Chao v Burges 2024 NY Slip Op 32590(U) July 24, 2024 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 654164/2021 Judge: Emily Morales-Minerva Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. INDEX NO. 654164/2021 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 159 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 07/25/2024
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. EMILY MORALES-MINERVA PART 42M Justice
--------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 654164/2021
STEPHEN CHAO, MARIANN MADRON
Plaintiff, MOTION DATE 02/21/2024
- V- MOTION SEQ. NO. 004 ANTHONY BURGES,
Defendant. DECISION + ORDER ON -------------------------------------------------------------------------X MOTION
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 004) 108, 109, 110, 111, 112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129.130, 131,132, 133,134, 135,136,137,138, 139,140,141,142, 143, 144, 145, 146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158 were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (AFTER JOINDER)
APPEARANCES: The Law Office of Theodore Geiger, PLLC, New York, New York (Theodore Geiger, Esq., of counsel) for Plaintiffs.
The Kimmel Law Firm, New York, New York (Brian S. Kimmel, Esq., of counsel), for Defendant.
HON. EMILY MORALES-MINERVA:
In this action for fraud and promissory estoppel, plaintiffs
STEPHEN CHAO and MARIANN MADRON ( "Plaintiffs 11 ) move, pursuant to
CPLR § 3212, for an order granting them summary judgment and,
pursuant to CPLR § 3211, for an order dismissing the affirmative
defenses and counterclaim of defendant ANTHONY BURGES ("Defendant").
Defendant submitted opposition, which the Court declines to consider
as untimely and without proffered good cause (see generally Corchado
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Motion No. 004
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v City of New York, 64 AD3d 429 [1st Dept 2009] see also Brill v
City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]) .
However, for the foregoing reasons, the Court denies
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in its entirety and grants
plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's affirmative defenses and
counterclaim, in part, to the extent of dismissing the counterclaim
and certain affirmative defenses, and otherwise denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs STEPHAN CHAO and MARIANN MADRON, a married couple,
and defendant ANTHONY BURGES are acquaintances as their udaughters
attended school together" (NY St Courts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc.
No. 109, Affidavit, p. 2) Around 2017, plaintiffs and defendant
began investing in real estate projects involving the development of
certain properties into residential housing. According to the
affidavit of plaintiff STEPHAN CHAO -- the only affidavit in support
of this motion for summary judgment defendant ANTHONY BURGES
fraudulently induced the couple to give him $275,900.00 to develop
properties that defendant never owned and to establish limited
liability companies that defendant never established.
However, things soured between the parties, when plaintiff
STEPHAN CHAO visited one of the development sites to discover that
it was a vacant lot. Also, plaintiff STEPHAN CHAO contends that a
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third-party informed him that defendant ANTHONY BURGES did not own
another one of the properties in which plaintiffs allegedly invested
funds. These events, among others, led to plaintiffs becoming
suspicious and distrustful of ANTHONY BURGES.
Eventually, in April of 2018, plaintiffs requested defendant
return their investment (see NYSCEF No. 002, Complaint at~ 20, 22).
From then through February 2019, the parties allegedly exchanged
numerous letters, e-mails, text messages and phone calls (see NYSCEF
Doc. No. 002, Complaint at~ 22, 24, 28, 30-36, 39, 43) However,
plaintiffs represent defendant never returned their monies.
Accordingly, on July 1, 2 021, plaintiffs filed the instant
complaint. As defendant failed to submit an answer, plaintiffs then
filed a motion (seq. no. 001) for leave to enter a default judgment
against Defendant, pursuant to CPLR § 3215. The Court {N. Bannon,
J .s.c.) denied said motion without prejudice to renewal, as
plaintiffs' application was not supported by an affirmation or
affidavit of someone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts
(see NYSCEF Doc. No. 32, Decision and Order, N. Bannon, J.S.C.).
On August 10, 2022, plaintiffs renewed their application for a
default judgment (motion seq. no. 002). Defendant filed opposition
and a cross-motion, requesting permission to file a late answer to
the complaint, annexing the proposed answer.
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Upon review of the submissions, the Court (N. Bannon, u.S.C.)
denied plaintiffs' renewed motion for to enter a default
judgment and granted defendant's cross mot to compel plaintiffs 1
ace of the late answer, deeming the answer timely served (s~e
NYSCEF Doc. No. 78, Decision and Order, November 4, 2022, N. Bannon
J.S.C.).
