Chapman v. San Mateo County

Opinion

MARCEL E. CHAPMAN, Case No. 21-cv-09038-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; DENYING LEAVE TO v. FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

SAN MATEO COUNTY, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 5, 9 Defendants.

Plaintiff, an inmate at Maguire Correctional Facility has filed a pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint (No. 1) is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. A. Standard of Review A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Complaint The complaint names as defendants Sheriff Carlos Bolanos, assistant sheriff John W. Munsey, undersheriff Mark C. Robbins, administrative lieutenant John Kovach, sergeant Richardson, correctional officer Shwiri Robinson, and the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Department. The complaint makes the following allegations. First, the complaint alleges that, starting in March 2021, due to unidentified inmates receiving a 13 film strip of suboxone through the mail, Defendants no longer allow inmates housed at Maguire Correctional Facility to receive handwritten mail, in violation of the First Amendment. Second, the complaint alleges that Maguire Correctional Facility inmates are denied access to the courts because they are prohibited from purchasing or possessing ink pens, pencil eraser, single eraser, legal folders, and legal paper bonders. Third, the complaint alleges that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Plaintiff and other inmates when they require inmates to remove their footwear, including special footwear authorized by medical chronos, during transport to court hearings or when travelling through the custody hallway facility to the medical clinic. The complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend because the complaint violates the joinder requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) provides that all persons “may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common that “multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff challenges the policy disallowing receipt of handwritten mail, the policy disallowing purchase or personal possession of ink pens, pencil eraser, single eraser, legal folders, and legal paper bonders, and the policy requiring removal of medically authorized footwear during certain transports. These policies are distinct and do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or allegations. The claims arise out of different questions of fact and different questions of law (First Amendment right to mail, First Amendment right to access the courts, Eighth Amendment prohibition on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). Plaintiff needs to choose the claims he wants to pursue in this action that meet the joinder requirements. He should only pursue the acts that arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and share a common question of law or fact. To seek relief for claims arising out of other incidents or raising different questions of law, Plaintiff must bring separate actions. To assist Plaintiff in preparing an amended complaint, the Court reviews the following legal principles. First Amendment Right to Receive Mail. Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v.Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Right of Access to the Courts. Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To establish a claim for any violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must prove that there was an inadequacy in the prison’s legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-51. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy in the prison’s program hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous claim Constitution does not require any particular number of pens or sheets of paper, it does require some. See Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1991). To state a First Amendment access to the courts claim, there must be a plausible allegation that the denial of the materials denied the prisoner the ability to perfect and pursue legal action, i.e., actual injury to court access. See id. at 1509 n.2. If Plaintiff pursues an access to the courts claim based on the inability to purchase and possess ink pens, pencil eraser, single eraser, legal folders, and legal paper bonders, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the restriction caused him an actual injury and identify what non-frivolous claim he was hindered in pursuing. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Eighth Amendment Medical Needs Claim. Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188. If pursuing an Eighth Amendment claim about the requirement that medically authorized footwear be removed during transport, Plaintiff should plausibly allege how the removal during transport resulted in a serious medical need. Equal Protection Claim. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). A plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on race or other suspect classification must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). To state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant state actor acted at least in part because of plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). If pursuing an equal protection claim, Plaintiff should plausibly allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent. Standing. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are violating the rights of all inmates housed at Maguire Correctional Facility. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit to complain about the deprivations of the constitutional rights of others. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); Estate of McKinney, 71 F.3d at 782 n.4. Constitutional claims are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously. See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1999) (attorney had no standing to assert § 1983 claim that prosecutor’s action interfered with his client’s alleged right to have him outside the grand jury room); United States v. Ayon-Meza, 177 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 1999) (one cannot vicariously assert the Fourth Amendment rights of another). