisprudence.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. Consequently, the district court erred in holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred this suit for money damages against individual defendants. We therefore reverse the order dismissing this case. Because the district court did not reach the questions of whether the plaintiffs failed to state a claim and the question of qualified immunity, the better course is to remand to allow the district court to make a determination on these issues in the first instance, particularly because there may be fact questions regarding the extent to which the defendants were personally involved in placement decisions. See City of Austin v. Reagan Nat'l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 77 (2022); Davis v. Allen, 112 F.4th 487, 494 16 No. 25-2235
(7th Cir. 2024). For these reasons we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.