Defendant's answer interposes twenty one (21} affirmative
defenses to the all ions in the complaint ( the "Affirmative
Defenses") and asserts one (1) counterclaim (the •counterclaim") for
attorneys' fees in the amount of $10,000.00 (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 71,
Answer with Counterclaim).
On January 19, 2023, the Court (N. Bannon, J. S. C.) issued a
preliminary conference order, sett forth specific discovery
deadl s (NYSCEF Doc. No. 80, Preliminary Conference Order).
Months later, at the compliance conference, the same justice
determined that defendant failed to respond to plainti ' document
requests, interrogatories, or requests for admission (NYSCEF Doc.
No. 80, Compliance Conference Order, May 11, 2023). Accordingly,
the Court (N. Bannon, J.S.C.) ordered defendant to serve document
responses and respond to discovery demands by May 31, 2023 (id.}.
However, defendant again failed to comply with the Court's
order. Consequently, on June 16, 2023, plaintiffs moved (motion
seq. no. 003) for an order to compel di or impose sanctions
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for defendant's failure to provide discovery as per the Court's
orders, dated January 19, 2023, and May 11, 2023 (see CPLR §§ 3124
and 3126) .
Pending the motion, the Court (N. Bannon, J.S.C.) held a status
conference and issued a third order, directing defendant to respond
to plaintiffs' previously served document demands and
interrogatories, within thirty (30) days (NYSCEF Doc. No. 100, Status
Conference Order, August 03, 2023). The order included notice to
defendant that noncompliance would result in defendant being
precluded from offering any evidence in support of his affirmative
defenses (id.) . Later, the same justice issued an order on
plaintiffs' motion to compel or to sanction, granting it to the
extent set forth in the status conference order and otherwise deeming
the motion resolved (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 101, Decision and Order,
August 4, 2023, N. Bannon J.S.C.).
Again, defendant failed to comply with the discovery deadline.
Accordingly, following a status conference, the Court (N. Bannon,
J. S. C.) issued an order, finding that defendant had not complied
with the Court's order compelling discovery and precluding defendant
from offering any evidence in support of his affirmative defenses
(NYSCEF Doc. No. 106, Status Conference Order, December 7, 2023
[emphasis added])
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Shortly thereafter, on December 29, 2023, plaintiffs filed Note
of Issue (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 107), followed by the subject motion
(seq. no. 004), on February 21, 2024.
In this motion, plaintiffs seek an order, pursuant to CPLR
§ 3212, granting them summary judgment, and an order, pursuant to
CPLR § 3211, granting them dismissal of defendant's twenty-one
affirmative defenses and single counterclaim.
On March 8, 2024, defendant filed an application for an
adjournment of the motion (NYSCEF Doc. No. 143), which plaintiffs
opposed. Over said objection, this Court granted defendant's
application, adjourning the return date on the motion to April 5,
2024, and ordering defendant's opposition papers due by March 29,
2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 144).
Defendant failed to meet yet another deadline and, without leave
of the Court, counsel for the parties submitted a signed stipulation,
dated April 5, 2024, consenting to an adjournment of the motion to
April 19, 2024, and to an extension of defendant's time to file
opposition to April 8, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 147).
Despite the parties' stipulation, defendant filed his
opposition late (NYSCEF Doc. No. 148, Opposition, April 11, 2024),
and plaintiffs now oppose consideration of defendant's opposition on
this ground.
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ANALYSIS
Defendant's Opposition
The Court first addresses the dispositive issue concerning
defendant's untimely opposition. The parties' stipulation clearly
provides that defendant was to file his written opposition by April
08, 2024. Further, defendant failed to meet that deadline, even if
only by a few days, and defendant presents no good cause for the
late filing. Therefore, the Court declines to consider defendant's
submission (see generally Brill, 2 NY3d at 652 [2004).
Statements that defendant is incarcerated, and that defendant's
wife is sick are insufficient excuses; defendant has long been
incarcerated, including during the time counsel of record entered
the subject stipulation, and during the time that this Court granted
defendant's initial application for an extension over plaintiff's
objection. Further, there is no showing that defendant's wife in
any way affected the ability of defendant -- who is represented by
counsel -- to timely prepare the opposition papers.
The parties were free to chart the procedural course that
deviated from the path of CPLR and shall be held to it (see
Corchado v City of New York, 64 AD3d 429, 429 [1st Dept 2009])
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Motion for Summary Judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 'make
a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law,
tendering [evidentiary proof in admissible form] to demonstrate the
absence of any material issues of fact'" {Nomura Asset Capital Corp.
v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49 [2015], citing
Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; CPLR § 3212[b];
Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1066, [1979]
[providing movant must support the subject application with
"'evidentiary proof in admissible form"']). Further, it is black
letter law that such proof shall include the "affidavit" of a person
having personal knowledge of the facts, "a copy of the pleadings"
and "other available proof, such as depositions and written
admissions" (CPLR § 3212 [b]) .
