Charles Buckner v. Elmo Frazer, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 CHARLES BUCKNER, Case No. 25-cv-01993-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 ELMO FRAZER, et al., [Re: ECF No. 17] 11 Defendants.

12 13 Before the Court is Defendants San Joaquin Valley College, Inc. (sued as “Carrington 14 College”) and Elmo Frazer’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 17; see also Memorandum 15 of Points and Authorities, ECF No. 17-4 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff Charles Buckner has not submitted an 16 opposition and the deadline to respond has passed. See Civ. L.R. 7-3(a). The Court finds that this 17 motion is suitable for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for June 4, 18 2026. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is 19 GRANTED. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 A. Undisputed Facts 22 Carrington College is an institution of higher education that offers vocational and degree 23 programs in healthcare-related disciplines. Declaration of Russel E. Lebo, ECF No. 17-2 (“Lebo 24 Decl.”) ¶ 3. It is wholly owned by Carrington College Holdings, LLC. Id. The membership 25 interest of Carrington College Holdings, LLC is held by San Joaquin Valley College, Inc. 26 (“SJVC”)—the proper institutional defendant in this case. Id. Mr. Buckner was enrolled in 27 SJVC’s Surgical Technology Program offered through the Carrington College division at the San 1 Decl.”) ¶ 3. At SJVC, Mr. Buckner engaged in disruptive classroom conduct and inappropriate 2 behavior toward faculty. Frazer Decl. ¶ 4. In September 2024, faculty documented their concerns 3 and reported them to the administration. Id. Mr. Buckner was then asked to meet with SVJC 4 personnel, including Defendant Elmo Frazer, a SVJC administrator. Frazer Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4–5. At 5 the meeting, Mr. Buckner asserted that faculty members had “consipir[ed] against him to lower his 6 grades and cause him to fail.” Frazer Decl. ¶ 5. In the aftermath of the meeting, Mr. Buckner’s 7 behavior continued to escalate, including when he “appear[ed] at the campus front desk in an irate 8 and confrontational manner in front of other staff members.” Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Buckner met with 9 Mr. Frazer again, indicated that he no longer wished to continue in the Surgical Technology 10 program, and elected to voluntarily withdraw. Frazer Decl. ¶ 6. 11 On the evening of October 22, 2024, Mr. Buckner phoned Mr. Frazer and “expressed 12 anger” in connection with his experience at SJVC, indicating that “he was ‘the only one feeling 13 the pain’ and that ‘someone else should feel the pain,’ specifically that the institution ‘should feel 14 the pain.’” Frazer Decl. ¶ 7. When asked whether this statement was a threat, Mr. Buckner 15 indicated that Mr. Frazer “can take [the comment] any way [he] want[s] to take it,” before hanging 16 up. Id. Particularly in light of Mr. Buckner’s prior confrontational conduct, Mr. Frazer 17 understood this statement to be a potential threat to campus safety. Id. ¶ 8. After Mr. Frazer made 18 multiple attempts to contact Mr. Buckner without response, SJVC took precautionary measures, 19 such as initiating a campus lockdown procedure. Id. Mr. Frazer also contacted law enforcement 20 to report Mr. Buckner’s comments. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement arrested Mr. Buckner 21 based on an outstanding warrant and the reported threat. Id. 22 B. Procedural History 23 This action was initially filed on November 22, 2024, in the Superior Court of California, 24 County of Santa Clara. In the complaint, Mr. Buckner asserts that Mr. Frazer and SJVC violated 25 his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to 26 due process. ECF No. 1-1 (“Compl.”) at 6. Although the complaint does not expressly assert 27 them as such, the Court construes Mr. Buckner’s federal constitutional claims as if they were 1 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A] litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must 2 utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). In an attachment to the complaint, Mr. Frazer also asserts a cause of 3 action arising from an “intentional tort” which the Court construes as a claim for defamation and a 4 claim arising out of a “false report.” See Compl. at 8 (alleging that Mr. Frazer made a “false 5 allegation to the San Jose police” which led to his arrest). Mr. Buckner states that as a 6 consequence of Defendants’ conduct, he has “endured significant emotional trauma, including 7 anxiety, fear, sleeplessness, [and] depression,” which has “necessitated” the use of medications 8 and other treatments. Compl. at 7. He further alleges that the false accusations have “tarnished” 9 his reputation, led to difficulty finding a job, and strained his relationships. Id. Mr. Buckner seeks 10 $20 million in damages as compensation for this emotional distress, reputational harm, and 11 financial loss. Id. 12 This action was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441(a), and 1446 on 13 February 25, 2025. