Chagolla v. Schrag

District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 14, 2023·No. 3:23-cv-00812·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAYMUNDO J. CHAGOLLA, Case No. 23-cv-00812-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 10 10 J. SCHRAG, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison - Solano, has filed a pro se action pursuant to 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), where he was 15 previously housed. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 10) is now before the Court 16 for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 25 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 4 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 5 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 7 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 8 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 9 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 10 B. Second Amended Complaint 11 The second amended complaint names as defendants the following Pelican Bay State 12 Prison (“PBSP”) correctional officials: correctional lieutenant J. Schrag, correctional counselor II 13 J. Young, correctional counselor II B. Buckhorn; correctional captain K. Berg; and warden J. 14 Robertson. 15 The second amended complaint makes the following factual allegations. In 2021, Plaintiff 16 was placed in administrative segregation by defendant Schrag, and retained in administrative 17 segregation by defendants Young, Robertson, Buckhorn, and Berg based on confidential 18 information that stated that Plaintiff was an associate of the Northern Structured (NS) / Nuestra 19 Familia (NF) prison gang, which had been carrying out violence against other inmates. Plaintiff 20 informed defendant Robertson that he was not a Northerner inmate and told defendant Robertson 21 to check Plaintiff’s c-file to verify this statement. The California Department of Corrections and 22 Rehabilitation (CDCR)’s Strategic Offender Management System (“SOMS”) states that Plaintiff is 23 not an NS/NF associate and that Plaintiff is from Riverside, California, thereby disproving the 24 confidential information. None of the defendants checked the SOMS, despite having access to the 25 SOMS. Defendant Buckhorn allowed the false confidential information to be placed in Plaintiff’s 26 c-file. Defendants’ failure to check the SOMS when relying on the confidential information was 27 reckless, negligent, malicious, and callous; constituted deliberate indifference; and resulted in 1 information in Plaintiff’s c-file provides the false impression that Plaintiff is an associate of 2 NS/NF and perpetrating violence within the prison, and will therefore cause him to be denied 3 parole. The false confidential information was not disclosed to Plaintiff prior to, during, or after 4 his placement in administrative segregation or the classification hearing authorizing his retention 5 in administrative segregation. Plaintiff did not receive a rules violation report (“RVR”) related to 6 this administrative segregation placement, i.e., for allegedly perpetrating violence on Facility D. 7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth 8 Amendment when they failed to check the SOMS prior to relying on the false confidential 9 information and when they placed the false confidential information in his central file because 10 their actions and inactions subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 11 Eighth Amendment and denied him his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 12 because the placement in administrative segregation was not based on “some evidence.” 13 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $2,000 per defendant, nominal damages 14 of $1, costs, and the removal of “all documentation pertaining to this issue” from his C-file. See 15 generally Dkt. No. 10. 16 The Eighth Amendment claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s placement in 17 administrative segregation does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Anderson v. County of 18 Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995 (indeterminate sentence in administrative segregation, 19 without more, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth 20 Amendment); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984) (more than usual 21 hardships associated with administrative segregation required to state Eighth Amendment claim). 22 Liberally construed, the allegation that the evidence relied upon to place Plaintiff in 23 administrative segregation was unreliable states a cognizable due process claim. See Madrid v. 24 Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“the evidence relied upon to confine an 25 inmate to the SHU for gang affiliation must have ‘some indicia of reliability’ to satisfy due 26 process requirements”); Jones v. Gomez, No. C 91-3875 MHP, 1993 WL 341282, *3-4 (N.D. Cal. 27 Aug. 23, 1993) (order denying summary judgment) (due process requires indicia of reliability due 1 independent factfinding by prison officials). 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons set forth above, the Court orders as follows. 4 1. The following defendant(s) shall be served: Pelican Bay State Prison officers 5 correctional lieutenant J. Schrag, correctional counselor II J. Young, correctional counselor II B. 6 Buckhorn; correctional captain K. Berg; and warden J. Robertson. 7 2. Service on the listed defendant(s) shall proceed under the California Department of 8 Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners 9 in the CDCR’s custody.

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