[44]*44OPINION
WALKER, Chief Justice.
This modification of child custody case focuses upon the future welfare of two young boys, Zachary and Matthew, both currently under the age of six years. Appellant, Donna René Chance, is the mother and appellee, Gene Ray Chance, is the father. Mr. Chance brought suit to modify prior judgment of the trial court which named Donna René Chance as the managing conservator and Gene Ray Chance as the possessory conservator.
The case was tried before a jury which returned its verdict naming Gene Ray Chance as sole managing conservator of the children. The trial court signed its modification order on June 15,1993. This appeal has been timely perfected with appellant seeking remand for new trial, with additional request that she be returned to her pre-trial status as managing conservator pending new trial.
Appellant’s portrayal of the case is: “Quite simply, this case is a tragedy — not only for DONNA, a mother who has lost custody of her children, but also for Zachary and Matthew who have been tom from their mother, her protection, and love.”
Appellee’s portrayal is: “The jury in this case meted out justice. They sifted the facts and made a reasoned, just decision.”
At the time of the original divorce between Donna René Chance and Gene Ray Chance, Donna Chance was named the sole managing conservator of the two minor children. Section 14.08(c)(1), Texas Family Code, provides:
After a hearing, the court may modify an order or a portion of a decree that: (1) designates a sole managing conservator if:
(A) the circumstances of the child, sole managing conservator, possessory conservator, or other party affected by the order or decree have materially and substantially changed since the date of the rendition of the order or decree to be modified; and
(B) the retention of the present sole managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare of the child; and
(C)the appointment of the new sole managing conservator would be a positive improvement for the child; ....
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon Supp.1995).
Obviously, it is no small step, from an evidentiary standpoint, to effectively preponderate, conjunctively, the three requirements of Section 14.08(c)(1). This is especially so in situations such as the present where the original Judgment of Divorce was signed on the 26th day of August, 1991, and modification of that judgment appointing Donna René Chance as sole managing conservator is sought to be changed less than one year after entry of judgment. Appellee, Gene Ray Chance filed his Amended Motion to Modify in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, on August 10, 1992. It is incumbent upon this Appellate Court to determine whether or not Gene Ray Chance met his burden of establishing the three required elements of Section 14.08(c)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence as properly instructed by the trial court. Regarding the burden of proof, the trial judge below provided the jury with the following instruction:
Answer “Yes” or “No” to all questions unless otherwise instructed. A ‘Tes” answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are instructed that the answer must be based on clear and convincing evidence. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a ‘Tes” answer, then answer “No.” The term “preponderance of the evidence” means the greater weight and degree of credible testimony or evidence introduced before you and admitted in this case. Whenever a question requires an answer other than ‘Tes” or “No”, your answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are instructed that the answer must be based on clear and convincing evidence.
The trial court gave no special instruction on any jury question requiring evidence of a clear and convincing nature. Nor, does appellant or appellee contend for application of a different standard of evidentiary proof than that of “a preponderance of the evidence.” Thus, our review of this case and the record [45]*45before us shall be pursued with recognition of appellee’s burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, conjunctively, the three requirements of Section 14.08(c)(1).
Appellant brings to this Court eleven points of error. We choose to address appellant’s point of error nine at the inception since point of error nine addresses the “no evidence” and “insufficiency of the evidence” questions.
Point of error nine contends:
A. There is no evidence to support submission of jury questions one, two, and four.
B. There is no evidence to support the jury’s response to questions one, two, and four.
C. The evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the jury in response to questions one, two, and four.
D. The finding of the jury in response to questions one, two, and four is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unfair and unjust.
E. The verdict included conflicting findings; specifically that Gene should be appointed sole managing conservator, while at the same time the jury found that Gene had engaged in acts that were emotionally or physically endangering to the children.
Appellant correctly contends that Gene Chance had the burden of proving that there had been a material and substantial change since the date of the original judgment, and that the retention of Donna Chance as managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare of the children, and that the appointment of a new sole managing conservator would be a positive improvement for the children. However, item “D” of appellant’s point of error nine constitutes a misapplication of the burden of proof.
A complaint that a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence is proper where appellant had the burden of proof and is thus attacking the factual sufficiency of a failure to find on a particular issue. Recognizing that appellee, Gene Chance had the burden of proof, we shall disregard item D of appellant’s point of error nine.
Paragraphs A and B of appellant’s point of error nine constitute “no evidence” attacks upon the record. Our scope of review requires that we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that tend to support the findings and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex.1988); Aim v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex.1986), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847, 111 S.Ct. 135, 112 L.Ed.2d 102 (1990); King v. Bauer, 688 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex.1985).
“No evidence” points of error must be sustained when the record discloses (1) a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law on evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla of evidence; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. See Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc. 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 n. 9 (Tex.1990); Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph, 749 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); Commonwealth Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 678 S.W.2d 278, 288 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 TexL.Rev. 361, 364-368 (1960).
