Champion v. McCalister

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: July 2, 2024
• Docket: 23-6141
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 2, 2024 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court CAITANYA A. CHAMPION,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 23-6141 (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00012-JD) OFFICER GREG MCCALISTER; (W.D. Okla.) WADE GOURLEY, Police Chief, Oklahoma City Police Department; OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before MORITZ, ROSSMAN, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Plaintiff Caitanya A. Champion, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district

court’s orders dismissing his civil rights complaint against the Oklahoma City Police

Department (“OCPD”), Police Chief Wade Gourley, and Officer Greg McCalister.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts1

This case arises out of a traffic stop. On May 7, 2021, McCalister observed

Champion driving without a seatbelt and pulled him over. When McCalister asked

Champion to produce his driver’s license, Champion refused, informed McCalister that

he was exercising his constitutional right to travel freely, then drove away. After

calling for backup, McCalister pursued Champion, who was ultimately stopped with

the aid of Stop Sticks, a tire deflation device. Champion was arrested and charged for

the seatbelt violation, attempting to elude the police, and an illegal tag display.2 During

the subsequent search and impoundment of his car, officers discovered and confiscated

two firearms.

B. District Court Proceedings

In January 2022, Champion sued the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

claiming the traffic stop, his arrest, the search and impoundment of his car, and the

confiscation of his firearms violated his constitutional rights. In his complaint,

Champion did not claim to be wearing a seatbelt at the time of the stop but asserted he

1 These facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations in Champion’s complaint. See Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, must be taken as true, and the court must liberally construe the pleadings and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” (Internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 2 Champion was ultimately convicted of these offenses, a fact of which the district court took judicial notice, and that Champion does not dispute on appeal. 2 Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 3

had “no duty to comply with an unlawful order of Officer Greg McCalister and the

defendant had no right and justification to deprive [him] of his constitutionally

protected right to travel.” R. at 17. He further alleged that he “was arrested, his vehicle

was impounded, he was detained at the county jail, . . . [and] his two firearms were

confiscated without a warrant or due process hearing.” Id. Based on these facts,

Champion alleged deprivations of (1) his right to travel under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments; (2) his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under

the Fourth Amendment; (3) his right to liberty and property under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) his right to keep and bear arms under the Second

Amendment. In both his original and amended complaints, which Champion submitted

on court-provided forms, he checked boxes to indicate he was suing Gourley and

McCalister in their official capacities.

The district court granted defense motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It dismissed the claims against the

OCPD on the ground that a police department is not a suable entity. The court

construed the official-capacity claims against the individual defendants as claims

against the City of Oklahoma City, and concluded Champion had failed to state a

plausible claim against the City under the standard for municipal liability set forth in

Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).3 The court

3 Contrary to Champion’s assertions, the district court did not dismiss any of his claims based on qualified immunity. As the court stated, “the defense of qualified immunity is available only in suits against officials sued in their personal capacities, not in suits against officials sued in their official capacities.” R. at 74, n.4 (brackets, 3 Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 4

concluded Champion could theoretically cure the defects in his municipal liability

claims through further amendment, so it gave him fourteen days to seek leave to amend.

When he did not do so, the court entered judgment in favor of all defendants. This

appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a dismissal for failure to state claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.

Estate of Burgaz v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 30 F.4th 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2022). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complainant must allege facts that, if true, state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted).

As a pro se litigant, Champion is entitled to a liberal construction of his

pleadings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir.

2005). But he still must comply with the rules that govern other litigants, and we do

not act as his “attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id.

ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1239, n.1 (10th Cir. 2015)). Accordingly, the district court did not engage in a qualified-immunity analysis, and neither do we. 4 Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 5

B. Municipal Liability Claims

“A suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in

his or her official capacity are the same.” Watson v. City of Kan. City, 857 F.3d 690,

695 (10th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the district court was correct to construe

Champion’s official-capacity claims against McCalister and Gourley as claims against

Oklahoma City. It was also correct to dismiss the claims against the OCPD, because

“police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit.” Dean v.

Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d

424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) (dismissing complaint against City of Denver Police

Department because it “is not a separate suable entity”), vacated as moot, 800 F.2d 230

(10th Cir. 1986)). We therefore consider whether Champion’s complaint stated a

plausible claim for relief against Oklahoma City.

His claims are based on a failure-to-train theory of municipal liability. As

alleged in the complaint, “the Oklahoma City Police Department trains their officers

to enforce the vehicle code and the criminal code but does not provide their officers

with adequate training in Constitutional law, civil liberties and applicable case law thus

producing officers who are unqualified as law enforcement officers.” R. at 18; see also

Aplt. Opening Br. at 14 (“The police chief trains the officers. He teaches them how to

act and it was the actions of the arresting officer that deprived plaintiff of his rights.”).

