Charge to Grand Jury—Neutrality Laws & Treason

30 F. Cas. 1024, 2 Curt. 630, 1851 U.S. App. LEXIS 379
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedOctober 15, 1851
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 30 F. Cas. 1024 (Charge to Grand Jury—Neutrality Laws & Treason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charge to Grand Jury—Neutrality Laws & Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1024, 2 Curt. 630, 1851 U.S. App. LEXIS 379 (circtdma 1851).

Opinion

CURTIS, Circuit Justice

(charging grand jury). You are aware that, the foreign relations of our country are under the exclusive care and control of the government of the United States. To make peace and war, to enter into treaties of amity and commerce, to protect the rights and. redress the injuries of our citizens from foreign aggression, are powers confided by the constitution to the general government alone. It is essential to the due exercise and maintenance of these powers, and to the welfare of the whole people, for whose benefit they exist, that they should not be in any way embarrassed or interfered with, by the irregular and irresponsible action of individuals. The public faith, pledged by treaties, could not be kept, if individual citizens were at liberty to act, in contravention of such treaties, as their private interest or passions might dictate. The public peace could not be preserved, if men might be armed and embodied on our soil, to make attacks on a foreign people or government. To permit this, would be to allow the interests or passions of a few, to control the deliberate and organized action of the whole, and to place the peace and welfare of our country at the mercy of strangers, or of needy, or desperate, or enthusiastic men. To guard against this evil, congress has made it a high misdemeanor, within the jurisdiction or territory of the United States, to begin to set on foot, or provide, or prepare the means for, any military expedition, or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace; and has also made specific, and highly penal enactments, to prevent the enlistment of [1025]*1025men, or the fitting out, or arming oí any vessel, for any such purpose, by any person within our jurisdiction.

It cannot be doubted that these laws are in conformity with the settled policy of our government. Very early in our history as a nation, this policy was adopted by President Washington, with the concurrence of the wise and eminent advisers by whom he was then assisted. On the 22d day of April, 1793, he issued a proclamation, in which he asserts it to be both the duty and interest of the United States, with sincerity and good faith, to pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the foreign powers therein mentioned, exhorting and warning the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts inconsistent with such friendly and impartial conduct, and declaring that whoever should do otherwise, would not receive the protection of the United States. At this time, congress had not legislated on this subject. And in the following December, the president made known to both houses certain facts connected with the then state of public affairs abroad and at home, and after expressing his own opinion, that where individuals shall, within the United States, enter upon military expeditions and enterprises, the ■ offence cannot receive too early or close an attention, he distinctly recommends to congress the extension of the statute law of the country to such eases, which, he says, though depending on principles already recognized, seemed to him to demand some further provisions of positive law. And, accordingly, on the 5th of June, 1794 (1 Stat. 381), an act was passed, one section of which was similar to the law whose substance I have already stated to you. And since that time, by legislation, as well as by the official action of the executive, this duty and policy of our country have been recognized and declared in the clearest terms, and under a great variety of circumstances. The principles on which these laws rest are, that until our country has made war, we are at peace with all, by the law of nature, and ■without any treaty to that effect; that for the citizens of the United States to combine to kill and rob those with whom they are at peace, and on whom they have no right to make any aggression, is as essentially criminal, as to combine to murder and rob our own citizens; that individual citizens have no prerogative to judge and condemn, and then proceed to execute others, or inflict on them any injury as a consequence of what may be assumed to be their misconduct; that the duties of impartiality, kindness, and peaceful treatment of other nations being plainly incumbent on the government of the United States, it is as olainiy its dutv to take care that all those subject to its authority, do nothing in contravention of those duties; what it may not do, in these particulars, it may not permit to be done; and that, for its own peace and welfare, and from its own sense of what is due to others, it cannot suffer individuals, by mingling themselves in the belligerent operations of other nations, or making war on their own authority, to run the hazard of counteracting the policy, or embroiling the relations of their government.

It may be added, that the United States was the first of all civilized nations to embody these principles in their municipal law, and enforce them by penal enactments. Having so legislated, it has become the clear duty of the courts of the United States to take cognizance of these offences, and it is to be expected that they will discharge with fidelity and firmness a duty so important to .their country and to the peace of the world.

Under the laws of the United States, the highest of all crimes is treason. It must be so in every civilized state: not only because the first duty of a state is self-preservation, but because this crime naturally leads to and involves many other, destructive of the safety of individuals and of the peace and welfare of society. This crime is defined by the constitution itself, and its magnitude, as well as the importance of a fit and rigid definition of it, may be inferred from the fact that it is the only offence defined by that instrument. It is there made to consist in levying war against the United States, or adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. This language is borrowed from an ancient English statute, enacted in the year 1352 (25 Edw. III.), mainly for the purpose of restraining the power of the crown to oppress the subject by arbitrary constructions of the law of treason. At the time of' the introduction of this language into our constitution, it had acquired a settled meaning, and that meaning has been adopted by the courts of the United States when they have had occasion, as unfortunately they have had occasion, to interpret these words. This settled interpretation is, that the words “levying war,” include not only the act of making war for the purpose of entirely overturning the government, but also any combination forcibly to oppose the execution of any public law of the United States, if accompanied or followed by an act of forcible opposition to such law in pursuance of such combination. The following elements, therefore, constitute this offence: (1) A combination, or conspiracy, by which different individuals are united in one common purpose. (2) This purpose being to prevent the execution of some public law of the United States by force. (3) The actual use of force, by such combination, to prevent the execution of that law.

These elements require some further explanation, to prevent their true nature from being misunderstood. It is not enough that the purpose of the combination is to oppose the execution of a law in some particular case, and in that only.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 F. Cas. 1024, 2 Curt. 630, 1851 U.S. App. LEXIS 379, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charge-to-grand-juryneutrality-laws-treason-circtdma-1851.