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. On January 29, 2026, Defendants served 14 requests for admission on Mr. Buckner. Declaration of William T. Okamoto, ECF No. 17-3 15 (“Okamoto Decl.”) ¶ 3 & Ex. A (“RFA”). Mr. Buckner did not serve any responses or objections 16 to the requests for admission, and the window to do so has closed. Id. Accordingly, all matters set 17 forth in Defendants’ requests for admission are deemed admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that 20 there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 21 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party who 22 fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 23 case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete failure of 24 proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other 25 facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A fact is material if it 26 might affect the outcome of the lawsuit, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the 27 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson 1 Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that 2 demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. 3 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively 4 demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Id. On an 5 issue for which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 6 only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. 7 at 325. If the evidence in opposition to the motion is merely colorable, or is not significantly 8 probative, summary judgment may be granted. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50. 9 Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the 10 nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, 11 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a 12 genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). If the 13 nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 14 of law.” Id. at 323. 15 The Court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 16 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 17 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn 18 from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. 19 The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that 20 precludes summary judgment. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If the 21 nonmoving party fails to do so, the district court may properly grant summary judgment in favor 22 of the moving party. Id. 23 Mr. Buckner is proceeding pro se. While the Court must construe pro se pleadings 24 liberally, see Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984), unrepresented litigants 25 remain bound by the Federal Rules and Local Rules of this District, see Civ. L.R. 3-9(a). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 A. Constitutional Claims 1 subject to summary judgment because the undisputed facts establish that Defendants did not act 2 under color of state law or violate Mr. Buckner’s constitutional rights. As stated above, the Court 3 construes Mr. Buckner’s constitutional claims as if they were properly alleged under 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right 5 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged 6 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 7 42, 48 (1988). 8 1. Color of State Law 9 Defendants first contend that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants did not act 10 under color of state law and thus summary judgment should be granted as to Mr. Buckner’s Fourth 11 and Fourteenth Amended claims. Mot. at 12–21.1 12 While “private parties are not generally acting under color of state law,” Price v. State of 13 Haw., 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 2011), “a § 1983 action can lie against a private party when 14 ‘he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 15 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). SVJC is a private 16 educational institution that does not exercise any governmental or law enforcement authority, 17 Lebo Decl. ¶ 4, and at all relevant times, Mr. Frazer was acting in his capacity as an employee 18 thereof, Frazer Decl. ¶ 2. The question is thus whether the alleged violations of Mr. Buckner’s 19 rights are “fairly attributable” to the state. See Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1092. There are “at least four 20 different criteria, or tests, used to identify state action: ‘(1) public function; (2) joint action; (3) 21 governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus.’” Id. (quoting (Sutton v. 22 Providence St. Jospeh Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999)). As, absent the existence of a 23 countervailing factor, “[s]atisfaction of any one test is sufficient to find state action,” id., the Court 24 assesses each test in turn. 25 26