Where there exists any evidence of probative force or nature to support a finding, the “no evidence” point must be overruled and the finding upheld. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). Furthermore, where there is more than a scintilla of the evidence in support of a finding, a “no evidence” challenge must fail. Stafford v. Stafford 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987).
Six questions were submitted to the jury as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1
Should DONNA RENÉ CHANCE be removed as sole managing conservator and
[46]*46GENE RAY CHANCE be appointed sole managing conservator of the children named below?
Answer “Yes” or “No” for each child.
ZACHARY RAYMOND CHANCE YES
MATTHEW LOGAN CHANCE YES
QUESTION NO. 2
Has Mother committed acts that are emotionally or physically endangering to the minor child, Zachary Chance?
Answer “yes” or “no”.
ANSWER: YES
QUESTION 8
Has Father committed acts that are emotionally or physically endangering to the minor child, ZACHARY CHANCE?
Answer ‘Tes” or “No.”
ANSWER: YES
QUESTION NO. 4
Has Mother committed acts that are emotionally or physically endangering to the minor child, Matthew Chance?
Answer “yes” or “no”.
ANSWER: YES
QUESTION 5
Has Father committed acts that are emotionally or physically endangering to the minor child, MATTHEW CHANCE?
Answer ‘Tes” or “No.”
ANSWER: YES
QUESTION 6
Was Father’s Motion to Modify filed frivolously or designed to harass Mother?
Answer ‘Tes” or “No.”
Answer: No
We now review only the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the jury’s findings, disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary.
The judgment of divorce was signed August 26,1991, wherein appellee Gene Chance, was named Possessory Conservator of the children and awarded certain rights of visitation. Pursuant to the judgment of divorce, Gene Chance was allowed to exercise visitation of the two children on Wednesdays of each week during the regular school term from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., beginning on the 28th day of August, 1991. According to the record, on August 28, 1991, when appel-lee arrived to pick up his two sons, he was met by Mr. Bill Ramsey, stepfather of Donna Chance, who threatened appellee with a shotgun. Appellee states, “I had a shotgun stuck in my stomach and up to my head and was threatened.” Evidence reveals: That on August 31, 1991, Gene Chance was at the beach on Labor Day weekend with his two children when Donna Chance and her boyfriend drove by making an obscene gesture at Gene. On September 18, 1991, Donna told Gene that Matthew was ill and would not allow Gene to take him on scheduled visitation. On September 25, 1991, Gene was denied visitation by Donna due to alleged illness of Matthew. On October 6, 1991, Matthew was hospitalized and neither Donna nor her mother, Denise Ramsey, would inform Gene as to which hospital the child was in. On October 18, 1991, Nancy Browning of the Child Protective Services informed Gene that a referral had been made against him regarding sexual abuse of the children. On October 30, 1991, when attempting to pick up the children for scheduled visitation, Mr. Bill Ramsey again threatened to get his gun. On December 26, 1991, Donna informed Gene that the children were sick and denied visitation. In December 1992, Melissa, wife of appellee, was accused of teaching Zachary to stick his finger down his throat and throw up. In January 1992, Donna filed assault charges against Gene to which a jury found Gene not guilty. Frequently, when Gene picked the boys up at night for visitation, all the lights in Donna’s house were turned off. Allegations were made against Melissa regarding sexual abuse of Zachary. On February 19, 1992, another referral was made to Child Protective Services alleging that Gene was hitting Matthew. On February 21, 1992, Gene attempted to pick the boys up for visitation; Lum-berton police were present, and Donna refused to allow Gene the children. On February 26, 1992, Gene was again denied visita[47]*47tion. Toward the end of February or beginning March 1992, Denise Ramsey, Donna’s mother, complained to Child Protective Services that Zachary was witnessing oral sex. During one visitation pick up, Donna gave Melissa honeymoon pictures of Gene and Donna. On March 6, 1992, Gene proceeded to Lumberton to pick up the children for visitation. No one was home; Child Protective Services had already arranged with Gene and Donna to interview Gene with the boys at Gene’s home during that weekend visitation. Nancy Browning, Child Protective Services worker, went to Gene’s house for an interview, however, the boys were not there. In April 1992, Gene was accused of hitting Matthew in the stomach; these accusations were determined to be unfounded. On April 29,1992, Gene was accused of burning Zachary on the back. In attempting to exercise court ordered visitation, Gene was accused of trespassing and police were called out. On July 30,1992, Donna filed an Application for Protective Order just prior to Gene’s summer visitation. Donna did not let Gene have the children. She suggested that the court order denied him visitation when in reality the court order required supervised visitation. In September or October 1992, allegations of sexual abuse were made against Gene Chance. On October 27, 1992, Donna filed another Application for Protective Order. On November 18, 1992, Donna requested that criminal charges be filed against Gene for alleged sexual abuse of the boys. In November 1992, Wanda Brumley, specialist with Child Protective Services, asked Judge Plunk to remove the children from Donna. In February 1993, Gene was accused of physically abusing Zachary. Child Protective Services did not validate any sexual abuse. In violation of the judgment of divorce, Donna did not inform Gene of change of address on at least two occasions. The children were taken by Donna to numerous persons for evaluation.