The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-movant, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences
(De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742 [2016]) If the moving party
establishes, the non-moving party then has the burden "'to establish
the existence of [factual issues] which require a trial of the
action'" (id., citing Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503
[2012], quoting Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324).
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While the movant' s burden on a summary judgment motion is
generally a high one, matters like fraud and promissory estoppel, as
here, prove even more difficult to warrant such relief.
A prima facie case of fraud must include a showing of
"misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, falsity,
scienter on the part of the wrongdoer, justifiable reliance and
resulting injury" (Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v Goldman Sachs
Grp, Inc., 115 AD3d 128, 135 [1st Dept 2014]) . As the applicable
standard requires consideration of "motive, intent, and subjective
feelings," fraud claims are generally ill suited for summary judgment
(Bank Hapoalim (Switzerland) Ltd. v Banca Intesa S.P.A., 22 Misc3d
1104[AJ, *2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]).
Indeed, "[c]ourts have traditionally held that summary judgment
is inappropriate to resolve complicated questions of motive and
intent " (McManus v Grippen, 244 AD2d 632, 634 [3d Dept 1997];
Bank of India v Weg & Myers, P.C., 257 AD2d 183, [1st Dept 1999]
[holding that unresolved factual issues regarding intent and motive
preclude summary judgment on fraud claim]; Grumman Aerospace Corp v
Rice, 199 AD2d 365, 366 [2d Dept 1993] [holding: "[t] he determination
of intent is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be
resolved on a motion for summary judgment")).
Similarly, as here, "[a] party relying upon promissory estoppel
must demonstrate that there was a clear and unambiguous promise upon
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which it reasonably and detrimentally relied" (Clifford R. Gray,
Inc. v LeChase Const. Services, LLC, 31 AD3d 983, 986 [3d Dept 2006];
see Rusi Holding Corp. v Inner City Elevator, 192 AD3d 441 [1st Dept
2021]. "The question what constitutes reasonable reliance is
always nettlesome because it is so fact- ive" (DDJ Mgt., LLC v
Rhone Group LLC, 15 NY3d 147 [2010]; see MBIA Ins. Co. v GMAC Mtge.
LLC, 30 Misc3d 856 [Sup Ct, NY County 2010)).
Applying these principals here, plaintiffs have not met their
burden. In support of their motion for summary judgment, p iffs
provide only the affidavit of plaintiff STEPHEN CHAO, as a person
with personal knowledge. However, the affidavit itself includes
information from third parties, not from t knowledge. Further,
while pointing to the attached exhibits for support, the exhibits
attached to the affidavit are not in evidentiary form.
Instead, they as a smorgasbord, including, but not
limited to, screen shots, e-mails between counsel and ntiff
STEPHEN CHAO, copies and/ or scans of documents that are either blurry
or incomplete, copies of agreements that are unsigned and
unauthenticated, and unofficial transcripts of calls between
plainti STEPHEN CHAO and defendant ANTHONY BURGES see NYSCEF Doc.
Nos. 115 14 0} . Among other things, none of these exhibits are
certif or subject to any foundational showing.
Further, plaintiff STEPHEN CHAO's supporting affidavit present
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issues of credibility that "should not be decided by the court [on
a motion for summary judgment] but should be left to the trier of
fact" (Sacher by Sacher v Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 142 AD2d 567, 568 [2d Dept 1988]; see MP Cool Investments Ltd
v Forkosh, 142 AD3d 286 [1st Dept 2016]). As the Court of Appeals
has held: "It is not the function of a court deciding a summary
judgment motion to make credibility determinations or findings of
fact, but rather to identify material triable issues of fact or point
to the lack thereof" (Vega, 18 NY3d at 505 [2012] see Art Capital
Group, LLC v Rose, 149 AD3d 447 [1st Dept 2017]).
