Chales Ordones v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-45
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 1 2024 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE CHALES ORDONES, No. 23-45 Petitioner, Agency No. A200-106-222 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 28, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and FORREST, Circuit Judges

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Jose Chales Ordones,1 a native of Guatemala and a member of the Mam

Mayan indigenous community, petitions for review of an order from the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of a final order of removal

issued by an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition for

review.

In the circumstances of this case, “[w]e review both ‘the reasons explicitly

identified by the BIA’ and ‘the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral decision in

support of those reasons.’” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1142 (9th Cir.

2022) (quoting Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014)).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination,

which was affirmed by the BIA. Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.

2021); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), § 1252(b)(4)(B). Chales Ordones’s

testimony about the Guatemalan government’s lack of response to the kidnapping

and murder of a Mayan girl from his community contradicted a news article that he

1 The Notice to Appear, the government’s answering brief, and the agency decisions, refer to the petitioner as “Jose Chales-Ordones.” The petitioner’s asylum applications refer to him as “Jose Chales Ordonez.” His opening brief refers to him as “Mr. Chales,” but lists his full name as “Jose Chales-Ordones.” To avoid confusion, we refer to the petitioner as “Jose Chales Ordones.” 2 submitted as evidence. The BIA reasonably rejected Chales Ordones’s argument

that he did not know about this article, given his testimony that he provided the

documents regarding the incident to his attorney. In addition, Chales Ordones’s

testimony that he was not fluent in Spanish contradicted his previously filed

asylum applications stating that he was fluent in Spanish. Because his testimony

and applications both used the same word, “fluent,” it is irrelevant that the word

“fluent” could have multiple meanings. Moreover, Chales Ordones lied that he

was from Mexico, once in 2002 to a Border Patrol Officer, and a second time while

under oath before an IJ at his removal proceedings in 2006. Lying to immigration

authorities “always counts as substantial evidence supporting an adverse credibility

finding” absent certain exceptions. Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.

2011). Those exceptions are not present here, because Chales Ordones’s lie under

oath was not made “in order to flee his place of persecution or secure entry into the

United States.” Id. (quoting Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Absent Chales Ordones’s credible testimony, the record evidence alone does

not compel us to reach a conclusion contrary to the agency’s conclusion. We

therefore uphold the BIA’s rulings as to asylum and withholding of removal. With

respect to his CAT claim, we must consider the evidence apart from the

disbelieved testimony. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (“[A]ll evidence relevant to the

3 possibility of future torture shall be considered . . . .”); see also Udo v. Garland, 32

F.4th 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[A petitioner’s] adverse credibility

determination ‘is not necessarily a death knell to CAT protection’ if other evidence

in the record alone establishes that he is eligible for CAT relief.” (quoting Shrestha

v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2010))). The country conditions

evidence in the record is too general to establish that Chales Ordones in particular

would be tortured if removed to Guatemala. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634,

649–50, 650 n.8 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that an applicant seeking CAT relief must

demonstrate a “particularized threat” of future torture, and generalized evidence of

violence will not suffice (citation omitted)).

PETITION DENIED.