UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PANAMA CITY DIVISION
JAMES JUSTIN CHANNELL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 5:23-cv-280-TKW/MJF
ROWDY FOLSOM, et al.,
Defendants. / REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION The undersigned has preliminarily screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because the facts as presented in this complaint fail to state a facially plausible claim for relief against the named Defendants, the District Court should dismiss this civil action. I. BACKGROUND In his second amended complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff names as Defendants three employees of the Florida Department of Corrections: Captain Rowdy Folsom, Classification Officer Parrish, and Daniel Stewart. Doc. 37 at 1. Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff asserts three claims: • Count I—Folsom violated the Eighth Amendment by not protecting Plaintiff from a serious risk of harm;
• Count II—Parrish violated the Eighth Amendment by not protecting Plaintiff from a serious risk of harm; and
• Count III—Stewart violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to follow the FDC’s grievance procedure.
Plaintiff seeks damages and restoration of gain time. Id. at 7. II. STANDARD The District Court is required to review Plaintiff’s complaint, identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true
and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Official-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed for two independent reasons. First, official-capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity as recognized by the Eleventh Amendment. Second, States and their agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and cannot be
sued for damages. 1. Sovereign Immunity “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Thus, in
a section 1983 action “a claim against a defendant in his official capacity is the same as a claim against his employer.” Christman v. Saint Lucie Cnty., Fla., 509 F. App’x 878, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997)). In other words,
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants—employees of the Florida Department of Corrections acting in their official capacities—is a suit against the FDC. The FDC, a state agency, is “clearly the equivalent of
the State of Florida for the Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Walden v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 975 F. Supp. 1330, 1331 (N.D. Fla. 1996). The Eleventh Amendment recognizes that States may assert
sovereign immunity that would bar suits by an individual against a State, its agencies, and its employees, unless Congress has abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has consented to the lawsuit. See
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Congress has not abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity in actions for damages under § 1983. Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67–68 (1989). Furthermore, Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity in § 1983 actions. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Florida’s
limited waiver of sovereign immunity was not intended to encompass section 1983 suits for damages.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Ex parte Young provides a narrow exception to sovereign immunity
in cases where a party is seeking prospective relief against State officials for violation of federal law. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This exception applies only when the alleged violations are ongoing and not when the relief
pertains to past violations of federal law. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing
violation of federal law. . . . We have refused to extend” Ex parte Young to “claims for retrospective relief.”). Plaintiff’s complaint identifies only past misconduct, not anticipated future harm. Doc. 37 at 5–6 (noting that
the events giving rise to the complaint occurred in September and October 2023). Because Plaintiff has not alleged an ongoing constitutional violation, his claims do not fit within the narrow Ex parte
Young exception to immunity. Therefore, his official-capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 2. Defendants Sued in Their Official Capacities are not “Persons” For Purposes of § 1983
Only “persons” may be sued for damages under section 1983, and “[a] state, a state agency, and a state official sued in his official capacity are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Edwards v. Wallace Cmty.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PANAMA CITY DIVISION
JAMES JUSTIN CHANNELL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 5:23-cv-280-TKW/MJF
ROWDY FOLSOM, et al.,
Defendants. / REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION The undersigned has preliminarily screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because the facts as presented in this complaint fail to state a facially plausible claim for relief against the named Defendants, the District Court should dismiss this civil action. I. BACKGROUND In his second amended complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff names as Defendants three employees of the Florida Department of Corrections: Captain Rowdy Folsom, Classification Officer Parrish, and Daniel Stewart. Doc. 37 at 1. Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff asserts three claims: • Count I—Folsom violated the Eighth Amendment by not protecting Plaintiff from a serious risk of harm;
• Count II—Parrish violated the Eighth Amendment by not protecting Plaintiff from a serious risk of harm; and
• Count III—Stewart violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to follow the FDC’s grievance procedure.