The record before this Court exceeds eighteen hundred pages. The evidentiary portion of this trial took seven days, includes multiple exhibits such as, but not limited to, audio tapes and video tapes, and the testimony of at least eighteen witnesses.
Appellant’s contention that there is no evidence to support the submission of Jury Questions 1, 2 and 4 and, further, that there is no evidence to support the jury’s response to these three questions, must be overruled. Where there is any evidence of probative force to support the jury’s findings, we must overrule a “no evidence” point. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965); In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d at 661. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the findings, the “no evidence” challenge fails. Id. To sustain appellant’s “no evidence” points, we would have to conclude that reasonable minds could not differ upon the evidence offered in support of appellee’s affirmative burden. The record speaks otherwise.
Having determined from the record that there is more than a scintilla of evidence supportive of the submission of Jury Questions 1, 2 and 4 we now address Paragraph C of appellant’s point of error nine, i.e., whether the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the jury in response to Questions 1, 2 and 4. As previously stated, we give no credence to appellant’s great weight and preponderance point of error since appellant Donna Chance did not have the burden of proof in this case. Appellant, by brief, recognizes the following:
In this case, DONNA did not have the burden of proof. When the party who did not have the burden of proof brings a factual sufficiency attack to reverse a finding favoring the party who did have the burden of proof on a preponderance of the evidence, the appealing party must establish that all of the evidence, considering ' evidence both for and against the fact finding, is so weak or insufficient that the finding is manifestly unjust.
Citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986).
We overrule Paragraph D of appellant’s point of error nine and proceed in considering only the factual insufficiency challenge.
Factually, this lengthy child custody proceeding revealed that appellant and appellee were once husband and wife, and that during this marital relationship two sons were born to this union. Appellant and appellee were [48]*48subsequently divorced and appellant was named sole managing conservator of the two minor children. Appellee, Gene Chance, was named as the possessory conservator of these children. Immediately following the divorce, a series of events began to occur which no doubt impacted, and perhaps continues to impact the best interest and welfare of these two innocent children. Evidence showed that immediately after the divorce was finalized, Donna began interfering with Gene’s possessory rights of the children. Donna began making allegations of abuse against Gene which, by the time of trial, Donna had come to believe were false. There is evidence of Donna’s prompting of these two small children to make false statements about their daddy, Gene. There were few if any occasions when Gene attempted to pick up his children that some type of confrontation did not occur. On the very first visitation period following the divorce, Gene testified that Bill Ramsey, stepfather of appellant, Donna Chance, threatened Gene with a gun by placing the gun to Gene’s head and stomach. Gene testified to the following:
Q Now, we’ve already mentioned that on August 26th, 1991, that was the date that the divorce became final; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Next date up here is August 28th, 1991. What is the significance of that date?
A On that day, it was the first Wednesday that I went to pick up my children after the divorce. I had a shotgun stuck in my stomach and up to my head and was threatened.
Q You went to pick up the children; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And was anyone with you when you went to pick up the children?
A Yes, sir, my sister was.
Q And when you went their, [sic] what occurred?
A Well, I went up to the door, knocked on the door and Donna’s stepfather came to the door; and I told him that I was there to pick up the children. He slammed the door in my face—
Q Who is Donna’s stepfather?
A Bill Ramsey. He shut the door in my face, went to the garage, garage door was right next to it, he grabbed a sawed off shotgun that was in the corner of the garage door and came outside and stuck it in my gut. And he told me that I better kiss my ass good bye because I was a gone mother fucker.
Q Is that a quote from him?
A That’s a quote. And he stuck the gun up to my head. And he said he was going to blow my brains all over the fence.
Q Had you done anything other [sic] to come pick up the children?
A No, sir.
Appellant harassed appellee on numerous occasions to prevent court ordered visitation by the appellee.
As for positive improvement, Gene and his wife, Melissa, testified that they would provide a stable home environment for the children because Melissa would be a full-time homemaker and would be able to give her undivided attention to the children and the home. On the other hand, Donna and the children had lived with her mother and her step-father who had threatened Gene with a gun as noted above. Evidence was tendered to inferentially establish that Donna did not keep a clean house. Appellant testified that appellee abused alcohol and drugs. She also testified the children received physical injuries while in his care; that prompted the children to call their mother and grandmother derogatory names, and that Gene harassed appellant. She testified Gene disrupted the exchange of the children with her. She did not press charges against Gene, but in fact Child Protective Services initiated such proceedings. There was conflicting evidence, but the supporting evidence was not so weak that the verdict was clearly wrong and unjust. Enough evidence was presented in detail to the jury to enable the jury to conclude that Gene had met all the statutory requirements necessary to effect a change in [49]*49custody and that he was the proper parent to be named sole managing conservator.
Appellant contends that the jury finding that Gene had engaged in acts that were emotionally and physically endangering to the children created a conflict in the verdict and required the judgment to be set aside. To set aside the verdict in question, appellant has the burden of showing that the conflicting answer in addition to the remainder of the verdict, disregarding other conflicting answers, requires entry of a judgment totally different from the one entered. Lewis v. Yaggi 584 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
Simply because the jury made a finding that both parents had at one time or another committed acts that were emotionally or physically endangering to the children does not conflict with their decision that the retention of the mother as sole managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare of the children and that the appointment of the father as the new sole managing conservator would be a positive improvement for the children. We overrule appellant’s point of error nine.
Appellant’s point of error one alleges error on the part of the trial court in admitting the testimony of Dr. Gripon, appellee’s expert witness. Point of error one is as follows:
The trial court erred in its rulings regarding the testimony of Dr. Gripon, Gene’s expert witness, in the following ways:
A. In allowing into evidence the opinions of Dr. Gripon involving the minor children, Zachary and Matthew, for the reason that the children were brought to the psychiatrist, Dr. Gripon, by Gene without the consent of either the court or of Donna, the managing conservator.
B. In allowing consideration of statements allegedly made by Zachary, allegedly recorded on an unauthenticated tape and presented to and considered by Dr. Gripon, because the statements were hearsay and there was no showing before the court and jury that this type of evidence was reasonably relied upon by experts in that field.
C.In allowing Dr. Gripon to testify when Gene failed, upon proper discovery request, to fully inform Donna of that expert’s impressions and opinions.
Dr. Gripon was named as an expert witness in appellee’s Response to Interrogatories. Appellant misrepresents that Dr. Gri-pon was “listed as an expert to testify only as to his impressions of GENE CHANCE.” Contrary to such representation by appellant, appellee’s Answer to Interrogatory No. 8 sets out the subject matter of Dr. Gripon’s intended testimony as follows:
psychological and psychiatric testing. Psychological and Psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis of Gene Chance, the minor children, and other family members. The effect of false allegations on the children. What is in the best interest of the children regarding conservatorship and possession.
We find no limitation of Dr. Gripon’s intended testimony to that of Gene Chance only. Appellant’s misrepresentation of the record prompts this Court to overrule Paragraph C of plaintiffs point of error one.
In Paragraph A of appellant’s point of error one, appellant takes issue, by play on words, with the fact that Gene Chance took Zachary and Matthew on occasions to Dr. Gripon’s office at times of Mr. Chance’s appointments. Appellant represents to this Court that, “GENE admits that Zachary and Matthew were taken to see Dr. Gripon in defiance of the decree of divorce, wherein GENE was denied the right to take the children to a doctor for any reason except an emergency.” In support of this contention, appellant references certain testimony as follows:
Q Did — when Mr. Smith sent you to Dr. Gripon, it was for the purpose of providing a defense for you in a criminal case, wasn’t it?
A No, sir, I went to Dr. Gripon because of all the turmoil and anxiety that I was getting from what they were dishing out to me.
Q You went to Dr. Gripon because of turmoil and anxiety; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Any other reason?
[50]*50A No, sir.
Q Did you go to Dr. Gripon to have him examine your children to determine if they needed help?
A I had brought my children to Dr. Gri-pon on one occasion when I had them— well, must have been two or three occasions while they were in my possession.
Q Did you bring your children to Dr. Gripon with the court order?
A No, sir.
Q You brought your children to Dr. Gri-pon after you had a lawyer for several years in direct violation of the court order that was entered by Judge Farris, didn’t you?
A That’s false.
Mr. Matheny: May I approach the witness, your honor?
The Court: Yes.
Q (By Mr. Matheny) This has been previously introduced into evidence, but not photostated, and you were appointed as possessory conservator of these children; weren’t you, Mr. Chance?
A That’s correct.
Q Did your lawyer instruct you to take these children to Dr. Gripon without a court order?
Mr. Smith: Your Honor, I’m going to object. That’s falls into attorney-client privilege.
The Court: Objection will be sustained.
Q (By Mr. Matheny) The duties of a pos-sessory conservator, sir, where does it say you have the right to take them to any doctor, except for an emergency medical treatment?
A I have the right to have the possession of my children anywhere I went, whether it be the supermarket, whether it be the psychiatrist, whether it be on vacation.
The Court: Now, Mr. Chance, please answer the questions.
A I have the power to consent to medical and surgical treatment during emergency involving an immediate danger to the health and safety of the children during periods of possession.
Q (Mr. Matheny) You were not granted the right to take these children to a doctor for anything except an emergency, were you?
A Emergency, yeah, I guess so.
