Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 2, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court YU HIN CHAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-1297 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-01767-LTB) RE/MAX, LLC; W. ERIK CARLSON; (D. Colo.) JOY F. CAMPANELLI; ROWAN D. WILSON; HECTOR LASALLE; GENINE D. EDWARDS; HUGO SALAZAR; RAYMOND CHAN; VERANA SANDERS; NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE; NYS DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LICENSING SERVICES,
Defendants - Appellees.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
YU HIN CHAN,
v. No. 25-2106 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-00776-KWR-LF) RE/MAX; KEVIN C. (D.N.M.) MCCLANAHAN; KAREN MAY BACDAYAN; SHANTONU BASU; CARMEN A. PACHECO; DAWN HILL-KEARSE,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________ Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Yu Hin Chan, proceeding pro se, appeals two district courts’ dismissals
without prejudice of Chan’s civil-conspiracy complaints. Chan also requests
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the dismissals
and deny the in forma pauperis requests.
BACKGROUND
In June 2025, Chan sued Chan’s landlord; Re/Max, the real-estate
company; the CEO of Re/Max; and multiple state officials and agencies in
Colorado and New York. The complaint, filed in the District of Colorado,
alleged a conspiracy among the defendants to defame Chan, including in court
documents, and to hold Chan in contempt of court. Chan sought $1 billion in
damages, a declaration that the defendants had violated Chan’s constitutional
rights, and injunctive relief against some defendants to compel them to
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value, consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 2 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3
investigate the others. Chan asserted that the district court “ha[d] jurisdiction
over th[e] action pursuant to” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No. 25-1297, App. vol. I at 5.
In August 2025, Chan sued again, this time in the District of New
Mexico. The second complaint named Re/Max and five individuals of unstated
affiliation. The complaint alleged that the defendants “conspired together in
forging the record that [Chan] filed an Answer to a Court case but truth being
[Chan] never did.” No. 25-2106, App. vol. I at 3. Chan again sought $1 billion
in damages. And Chan asserted that the district court “ha[d] jurisdiction under
the RICO Act.” Id.
Both courts ordered Chan to show cause why they shouldn’t dismiss the
complaints for defects like improper venue, failure to use court-approved
forms, and failure to state a claim. But Chan never showed cause, cured the
defects, or otherwise responded to either court. So each court dismissed Chan’s
complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.
Chan timely appealed both judgments. Chan’s appeal from the District of
Colorado argues that the court erred by dismissing for improper venue despite
several defendants residing in Denver. Chan also reiterates that the court
“obtained its jurisdiction pursuant to” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No. 25-1297, Chan’s
Op. Br. at 2. Chan’s appeal from the District of New Mexico argues that the
court erred in dismissing because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “does not bar a federal
court from intervention.” No. 25-2106, Chan’s Op. Br. at 2; see also id. at 3
3 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4
(stating that the “[l]ower court erred in dismissal” and citing § 1983); id. at 4
(similar).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a litigant proceeds pro se, we construe their pleadings liberally and
hold the pleadings “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283, 1292 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation
omitted). Though “we do not act as [the litigant’s] advocate, if we can
reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which [the litigant]
could prevail,” we do so despite the litigant’s “failure to cite proper legal
authority,” “confusion of various legal theories,” or “unfamiliarity with
pleading requirements.” Id. (citation modified).
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal for failure
to follow a court order. Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir. 2003).
A court abuses its discretion whenever its ruling rests on “an error of law or a
clearly erroneous finding of fact,” or when the ruling “manifests a clear error in
judgment.” United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2025)
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. The district courts did not abuse their discretion by dismissing Chan’s complaints.
A district court can dismiss an action sua sponte if the plaintiff fails to
comply with a court order. Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir.
4 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5
2009) (citation modified); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Olson v. Mapes,
333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003).
That’s precisely what happened here. Both district courts ordered Chan to
show cause why the complaints shouldn’t be dismissed. But Chan didn’t show
cause, fix the defects in the pleadings, or otherwise respond to either court. So
the courts dismissed the complaints without prejudice.
Dismissal was within the courts’ authority and appropriate under the
circumstances. See Davis, 571 F.3d at 1060. Thus, it was not an abuse of
discretion. See Clay, 148 F.4th at 1190.
II. Chan may not proceed in forma pauperis.
To proceed in forma pauperis, a litigant “must comply with the filing
requirements,” show “a financial inability to pay the required filing fees,” and
point to “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and
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Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 2, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court YU HIN CHAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-1297 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-01767-LTB) RE/MAX, LLC; W. ERIK CARLSON; (D. Colo.) JOY F. CAMPANELLI; ROWAN D. WILSON; HECTOR LASALLE; GENINE D. EDWARDS; HUGO SALAZAR; RAYMOND CHAN; VERANA SANDERS; NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE; NYS DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LICENSING SERVICES,
Defendants - Appellees.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
YU HIN CHAN,
v. No. 25-2106 (D.C. No. 1:25-CV-00776-KWR-LF) RE/MAX; KEVIN C. (D.N.M.) MCCLANAHAN; KAREN MAY BACDAYAN; SHANTONU BASU; CARMEN A. PACHECO; DAWN HILL-KEARSE,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________ Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Yu Hin Chan, proceeding pro se, appeals two district courts’ dismissals
without prejudice of Chan’s civil-conspiracy complaints. Chan also requests
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the dismissals
and deny the in forma pauperis requests.