27 1 Because the Court construes Mr. Buckner’s constitutional claims as alleged under § 1983, the a. Public Function 1 “[A] private entity may qualify as a state actor when it exercises ‘powers traditionally 2 exclusively reserved to the State.’” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802, 809 3 (2019) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). To satisfy the public 4 function test, “the government must have traditionally and exclusively performed the function.” 5 Id. “Very few” functions qualify. Id. 6 Defendants argue that Plaintiff will be unable to show that SJVC or Mr. Frazer’s conduct 7 satisfies the public function test, because their conduct was limited to operating a private 8 educational institution. Mot. at 13–14. The Court is persuaded. Defendants have offered 9 evidence showing that SJVC is a private educational institution and Mr. Frazer acted in his 10 professional capacity as an SJVC administrator. Lebo Decl. ¶¶ 3–4; Frazer Decl. ¶¶ 2–6; RFA 11 Nos. 11–12. Mr. Frazer’s conduct in responding to the possible threat was within the scope of his 12 private institutional responsibilities, including maintaining campus safety and communicating with 13 law enforcement. Frazer Decl. ¶¶ 7–10. Moreover, Mr. Buckner has admitted that Defendants did 14 not conduct any search or seizure, direct or control law enforcement’s response, or act on behalf of 15 the state in any capacity. RFA Nos. 1–6, 16–19. Furthermore, while higher education can be 16 described as a ‘public function,’ it is not ‘exclusively governmental.’ Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 17 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (holding that private high school funded at public expense was not a 18 state actor for the purposes of § 1983); see also Fial v. Childpeace Montessori, No. 25-cv-00696- 19 JR, 2025 WL 4032308, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2025) (“Courts have uniformly held that private 20 schools do not meet the public function test as education is not traditionally or exclusively 21 governmental.”). Accordingly, Defendants have established an absence of evidence in the record 22 demonstrating state action under the public function test. 23 b. Joint Action 24 Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the joint action test because there is an 25 absence of evidence in the record demonstrating that SJVC or Mr. Frazer acted in concert with law 26 enforcement in carrying out the alleged deprivation of Mr. Buckner’s rights. Mot. at 15–16. The 27 joint action test for state action is satisfied where “state officials and private parties have acted in 1 concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 2 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002)). 3 This requirement can be met “either ‘by proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that 4 the private party was a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’” Id. (quoting 5 Franklin, 312 F.3d at 445). The participants must “share the common objective of the 6 conspiracy.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 445. And “a substantial degree of cooperation” is required to 7 “impos[e] civil liability for actions by private individuals that impinge on civil rights.” Id. 8 Defendants identify uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that they did not conduct any 9 search or seizure, act on behalf of any state actor, or direct, control, or otherwise participate in the 10 investigation, detention, and arrest of Mr. Buckner. Frazer Decl. ¶¶ 8–10; RFA Nos. 1–6, 16–19. 11 “[T]he mere reporting of suspected criminal activity to law enforcement officials does not 12 constitute the type of joint action capable of transforming a private party into a state actor for 13 purposes of § 1983.” Fleeger v. Bell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132 (D. Nev. 2000). It is also 14 undisputed that “[t]he arrest occurred off campus and was carried out solely by law enforcement 15 officers, and all decisions regarding the investigation, detention, and any charges were made by 16 law enforcement authorities.” Frazer Decl. ¶ 10. Nor did SJVC or any of its employees invoke 17 any state procedure, inform law enforcement of Mr. Buckner’s location, or instruct law 18 enforcement to take any specific action. Frazer Decl. ¶ 10. Because Defendants have identified 19 an absence of “evidence of cooperation between the state and the private parties in this case, much 20 less a substantial degree of cooperation[,]” Defendants have established that their conduct does not 21 amount to state action under the joint action test. See Strum v. El Camino Hosp., No. 09-cv- 22 02324-RMW, 2010 WL 725563, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010). 23 c. Governmental Compulsion or Coercion 24 Defendants also argue that Mr. Buckner’s claims do not satisfy the state compulsion test, 25 because there is no evidence that any state entity compelled, directed, or influenced Defendants’ 26 conduct. Mot. at 16–17. For a private party’s conduct to constitute state action under a 27 compulsion theory, it must involve “such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 1 (1982). A compulsion claim against a private party requires evidence sufficient to show “some 2 additional nexus that [makes] it fair to deem the private entity a governmental actor in the 3 circumstances.” Sutton, 192 F.3d at 839. Here, Defendants demonstrate an absence of evidence in 4 the record of coercion on the part of the state. The record establishes that Mr. Frazer exercised his 5 independent judgment