Q But you took it upon yourself to take them to a psychiatrist without a court order, without permission of the managing conservator, just — did you do that on your own, or were you instructed to do it?
A The children didn’t see the psychiatrist.
Dr. Gripon testified that he did, indeed, see the children at his office when they were brought by Gene on the occasions, however the children were not patients of Dr. Gripon. In fact, Dr. Gripon testified that he never talked with Zachary or Matthew. Dr. Gripon neither examined nor questioned the children for purposes of rendering a medical opinion regarding the childrens’ mental health. We believe that appellant’s portrayal of the children being taken to Dr. Griporis office in violation of court order is overreaching. The fact that Gene Chance had the children accompany him to scheduled appointments at Dr. Gripon’s office certainly does not establish or prove that the minor children were patients of Dr. Gripon. Dr. Gripon testified under oath that the boys were not his patients. Appellant cites the case of Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Strickland, 483 S.W.2d 541 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1972, writ refd n.r.e.), for the proposition that “[o]ne should not be allowed to play fast and loose with the rules of procedure, much less be rewarded.” We agree with appellant’s general statement about “fast and loose” play, and this Court applies that same general philosophy to the use of the record on appeal. Strickland involved a trespass upon plaintiffs property whereby an unlawful inspection occurred. We do not find our present situation comparatively similar to Strickland. Even had Gene Chance taken the two minor children to Dr. Gripon for observation, we are hard-put to find a direct violation of the original Divorce Decree with provides:
[51]*51IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Possessory Conservator shall have the follow rights, privileges, duties, and powers:
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the power to consent to medical and surgical treatment during an emergency involving an immediate danger to the health and safety of the children during periods of possession;
⅜ ⅜: ‡ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜
The decision to incur health care expenses shall be made by DONNA RENÉ CHANCE except when the children are visiting with GENE RAY CHANCE said decision shall be made by GENE RAY CHANCE.
Regarding Dr. Gripon’s opinion concerning Zachary and Matthew, the doctor testified that he saw the children at his office when Gene brought them on the occasion of one of Gene’s appointments. The children were not patients of Dr. Gripon and in fact, he never talked with Zachary or Matthew. He did not examine the children for purposes of rendering a medical opinion regarding the children’s mental health. Hence, there was no violation of any order forbidding appellee from taking his sons to a doctor except in emergency situations.
Appellee had submitted himself to treatment by Dr. Gripon because of appellant’s repeated allegations against him of sexual and physical abuse of the children and the extreme difficulties in appellant’s exercising his visitation rights with the children. The doctor specifically testified that the children were not his patients. We also note that the trial court never adjudicated Gene to be in violation of the judgment of divorce concerning this area.
We find no valid reason to disregard Dr. Gripon’s testimony for alleged violations of the judgment of divorce. Paragraph A of appellant’s point of error one is overruled.
Appellant contends that it was error to allow Dr. Gripon to base his opinion, at least on part, on statements contained in a tape-recording of Zachary Chance. This tape-recording was made by Gene Chance of a conversation between himself and his son, Zachary. This taperecording was used by Dr. Gripon as part of the history and background information concerning Gene Chance and the problems which Gene was experiencing. Gene Chance supplied Dr. Gripon with the tape-recording along with records from Dr. Lane, who had been treating Zachary and Matthew on a referral from Child Protective Services. This information constituted part of the history taken and evaluated by Dr. Gripon, analyzed by him, at least in part, to form the basis of an opinion.
For an expert’s opinion to be admissible as evidence, the witness must be qualified in the area of his opinion, his opinion must have a sufficient evidentiary foundation, and the opinion must assist the fact finder. See Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 702-705. There is no contest that Dr. Gripon qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry. For the evidentiary base, Dr. Gripon relied on appel-lee’s history, which included Dr. Gripon’s interview of appellee, another doctor’s records, the tape recording in question, interviews with appellee during his office visits, tests, evaluations, and treatment. As an expert, Dr. Gripon could base his opinion at least in part on inadmissible opinions if the facts are of a nature that other experts in the field reasonably rely on same. Even if the tape of the conversation with Zachary is inadmissible Dr. Gripon’s opinion would remain admissible. Admissibility is, of course, determined by the sound discretion of the trial court. Trick v. Trick, 587 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979, writ dism’d). We overrule appellant’s point of error one in its entirety.
Appellant alleges in her point of error two that the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to question one Cheryl Schultz regarding her statements to another witness and by refusing to allow appellant the right to make a bill of exceptions regarding that particular testimony. While the trial court refused appellant the opportunity to make a bill of exceptions on the excluded testimony in question and answer form, appellant was allowed to make an offer of proof which apprised the court of the substance of the testimony which adequately preserved appellant’s contention for appeal. The offer [52]*52of proof was in the form of a concise statement which is allowed under Tex.R.App.P. 52(b) and Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 103.