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a class action, the Court cautions that, generally speaking, pro se prisoner plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives able to fairly represent and adequately protect the interests of the class, see Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (“a litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than himself”), and class certification may be denied on that basis, see Griffin v. Smith, 493 F. Supp. 129, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying class certification on basis that pro se prisoner cannot adequately represent class). Defendants. In naming defendants, Plaintiff must name the individuals who directly liability solely because a defendant is a supervisor or otherwise responsible for the actions or omissions of another. See Mortimer v. Baca, 594 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2010). A supervisor may be liable under section 1983 only upon a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, Rico v. Ducart, 980 F.3d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 2020); or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation, i.e. if the supervisor knew of the violation and failed to act to prevent it, Rico, 980 F.3d at 1303, or the supervisor engaged in culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates, Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018), or the supervisor engaged in conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others, id.; or (3) if the supervisor implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation,” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). If Plaintiff is seeking to hold the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Department liable for constitutional violations, he is alleging a municipal liability claim against San Mateo County, and the proper defendant for Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim would be San Mateo County itself. Cf. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (dismissing Santa Clara County Department of Corrections from § 1983 action and noting that “[t]he County is a proper defendant in a § 1983 claim, an agency of the County is not”); Stump v. Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991) (noting that, “although some courts have overlooked it, naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality”). To state a cognizable municipal liability claim against San Mateo County, Plaintiff is advised as to the following. “Under Monell [v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)], municipalities are subject to damages under § 1983 in three situations: when the Plaintiff was injured pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, a long-standing practice or custom, or the decision of a ‘final policymaker.’” Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013). In order to hold the municipality liable, the policy, practice, or custom must be the “moving force behind a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. Potential Co-Plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged that Sirvontre Ingram also seeks to proceed as a co-plaintiff in this action. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Mr. Ingram has not indicated that he wishes to join in this action. Regardless, the Court is not inclined to allow Mr. Ingram to join this action as a co- plaintiff. The use of co-plaintiffs presents a procedural problem unique to prisoner litigation. The main problem with having unrepresented inmates proceeding as co-plaintiffs is that inmates lack control over their ability to access each other to prepare documents and prosecute a case. Inmates are frequently moved. The plaintiffs may not have access to each other in the future to prepare documents and to discuss the case. Even inmates who initially are physically close to each other often do not remain so for the months or years that it takes for a case to work its way through to judgment. Perhaps one plaintiff will be moved to a different facility or be released from custody all of which will make their joint prosecution of this case inordinately more difficult. The slow pace of plaintiffs’ communications with each other will result in extensive delays at each point in the litigation where they are required to file anything with the court. In addition, as pro se plaintiffs, none of the plaintiffs have the authority to represent the others. See Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (“a litigant appearing in propria persona has no authority to represent anyone other than himself”). Thus, this case would be delayed as any potential filing from the plaintiffs is shuttled back and forth between the plaintiffs until both are comfortable signing it. If Mr. Ingram wishes to pursue the claims in this action, he should file a separate action. The Clerk is directed to send Mr. Ingram two copies of the court’s complaint form, along with a copy of this order. C. Supplemental Complaint Plaintiff has filed a supplemental complaint, an affidavit in support of the supplemental complaint, and an additional supplemental complaint, Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 9, which the Court construes as a request for leave to file a supplemental complaint. The Court DENIES this request. Plaintiff has been granted leave to file an amended complaint. He should include in his amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants he wishes to sue, including the claims in his supplemental complaint. Plaintiff may not amend the complaint piecemeal, i.e., by filing 1 defendants that Plaintiff wishes to sue and list all of Plaintiffs legal claims in one pleading. The 2 Court will not piece together Plaintiff's claims and the named defendants from different pleadings. 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows. 5 1. The Court DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend. Within twenty-eight 6 (28) days of the date of this order, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint that addresses the 7 identified deficiencies. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number 8 used in this order, Case No. C 21-09038 HSG (PR) and the words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” 9 on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Plaintiff must answer all the questions on the 10 form in order for the action to proceed. An amended complaint completely replaces the previous 11 complaints. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, 12 Plaintiff must include in his amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present and all of the 13 defendants he wishes to sue, and may not incorporate material from the prior complaint by 14 reference. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order in the time provided 15 || will result in dismissal of this action without further notice to Plaintiff. The Clerk shall include a 16 || two copies of the court’s complaint form with a copy of this order to Plaintiff. The Clerk shall 17 also send two copies of the court’s complaint form and a copy of this order to Sirvontre Ingram, 18 #1236119, 1300 Maple Street, Redwood City CA 94063. 19 2. The Court DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s request to file a supplemental complaint. 20 Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 9. Plaintiff may raise all his claims in his amended complaint. 21 This order terminates Dkt. Nos. 5, 6, 9. 23 Dated: 2/11/2022 24 Abspurel 5 Mh |). HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 25 United States District Judge 26 27 28