in contacting law enforcement and his role was cabined to his factual 6 report. See, e.g., Frazer Decl. ¶ 8; RFA No. 20 (admitting that Defendants did not “act on behalf 7 of any state in connection with the allegations in the complaint”). Such undisputed evidence also 8 forecloses the required “additional nexus” that would make it fair to deem SJVC a governmental 9 actor under the circumstances. In sum, Defendants have established that their decision to contact 10 law enforcement is not state action under the compulsion test. 11 d. Governmental Nexus 12 Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot meet the governmental nexus test because 13 the record establishes that Defendants acted independently of the state in addressing 14 Mr. Buckner’s conduct. Mot. at 17–18. State action under a governmental nexus theory requires 15 there to be “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly 16 private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley, at 1094–95 (quoting 17 Brentwood Acad v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)). “The purpose 18 of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said 19 that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains.” Blum, 457 20 U.S. at 1004. 21 Defendants raise substantially similar evidence to support their joint action and 22 governmental nexus arguments. Compare Mot. at 15–16, with Mot. at 17–18. They refer the 23 Court to evidence showing that SJVC and Mr. Frazer acted independently of law enforcement in 24 responding to Mr. Buckner’s conduct, and those actions were undertaken as part of SJVC’s 25 operation as a private institution. Frazer Decl. ¶¶ 7–10; Lebo Decl. ¶ 4; RFA Nos. 8, 20, 21. The 26 Court agrees with Defendants that rather than demonstrating a close nexus between the state’s 27 actions and Defendants’, such evidence illustrates that Defendants’ conduct was independent of 1 governmental nexus theories in tandem, see Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 2 748 (9th Cir. 2020), the Court finds that in light of the above analysis finding a joint action theory 3 unsupported by any evidence, a governmental nexus theory is also unavailing. 4 * * * 5 “At bottom, the inquiry is always whether the defendant has ‘exercised power possessed 6 by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 7 of state law.’” Id. (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 49)). Because Defendants have established an 8 absence of evidence in the record demonstrating that they exercised power under color of state 9 law—a threshold requirement of Mr. Buckner’s § 1983 claims—the burden shifts to Mr. Buckner 10 to identify specific facts demonstrating the existence of disputed issues for trial. As he did not file 11 a response, and thus did not meet his burden, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for 12 summary judgment as to Mr. Buckner’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 13 2. Violation of Constitutional Rights 14 An essential element of a § 1983 claim is “the violation of a right secured by the 15 Constitution and laws of the United States.” West, 487 U.S. at 48. As a second and independent 16 basis for seeking summary judgment as to Mr. Buckner’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 17 claims, Defendants assert that there is no evidence that they violated Mr. Buckner’s constitutional 18 rights. Mot. at 19–21. 19 a. Fourth Amendment 20 In the complaint, Mr. Buckner alleges that Defendants violated his “Fourth Amendment 21 right against unreasonable seizure.” Compl. at 6. According to Defendants, however, the 22 undisputed facts demonstrate that any unreasonable seizure experienced by Mr. Bucker was not 23 attributable to Defendants. See Mot. at 20. 24 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Torres v. 25 Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 311 (2021). Here, Mr. Buckner has admitted that Defendants did not 26 search his person, home, automobile, or property, and did not seize him or his property. RFA 27 Nos. 1–6. Mr. Buckner has also admitted that law enforcement, rather than Defendants, made 1 moving burden to establish an absence of evidence in the record as to their Fourth Amendment 2 liability. The burden thus shifts to Mr. Buckner to show triable issue of material fact. As he has 3 not filed a response and thus failed to meet his burden, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as 4 to Mr. Buckner’s Fourth Amendment claim. 5 b. Fourteenth Amendment 6 Mr. Buckner alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to 7 due process. Defendants contend that record evidence eliminates any basis from which a 8 reasonable jury could conclude that they violated Mr. Buckner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 9 Mot. at 20–21. 10 The Fourteenth Amendment contains both procedural and substantive due process 11 protections. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). It is not clear whether 12 Mr. Buckner alleges a violation of his substantive or procedural due process rights. “To establish 13 a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, show a government 14 deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 15 1998). “A procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a 16 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 17 protections.