Chapman v. Penzone

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided March 11, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-01214·Unknown

Opinion

1 MDR 2 WO 3 4 5 8 9 Kylene Kaye Chapman, No. CV-23-01214-PHX-JAT (ASB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Paul Penzone, 13 Defendant.

15 Self-represented Plaintiff Kylene Kaye Chapman is confined in a Maricopa County 16 Jail and is proceeding in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983. After the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint because she had failed to 18 state a claim and gave her an opportunity to file an amended complaint that cured the 19 deficiencies the Court identified, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (Doc. 7). 20 The Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 21 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 23 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 24 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 25 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 27 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 28 . . . . 1 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 2 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 3 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 4 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 5 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 6 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 7 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 8 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 10 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 11 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 12 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 13 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 14 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 15 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 16 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 17 must “continue to construe [self-represented parties’] filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 18 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a self-represented prisoner] 19 ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. 20 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 21 If the Court determines a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a 22 self-represented litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 23 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 24 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, but 25 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 26 to amend. 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1 II. First Amended Complaint 2 In her one-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendant Paul Penzone, 3 the former Maricopa County Sheriff, seeking monetary damages and her costs of suit. 4 Plaintiff raises an Eighth Amendment claim based on “health and safety 5 negligence.” She alleges Defendant Penzone’s “deferred maintenance is excessive” and 6 the “failure to maintain the building is the proximately cause of unhealthy and unsanitary 7 conditions.” Plaintiff contends the failure to maintain the building allowed the 8 “proliferation of excessive water moisture in the building,” which caused “excessive and 9 atypical mold growth in the building.” She claims the “mold contamination” poses a health 10 risk to her. 11 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Penzone “knew or should have known” in 2019 about 12 the “black mold contamination” and failed to “adopt and implement reasonable standards 13 for adequately cleaning the mold.” She claims Defendant Penzone “painted over vis[i]ble 14 mold,” which is “not within the standard of care in the mold abatement industry” and does 15 not eliminate the risk to Plaintiff from exposure to “toxic mold.” Plaintiff asserts 16 Defendant Penzone’s conduct was “intentional and malicious and done for the purpose of 17 causing [P]laintiff to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical 18 distress”; was done “with a wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences to . . . 19 [P]laintiff]”; and is “outrageous, a[]trocious, so extreme in degree to go beyond all possible 20 bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” She claims she suffered 21 humiliation, mental anguish, and physical distress, and “has been injured in mind and 22 body.” 23 III. Failure to State a Claim 24 Although pleadings by self-represented parties are liberally construed, Haines v. 25 Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a 26 cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal 27 interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim 28 that were not initially pled. Id. 1 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 2 specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 3 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 4 371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, 5 a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s 6 constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 7 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 8 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, 9 a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 10 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 11 A pretrial detainee has a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 12 Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, to be free from punishment prior to an 13 adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “Pretrial detainees ar

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