Additionally, the Court is unable to determine, on the motion
papers alone, whether defendant intended to deceive and manipulate
plaintiffs; the level of plaintiffs' sophistication as investors in
the real estate market; and whether plaintiffs' blind reliance on
defendant and defendant's representations were reasonable or
justifiable (see DeRossi v Rubinstein, 233 AD2d 220 [1st Dept 1996]
[issues of fact exist as to plaintiffs' sophistication as investors
and their reliance on defendant for tax and investment advice]; see
also Bennett v Bennett, 223 AD3d 1013, 1016 [3d Dept 2024] [whether
plaintiffs justifiably relied on defendant lS highly fact-
intensive)]
Questions of fact also exist concerning whether defendant made
clear and unambiguous promises to plaintiffs, and whether plaintiffs
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reasonably relied upon the alleged promises (see Fleet Bank v Pine
Knoll Corp., 290 AD2d 792 [3d Dept 2022] [question of fact as to
whether party justifiably relied upon promise allegedly made]; see
also Agress v Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 69 AD3d 769 [2d Dept
2010] [triable issues of fact exist as to whether representations
were made, and whether it was reasonable for plaintiff to reply upon
them if they were made]).
Motion to Dismiss Affirmative Defenses
"The standard of review on a motion to dismiss an affirmative
defense pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (b) is akin to that used under CPLR
§ 3211 (a) (7), i.e., whether there is any legal or factual basis for
the assertion of the defense" (Matter of Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. , 14 O
AD2d 62, 67 [1st Dept 1988]). "On a motion to dismiss affirmative
defenses pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (b), the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating that the defenses are without merit as a matter of
law" (534 E. 11th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v Hendrick, 90 AD3d 541,
541 [1st Dept 2011]) . "In deciding a motion to dismiss a defense,
the defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable
intendment of the pleading, which is to be liberally construed"
{Warwick v Cruz, 270 AD2d 255 [2d Dept 2000]). However, CPLR § 3013
provides, in pertinent part, that statements in a pleading shall be
sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the
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transactions or occurrences intended to be proven and the material
elements of each defense.
The first and second affirmative defenses (failure to state a
cause of action) are viable. "No motion by the plaintiff lies under
CPLR § 32ll(b) to strike the defense of failure to state a cause of
action, as this amounts to an endeavor by the plaintiff to test the
sufficiency of his or her own claim" (Ochoa v Townsend, 209 AD3d
867, 868 [2d Dept 2022] ; see Tribbs v 326-338 E 110th LLC, 215 AD3d
480 [1st Dept 2023]); Pump v Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 238 AD2d 849
[3d Dept. 1988]). Accordingly, plaintiffs' application to dismiss
the first and second affirmative defenses is denied.
The third affirmative defense - that plaintiffs acted in bad
faith and have unclean hands - is pled as a conclusion of law without
any factual support and fails to allege any specific conduct of the
Plaintiffs, in the body of the answer or elsewhere. (See Long Is.
Minimally Invasive Surgery, P.C. v Outsource Mktg. Sols., Inc., 33
Misc3d 1228 (A) [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2011] [dismissing affirmative
defense that alleges plaintiff's claim is barred by its own
unconscionable acts as it is pled as a conclusion of law without any
factual support]). Therefore, the third affirmative defense is
insufficiently pled and is dismissed.
The fourth (unjust enrichment), fifth (statue of frauds), sixth
(lack of causation), seventh (failure to mitigate), eighth (laches),
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ninth (waiver), eleventh (collateral estoppel and/or res judicata},
fifteenth (intervening acts) and sixteenth (damages caused by other
party) affirmative defenses do not state any facts whatsoever, and
are completely devoid of any of the material elements of the named
defenses see Johnson v Goord, 290 AD2d 844 [3d Dept 2002]
[conclusory and generalized statements which are unsupported by any
specific factual allegations fall far short of meeting the
requirements of CPLR § 3103]).
Further, while a defendant is not required to plead factual
allegations under each specifically titled affirmative defense,
factual allegations must be pled in the body of the answer sufficient
to give notice to the plaintiff as to what defendant intends to
provide under his defenses see 534 E. 11th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.
v Hendrick, 90 AD3d 541 [1st Dept 2011]). Here, defendant did not
plead factual allegations in the body of his answer sufficient to
give notice of what he intends to prove under his defenses, as the
answer contains blanket, boilerplate denials to the entirety of the
complaint. Accordingly, the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth,
ninth, eleventh, fifteenth, and sixteenth affirmative defenses are
dismissed.
Defendant sufficiently pleads the tenth affirmative defense
that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Although defendant failed to include any applicable time period for
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either cause of action, both causes of action arise from the same
transactions or occurrences, and plaintiff is not prejudiced by the
lack of particularity (cf. Scholastic Inc. v Pace Plumbing Corp.,
129 AD3d 75, 85 [1st Dept 2015] [recognizing that it is sensible to
require defendants to plead statute of limitations with
particularity in cases where plaintiff states multiple causes of
action arising from different transactions and occurrences]).
Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Defendant's tenth
affirmative defense is denied.
The twelfth affirmative defense, that recovery is barred by
documentary evidence, is dismissed, as it is a vague, conclusory,
general statement that is asserted without any detail.
The thirteenth affirmative defense is sufficiently pled.
Defendant alleges that pursuant to CPLR § 1001, plaintiffs have a
duty to join necessary parties to the instant litigation and have
failed to join the ~two business entities [RCIG I & RCIG II] with
whom they directly invested fundsn [NYSCEF Doc. No. 71, Answer at 1 114-115). These allegations give plaintiffs sufficient notice of the
transactions and occurrences intended to be proven, and this defense
does not lack merit.
Defendant insufficiently pleads the fourteenth affirmative
defense, assumption of risk, as no factual allegations are included
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in the body of the answer. Accordingly, this affirmative defense
shall be dismissed.
The seventeenth affirmative defense is also dismissed. While
defendant alleges therein that "the Court does not have jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the causes of action," the defendant is
mistaken [NYSCEF Doc. No. 71, Answer at~ 128). The jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court is promulgated in the New York State Constitution,
which bestows the court with original jurisdiction over matters in
law and equity {NY Const. Art. VI, § 7[a]). The causes of action in
the case at bar fit squarely into this Court's subject matter
jurisdiction.
The eighteenth affirmative defense is also dismissed. While
Defendant cites to CPLR § 4545 (c) as an affirmative defense,
effective November 12, 2009, CPLR § 4545 no longer contains a
subsection (c) (see CPLR § 4545) . Neither the plaintiff nor the
court ought to be required to sift through CPLR § 4545 to determine
which subsection Defendant is relying upon in his defense where the
supporting facts are also vague or nonexistent.
The nineteenth and twentieth affirmative defenses are aJ..SO
dismissed as completely blank. Finally, as defendant's twenty-first
affirmative defense names an individual who is not a party to this
action, it is dismissed.
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Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim
"On a . . motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as
true" {Alden Glob. Value Recovery Master Fund, L.P. v KeyBank Nat'l
Ass'n, 159 AD3d 618, 621 [1st Dept 2018]; 219 Broadway Corp. v
Alexander's, Inc., 46 NY2d 506 [1979]}. u(O]nly a prevailing party
is entitled to attorney's fees" (Nestor v McDowell, 81 NY2d 410,
415-416 [1993]) "Under the general rule, actorney' s fees are
incidents of litigation, and a prevailing party may not collect them
from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between
the parties, statute, or court rule" (Hooper Assoc. , Ltd. V AGS
Computers, Inc., 74 NY2d 487, 491 [1989]).
In defendant's answer, defendant asserts one counterclaim for
attorneys' fees in the amount of $10,000 "based upon the dismissal
of th~s action, or in the event Defendant is otherwise the prevailing
party" [NYSCEF Doc. No. 71, Answer with Counterclaim at ~ 128].
Plaintiff argues that the counterclaim must be dismissed, as it fails
to point to an applicable statutory or contractual provision.
Defendant concedes that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily
recovered without a relevant statutory or contractual provision,
arguing that "there are circumstances that may give rise to
entitlement to attorneys' fees" [NYSCRF Doc. No. 148, Opposi~ion at
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1 82]. However, defendant cites to no circumstance, and tead
proposes two generalized hypothetical situations. Therefore, even
construing the counterc liberally and giving defendant the
benefit of every possible favorable erence, the counterclaim
completely fails to allege Defendant's entitlement to attorneys'
fees see 308 W. 78 th Corp. v 360 9 Rest, LLC, 115 AD3d 464, 465 [1st
Dept. 2014] [lower court erred in failing to dismiss counterclaim,
which lacked in factual support and was meritless on its face]).
Accordingly, the counterclaim is dismissed.
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion (seq. no. 004) is
part, to the extent that plaintiffs' mot for summary judgment is
denied in its entirety; it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion (seq. no. 004), is granted, in
part, to the extent as follows:
(i) defendant's counterclaim is dismissed; and
(ii) defendant's affirmar.ive defenses numbered third,
fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth,
eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth,
seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and
twenty-f are dismissed; is further
ORDERED that that plaintiffs' motion (seq. no. 004) is
otherwise denied; and it is further
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ORDERED that pla iffs shall serve defendant with notice of
entry within ten days from the date of this decision and
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
07/o<{/ao;;{ DATE CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
GRANTED □ DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER
APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE
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