Failure to train is a cognizable theory of liability under § 1983, but Oklahoma City

cannot be held liable solely because one of its police officers inflicted injury. See

Crowson v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020) (“A core principle

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of Monell liability is that municipal entities are liable only for their own actions and

not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees.”); see also Graves v. Thomas,

450 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a municipality “will not be held

liable under § 1983 solely because its employees inflicted injury”). To state a claim

against a city in this context, a plaintiff “must allege facts showing: (1) an official

policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) deliberate indifference.” Crowson, 983 F.3d

at 1184 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court explained at length why Champion’s complaint fell short of

these elements, and we do not disagree with its analysis. We note, however, that

Champion is a pro se litigant. And given the thrust of his arguments on appeal, it

appears he may not have appreciated the distinction between individual-capacity and

official-capacity claims when he checked the boxes on his form complaint. We

therefore focus our discussion on the complaint’s fundamental failure to allege an

underlying constitutional violation, which is fatal to both types of claims. See id.

at 1186 (“[A] claim under § 1983 against either an individual actor or a municipality

cannot survive a determination that there has been no constitutional violation.”); Estate

of George v. City of Rifle, 85 F.4th 1300, 1321 (10th Cir. 2023) (rejecting municipal

liability claim because plaintiff failed to show police officer violated his constitutional

rights), petition for cert. docketed (U.S. May 22, 2024) (No. 23-1232); Burgaz, 30

F.4th at 1189 (“For a municipality . . . to be held liable for either a failure-to-train or

failure-to-supervise claim, an individual officer . . . must have committed a

constitutional violation.”); Reavis ex rel. Estate of Coale v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978, 984

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(10th Cir. 2020) (explaining that qualified immunity shields officials from personal

liability so long as their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional

right).4

1. Right to Travel Claim

The freedom to travel interstate “has long been recognized as a basic right under

the Constitution.” United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); see also Maehr

v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 5 F.4th 1100, 1118 (10th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (observing the

right to travel is a “basic constitutional freedom” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

But this right does not absolve travelers from complying with licensing, registration,

and seatbelt laws any more than it excuses ignoring a red light. To the contrary, the

constitutional right to travel is both limited in scope and subject to reasonable

restrictions. As we explained in United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th

Cir. 2009), the Constitution “protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens:

the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement and being treated differently from

intrastate travelers.” (internal quotation marks omitted). Just as in Eckhart, which

involved a challenge to Utah’s license plate law, “[n]either set of burdens is implicated

here.” Id.

4 A “limited exception” to his rule recognizes a due process claim against a municipality absent an underlying constitutional violation when the municipal policy “devolves responsibility across multiple officers” such that no “single officer is positioned to prevent the constitutional violation.” Crowson, 983 F.3d at 1191. Champion’s complaint alleges no facts that would support application of this exception. 7 Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 8

Champion did not allege that he was barred from crossing state lines. But even

if this case involves interstate travel, reasonable restrictions on such travel are

constitutionally permissible. See Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1029 (10th Cir. 2019).

States have a vital interest in ensuring highway safety, which extends to the

enforcement of “licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements.”

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979); see United States v. Dawson, 90 F.4th

1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 2024) (explaining that “an officer’s mission during a traffic stop

includes” making inquiries “to ensure that vehicles on the road are operated safely and

responsibly” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the Supreme

Court has rejected constitutional challenges to arrests for minor traffic violations

including seatbelt violations, see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354

(2001), and we have rejected a right-to-travel challenge to a traffic stop, concluding

that license plate regulations are not unreasonably restrictive, see United States v.

Martinez, 512 F.3d 1268, 1273 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008). Champion alleges no facts that

plausibly suggest Oklahoma City’s seatbelt and licensing laws unreasonably restrict

interstate travel.

Nor does he allege that Oklahoma City treats intrastate and interstate travelers

differently when it comes to enforcing these laws. Accordingly, he has not alleged a

constitutional violation. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,

277 (1993) (holding that a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right of

interstate travel unless applied discriminatorily against travelers from other states).

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2. Fourth Amendment Claims

Champion argues the defendants subjected him to unlawful arrest and

unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.5

As to the arrest, the following facts are undisputed: (1) Champion was required

to wear a seatbelt while driving, see 47 Okla. St. Ann. § 112-417; (2) he was not

wearing a seatbelt when McCalister pulled him over; (3) the seatbelt violation was the

reason McCalister pulled him over; (4) when McCalister asked to see his license,

Champion drove away; and (5) despite being pursued by multiple officers, Champion

only stopped when his tires were destroyed by police Stop Sticks. Given these facts,

Champion’s arrest for the seatbelt violation and attempting to elude police

unquestionably survives Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See id. (mandating seatbelts),

21 Okla. St. Ann. § 540A (setting forth offense of eluding a police officer); see also

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual

has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without

violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”); Mocek v. City of Albuquerque,

813 F.3d 912, 922 (10th Cir. 2015) (“As a general matter, a warrantless arrest is

consistent with the Fourth Amendment when there is probable cause to believe the

5 He also claims the arrest, search, and seizure deprived him of his liberty and property interests under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But his only reference to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is in connection with his specific allegations implicating his Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were properly dismissed. See Shimomura v. Carlson, 811 F.3d 349, 361 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining that the constitutional right to be free from warrantless arrest absent probable cause arises under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses). 9 Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 10

arrestee has committed a crime.”). Thus, the district court properly dismissed

Champion’s claim challenging the constitutionality of his arrest.

