Chamberlain v. Walpole

796 N.E.2d 818, 2003 Ind. App. LEXIS 1876, 2003 WL 22284328

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 6, 2003
• Docket: 02A04-0302-CV-92
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

BROOK, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

Appellants-defendants Timothy R. Chamberlain, M.D., Timothy R. Chamberlain, M.D., P.C., C. Bryan Wait, M.D., Alfred F. Allina, D.O., Carl S8. Wrobleski, M.D., Christopher Zee-Cheng, M.D., Gary Hambel, M.D., Whitley Memorial Hospital, Inc., a/k/a Whitley County Memorial Hospital, Inc., and Lutheran Hospital of Indiana a/k/a Lutheran Hospital of Indiana, Inc. (collectively, "Appellants") appeal from the denial of their motion for preliminary determination. We affirm.

Issue

Appellants raise two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether the Indiana Wrongful Death Act ¹ limits recovery under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.²

Facts and Procedural History

On September 30, 1998, Richard Steven Walpole's father died while under the care of Appellants. On May 1, 2000, Walpole filed his first amended proposed medical malpractice complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance,³ alleging that he had "incurred funeral and burial expenses and [had] lost the love, care, affection, society, companionship, and services of his father and has experienced extreme mental anguish" due to Appellants' negligence. Appellants' App. at 4. On January 9, 2002, Wrobleski, Zee-Chang, and Hambel filed a motion for preliminary determination under the Medical Malpractice Act ⁴ seeking an order precluding Walpole from recovering for the loss of his father's love, care, and affection under the Wrongful Death Act. The remaining appellants later joined in the motion. On December 16, 2002, the trial court denied Appellants' motion. Appellants now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

Appellants contend that Walpole may not seek damages for the loss of his father's love, care, affection, society, companionship, and services under the Medical Malpractice Act because he would not be able to recover them under the Wrongful Death Act.⁵ Appellees counter that the damages provisions of the Wrongful Death Act do not apply to the Medical Malpractice Act.

All parties agree that this appeal turns on statutory interpretation. "A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be determined by this court." Perry-Worth Concerned Citizens v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Boone County, 723 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. Although Appellants do not specifically mention the concept, they essentially contend that the Wrongful Death Act is in pari materia with the Medical Malpractice Act and that the damages provisions of the former must be applied to the latter.⁶ "Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed consistently and harmoniously, rather than in a manner that renders them conflicting." Estate of Cummings by Heck v. PPG Indus., Inc., 651 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (1996).

We note, however, that "the rule of construction requiring statutes in pari materia to be construed together is only to be applied as an aid in determining the meaning of a doubtful statute; it cannot be invoked where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous." Comm. Hosp. of Anderson and Madison County v. McKnight, 493 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ind.1986). We must determine, then, whether the Medical Malpractice Act is ambiguous as to the damages recoverable thereunder.

Indiana Code Section 34-18-8-1 provides in part that "a patient or the representative of a patient who has a claim under this article for bodily injury or death on account of malpractice may ... [flile a complaint in any court of law having requisite jurisdiction." Indiana Code Section 34-18-2-22 defines "patient" as

an individual who receives or should have received health care from a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied, and includes a person having a claim of any kind, whether derivative or otherwise, as a result of alleged malpractice on the part of a health care provider. Derivative claims include the claim of a parent or parents, guardian, trustee, child, relative, attorney, or any other representative of the patient including claims for loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses, and other similar claims.

Quite simply, the Medical Malpractice Act is plain and unambiguous as to the damages recoverable thereunder. Consequently, we may not construe these provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act with the Wrongful Death Act. Cf. McKnight, 493 N.E.2d at 777 ("When the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction. The Medical Malpractice Act is plain and unambiguous in designating who qualifies as a representative and in designating those who are eligible to pursue derivative claims. The Medical Malpractice Act is also plain and unambiguous in designating that such claims can be for bodily injury or death.") (citation omitted).

Even if the Medical Malpractice Act were ambiguous in this regard, the Medical Malpractice Act and the Wrongful Death Act do not relate to the same general subject matter and are therefore not in pari materiq. The Medical Malpractice Act governs claims arising from the malpractice of a certain class (health care providers), while the Wrongful Death Act governs claims arising from a certain type of harm (death). We simply cannot conclude that the two acts are in pari mate-ria. Cf. Mathis v. Coop. Vendors, Inc., 170 Ind.App. 659, 672-73, 354 N.E.2d 269, 277 (1976) ("Nor do we consider the Cigarette Tax Act and the Retail Tax Act to be in pari materia. It is true that both are excise taxes, and that both ultimately levy a tax on the retail purchaser of cigarettes. One, however, specifically levies 'a tax on all cigarettes sold, used, consumed, handled or distributed within this state ..., while the other imposes a tax 'on transactions of retail merchants constituting selling at retail....' (Emphasis supplied). One is a tax on a particular product, the other on a transaction. While the sales tax has the effect of increasing the price of a package of cigarettes, it is the buying/selling transaction that is being taxed, not the cigarettes themselves.") (citations omitted) trans. denied.

