Chagolla v. Schrag

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 2, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-00812
StatusUnknown

This text of Chagolla v. Schrag (Chagolla v. Schrag) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chagolla v. Schrag, (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RAYMUNDO J. CHAGOLLA, Case No. 23-cv-00812-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 9 v.

10 J. SCHRAG, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison - Solano, has filed a pro se action pursuant to 14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), where he was 15 previously housed. His complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is now before the Court for review under 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 24 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 25 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 1 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 2 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 3 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 4 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 5 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 6 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 7 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 8 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 9 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 10 B. Dismissal with Leave to Amend 11 The complaint names as defendants the following SQSP prison officials: correctional 12 lieutenant Schrag, classification committee chairperson Campbell, correctional counselor II 13 Young, correctional counselor II Young, correctional captain Berg, and warden Robertson. The 14 complaint makes the following allegations. Defendants Schrag, Berg, Campbell, and Young 15 negligently placed Plaintiff’s well-being, safety and life in jeopardy, caused damage to Plaintiff’s 16 marriage, and potentially jeopardized Plaintiff’s parole eligibility when defendant Schrag placed 17 Plaintiff in administrative segregation pending an investigation into Plaintiff’s involvement with 18 prison gang Nuestra Familia’s violence on PBSP Facility D, defendant Berg authorized the lock- 19 up, defendant Campbell negligently retained Plaintiff in administrative segregation, and defendant 20 Young authorized the extension of Plaintiff’s stay in administrative segregation. Defendant 21 Buckhorn both negligently and maliciously placed Plaintiff’s well-being, safety and life in 22 jeopardy, caused damage to Plaintiff’s marriage, and potentially jeopardized Plaintiff’s parole 23 eligibility by authoring a memorandum that concluded that Plaintiff had demonstrated loyalty to 24 Nuestra Familia and would continue to perpetrate violence. Conditions in administrative 25 segregation were harsher than normal prison life. Defendant Robertson had access to information 26 that could have prevented defendants Schrag, Berg, Campbell, Young and Buckhorn’s life- 27 threatening actions and the irreversible damage caused by these actions, but negligently failed to 1 The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend because Plaintiff has not alleged any 2 violation of, or referenced, federal law or the federal Constitution. The Court will not attempt to 3 determine causes of actions from a list of factual allegations. In filing an amended complaint, 4 Plaintiff should identify the federal law or federal constitutional provision that he believes has 5 been violated by each defendant’s actions. In addition, as stated above, a pleading that offers only 6 labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked 7 assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice to state a cognizable claim for 8 relief. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677–78. Plaintiff must provide more than a conclusory statement that 9 his constitutional rights were violated by prison officials and must do more than proffer a legal 10 term, such as “negligence” or “due process” or “malice.” 11 In preparing an amended complaint, the Court reviews the following legal principles that 12 may be relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Negligence generally fails to state a federal constitutional 13 violation. See, e.g., Estate of Ford v. Ramirez–Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1052 (2002) (“negligence, 14 or failure to avoid a significant risk that should be perceived but wasn’t, ‘cannot be condemned as 15 the infliction of punishment’” within meaning of Eighth Amendment) (quoting Farmer v. 16 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994). An allegation that an innate was placed or retained in more 17 restrictive housing generally does not implicate the Due Process Clause. See Myron v. Terhune, 18 476 F.3d 716, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (classification for California Level IV prison rather than 19 Level III prison not shown to be atypical and significant hardship that implicates Due Process 20 Clause). There is no respondent superior liability, or supervisory liability, under Section 1983, i.e. 21 no liability under the theory that one is liable simply because he supervises a person who has 22 violated a plaintiff’s rights. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). To state a 23 claim for relief under Section 1983 against a supervisor defendant, a plaintiff must allege some 24 facts that would support a claim that (1) the supervisor defendant proximately caused the 25 deprivation of rights of which plaintiff complains, see Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 26 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); (2) the supervisor defendant failed to properly train or supervise personnel 27 resulting in the alleged deprivation, Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 1

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