Chancey v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
This text of 477 A.2d 22 (Chancey v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion by
Nicholas Chancey (petitioner) petitions for review of an order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) dated February 28, 1983 denying him administrative relief from a Board recommitment order revoking his parole and recommitting him as a convicted and a technical parole violator to serve forty-two months on baektime.1 Petitioner contends the Board violated his due process rights by failing to provide him timely parole revocation hearings and as a result of that failure he is entitled to have the direct and technical parole violations dismissed and his parole reinstated.
Petitioner was paroled by the Board effective August 7, 1980 on a sentence of two to ten years imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after petitioner violated probation received on a Burglary2 conviction. Petitioner was arrested by Philadelphia Police on March 15, 1981 on new criminal charges3 and subsequently released on bail. On April [44]*442, 1981 petitioner was arrested in Bensalem, Bucks County, on other Philadelphia County criminal charges.4 The Board lodged its detainer against petitioner on April 16,1981 based on the new charges and technical parole violations.5
A Preliminary and Detention Hearing was scheduled for April 28, 1981 at the Philadelphia House of Correction. Prior to that hearing, petitioner was hospitalized with a serious illness and the April 28, 1981 hearing was continued. Hearings were scheduled for May 5, 1981, May 20, 1981, June 23, 1981, and October 20, 1981. On each of these dates, continuance requests were made on petitioner’s behalf by an attorney from the Defender Association of Philadelphia due to petitioner’s hospitalization. A Preliminary and Detention hearing was held on November 6, 1981 at which petitioner was represented by an attorney from the Philadelphia Defender Association. While petitioner objected to the timeliness of the hearing, he did not voice any complaints as to the quality of legal representation he was afforded by the Phila[45]*45delphia Defender Association. Petitioner also requested a full Board Violation Hearing at this time.
The Board scheduled a full Board Violation Hearing at the Philadelphia House of Correction for January 7, 1982. At that time, petitioner requested a continuance of the hearing until his pending criminal charges were disposed of to include post-trial motions and sentencing. The written continuance request was signed by the same attorney from the Philadelphia Defender Association who represented petitioner at the November 6, 1981 hearing and specifically waived all timeliness issues.6
Petitioner was convicted on April 15, 1982 of violating the Uniform Firearms Act7 in Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court and sentenced to a term of two and one-half to five years on November 14, 1982. On December 3,1982, petitioner was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Graterford (SCI-Graterford).
The Board held a full Board Violation and Revocation Hearing for petitioner at SCI-Graterf ord on January 4, 1983. While an attorney from the Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office was available to petitioner;8 petitioner elected to represent himself at [46]*46the hearing with the public defender attending the hearing as standby co-counsel.
On January 17, 1983 the Board ordered petitioner recommitted as a technical violator to eighteen months and as a convicted violator to serve twenty-four months for a total of forty-two months or backtime. Petitioner’s maximum term expiration date was extended to June 10, 1989.9 Petitioner filed an administrative appeal with the Board challenging the timeliness of the November 6, 1981 Preliminary Hearing and the January 4, 1983 Violation/Revocation Hearing which was denied.
Petitioner first contends that his November 6,1981 Preliminary Hearing was untimely as held more than fifteen days after the lodging of the Board’s warrant requiring the dismissal of the technical violations. The Board’s regulations require that a Preliminary Hearing on technical parole violations be held within fifteen days of the lodging of the Board’s warrant. 37 Pa. Code §71.2(1) (ii). The Board lodged its war-ant against petitioner on April 16, 1981 and scheduled a hearing for April 28, 1981, twelve days after the warrant was lodged. That hearing was continued due to petitioner’s unavailability caused by his hospitalization. The other scheduled hearings were continuted at the written request of counsel from the Defender Association who purported to represent petitioner. The Board is permitted to continue its hearings due to the unavailability of the parolee or defense counsel or at the request of either the parolee or defense counsel and such time is excluded from the computation of [47]*47whether a hearing is timely. 37 Pa. Code §71.5(i). Petitioner asserts that the public defender’s continuance requests were invalid as they were made without petitioner’s knowledge or consent and the public defender was not representing him at that time. In Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 72 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 14, 455 A.2d 778 (1983), we held that the Board, like a court, is entitled to proceed on the basis that a lawyer does represent the person whom the lawyer, as an officer of the court, purports to represent. Id. at 16, 455 A.2d at 779.10 We also reject petitioner’s assertion that any continuance request is invalid unless it was made with petitioner’s prior knowledge and consent. This claim is patently frivolous. Continuances are a matter of sound trial strategy within the reasonable purview of counsel. To hold that counsel cannot unilaterally request continuances that would delay a hearing beyond the time limits imposed by the Board’s regulations would severly hamper counsel’s ability to effectuate trial strategy. Commonwealth v. Walley, 262 Pa. Superior Ct. 496, 502, 396 A.2d 1280, 1283 (1978). We find the Board was entitled to rely upon the continuance requests of counsel and that the November 6, 1981 Preliminary Hearing was timely.
Petitioner’s next contention is that his Violation/Revocation Hearing held on January 4, 1983 at SCI-Graterford was untimely as beyond the 120 days following a new conviction as required by the Board’s regulations. 37 Pa. Code §71.4(2). Petitioner was convicted of the new criminal charges in Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court on April 15, 1982. Petitioner, however, had requested a continuance un[48]*48til disposition of post-trial motions and sentencing in the event of conviction. This request specifically waived all timeliness issues.11 Petitioner was sentenced on November 14, 1982 and transferred to SCIGrraterford on December 3, 1982. Had petitioner waived the full Board Revocation Hearing, the 120 days in which the Board has to give a convicted violator a hearing would have commenced on November 14, 1982. However, as petitioner did not waive the full Board Hearing, the 120 days does not commence until petitioner’s return to a State Correctional Institution. 37 Pa.
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477 A.2d 22, 83 Pa. Commw. 42, 1984 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chancey-v-commonwealth-pennsylvania-board-of-probation-parole-pacommwct-1984.