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 18 1998). 19 Here, Defendants assert that Mr. Buckner has not identified any evidence of a deprivation 20 of a life, liberty or property interest attributable to Defendant—let alone such a deprivation 21 without sufficient procedural protections. Mot. at 21. The Court agrees. As discussed above, 22 Mr. Buckner has admitted that Defendants did not participate in, direct, or control any law 23 enforcement activity. RFA Nos. 1–6; 16–19. The record reflects that Mr. Frazer reported 24 Mr. Buckner’s comments to law enforcement but was not otherwise involved in or responsible for 25 any alleged life, liberty, or process deprivation that took place thereafter. Frazer Decl. ¶ 8. 26 Accordingly, Defendants have met their moving burden to establish an absence of evidence in the 27 record as to the Fourteenth Amendment Claim. The burden shifts to Mr. Buckner to show triable 1 Court accordingly GRANTS summary judgment as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim. 2 B. Tort Claims 3 1. Defamation 4 Turning to Mr. Buckner’s tort claims, Defendants argue that the undisputed facts 5 demonstrate that they did not publish false statements about Mr. Buckner, and, in any event, their 6 conduct is protected by privilege. To prevail on a defamation claim under California law, a 7 plaintiff must establish “(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, 8 and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.” Taus v. Loftus, 9 40 Cal. 4th 683, 720 (2007); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 45–46. The truth of the statement is a complete 10 defense against liability in defamation actions, regardless of bad faith or malicious purpose. Smith 11 v. Maldonado, 72 Cal. App. 4th 637, 646 (1999). 12 Defendants refer the Court to evidence demonstrating that the report to the police was not 13 false or fabricated but was instead a truthful recitation of Mr. Buckner’s conduct. Mr. Buckner 14 stated that others “should feel the pain,” and, when asked, declined to disavow that his comments 15 were a threat. Frazer Decl. ¶ 7; RFA Nos. 9–10. Mr. Frazer accurately reported the threatening 16 statement to law enforcement. Frazer Decl. ¶ 8. As Defendants have established that the report to 17 law enforcement was truthful, the burden shifts to Mr. Buckner to identify evidence of any 18 genuine dispute of fact as to the truth of Defendants’ statements. As Mr. Buckner has not filed 19 any response, the Court finds that the defamation claim fails as a matter of law. 20 Moreover, as a separate and sufficient reason to grant summary judgment, Defendants 21 contend their conduct is privileged under California Civil Code § 47, which has been interpreted 22 to shield reports made to law enforcement to report suspected criminal activity. Makhzoomi v. Sw. 23 Airlines Co., 419 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Courts have interpreted section 47(b) 24 as providing an absolute privilege to reports made to law enforcement to report suspected criminal 25 activity, such that the reports ‘cannot be the basis for tort liability.’”). The record demonstrates 26 that Defendants’ statements to police were for the purpose of reporting a possible threat. Frazer 27 Decl. ¶¶ 7–8. Mr. Buckner has not identified any material facts in dispute as to § 47(b) privilege. ] In sum, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Defendants’ statements to police were 2 || both truthful and privileged. Summary judgment is thus GRANTED as to the defamation claim. 3 2. False Report 4 To the extent Mr. Buckner is proceeding on a “false report” theory of tort liability, 5 || Defendants argue that California Penal Code § 148.5 is a criminal statute that does not provide a 6 || private right of action. Mot. at 22. Pursuant to § 148.5, it is a criminal offense to falsely report a 7 || crime to law enforcement officers. See People v. Lawson, 100 Cal. App. 3d 60, 67 (1979). The 8 Court agrees with Defendants that there is no private right of action under § 148.5. Rezek v. City 9 || of Tustin, No. SACV 11-01601 DOC (RNBx), 2012 WL 5829928, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 10 || 2012). Because Mr. Buckner’s claim based on an alleged false report fails as a matter of law, 11 summary judgment is GRANTED as to the § 148.5 claim. 12 C. Damages 13 Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims for damages, including any request for 14 || punitive damages, fail because they are not liable for any of the claims. Mot. at 22-23. The Court 3 15 agrees. Because the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of a 16 || Mr. Buckner’s claims, no underlying claims exist to support the award of any damages. Thus, the 17 || Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Mr. Buckner’s damages claims. 18 IV. ORDER 19 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for 20 || summary judgment is GRANTED. 21 22 || Dated: May 18, 2026

H LABSON FREEMAN 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28