Charles Ash v. Board of Education of the Woodhaven School District

699 F.2d 822, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3226

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: February 7, 1983
• Docket: 81-1597
• Status: Published

Opinions

CONTIE, Circuit Judge.

• This appeal presents the question of whether the plaintiffs-appellants have a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving the full salary stated in their employment contracts. The district court found no such interest, and alternatively found that even if such an interest did exist, the plaintiffs had received sufficient procedural protections before their wages were reduced. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I.

The plaintiffs are twelve Michigan public school teachers and their collective bargaining representative, the Wayne County MEA/NEA (WCEA). WCEA’s immediate predecessor, the Woodhaven Education Association and defendant Board of Education for the Woodhaven School District (Board) were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which expired on August 31, 1979. On June 7, 1979, the Board and the WCEA began bargaining for a new contract to govern the 1979-80 school year, but no agreement was reached by the contract expiration date. On August 27, 1979, the Board adopted a 1979-80 school calendar and adopted interim operating regulations to govern the employment relationship until a new agreement was negotiated and ratified. This initial school calendar provided for 186 teacher work days and 180 student attendance days. School commenced on September 4,1979, with all teachers reporting for class as negotiations for a new contract continued. On March 10, 1980, however, almost all teachers failed to report for work.

On March 24, 1980, the Board requested injunctive relief in the Wayne County Circuit Court to end the work stoppage. On April 2, 1980, the court issued a temporary restraining order after finding that the teachers’ strike violated sections 1 and 2 of the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), M.C.L.A. §§ 423.201 and 423.202. The court ordered the teachers to stop striking and to recommence negotiations. When the teachers failed to return to work, the Board sought to enforce the court order. Between April 8 and April 15, 1980, thirty-five teachers were held in contempt of court. Nine teachers received thirty-day jail sentences for civil contempt. The contempt hearings were adjourned and the jailed teachers released at the school district’s request. On April 13, 1980, the teachers were notified that they would be discharged under section 6 of the PERA, M.C.L.A. § 423.206, if they did not return to work on April 18,1980. The vast majority of the teachers returned to work on that date.

After the teachers had returned, the school board unanimously adopted an amended school calendar which provided for 173 teacher work days and 167 student attendance days. Although the Board was advised by an employee of the State Department of Education that the Board could still schedule 180 student attendance days by holding classes on Saturday, the Board did not adopt this suggestion. The teachers were officially notified of the reduction in their individual salaries due to the shortened school year on May 2, 1980.

The WCEA filed a grievance concerning the unilateral adoption of a school calendar with less than 180 student attendance days. The grievance was processed through the four stages provided for in the interim operating conditions, and a hearing was held to allow the union to present its argument before the Board. On May 21, 1980, the Board denied the grievance. The teachers had also contended that they were entitled to individual hearings under section 6 of the PERA,¹ but the Board refused to hold such hearings.

II.

The plaintiffs brought this action against the Board and its members in their individual capacities. Their complaint stated a variety of federal and state claims, including a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged that the teachers were not given sufficient procedural safeguards before their salaries were reduced. The district court dismissed the majority of the plaintiffs’ claims and later granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim. Only the § 1983 claim is at issue on appeal.

The fourteenth amendment prohibits any state deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The plaintiffs contend that they have a protected property interest in receiving the full amount stated in their individual employment contracts for the 1979-80 school year. To have a protected property interest of this kind, the plaintiffs must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to their full salaries arising out of Michigan law. An abstract need or unilateral exception is not sufficient. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

The plaintiffs rely on several Michigan statutes to support their claim of a protected property interest. Their first argument is premised on the following two statutory provisions:

M.C.L.A. § 380.1231

Sec. 1231. (1) The board of a school district shall hire and. contract with qualified teachers. Contracts with teachers shall be in writing and signed by a majority of the board in behalf of the district, or by the president and secretary, or by the superintendent of schools or an authorized representative of the board. The contracts shall specify the wages agreed upon.