Mr. Matheny: I would ask the witness if she told the witness, Wanda Brumley, that she should not be talking to me, Mike Matheny, one of the attorneys for Donna Chance, because she was supposed to be a witness for the other side, the other side of Gene Chance. And that she instructed her not to talk with me. I’d ask had her whether she said something along that line.
I would further ask her what exactly she said. I would further ask her was that not an incorrect statement of the law. And that since she was a trial lawyer, why did she make an incorrect statement of law to Wanda Brumley. And that would be the question, Judge, and that’s all I have.
The line of questioning by Mr. Matheny was as follows:
Q. Yes, Ma’am and that is in — that is incorrect, isn’t it? You told her something that was in direct violation of the code of professional responsibility?
Mr. Smith: I’m going to object. That has absolutely no relevance to this proceeding.
The Court: All right. I don’t believe that’s the tribunal for this, Mr. Matheny. There are other tribunals to hear those kind of matters.
The Court: I don’t believe she’s here in the capacity of an attorney. All right.
Appellant must show that the excluded testimony was relevant and a substantial right was affected and further, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof, the third requirement satisfied in the ease before us. See Hood v. Hays County, 836 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ). We fail to see any error in the exclusion of the proffered evidence because appellant never demonstrated that the testimony was relevant or that it affected a substantial right in the case. In any event, the rule requiring that proffered evidence be incorporated in a bill of exception does not apply to cross examination of an adverse witness. Ledisco Financial Services, Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ). When cross-examination testimony is excluded, appellant need not show the answer to be expected but only need show that the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context within which the question was asked. Life Ins. Co. of Southwest v. Brister, 722 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ). Thus, the trial court did not prevent appellant from preserving a record for review. We find that any error committed by the trial court was harmless because the testimony in question was not relevant to any material issue in the case other than bias, which was already established through other evidence. LM Linen & Uniform v. W.P. Ballard & Co., 793 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied). In summary, it is rare that reversible error will occur in questions of evidence unless the complaining party can demonstrate that the entire case turns on the particular evidence admitted or excluded. Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Martin, 855 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, no writ). We overrule appellant’s point of error two.
Appellant alleges, regarding the witness Frank Stubbs, the court erred in refusing to allow samples of the handwriting of appellee into evidence and allegedly commenting on the weight of the evidence during the testimony of Frank Stubbs. Appellant called Frank Stubbs as a handwriting expert to establish that Gene had written certain messages in public places. He concluded that appellee had in fact written the messages on the walls. As a basis for his handwriting, Mr. Stubbs examined certain writings by the appellee including checks, an anniversary card, a deposit slip, a tax return, a signed contract, an affidavit, and a deed of trust executed by appellee. Appellee took the position that Stubbs had only examined used cheeks in making his overall comparison and no other documents. The court sustained the predicate objection by appellee to the introduction of those items. The witness equivocated in testifying about his evidentia-ry foundation for his opinion. On voir dire, he changed some of his testimony, and in [53]*53fact, stated that he did not remember whether he actually used the deposit slip as a comparison after all. His memory was unsure and his testimony was contradictory. Trustworthiness was not established by appellant and the witness could not testify that he used all of the documents contained in the singular Exhibit No. 18 for his comparison, therefore the singular exhibit containing all the materials should not have been admitted.
Appellant further objects to remarks made by the trial judge concerning the photographs of the walls, telephone booths, and portable bathrooms on which there were certain writings. In ruling on admissibility of the pictures, the trial judge commented “I think he’s testifying as a photographer. They’ll be admitted as a photograph. He goes around taking pictures of dirty words.” When appellant’s attorney asked to introduce the pictures to the jury, the judge responded “If they want to look at them. I don’t recommend them, particularly you ladies.” Appellant urges that the comments made by the court were in fact a comment on the weight of the evidence. While the trial court should not disclose an opinion as to the weight of the evidence or calculate to increase or diminish the weight of the evidence to the jury, the trial judge is not limited to expressions “objection sustained” or “objection overruled”. A trial judge is allowed some discretion in expressing himself in the control of a case and reversal should not be ordered unless there is a showing of impropriety coupled with probable prejudice. Best Investment Company v. Hernandez, 479 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Jolly, 307 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1957, writ ref d n.r.e.). We find that the comments made by the trial court were not so prejudicial in view of the entire record that they could possibly constitute reversible error. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1). We therefore overrule appellant’s point of error number three.
In point of error four appellant argues that the trial court made certain remarks to appellant’s counsel during the course of the trial that were prejudicial to both appellant’s case and to her attorney. These comments are as follows:
Mr. Matheny: Judge, my objection is they’ve introduced a tape. The tape speaks for itself. I’d like to have it duplicated and let the jury listen to it.
The Court: The jury is going to listen to it, all of it.
Mr. Matheny: But then he is now attempting to say what was said on the tape.
The Court: I don’t think he’s doing anymore than you did while ago.
Mr. Matheny: That may be, but you wouldn’t let me.
The Court: I’ve ruled. You may have a seat.