BACKGROUND
In June 2025, Chan sued Chan’s landlord; Re/Max, the real-estate
company; the CEO of Re/Max; and multiple state officials and agencies in
Colorado and New York. The complaint, filed in the District of Colorado,
alleged a conspiracy among the defendants to defame Chan, including in court
documents, and to hold Chan in contempt of court. Chan sought $1 billion in
damages, a declaration that the defendants had violated Chan’s constitutional
rights, and injunctive relief against some defendants to compel them to
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value, consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 2 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3
investigate the others. Chan asserted that the district court “ha[d] jurisdiction
over th[e] action pursuant to” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No. 25-1297, App. vol. I at 5.
In August 2025, Chan sued again, this time in the District of New
Mexico. The second complaint named Re/Max and five individuals of unstated
affiliation. The complaint alleged that the defendants “conspired together in
forging the record that [Chan] filed an Answer to a Court case but truth being
[Chan] never did.” No. 25-2106, App. vol. I at 3. Chan again sought $1 billion
in damages. And Chan asserted that the district court “ha[d] jurisdiction under
the RICO Act.” Id.
Both courts ordered Chan to show cause why they shouldn’t dismiss the
complaints for defects like improper venue, failure to use court-approved
forms, and failure to state a claim. But Chan never showed cause, cured the
defects, or otherwise responded to either court. So each court dismissed Chan’s
complaint and entered judgment for the defendants.
Chan timely appealed both judgments. Chan’s appeal from the District of
Colorado argues that the court erred by dismissing for improper venue despite
several defendants residing in Denver. Chan also reiterates that the court
“obtained its jurisdiction pursuant to” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. No. 25-1297, Chan’s
Op. Br. at 2. Chan’s appeal from the District of New Mexico argues that the
court erred in dismissing because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “does not bar a federal
court from intervention.” No. 25-2106, Chan’s Op. Br. at 2; see also id. at 3
3 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4
(stating that the “[l]ower court erred in dismissal” and citing § 1983); id. at 4
(similar).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a litigant proceeds pro se, we construe their pleadings liberally and
hold the pleadings “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283, 1292 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation
omitted). Though “we do not act as [the litigant’s] advocate, if we can
reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which [the litigant]
could prevail,” we do so despite the litigant’s “failure to cite proper legal
authority,” “confusion of various legal theories,” or “unfamiliarity with
pleading requirements.” Id. (citation modified).
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal for failure
to follow a court order. Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir. 2003).
A court abuses its discretion whenever its ruling rests on “an error of law or a
clearly erroneous finding of fact,” or when the ruling “manifests a clear error in
judgment.” United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 2025)
(citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. The district courts did not abuse their discretion by dismissing Chan’s complaints.
A district court can dismiss an action sua sponte if the plaintiff fails to
comply with a court order. Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir.
4 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5
2009) (citation modified); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Olson v. Mapes,
333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003).
That’s precisely what happened here. Both district courts ordered Chan to
show cause why the complaints shouldn’t be dismissed. But Chan didn’t show
cause, fix the defects in the pleadings, or otherwise respond to either court. So
the courts dismissed the complaints without prejudice.
Dismissal was within the courts’ authority and appropriate under the
circumstances. See Davis, 571 F.3d at 1060. Thus, it was not an abuse of
discretion. See Clay, 148 F.4th at 1190.
II. Chan may not proceed in forma pauperis.
To proceed in forma pauperis, a litigant “must comply with the filing
requirements,” show “a financial inability to pay the required filing fees,” and
point to “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and
facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d
624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
Chan has not pointed to a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument in support of
the issues on appeal. An appellant’s first task “is to explain . . . why the district
court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denv., 784 F.3d 1364,
1366 (10th Cir. 2015). But the District of Colorado brief contains two sentences
of reasoning. The District of New Mexico brief contains just one, repeated
three times. And neither brief addresses the primary ground for dismissal:
Chan’s failure to respond to the show-cause orders.
5 Appellate Case: 25-1297 Document: 10 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6
We also reject Chan’s arguments on their own terms. That some
defendants allegedly reside in Denver does not necessarily mean venue lies in
the District of Colorado. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (laying venue in “a
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located” (emphasis added)). And though
Chan is correct that federal courts ordinarily have subject-matter jurisdiction
over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, subject-matter jurisdiction
is not the same as venue, Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (3). Nor is it the same as stating a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), (6);
see generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–87 (2009).
Arguments like these do not merit in forma pauperis status. See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (explaining that, for in forma pauperis
purposes, a claim is frivolous when “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
in fact”). So we do not grant that status here.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district courts’ dismissals and deny Chan’s requests to
proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge