Chapmen v. Antham Health Plans

2005 DNH 062
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedApril 8, 2005
DocketCV-03-480-PB
StatusPublished

This text of 2005 DNH 062 (Chapmen v. Antham Health Plans) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chapmen v. Antham Health Plans, 2005 DNH 062 (D.N.H. 2005).

Opinion

Chapmen v . Antham Health Plans CV-03-480-PB 04/08/05

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Paul Chapman

v. Civil No. 03-cv-480-PB Opinion No. 2005 DNH 062 Anthem Health Plans of New Hampshire, Inc., et a l .

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Paul Chapman brings this suit against Anthem Health Plans of

New Hampshire, Inc. and Matthew Thornton Health Plan, Inc.,

claiming that defendants’ failure to cover the costs of a

surgical procedure known as Intradiscal Electrothermal Therapy

(“IDET”) constitutes a breach of contract. This case is in

federal court on the premise that diversity jurisdiction exists

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Defendants now move to dismiss the

case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the grounds that

Chapman has failed to allege that a sufficient amount is in

controversy to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a). For the following reasons, defendants’ motion to

dismiss is denied. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under § 1332(a), federal diversity jurisdiction exists only

if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” See 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a); Bull HN Information Sys. v . Hutson, 229 F.3d 3 2 1 , 328

(1st Cir. 2000). According to the United States Supreme Court,

however, “[i]t must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is

really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify

dismissal” on the basis that the amount in controversy

requirement has not been met. S t . Paul Mercury Indemn. C o . v .

Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); see Spielman v . Genzyme

Corp., 251 F.3d 1 , 5 (1st Cir. 2001); Phillips v . Fox Ridge

Resort, 2003 DNH 1 4 4 , 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14911, *3-4

(Barbadoro, C.J., Aug. 2 2 , 2003). This rule strikes a compromise

between the requirement that federal courts not exceed the

limited grant of jurisdiction provided by § 1332(a) and the

public policy imperative that courts not engage in an overly-

detailed inquiry regarding preliminary questions of jurisdiction

that could amount to a mini trial on the merits. See Jack H .

Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane, and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure

-2- 44 (3d ed. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Deutsch v . Hewes S t . Realty

Corp., 359 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1966)).

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants first argue that the $22,834.69 Chapman seeks as

compensation for his medical expenses and the $16,000 he seeks as

compensation for lost income are not supported by adequate

evidence. I reject this argument. Chapman has produced a

billing statement setting forth the medical charges he incurred

for the treatment he sought. Further, he has disclosed

deposition testimony of an expert witness who purportedly

supports his claim for lost income. This evidence is sufficient

at this stage of the proceedings to support Chapman’s claims for

medical expenses and lost income.

Defendants next argue that Chapman will be unable to recover

damages in excess of his medical expenses and lost income, an

amount that is far below the $75,000 jurisdictional amount

necessary to try their case in federal court. Defendants’

challenge rests primarily on the claim that Chapman cannot

recover the $55,000 in attorneys fees he argues that he has

amassed at this point in litigation. Defendants do not dispute

-3- that attorney’s fees may contribute toward the requisite

jurisdictional amount. See Missouri State Life Ins. C o . v .

Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 202 (1933) (holding that attorney’s fees

shall be included as part of the amount in controversy

calculation). Rather, they assert that (1) Chapman is not

entitled to recover fees under the relevant statute, and (2) even

if he is entitled to a recovery, only reasonable attorney’s fees

may be granted, and $55,000 exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.

As to defendants’ first argument, New Hampshire law states

that “in any action to determine coverage of an insurance policy

pursuant to RSA 491:22, if the insured prevails in such action,

he shall receive court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees from

the insurer.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:22-b. Chapman has

brought a claim for declaratory judgment under RSA § 491:22

seeking a declaration that he is covered under defendants’

insurance policy. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:22 (New Hampshire’s

Declaratory Judgment A c t ) . Under the plain terms of § RSA

491:22-b, then, Chapman will be entitled to attorney’s fees if he

prevails. Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v . Keene, 898 F.2d 265,

273-74 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that under the Erie doctrine, the

remedies provided in RSA § 491:22-b are available to a plaintiff

-4- seeking declaratory relief in a diversity suit because “state

remedies are available in federal diversity actions”).

As to defendants’ second argument, they are correct that

Chapman is entitled only to “reasonable attorney’s fees” under

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491:22-b. Whether an award of fees

approximating, or even in excess of $55,000, would be appropriate

in this case, however, would require the court to weigh several

different factors. These include

the amount involved, the nature, novelty, and difficulty of litigation, the attorney’s standing and the skill employed, the time devoted, the customary fees in the area, the extent to which the attorney prevailed, and the benefit thereby bestowed on his client.

Bianco, P.A. v . The Home Insurance Co., 147 N.H. 249, 251 (2001)

(emphasis added) (citing Couture v . Mammoth Groceries, Inc., 117

N.H. 2 9 4 , 296 (1977)). Such an analysis is simply not warranted

at this stage of the proceedings.

III. CONCLUSION

The $22,834.69 Chapman seeks as compensation for his medical

expenses, the $16,000 he seeks as compensation for lost income,

and the $55,000 he seeks as attorney’s fees more than fulfill

-5- § 1332(a)’s amount in controversy requirement. Defendant’s

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

(Doc. N o . 43) is therefore denied.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge April 8 , 2005

cc: Scott H . Harris, Esq. Peter L . Thompson, Esq. Donald F. Whittum, Esq.

-6-

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Related

Missouri State Life Insurance v. Jones
290 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 1933)
Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.
303 U.S. 283 (Supreme Court, 1938)
Lavallee v. Coplan
239 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D. New Hampshire, 2003)
Bianco, P.A. v. Home Insurance
786 A.2d 829 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2001)

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