Mr. Matheny: May I make—
The Court: Sit down.
Mr. Matheny: May I make an objection while I’m sitting down?
The Court: Stand up and make your objection, however nice you want to be.
Mr. Matheny: I’m just trying to follow the rules.
The Court: You’re following the rules. Make your objection.
Appellant also alleges that the trial court in responding to a request to be heard by appellant’s counsel that “We could have done all this in recess” led the jury to conclude that the appellant’s attorney was wasting their time and the court’s time. Perhaps the jury was given the impression that the trial judge was impatient and therefore somewhat agitated by the manner in which appellant’s counsel was conducting his case. The record reflects that counsel was not inexperienced and that he possibly invited and contributed to the court’s growing concern over the conduct of the trial. We do not find evidence that the trial court entertained or displayed any bias or prejudice against appellant and her counsel but that the remarks were directed toward the orderly process of the trial. French v. Brodsky, 521 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.), overruled on other grounds by Texarkana Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.1977). We cannot find reversible error based on the record. Tex. [54]*54R.App.P. 81(b)(1). We therefore overrule appellant’s point of error four.
In point of error five appellant alleges error on the part of the trial court in allowing one Dr. Bender to testify as to his impressions and opinions when appellee had not fully informed appellant upon proper discovery request of the expert’s impressions and opinions. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the doctor to testify based upon hearsay that he received from appellee. The interrogatory in question reads as follows:
8. If you intend to call any expert or experts as witnesses with regard to the subject matter in issue in this cause of action, then—
a. identify each such expert;
b. state the subject matter on which each such expert is expected to testify, including the expert’s impressions and opinions;
c. state the facts known to each such expert that relate to or form the basis of the mental impressions and opinions held by the expert; and
d. identify all documents, communications, and other tangible things used by, prepared by, prepared for, or furnished an expert in anticipation of the expert’s trial or deposition testimony, including all tests and calculations that form the basis of the expert’s opinion.
Appellee’s response to interrogatory number 8, at least in regard to Dr. Bender, is as follows:
a. William Bender, Ph.D.
1250 Overlook Ridge Bishop, GA
(706) 769-7893
b. Research on false allegations of abuse
c. those facts related to the expert by the parties and the children
d. only those documents in possession of the expert
Based on this answer, the subject matter of Dr. Bender’s testimony would include research on false allegations of abuse and in conjunction therewith “[t]hose facts related to the expert by the parties and the children.” The question and response taken together specifically relate that the facts given the expert by the parties and the children would form the basis of his opinion. In examining the record, we find that appellee properly answered the question and the courtroom inquiries to Dr. Bender fit within the answer to the subject interrogatory. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(2)(e). Appellant further contends that Dr. Bender’s opinion was based on hearsay from appellee. Dr. Bender also testified that his opinion was not only based on his meeting with Gene Chance, but his review of research articles, Child Protective Services reports, appellant’s application for protective order, and a structured interview with a series of follow-up discussions with appellee. We find this evidentiary base to be sufficiently reliable and a reasonable foundation to be relied upon by an expert in this field. We find that the trial court in this ease did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of Dr. Bender based upon this evidentiary foundation. We overrule appellant’s point of error five.
Appellant in her point of error six alleges error on the part of the trial court in admitting into evidence the audio tape made by appellee in the office of Dr. Frank Lane. The tape recording in question was made by appellee of Dr. Lane’s meeting with himself, Melissa Chance, and Cheryl Chance on March 10, 1992. Appellant presented her witness, Dr. Frank Lane, whose testimony was based at least in part on a tape recording which Donna Chance, appellant, had secretly made of appellee and Zachary Chance. Dr. Lane’s testimony was also based on written notes and records of Debra Eisen, an employee of Dr. Lane.
On direct examination, Dr. Lane testified that appellee was attempting to program the child, Zachary, and such conduct was emotionally abusive to the child. He further testified that the notes of Debra Eisen did not reflect that appellant was programming the children, rather the notes indicated one Stewart Umlauf was of that persuasion. Dr. Lane stated on direct examination that in light of the children being used as pawns, [55]*55removal from their mother would have a very negative effect.
On cross-examination Dr. Lane, in being examined about the March 10, 1992, meeting and his recollections of it, made at least sixteen denials about specific statements made by himself at that meeting. Dr. Lane was given an opportunity to refresh his memory by listening to the tape. The tape was entered into evidence. Appellee was well within his rights to have the tape admitted and played for rebuttal and impeachment purposes. Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). We therefore overrule appellant’s point of error six.