M. C.L.A. § 380.1232

Sec. 1232. The board of a school district, by agreement between the board and a teacher or by agreement between the board and an organization representing the teacher under Act No. 176 of the Public Acts of 1939, as amended, being 423.1 to 423.30 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, may terminate an existing contract for the services of the teacher and substitute a new contract which provides increased benefits to the teacher. The new contract shall be binding without regard to preexisting duties or obligations of either the board or the teacher under the previous contract.

The Plaintiffs argue that § 380.1231(1) gave the teachers a reasonable expectation of receiving the amount stated in their employment contracts, and that the Board violated § 380.1232 by unilaterally reducing the teachers’ salaries. The plaintiffs thus contend that the only conclusion to be gleaned from these two statutes is that the teachers could, at the very least, reasonably expect to receive the salary stated in their employment contracts.

We agree that § 380.1231(1) may have provided the teachers with a unilateral expectation of receiving their full salary; provided, of course, that the teachers fulfill their obligations under their contracts of employment. Neither statute, however, creates a legitimate claim of entitlement in this case. Section 380.1231(1) provides only that the wages to be paid a teacher shall be stated in that teacher’s employment contract. It does not contain any restrictions on the Board’s right to adopt an amended school calendar with an attendant reduction in the teachers’ salaries due to their participation in an illegal strike. Section 380.1232 refers only to a situation in which a teacher’s employment contract is terminated. The district court found no such termination, and thus ruled that § 380.1232 was not applicable to this case. The plaintiffs admit in their reply brief that no employment contracts were terminated, and argue only that the Board improperly reduced the teachers’ salaries. Accordingly, we hold that the district court’s finding that no employment contracts were terminated is supported by the record and the applicable law, and that these statutes do not provide the plaintiffs with a protected property interest.

The plaintiffs also rely on M.C.L.A. § 380.1284(1) which states that:

[t]he board of a school district shall determine the length of the school term. The minimum number of days of student instruction shall be 180. A district failing to hold 180 days of student instruction shall forfeit 1/180 of its total state school aid for each day of failure. Not later than August 1, the board of each district shall certify to the state board the number of days of student instruction in the previous school year. If the district did not hold at least 180 days of student instruction, the deduction of state school aid shall be made in the following fiscal year from the first payment of state school aid. Days lost because of strikes or teachers’ conferences shall not be counted as days of student instruction.

The Plaintiffs argue that this statute creates an absolute requirement that the Board provide at least 180 days of student instruction. If the statute requires the Board to schedule at least 180 instructional days, the plaintiffs reason, the statute must also provide the teachers with a legitimate claim of entitlement to their salaries for that period.

This argument is without merit. The district court noted that the obligation imposed by the statute is an obligation between the local school boards and the state and not between the boards and the teachers. If any intended beneficiaries of the 180-day provision can be identified, it is the taxpayers, parents and school children, rather than the teachers. Moreover, the statute itself requires only that each school district must provide a minimum of 180 instructional days in order to receive its full state aid allotment. It then establishes a pro rata formula for diminishing the amount of state aid if a school district fails to provide 180 days of student instruction within the statutory school year. Therefore, the statute itself contemplates a situation in which a school district fails to provide for at least 180 instructional days.²

Having considered the plaintiffs’ statutory arguments, we hold that these three statutes, either individually or collectively, do not vest the plaintiffs with a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving the full salary stated in their employment contracts.

The plaintiffs also rely on the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which refers to the wage figures in the teachers’ employment contracts, as a source of their protected property interest. The plaintiffs do not, however, contest the district court’s finding that the CBA expired on August 31, 1979, more than eight months before the Board adopted its amended school calendar. Since the CBA had expired, the plaintiffs cannot rely on it as a source of their protected interest.³ See Lake Michigan College Federation of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College, 518 F.2d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3189, 49 L.Ed.2d 1197 (1976). The Board did adopt a set of interim operating conditions (IOC) which incorporated many provisions of the CBA, but also provided that teachers would not be paid if they participated in an unauthorized work stoppage. Since the plaintiffs did engage in an unauthorized work stoppage, they cannot rely on the IOC as a source of their protected interest. In addition, the plaintiffs clearly state in their reply brief that they “have never recognized the effectiveness of the IOC,” and have never relied on the IOC as a source of their protected property interest.

