Charles F. McCurdy v. United States

467 F.2d 285, 30 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5582, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 28, 1972
Docket72-1063
StatusPublished

This text of 467 F.2d 285 (Charles F. McCurdy v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles F. McCurdy v. United States, 467 F.2d 285, 30 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5582, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373 (6th Cir. 1972).

Opinion

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves a taxpayer’s suit to recover taxes paid as a result of a re-determination of his taxes by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was tried before a District Judge and jury in the Southern District of Ohio and resulted in a verdict in favor of the taxpayer in the sum of $22,826.57 for income taxes paid and interest due thereon for the taxable year of 1960.

The government appeals from that jury award. The United States contends that there was insufficient evidence at trial for the District Judge to have denied the government’s motion for a directed verdict or to support the jury verdict which was entered. The government also contends that the District *286 Judge’s instruction to the jury was in error.

The background of facts of this dispute are found in a post-trial opinion D.C., 328 F.Supp. 1068, of the District Judge:

“In 1958 and 1959 the plaintiff exchanged a total of $85,000.00 for 170 shares of the common capital stock of a Florida corporation, called the Arnn Corporation, and .four notes, the face value of which aggregated $68,000.00. This was done in four separate transactions, in each of which the plaintiff received both a note payable and a stock certificate. The allocation both by the taxpayer and the company was four to one, that is to say, $17,000.00 represented the purchase price of the stock and $68,000.00 represented the purchase price of the notes which in the aggregate had that face value.
“The Arnn Corporation had been incorporated in 1957 in Florida. It was a closely held corporation and was so contemplated at its commencement. It was basically promoted by a golf professional from the Cleveland, Ohio, area. The plan was to develop a typical South Florida golf course-residential area. Something in excess of 1200 acres of land in Collyer County were to be purchased, a golf course and country club were to be installed and erected on the land and the surrounding acreage was to be plotted and developed for residential purposes. The initial cost of the land was approximately $600,000.00 which required a cash down payment of approximately $100,000.00. In contemplation and in fact the cost of the golf course installation involved something in the neighborhood of an outlay of more than $100,000.00 for machinery and equipment and approximately $300,000.00 for the construction and installation. The capital was raised on a personal solicitation basis. It eventually involved some approximately 30 people.”

In dealing with an appeal from a jury verdict we are, of course, required to view the disputed facts from the point of view favorable to the prevailing party. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 696, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962); 5A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 50.08, at 2357 (2d ed. 1971).

The facts upon which appellee relies are set out in his brief as follows:

“Contrary to the plan of generating income from the sale of the land to finance the obligations of the corporation, Mr. Purola, the president, exhausted all resources on the construction of a golf course which was only a part of the development project. As early as June 1959, with no sales of land, it was apparent that a financial problem was faced by the corporation. Its president appointed a committee to find ways and means of meeting the corporation’s obligations. On the same date, the president wrote to each shareholder advising them of the ‘financial crises’ confronting the corporation and requesting contributions of capital. Two weeks later, the president advised the stockholders that the corporation had received nothing by way of additional capital. At this same time, the taxpayer observed, among other things, that the project was ‘practically at the dry rot state.’ He added, ‘I have thrown a considerable amount of money down a rat hole and I am wondering why I should stuff more in the hole.’ This was in June of 1959. Four months later, the president, Mr. Purola noted, among many other things that he was personally carrying the corporation’s payroll but that, with completion of roads and bridges, the sale of lots would progress rapidly. Such sales did not progress rapidly. By April of the following year (1960), not one lot had been sold. Two months later, Mr. Purola stated that the corporation was insolvent. If nothing was done to remedy the situation, he added, it would be necessary to liquidate. Within three weeks, Mr. Purola revealed that the corporation had accumu *287 lated current liabilities of approximately $70,000; and that help was needed.
“Between the period that the corporation acquired the land and the date of Mr. Purola’s request for help, June 22, 1960, a number of things had occurred which had altered the financial status of the corporation. Unable to pay its first installment of the mortgage ($135,333.33) in December 1958, the corporation granted a $100,000 second mortgage to the mortgagee and executed a note in the same amount, due December 19,1962 with interest at 6 percent per annum. In December 1959, unable to make the second payment on the mortgage, the corporation granted a third mortgage to the mortgagee in the amount of $200,000 payable December 19, 1962 and secured by a note bearing 6 percent interest. At the same time, the corporation gave back to the mortgagee 80 acres of land with a pro-rated cost value of $32,-000. Such was the financial posture of the corporation as the year 1960 unfolded. The golf course opened in January. It was evident to the taxpayer that the sale of lots was critical; and, as the year progressed, it was equally evident that progress during the coming ‘winter season’ was essential. ‘[I]t was a question of starting to plat all the lots and start sailing.’
“However, by the end of the fiscal year, the total value of lot sales by the corporation in 1960 was only $39,832. This was a gross figure which, reduced by direct cost, amounted to only $23,983.44. This ‘net’ figure, in addition, did not carry any allocation of the corporation’s overhead or other expenses during the year which amounted to $41,583.39. Even the gross receipts were insufficient to pay the $135,333.33 mortgage installment due December 19th much less the accrued interest on the mortgage in the amount of $42,697.41 also due on the same date. Under these circumstances, the corporation agreed to pay to the mortgagee sixty percent of the selling price of all lots at the time of sale. From the remaining forty percent, the corporation would have to: (1) Meet its principal mortgage obligations; (2) pay interest on those obligations (amounting to $42,360 per annum); and (3) satisfy current liabilities which had doubled in five months to approximately $114,000 due, as of December 1960, in thirty days, not to mention continued development costs for which it had no funds. It was at this point that the taxpayer and his accountant concluded that the securities were worthless.
“The corporation did continue to sell lots in subsequent years; but the cost of those sales nearly equalled the income received, sixty percent of which could not be retained. In one year the cost of lot sales exceeded the income received. A consistent and increasing net loss was suffered by the corporation each succeeding year.

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Related

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.
370 U.S. 690 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Thompson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
115 F.2d 661 (Second Circuit, 1940)
Huston v. United States
96 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1951)
McCurdy v. United States
328 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D. Ohio, 1970)

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Bluebook (online)
467 F.2d 285, 30 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5582, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 7373, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-f-mccurdy-v-united-states-ca6-1972.