Moreover, even if the Medical Malpractice Act were ambiguous and in pari mate-ria with the Wrongful Death Act, there would be no need to harmonize the two acts because they do not conflict. A claim arising from a death is properly brought under the Wrongful Death Act, unless the death was allegedly caused by a health care provider's malpractice, in which case the complaint must brought under the Medical Malpractice Act.⁷ The two acts are mutually exelusive and do not conflict in any way.

Finally, even if the Medical Malpractice Act were ambiguous, in pari materia with the Wrongful Death Act, and in conflict with it, we would nonetheless conclude that the damages provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act must apply in the instant case. "When two statutes on the same subject must be construed together, the court should attempt to give effect to both, however, where the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, then the later statute will control and operate to repeal the earher to the extent of the re-pugnaney." S.W. Forest Indus., Dunlap Div. v. Firth, 435 N.E.2d 295, 297 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (emphasis added). The General Assembly enacted the predecessor to the Wrongful Death Act in 1881 and the Medical Malpractice Act in 1975. See 188l1(ss) Ind. Acts Ch. 38, § 8; 1975 Ind. Acts 146, § 1. Thus, the Medical Malpractice Act would control in any event.

In sum, Walpole's potential recovery for his claim under the Medical Malpractice Act is not limited by the damages provisions of the Wrongful Death Act. The Medical Malpractice Act plainly and unambiguously provides that Walpole may pursue claims for "loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses, and other similar claims." Ind.Code § 234-182-222.⁸ Appellants' argument must fail.

Affirmed.

SHARPNACK, J., coneurs with opinion. BAKER, J., dissents with opinion.

1 . Ind.Code §§ 34-23-1-1 to 34-23-1-2.

2 . Ind.Code §§ 34-18-1-1 to 34-18-18-2.

3 . See Shelton v. Wick, 715 N.E.2d 890, 894 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (''The [Medical Malpractice] Act provides that submission of a proposed complaint to the Department of Insurance and presentation to a medical review panel is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim in a court in Indiana."), trans. denied (2000).

4 . See Ind.Code § 34-18-11-1 (allowing trial court to preliminarily determine issue of law in medical malpractice action}.

5 . Appellants concede that Walpole may seek to recover reasonable hospital, medical, funeral, burial, and estate administration expenses. See Ind.Code § 34-23-1-1 ("[When [the] decedent leaves no ... widow, widower, or dependent children, or dependent next of kin, surviving him or her, the measure of damages to be recovered shall be the total of the necessary and reasonable value of such hospitalization or hospital service, medical and surgical services, such funeral expenses, and such costs and expenses of administration [of his or her estate], including attorney fees.").

6 . Appellants do not explain why only the damages provisions of the Wrongful Death Act should apply to the Medical Malpractice Act. Indeed, if we were to construe the Medical Malpractice Act and the Wrongful Death Act together, we would necessarily conclude that Walpole is barred from pursuing his claim altogether because he is not the personal representative of his father's estate.

7 . We note that although the Medical Malpractice Act requires that all malpractice actions against health care providers (whether arising from death or injury) be brought under that act, the Wrongful Death Act does not specifically require that all actions arising from death be brought under that act. Compare Ind.Code § 34-18-8-4 ("[An action against a health care provider may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before ... the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel ... and ... an opinion is given by the panel.") (emphasis added) with Ind.Code § 34-23-1i-1 ('When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission.").

8 . Our conclusion is consistent with our supreme court's disposition of a similar issue in Goleski v. Fritz, 768 N.E.2d 889 (Ind.2002). In Goleski, the decedent's widow, who was not the personal representative of her husband's estate, filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint with the Department of Insurance. The Goleski court determined that under Indiana Code Section 34-18-2-22, widow, as a "relative," could have pursued derivative claims for "lost financial support, love, affection, kindness, attention, compan-fonship, and reasonable funeral and burial expenses." Id. at 891. Although the Goleski court did not directly address the issue of damages, it is worth noting that it did not refer to the Wrongful Death Act and relied entirely on the Medical Malpractice Act in determining the claims available to widow.