Plaintiff seeks damages and restoration of gain time. Id. at 7. II. STANDARD The District Court is required to review Plaintiff’s complaint, identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true
and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s Official-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed for two independent reasons. First, official-capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity as recognized by the Eleventh Amendment. Second, States and their agencies are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and cannot be
sued for damages. 1. Sovereign Immunity “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Thus, in
a section 1983 action “a claim against a defendant in his official capacity is the same as a claim against his employer.” Christman v. Saint Lucie Cnty., Fla., 509 F. App’x 878, 879 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997)). In other words,
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants—employees of the Florida Department of Corrections acting in their official capacities—is a suit against the FDC. The FDC, a state agency, is “clearly the equivalent of
the State of Florida for the Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Walden v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 975 F. Supp. 1330, 1331 (N.D. Fla. 1996). The Eleventh Amendment recognizes that States may assert
sovereign immunity that would bar suits by an individual against a State, its agencies, and its employees, unless Congress has abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has consented to the lawsuit. See
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Congress has not abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity in actions for damages under § 1983. Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67–68 (1989). Furthermore, Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity in § 1983 actions. See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Florida’s
limited waiver of sovereign immunity was not intended to encompass section 1983 suits for damages.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Ex parte Young provides a narrow exception to sovereign immunity
in cases where a party is seeking prospective relief against State officials for violation of federal law. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This exception applies only when the alleged violations are ongoing and not when the relief
pertains to past violations of federal law. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing
violation of federal law. . . . We have refused to extend” Ex parte Young to “claims for retrospective relief.”). Plaintiff’s complaint identifies only past misconduct, not anticipated future harm. Doc. 37 at 5–6 (noting that
the events giving rise to the complaint occurred in September and October 2023). Because Plaintiff has not alleged an ongoing constitutional violation, his claims do not fit within the narrow Ex parte
Young exception to immunity. Therefore, his official-capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 2. Defendants Sued in Their Official Capacities are not “Persons” For Purposes of § 1983
Only “persons” may be sued for damages under section 1983, and “[a] state, a state agency, and a state official sued in his official capacity are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). For this second,
independent reason, Plaintiff’s request for damages against Defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed. B. Plaintiff’s Request for Restoration of Gain Time Credits
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in the form of the restoration of his lost “gain time credits,” he cannot obtain that relief in a § 1983 action. A prisoner in state custody cannot challenge “the very
fact or duration of his physical imprisonment” in a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Rather, “[w]hen a state prisoner is challenging the duration of his
confinement and the relief sought is a speedier release from imprisonment, the ‘sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.’” Hale v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 345 F. App’x 489, 492 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500). Thus, “state prisoners must use petitions for writs of habeas corpus in seeking restoration of good-time credits.” Roberts v. Wilson, 259 F. App’x 226, 228 (11th Cir. 2007). The District
Court, therefore, should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims to the extent he seeks restoration of gain-time credits. C. Amendment Would Be Futile
“[B]efore dismissing a complaint, a district court ‘must’ give a pro se party ‘at least’ one chance to amend the complaint if a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.” Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282,
1295 (11th Cir. 2023). “Amendment is not warranted” when an amendment is futile, i.e. the amended complaint would still be subject to dismissal. Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th
Cir. 2019); see Taveras v. Bank of Am., N.A., 89 F.4th 1279, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2024). Furthermore, the “district court need not . . . allow amendment . . where there has been . . . repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). Amendment would be futile because Plaintiff cannot seek
restoration of gain time credits in a civil action filed under section 1983 action and because his official-capacity claims are barred by the immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment. As for potential
individual-capacity claims, the undersigned preliminarily screened Plaintiff’s original complaint, advised what he needed to plead to pursue individual-capacity claims, and afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to plead individual-capacity claims. Doc. 13 at 6–8. Plaintiff elected not to pursue
individual-capacity claims. Therefore, the undersigned concludes that further leave to amend the complaint is not warranted. IV. CONCLUSION
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court: 1. DISMISS this action with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) because Plaintiff has failed to state a
plausible claim for relief; and 2. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file. At Pensacola, Florida this 19th day of November, 2024.
/s/ Michael J. Frank Michael J. Frank United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES The District Court referred this case to the undersigned to address preliminary matters and to make recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of the report and recommendation. Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected- to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.