The plaintiffs’ final source of their protected interest is the State Teacher Tenure Act, M.C.L.A. § 38.71 et seq. We note, however, that the plaintiffs did not use this statute as a basis for their § 1983 claim before the district court.⁴ Consequently, they cannot assert it for the first time on appeal. Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 610 (6th Cir.1976); Bannert v. American Can Co., 525 F.2d 104, 111 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 2662, 49 L.Ed.2d 394 (1976). We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs do not have a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving the full amount stated in their individual employment contracts.

Even if a protected property interest could be found, this court is of the opinion that the May 19 hearing before the full Board of Education satisfied the minimum requirements of the due process clause. The hearing was the culmination of a four-step grievance procedure invoked by the plaintiffs when they filed their initial grievance on April 28, 1980. The plaintiffs presented their arguments on why the amended calendar and the attendant salary reductions should be rescinded by the Board, and the Board eventually voted to deny the plaintiffs’ grievance. The plaintiffs contend, however, that the Board should have referred the matter to binding arbitration as required by the CBA. This argument is without merit. The district court correctly pointed out that the relevant inquiry in this case is not whether the Board satisfied any potential contractual obligation to arbitrate the grievance, but whether the grievance procedures that were afforded the plaintiffs satisfied the minimum requirements of due process.

The plaintiffs’ final allegations are that the Board improperly refused to provide each teacher with a hearing under § 6 of the PERA, M.C.L.A. § 423.206, and that the Board breached each teachers’ employment contract. We have previously ruled, however, that the plaintiffs are unable to establish a federal cause of action under § 1983. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to analyze the plaintiffs’ pendent state claims. These claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan courts. See Morse v. Wozniak, 565 F.2d 959, 960 (6th Cir.1977); Manchester v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 289, 291 (6th Cir.1974).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is Affirmed.

1 . Section 6 of the PERA, M.C.L.A. § 423.206, provides that public employees who, in concerted action with others, in support of efforts to obtain a change in compensation or other conditions of employment, fail to render services shall be deemed on strike. If the employee is disciplined by his employer for striking, the employee is entitled, on request, to a determination of whether the employee has violated the provisions of the act. The request is to be made “within 10 days after regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed.” Rockwell v. Crestwood School District, 393 Mich. 616, 624, 227 N. W.2d 736 (1975).

2 . The plaintiffs cite State Board of Education v. Garden City School District, 62 Mich.App. 376, 233 N.W.2d 547 (1975) to support their contention that the Board was required to provide at least 180 days of student instruction. This reliance, however, is misplaced. One of the statutory sections relied on by the Garden City court has been substantially modified to eliminate any reference to a minimum number of instructional days. See M.C.L.A. § 388.1613. Furthermore, the court concludes by stating that “[t]he important thing to remember about this opinion is that we specifically declare it precedent for nothing.” Id. at 381, 233 N.W.2d 547.

3 . The plaintiffs contend that the CBA remained in effect after August 31, 1979 due to Art. XXV of the CBA, which provides that the terms and conditions of employment of the contract shall remain in effect until altered by mutual consent in writing between the parties. This argument does not, however, provide the plaintiffs with a protected property interest. If the CBA did not expire on August 31, 1979, the plaintiffs breached Article XVIII, Section A of the CBA (the no-strike clause) by engaging in a strike against the Woodhaven School District dining the period of the agreement. It was only after the strike had ended that the Board reduced the teachers’ salaries by adopting an amended school calendar with a reduced number of teacher work days. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot breach the CBA’s no-strike clause, and later rely on the salary schedule in another section of the CBA to support their protected property interest claim.

4 . The plaintiffs did not rely on the Teacher Tenure Act as a basis for their protected property interest in their motion for summary judgment. They did mention the Tenure Act in their complaint, but only in the section where they listed a portion of their pendent state claims. Thus, the plaintiffs did not use the Tenure Act to support their § 1983 claim at the trial court level.