Appellant complains in her seventh point of error that the trial court should not have overruled appellant’s objections to certain hearsay statements by Zachary Chance and by overruling appellant’s request and motion to disregard such hearsay evidence. Appellant complains that certain statements by Zachary relayed by appellee constituted hearsay evidence and was inadmissible. Ap-pellee testified that Zachary had stated “Daddy hits Matthew” and Zachary may have said something about Melissa sexually abusing him. Appellee further stated that when he noticed scrapes on Zachary’s back and asked him what happened he stated “He told me that Daddy put him in the fire. And I said well, who told you that or who said that, and he said Mimaw said that or say that. [Question:] Mimaw is — . [Answer:] Donna’s mother.” It was further relayed by Appellee that, “Zachary was saying that Daddy puts his tee-tee in my mouth. That’s the main thing that I remember. Zachary saying things or having some kind of sexual knowledge above what he should have.” Appellant alleges that these statements implicate appellant in a type of attempt to program the children, this programming being a major part of appellee’s case. Whereas appellant contends that the entirety of appel-lee’s case was built on this hearsay, we find otherwise. These statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but were offered under the exception to the hearsay rule providing that the testimony related to the mental and emotional condition of the child. Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 803(1),(3). The child, Zachary, was of a tender age being only two or three years old and revealed the child’s state of mind and lack of emotional well being. Posner v. Dallas County Child Welfare, 784 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1990, writ denied). We overrule appellant’s point of error seven.
Appellant’s point of error eight alleges charge error on the part of the trial court in refusing to give certain instructions requested by appellant and by giving a certain instruction regarding the statements of the child, Zachary. The court charged the jury by instruction that they were to disregard all evidence of any statements said to have been made by Zachary to any person except (1) any statements made personally by him to any mental health care workers, or (2) statements allegedly made by him that the jury finds were considered by mental health workers. Counsel for appellant objected to this instruction on grounds that it amounted to a comment on the weight of the evidence. Appellant tendered an instruction telling the jury to disregard all evidence of any statement made by Zachary to any person except statements made personally by him to any mental health care workers. We have previously discussed the issue of the court’s having admitted statements by Zachary under certain exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 803(1),(3). We find that the court sufficiently narrowed the consideration of the evidence to those statements he made personally or statements made by him which were considered by health care workers. We find this instruction to be substantially correct and does not constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence.
Appellant’s requested instructions one through seven read as follows:
You are instructed to disregard all evidence of any statements said to have been made by the child, Zachary Chance, to any person, except any statements made personally by him to any mental health care workers.
You are instructed to disregard any statements made by Gene Chance, Melissa Chance, or Cheryl Chance contained in the [56]*56(secret) tape made in Dr. Lane’s office regarding any purported statements of the child, Zachary Chance, or any other third person.
You are instructed to disregard any statements of the child, Zachary Chance, made to his mother, Donna Chance, as to the truth and veracity of those statements, but you may consider these statements for whatever effect, if any, they had upon the motives of Donna Chance.
You are instructed to disregard any statements said to have been made by the child, Zachary Chance, to Melissa Chance, Gene Chance, or any other person other than any personal statements made by Zachary Chance to any mental health care worker. You are instructed to disregard any statements of Gene Chance regarding any statement said to have been made to him by Nancy Browning.
You are instructed to disregard any statements said to have been made by the child, Zachary Chance, to Cheryl Shultz.
You are instructed to disregard any opinion of Dr. Gripon relating to his observation regarding the taped statements of the child, Zachary Chance.
At the outset, we note that trial courts have wide discretion in admitting instructions and definitions to the jury. Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). We note that appellant’s requested instructions one, three, four, six, and seven are actually phases and shades of the instruction given to the jury by the court. We find no error in refusing these requested instructions. Braugh v. Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
Regarding appellant’s second and fifth requests, Gene Chance and Melissa Chance each testified at trial. Cheryl Chance was available as a witness who could have been examined. Appellant had adequate opportunity to establish grounds for disregarding the statements complained of by appellant. We also note that Nancy Browning testified at trial. We find that the charge questions and instructions are an accurate reflection of the rulings made by the court during trial regarding admissibility of statements objected to as being hearsay. We find that appellant has failed to show the trial court’s refusal to submit to the jury the requested instructions as well as the trial court’s refusal to sustain her objection to the inclusion of an instruction regarding Zachary’s statements to be reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper verdict. Multi-Moto Carp. v. ITT Commercial Finance Carp., 806 S.W.2d 560 (TexApp.—Dallas 1990, writ denied). We therefore overrule appellant’s point of error eight.
Point of error ten alleges that the cumulative effect of all the errors in her trial supports a reversal of this cause. Appellant sets out fourteen allegations of error specifically setting out alleged error discussed under appellant’s points of error. We have discussed each of the fourteen points in the various points of error. We have considered all allegations of error committed on the part of the trial court and we specifically find that any possible error committed by the trial court does not constitute cumulative error and we therefore overrule appellant’s tenth point of error. See Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d 833 (TexApp. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
Point of error eleven complains part of Exhibit No. 18 is missing from the appellate record. Appellant’s motion to supplement the statement of facts was granted and the entire exhibit now appears in the record. Point of error eleven is overruled as moot.
Having overruled all of appellant’s points of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court below.
AFFIRMED.