The district court also properly dismissed Champion’s Fourth Amendment claim

based on the OCPD’s decision to impound his car and the ensuing search of the car

and seizure of his firearms. A warrantless search or seizure is reasonable if it “falls

within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” United States v. Braxton,

61 F.4th 830, 833 (10th Cir. 2023). Those exceptions include searches and seizures

pursuant to the police’s community caretaking function and searches conducted for

inventory purposes. See id. Both exceptions apply here.

“When [a] driver is arrested, the police must decide what to do with the car.”

United States v. Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 2021). Impounding the car is

justified when leaving it where it is during the arrest would create a traffic hazard,

expose it to vandalism or theft, or otherwise threaten public safety. See id.; see also

United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing examples of

lawful grounds for impoundment). And although the arresting officer must consider

reasonable alternatives to impoundment, Braxton, 61 F.4th at 836-37, he is “not

required to allow [the driver] to call someone to come pick up the [car] and then . . .

wait around for the new driver to arrive,” United States v. Trujillo, 993 F.3d 859, 870

(10th Cir. 2021).

Champion’s complaint does not say where the car was when he was arrested,

but as the district court noted, given the state of its tires, it “was inoperable regardless

of its location [and] no one else was immediately present who could secure the vehicle,

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or have it towed.” R. at 85; see Trujillo, 993 F.3d at 867 (observing that “unoccupied

vehicles may still constitute nuisances, although their impact on traffic is

questionable”). And Champion alleged no facts suggesting a reasonable alternative to

impoundment was readily available. Cf. Braxton, 61 F.4th at 837 (holding that

presence of arrestees’ girlfriend who asked to take possession of his property was a

reasonable alternative to impoundment). Nor did he allege facts suggesting the

impoundment was pretextual or that the OCPD failed to follow standardized

procedures. See Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1248 (holding impoundment must be justified

by standardized policies when the vehicle is on private property and is neither

obstructing traffic nor threatening public safety). To the contrary, the facts suggest

that the OCPD properly performed its community-caretaking function in impounding

Champion’s car and conducting an inventory search of its contents. See Woodard, 5

F.4th at 1150 (“[W]e typically allow the police to determine what’s inside the car

before it’s impounded.”).6

6 Champion indicated in his complaint that defendants still have possession of his property. But to the extent his general assertions may be read to assert a deprivation-of-property claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, his allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim because he did not allege facts concerning the lack of an adequate state remedy for the deprivation. See Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a plausible claim for deprivation of property under the Fourteenth Amendment must include facts showing “the lack of an adequate state remedy for that deprivation”). Finally, because Champion’s guns were seized pursuant to a lawful inventory search, the district court was correct to dismiss his Second Amendment claim. 11 Appellate Case: 23-6141 Document: 010111073740 Date Filed: 07/02/2024 Page: 12

C. Arguments Regarding Judicial Bias

Lastly, we address Champion’s allegations of bias against the district court,

which are based on (1) the court’s failure to rule on his opposition to McCalister’s

motion to dismiss; and (2) its granting of Gourley’s motion despite Gourley’s alleged

failure to serve it on Champion. “Normally, a party alleging judicial bias should move

for recusal, and must do so in a timely fashion.” United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286,

1297 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Champion did not move for

recusal. We therefore review his claims of bias for plain error, which is one that

“affects substantial rights” and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not err here. The court acknowledged Champion’s

response in opposition to McCalister’s motion, see R. at 69, and considered his

arguments. It was not required to issue two orders separately addressing the motion

and response. Champion’s argument regarding lack of service is puzzling given that

Gourley’s certificate of service indicates the motion was mailed to Champion’s

physical and email addresses of record. But even assuming he did not receive the

motion, Champion suffered no prejudice because the grounds for dismissal of both

motions were the same, and the district court had the benefit of Champion’s response

to McCalister’s motion. Champion admits he became aware of Gourley’s motion when

the court issued its adverse ruling. And as we mentioned earlier, the court gave

Champion an opportunity to file a second amended complaint, and he failed to do so.

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Nor did he file a motion in the district court complaining about the lack of service. He

cannot now claim procedural unfairness stemming from judicial bias.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge